Bangladesh: Amid Hope and Despair

Dr Imtiaz Ahmed
Introduction
Since its creation, Bangladesh has suffered a poor reputation, for which the credit goes to Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state, who described Bangladesh as an 'international basket case'1 in the early years of its independence. Against the backdrop of a country with an unchecked population growth, poverty, and periodic floods and famines, Kissinger believed that Bangladesh could survive only with a continuous flow of food aid from international donors. Some took the statement as an outcome of Kissinger's personal anger at the birth of Bangladesh (1971), which had greatly upset the grand strategy of the US vis-à-vis its engagement with China and the Soviet Union pursued under his somewhat Machiavellian diplomatic novelty,2 while others thought that there were elements of truth in what Kissinger had to say about Bangladesh. Whatever may have been the reasons for Kissinger's statement, after 34 years there is now consensus both at home and abroad that Bangladesh has proved Kissinger wrong on many fronts.

How valid is this consensus? True, the process of nation-building has emboldened the people and the majority are ready to sacrifice their lives for their country, but why is there so much division when it comes to defining the country's national identity? What about the legacies of violence and bloodshed? How much do they contribute to the making or unmaking of the citizen? True, NGOs have succeeded beyond expectation in their efforts to alleviate poverty, but what about the misgovernance of the government? What about the rampant corruption in various sectors of the economy? It is true that democratic institutions now prevail in the country, but then what about the prolonged boycott of the parliament by members of the opposition parties? What about the violence that is now being carried out in the name of Islam? Who is to be blamed for all this? Why is there so much intolerance in the society? There is a viable women’s workforce, particularly in the garments sector, but then why do women still suffer from insecurity? It is true that the issue of language and religion has cemented bonds between the majority sections of the population, but why is there a creeping majoritarianism, one that is increasingly resentful of the life and living of the minorities? Is it people's obsession with politics that is ruining all the economic achievements? Or is it the state of the economy that is creating all the restlessness in the society? Are the frequent natural disasters to be blamed for the periodic setbacks, or has the imagination of the Bengali mind come to an end?

Queries of this nature are endless, although one can easily see that both hope and despair are blended together, in an intricate manner, making Bangladesh an interesting case for reflection and discourse. The purpose of this paper is precisely that, dealing with the colonial and post-colonial legacy of polarised politics and the struggle for democracy. The paper also looks at the overly empowered status of government in Bangladesh and the nature of governance arising out of it. Apart from critiquing the burden of history, it focuses on the governmentalisation of the state sector and the corruption it invites. The formidable power of non-governmentality is discussed as are some of the success stories of the non-governmental sector, including the social and political implications of non-governmentality. The relationship between globalisation, diaspora and subalternity and the impact it has on the lives of the people is also examined. Finally, in the concluding section an attempt is made to understand the resilience of the people in the midst of all the political, economic, social and environmental hardships.

Polarised Politics and the Struggle for Democracy
Bangladesh had the misfortune of experiencing colonialism twice, first under the British (1757-1947), followed by the so-called “internal colonialism” under Pakistan (1947-1971). Two things emerged from Bangladesh's prolonged encounter with colonialism. First, it gave birth to a polarised political milieu on a national scale. This is best reflected in the struggle between the colonial government and the colonised subalterns. At a particular moment of history, this took the form of a struggle between the colonial and the nationalist forces. Second, in the face of polarisation, the colonised subalterns could do little other than resort to violence in the campaign to redress the wrongs done by the colonial power. And it is indeed in the midst of violence and polarised politics that the colonised subalterns finally got rid of the colonial power. However, something else was also transformed.

In the wake of the struggle against colonialism, the relatively autonomous 'civil society' also became polarised and violent. Put differently, civil society in colonial Bengal, unlike that of the West, could not develop freely and boast of its civilising and consenting roles. Colonialism reconstructed civil society to such an extent that the latter soon got into the business of organising and reproducing violence and intolerance in the manner of the political society. Political parties, voluntary associations, intellectuals, media, schools, sports clubs--all that the civil society represented--were tainted by this reconstruction. In the 25 years of Pakistan rule, polarisation and violence were further intensified, culminating in the bloody birth of Bangladesh. In this connection, it is noteworthy that in 1971, approximately 26,000-3 million people were killed by the Pakistani military and its Bengali collaborators.3 Independence, therefore, came as a result of great sacrifice by the people, with polarisation and violence becoming the bedrock of Bangladesh politics.

Immediately after Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman's return from Pakistan (where he had been interned since the night of 25th March, 1971) on 10th January 1972, he busied himself in the task of rebuilding the war-torn nation. Amongst his many activities, Mujib succeeded in bringing about a quick withdrawal of the Indian army, which played a critical role in the surrender of the Pakistan army in December, 1971. During the early months of 1972 Mujib also signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship with India, which many in the opposition--consisting of both leftist and rightist elements--openly opposed. For Mujib and the Awami League (AL), however, things began to move from bad to worse with the unprecedented floods in 1974. Partly due to the seemingly purposeful maladministration on the part of the bureaucracy and partly due to the lack of political motivation on the part of the ruling party, the 1974 floods soon transformed into a demonic man-made famine. The famine brought untold miseries to millions. Somewhat panicked by events, particularly domestic resentment and social unrest, Mujib felt the need to overhaul the political system of the country.

In January, 1975 Mujib imposed a one-party system under the banner of Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL). The formation of BAKSAL, however, did little to contain the declining state of the economy. As a result, public dissension, far from being arrested, grew further. In the midst of such a dismal situation, a group of young military officers, mostly holding the rank of army Major, staged a coup d'etat on 15 August, 1975. During the coup Mujib and most of his family members were killed, martial law was declared and Khondoker Mushtaque, a rightist and pro-American member of the Awami League, took over as the new Head of State.

The Mushtaque regime, however, was beset with two major problems from the beginning. One, about the state of relations between and amongst Mushtaque's colleagues within the Awami League, and two, with respect to the state of relations between the young (i.e., the coup members) and senior officers of the military. Unable to do anything effective on both these matters, Mushtaque had to step down in November, 1975 amidst the killing of four prominent Awami League leaders inside the Dhaka Central Jail by 'unknown elements' and counter-coups staged by the senior officers, first by Khaled Musharaf (3rd November) and then four days later by forces loyal to Ziaur Rahman (7th November).

As a 'freedom fighter', Ziaur Rahman was respected by many in and outside the military. Making full use of his popularity, Zia engaged himself in the task of building a unique rapprochement between the liberation and anti-liberation forces, on the one hand, and between the military and civilian forces, on the other. To fulfill this task Zia advocated an Islamic brand of nationalism under the label of 'Bangladeshi nationalism,' replacing the pre-1975 'Bengali nationalism' of Mujib and the Awami League. Zia also dropped 'secularism' from the constitution through a proclamation order in 1977. It was replaced by the wording “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah.” If anything, this catered well to the newly constructed aspirations of the Muslim majority of the country to the detriment of the minorities.

But if Zia was brought to power by coups and mutinies, there was no respite from such incidents throughout his tenure. In fact, failing to satisfy various factions of the military, Zia faced more than 20 attempted coups before finally falling victim to the one that was carried out on 30th May, 1981. The coup failed but those involved succeeded in killing Zia. Following Zia's death, the top brass of the military continued to support the BNP-led government. The latter arranged a presidential election in November 1981, which the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) nominee, Justice Abdus Sattar, easily won. However, shortly after this, the Chief of Staff, H.M. Ershad, seized power in a coup and sacked Sattar and his government (24 March 1982).

Ever since Ershad seized power in 1982 political parties of different shades, particularly Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Awami League (AL), along with their student fronts, began demanding free and fair elections, including the transfer of power to the civilian authority. With each month of Ershad's tenure the opposition movement against him gained momentum. In his desperate bid to remain in power Ershad began using religion in his favour, by declaring Bangladesh as 'Islamic state,' including instigating communal riots against the Hindu minorities. But nothing could save him. In the face of combined opposition, which saw thousands of people marching in the streets, coupled with the inaction of the military to rescue him from his predicaments, Ershad resigned on 6th December 1990. He was replaced by a caretaker government led by Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, whose primary task was to hold free and fair elections and hand over power to the winning party.

The election in 1991 held by a civilian caretaker government was the first of its kind in Bangladesh. In the parliamentary elections, which observers declared as 'free and fair,' the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), under Khaleda Zia, emerged victorious. But it did not take long for the latter to come under violent protests from the opposition, for an issue which created by BNP. Much like the old times, when elections under incumbent governments were rigged, BNP won the Magura seat by rigging the by-election in March, 1994. The opposition political parties immediately protested against the result and demanded that future general elections be held under a caretaker government. Khaleda resisted the demand and sought fresh mandate in February, 1996. All the opposition parties boycotted the election. Immediately after the February election and in the face of massive protest Khaleda declared that a fresh election would be held following the approval of the 'Caretaker Government Bill' by the newly constituted parliament. Upon its approval the parliament was dissolved in April, 1996. Khaleda's government also resigned and, according to provisions stipulated in the Bill, handed over power to a constitutionally mandated caretaker government. Election under the latter was held in June 1996, and this time the Awami League, under Sheikh Hasina, came out victorious, incidentally by way of entering into a tactical alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami (one of the right-wing parties that supported the Pakistani military in 1971) against BNP.

Hasina, after forming the government, got down to the business of consolidating her power by attracting the secular and pro-liberation forces, including eulogising the pre-1975 regime of her father and establishing friendly relations with India. This alienated the Jamaat-e-Islami which returned to the fold of the BNP, after which they quickly cemented an anti-Awami League alliance and started a campaign to oust the government. In the 2001 elections, again held under the constitutionally mandated caretaker government, the BNP-Jamaat alliance defeated the Awami League (AL) and captured more than two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. The Awami League (AL), somewhat surprised and panicked by the defeat, first raised the issue of rigging and then went on to pressurise the BNP government to resign, often by enforcing hartals (work stoppage) and periodically boycotting the parliament. Indeed, even after 34 years of independence, Bangladesh could not overcome its legacy of violence and polarised politics. Currently, the polarisation is so intense that almost the entire population, including government officials, private entrepreneurs, civil groups, educational institutions, cultural fronts, student bodies, media and many more, seems to be divided into Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Awami League (AL) camps. 'If you are not with me then you are with them' has become the central doctrine of Bangladesh politics, with the neutrals, albeit only a handful of them now, being frowned upon by members of both the camps as abnormal or engaged in sheer opportunism. However, this is only one side of the legacy.

Government, Governmentality and Misgovernance
'Government' was never an all-encompassing entity in this part of the world. During the 500-years of the Mughal rule and even before, the government, as it was understood then, busied itself in collecting revenues and all the 'good things' in society, mainly for the consumption and enrichment of the sovereign and his/her close associates. The relationship between the sovereign and the people was mostly linear, with the latter providing all the 'wealth' and, at times, also 'wisdom' to the sovereign. The sovereign, for its part, did not bother much with the life and lifestyle of the people. Things began to change, however, with the coming of the British and the colonisation of South Asia.

Colonialism in South Asia went through two phases. In the first phase (running from 1757 to the end of the 18th century), the colonial power settled for a conciliatory gesture towards the traditional elite. During this phase, the colonial power even promoted indigenous education, establishing the Calcutta Alia Madrasha and the Banares Sanskrit College in 1781 and 1792, respectively. While there was an element of genuine interests among some British officials in propagating India's culture and languages, the policy itself was no less related to the colonialist need for a class of officials (both foreign and native) well versed in Persian, Arabic or Sanskrit so that they could assist in the governance of the country.4

With the maturity of British domination, however, such a need gave way to a newer dimension in the organisation of governance. Thus, the second phase of colonialism, understood more as 'colonialism proper'--a synonym for intellectual dependency of the South Asians on the West--began (to be precise) in 1835, with the introduction of English as a medium of instruction. Consequently, in less than a hundred years, the task of government, including the nature of governance, was radically transformed, with critical long-term consequences. Indeed, in the wake of 'colonialism proper,' with the government controlling the task of knowledge production and diffusion, the relationship between the government and the people transformed from one of a linear state of resignation to something that can best be referred to as governmental.

The Pakistani phase of semi-colonialism further governmentalised ideas in Bangladesh, indeed, to a point where guarding the national flag, building a highway, making curriculum for the school, even collecting household garbage, all became the responsibilities of the government. Indeed, governmental policy, whatever may have been its target and field of operation, increasingly came to be viewed as the means to police the people. Resistance at that time was built on the belief that if the semi-colonial (Pakistani) government were removed, the government of a free Bangladesh would be able to deliver goods. In the process, however, neither the practice of rendering governmental policy (the cause of the contention) nor the culture of policing the people (the cause of the action) got removed, and Bangladesh remained highly governmentalised after its birth in 1971.

Governmentality, for instance, had a far reaching influence in organising the sphere of 'economics' in Bangladesh, which, by the time of independence, had settled for a politics of development centered on the all-pervasive role of the government. It is important to make a distinction here between what the word 'economy' meant in the West and what it had come to mean in Bangladesh. Suffice to point out here that in the West the word “economy” originally meant the art of managing a household or “the government of the family,” which only in the 16th century had been elevated to the state level, suggesting that 'the meticulous attention of the father towards his family be introduced into the management of the state.'5 The sense of voluntarism in managing or governing things is still there in the West, one which is well expressed by the term 'economic government.'6

In Bangladesh, the case was quite different. By the time of independence, government intervention in the sphere of 'economics' had already reached a stage where it could be best summed up, in contrast to the 'economic government' of the West, as governmental economy, referring to the all-pervasive role of the government in organizing and reproducing the sphere of 'economics,' indeed, to the point of constructing a politics of development for the state.

The state sector in the economy came into being not as a result of an economic marvel but because of governmental policy. The government took up the task of not only policing and keeping intact all governmental structures built during the Pakistan rule, but also owning all non-Bengali (and some Bengali) private industries. The later policy of denationalising state-owned enterprises was based not on positive economic performance but, rather, the lack of it; and that again, by a governmental policy, albeit this time under donor pressure. In fact, there is no substantial difference insofar as running these enterprises (both nationalised and denationalised) are concerned. If, in the nationalised phase, the bureaucrats were given the power to run the business, in the denationalised phase the power is mostly given to the nouveau riche or those having dubious connections with government and banking authorities.

Put differently, the governmentalisation of privatisation creates space for bribe giving as well as bribe taking. So rampant is corruption that the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International has ranked Bangladesh at the bottom of the list for the fifth consecutive year. There is, however, a socioeconomic or class dimension to corruption, as Iftekharuzzaman, the Executive Director of Transparency International Bangladesh, somewhat uncritically mentions:
“Corruption's inherent bias against the poor is easily discernible in Bangladesh. While corruption affects everyone, the poor are more vulnerable especially because they are easy victims of bribery, extortion and intimidation. The poor in Bangladesh are directly affected by the increasing cost of key public services by way of unauthorised payments, low quality of such services and limiting or even preventing the poor's access to essential services as education, health and justice”.7

If that is the case then why is the whole country, which includes over 80 percent of the population living below the poverty line and actually having nothing to do with corruption, labeled as the most corrupt in the world? Put differently, if the government or the elite running the government or those associated with policymaking or lucrative business or the banking sector are to be blamed then why is the burden of corruption, as is the case with the CPI labeling, shifted to the whole nation, including the poor folk of the country?

One can point out here that while we are passionate about the 'horizontal' side of corruption (that is, corruption in different sectors) we are less inclined to raise the issue of 'vertical' corruption (that is, the actual volume in monetary terms). This has both national and global dimensions. Nationally, the corruption of a 'big fry' (one who is misappropriating funds to the tune of millions of takka) is made at par with the corruption of a 'small fry' (one who is probably taking a bribe to literally survive in the metropolitan city of Dhaka). Similarly, at the global level, the corruption in actual monetary terms is much higher in some of the developed countries (the most likely figure is in millions of dollars!) than in some of the developing countries, including Bangladesh. However, the honorific title of being the most corrupt still goes to the country engaged in horizontal corruption rather than the one engaged in vertical corruption. Emphasising the former, without taking into account the latter, only allows the 'big fry,' both at the national and global levels, to continue misappropriating funds to the detriment of the poor and the marginalised.

Power of Non-governmentality
Misgovernance has tainted the government more than the non-governmental sector. In fact, if misgovernance has paralysed the government, particularly its developmental sector, it seems less evident in the non-governmental developmental sector. Indeed, for reasons of sheer extra efforts (which includes even making for the lost time caused by political disturbances), a better salary and, above all, ingenuity of certain individuals, non-governmental organisations have fared better in developmental activities. In fact, their success has been so astounding that one often hears of non-governmentality as the key to Bangladesh development.

There is some merit in this observation. In fact, one way of getting a sense of the rising power of non-governmentality is to see the growing frustration of the donors with the governmental sector and the corresponding rise in their interests in the activities of the non-governmental sector. Approximately 25 percent of donors' funds currently go to the non-governmental sector. This percentage has come about very rapidly; in 1988, it was 18 percent.8 If this trend continues, the non-governmental sector is bound to overtake the governmental share of donors' funds, including the volume of developmental activities, in coming decades. But there are other good historical reasons for the formidable power of the non-governmental sector.

Unlike many other countries in the world, the non-governmental sector in Bangladesh developed simultaneously with the government from the time of the country's independence. In the wake of massive displacement of people, including the birth of 10 million refugees during the liberation war of Bangladesh, the non-governmental sector, more as a supporting hand of the government, engaged itself in the task of relief and rehabilitation. One or two NGOs even had a pre-independence existence, although they were at their rudimentary stages then. BRAC, currently the largest NGO in the world, actually started working formally in 1972, although some of its key members were active as early as 1970 when the country was struck with a massive cyclone and thousands of people were in dire need of food and shelter. After independence, BRAC began with a short-term relief and rehabilitation project, but quickly moved towards long-term issues of poverty alleviation and empowerment of the poor. A closer exposition of two of its achievements would suffice here.

In the field of education, BRAC came up with the novel idea of establishing Non-Formal Primary Schools, which are designed to include poor, rural drop-outs and children, particularly girls deprived of formal schooling. BRAC started this program way back in 1985 with 22 one-room schools, which by 2004 had grown to 49,000 primary and pre-primary schools, with an enrollment of over a million children, the majority of whom are girls (65 percent).9 Moreover, 2.8 million students have already graduated from these schools and over 90 percent of them have gone for further education with formal, public schools.10 BRAC, along with other NGOs as well as the education program of the government, has certainly helped in raising the literate rate of the country, from 37.5 percent in 1995 to 43 percent in 2003, which also earned Bangladesh the International Literacy Prize 1998 from UNESCO.

In the field of health also BRAC's success is noteworthy. Bangladesh was known for a high infant mortality rate and one of the reasons for this was diarrhea. BRAC in collaboration with the ICDDR, B undertook a countrywide program where 2,000 BRAC workers (90 percent women) went door-to-door and taught 13 million mothers the simple technique of preparing home-made oral rehydration saline (ORS) and also communicated the knowledge of ORS to 100 percent of the population. The program was so effective that it brought down the infant mortality rate from 258 per thousand to 75 per thousand.11

But these are only two of BRAC's manifold activities. Although BRAC is an NGO, it is a parent organisation of several companies and institutions involved in activities ranging from providing internet service, hospitality, land and housing, tea plantation to software development, finance and banking, and many others. There is also a BRAC University now. The total workforce of BRAC has surpassed the 300,000 mark,12 and is still growing.

In the non-governmental sector the innovation of micro-credit had the most spectacular success in Bangladesh. It started with the simple idea of providing micro loans to rural women without any collateral. In 1976 Professor Muhammad Yunus, as part of an action research project of Chittagong University, lent US$27 to 42 women in Jobra, a village adjacent to the University, so that they could use the loan for some micro business ventures. All the women not only repaid the loans but also made small profit from it. Out of this experience emerged the Grameen Bank, a specialised bank registered not as an NGO but as a trustee, which has so far cumulatively disbursed more than US$5.1 billion to 5.5 million borrowers, 96 percent of whom are women, in nearly 58,000 villages across Bangladesh. It may be mentioned that out of this disbursed amount, US$4.6 billion has been paid back and the recovery rate is 99 percent. Furthermore, the borrowers of Grameen Bank currently own 93 percent of the total equity of the bank, while the remaining seven percent is owned by the government. But the Grameen Bank did not limit itself to just micro-financing. It has tried to support its members in various activities, including housing, education, village mobile phone service and pension funding. According to Grameen Bank's internal survey, based on 10 objective indicators, 55 percent of its members have already crossed the poverty line, and this is no small claim. No wonder the Grameen experience to date has been replicated in 36 countries, including the United States.

There are two things, however, that need to be pointed out with respect to the power of non-governmentality. First, in its present phase, the success of non-governmental organisations is largely measured in terms of the failure of the governmental sector. This point is pertinent because non-governmental organisations have not succeeded in getting rid of the 'mentality' of the government. Indeed, so long certain 'noble' individuals are at the top and remain the 'mental,' things probably would go well for these organisations. But then, in the absence of a proper structure of non-governmentality, there is no guarantee that such an efficient working of things will continue after the retirement or demise of the 'noble' individuals.

Secondly, non-governmentality could thrive only when there is space for practicing alternative development. In this context, 'Yunusonomics' (i.e. the economics and developmental practices of Muhammad Yunus) need to be further explored and brought to the mainstream discussions, including building an alternative economics curriculum on the basis of its paradigmatic vision and experience. The very fact that the neo-classical economists have begun attacking Yunusonomics at this early stage shows that there is some merit in the latter.

Globalisation, Diaspora and Subalternity
Globalisation, mainly because of its birth from a complex combination of multiple interactions, has given rise to a multiversity or multiple universes of knowledge and practices. As a result we are faced with several versions of globalisation.

There is, first, economic globalisation or globalisation from top.13 What this means is that, in addition to the internationalisation of trade, finance and investment, there is now the internationalisation of production. That is, multi-national or rather transnational companies now collect resources in several countries, process them in another several countries and finally, export the finished products to the rest of the world. A fully finished product, therefore, no longer has one single birthmark; it has multiple birthmarks since several countries have gone to produce it. In Bangladesh the ready-made garments (RMG) industry is a good example of this. The industry is based primarily on sub-contracting, under which Bangladeshi entrepreneurs work as sub-contractors of foreign buyers.14 Moreover, about 90 percent of woven fabrics and 60 percent of knit fabrics are imported to make garments for export. In the process, however, the RMG sector has not only become the major export earner but has also helped empower women as the bulk of the workforce is female. It may be mentioned that in 1982 there were only 47 garment manufacturing unit, but by 1999 it increased to around 2,900, employing directly more than 1.4 million workers, out of which 80 percent are female. The RMG industry, with total export earnings of over US$5.5 billion (1998-1999), now contributes to more than 75 percent of the total export earnings of Bangladesh. Few can deny the impact of economic globalisation in all this.

The second version can be referred to as reverse globalisation. One good example would be the so-called Indian restaurants found throughout the world. Curry, masala tikka, biryani, even dosa and idli are now household names and certainly gastronomic delights across cultures, nationalities and continents. Michael Dummett, the English philosopher, went on to say, “British eating habits have been considerably affected by the Bangladeshi, and to a lesser extent Chinese, presence.”15 In fact, in many of the so-called Indian restaurants the chef is a Bangladeshi, adding credence to the fact that the term 'Indian' is more conglomerate when it comes to cuisine and somewhat defies the post-colonial nationality of the Indian state. Bangladeshi diaspora has certainly played a significant role in this regard.

There is, however, a third version of globalisation. Critics have already referred to the mushrooming of global networks resisting economic globalisation as 'globalisation from below.'16 The latter includes a diverse group of people environmentalists, NGOs, religious groups, small farmers, labour unions (incidentally of both the developed and developing countries), women's movement, consumerists, African debt relief campaigners, anti-sweatshop activists, and the like, all one way or other either critical of or directly suffering from and struggling against the impact of economic globalisation. Here the forces of the seemingly disempowered non-state have creatively joined hands to overcome the exploitation of the empowered non-state, i.e. the forces of economic globalisation. The subaltern nature of the resistance movements, particularly the networking, can hardly be minimised.

But then, there is a further subaltern variant to the whole notion of globalisation from below. This refers to the deepening of relationship between and amongst the 'dubious groups' and 'shadowy activities' ranging from smuggling of goods and people, illicit production and trading of small arms and explosives, money laundering, narco-production and trading, terrorism, and the like, and that again, across and beyond national, ethnic, racial, and even religious affiliations. The subalterns, particularly the poverty-ridden and marginalised population, become easy targets of such groups and activities, but more importantly the state of being itself becomes a factor for certain relatively well off individuals to rally support and even clandestinely work for their cause. A protracted nature of poverty and marginality and a lack of substantive global concern also push them to seek informal or even criminal means to reproduce their lives and if possible to redress the situation. The complex networking at this level and in combination with the resistance movements against economic globalisation could be best referred to as subaltern globalisation.17 The relationship between globalisation, diaspora and subalternity is formidable.

The post-independence Bangladeshi diaspora is somewhat of a pride for Bangladesh. In 2004 Bangladesh received US$3.4 billion in remittances compared to India's US$21.7 billion. In terms of per capita remittance Bangladesh has done far better than India. In fact, remittance now constituted one-third of the total foreign exchange earning of the country. But then this is only one side of the story. The Bangladeshi diaspora, particularly in the Middle East, could not help but be attracted to a puritan version of Islam and in turn help promote the Wahhabisation of Bangladesh. Indeed, if any group that has come to aid religious education in Bangladesh in a substantial way beyond what is given by the government it is the diaspora that had once left the country in search of 'modernist' goals. The figures are revealing. In 1999 the number of primary schools stood at 65,610. This is down from 78,595 in 1996. The number of Alia Madrashahs, however, increased from 14,414 in 1989 to 25,201 in 2004.18 Support from the state as well as from the members of the diaspora, indeed for quite different reasons, is what is making religious education and the organisation around it turn into a formidable power in the country, including making many of them turn militant, which in the age of subaltern globalisation can turn demonic.

According to well-informed sources, there are about 250,000 illegal fire arms in Bangladesh.19 Some unconfirmed reports indicate that a substantial amount of illegal fire arms enter the country everyday through its borders, indicating the existence of an informal arms bazaar in the region. During 2001-2002 the use of illegal weapons became so rampant that the Government of Bangladesh had to launch a military operation named, “Operation Clean Heart” to bring the perpetrators to book. Indeed, one of the major tasks of the joint forces in this operation was to recover illegal fire arms. In this operation a total of 2016 fire arms of different categories were recovered, amongst these were six AK-47, two M- 16 rifles and few sub-machine guns (SMG), indicating the efficiency of subaltern globalisation in making these weapons available in Bangladesh. Indeed, the wealth in the hands of the diaspora, the parcellised understanding of Islam, the reason of the state, the global bashing of the Muslims and not to mention the opportunities provided by the shadowy and dubious networks of subaltern globalisation, particularly in getting access to funds and weapons, has allowed many in the Madrasahs join the so-called Islamic militant groups. The latter is blamed for much of the recent violence, including the death of more than 150 people and injury of over 1000 in bomb explosions in last five years.

Conclusion
What makes the Bangladeshis so resilient? How are they able to cope with all the traumas resulting from the bloody birth of the country to the natural calamities of floods, droughts and cyclones and now the brutality of contemporary terrorism? How did Bangladesh reduce infant mortality by half in the past decade, indeed, at a rate faster than any other developing country? How did Bangladesh accomplish an outstanding result in the reduction of child labour--only seven percent compared to India's 13 percent and Niger's 66 percent? How did female labour force participation rate, particularly in rural area, increase dramatically--from seven percent in 1983 to 22 percent in 1999? What allowed Bangladesh to perform so well in terms of the human development indicators (incidentally it came out in number three position in the developing world, after China and Cape Verde)? What makes Bangladesh the 'happiest nation in the world'?20

Interestingly during the recent floods the civil and political societies have responded differently at least in certain areas. There was less deterioration of the law and order situation, for instance. In fact, a nationwide field survey in 15,467 villages carried out by Nagarik Durjog Mokabila Udyog (a civil response body formed during the 1998 flood) found that the law and order situation deteriorated only in 13 to 17 percent of the villages whereas in over 80 percent of the villages there was no such deterioration. More interestingly, it was found that there was less corruption or irregularities in food/relief distribution.21 One requires tapping the immense possibilities arising from what seemed to be deviations from the norm or what may be defined as resilience through collective sufferings. But then, can a nation be built on the basis of collective sufferings? Or, can the basis of collective despair bring about collective hope? If the past is any lesson for Bangladesh then there are reasons to be equally apprehensive and thrilled about its future.

End Notes
1. In some reports we find that Kissinger called Bangladesh a 'bottomless basket.' The idea however is the same.
2. For a closer exposition, see, Imtiaz Ahmed, “The 1971 South Asian Crisis: US Policy Revisited,” Social Science Review, The Dhaka University Studies, Part D, Volume 22, Number 2, December 2005.
3. Three million is the official casualty figure provided by the Bangladesh government and supported by the governments of India and the erstwhile Soviet Union, while the lower casualty figure is provided by the Hamoodur Rahman Report of Pakistan. See, “Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, 1974,” Information Times, America's online international daily newspaper, Washington, DC, 12 August 2000.
4. See, SK Agrawala, "The Universities of India," in The Universities of Commonwealth Countries (London, 1994), p. 799.
5. For a closer exposition of the transformation of the word 'economy,' see Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (ed.), The Foucault Effect: Studies In Governmentality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p.92.
6. Ibid., pp.92-93.
7. Iftekharuzzaman, “Corruption and Human Insecurity in Bangladesh.” Paper presented at a workshop in BRAC Centre organized by Transparency International Bangladesh in December 2005.
8. In 1988 the non-governmental share was 18 percent. See, Binayak Sen, “NGOs in Bangladesh Agriculture: An Exploratory Study,” in Agriculture Sector Review, Vol.5, UNDP, 1988.
9. BRAC Annual Report 2004 (Dhaka: BRAC Printers, 2005), pp.54-55.
10. Ibid.
11. Khadija Rehma, “The Biggest NGO on Earth,” 15th Anniversary Special, The Daily Star, 4 February 2006.
12. BRAC Annual Report 2004, p.6.
13. Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith, Globalization From Below: The Power of Solidarity (Cambridge, Mass: South End Press, 2000).
14. See, Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003), pp.327-331.
15. Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 2001), p.15.
16. Brecher, Costello and Smith, op.cit., p.10.
17. Imtiaz Ahmed, “Contemporary Terrorism and the State, Non-State and the Interstate: Newer Drinks, Newer Bottles,” in Sridhar K. Khatri & Gert W. Kueck, eds., Terrorism in South Asia: Impact on Development and Democratic Process (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2003).
18. Abdalla, Amr, ANM Raisuddin and Suleiman Hussein, Bangladesh Educational Assessment: Pre-primary and Primary Madrasah Education in Bangladesh (Washington DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2004), pp.2, 16.
19. This was disclosed by the former Chief Advisor Latifur Rahman in an interview with The Daily Star. See, “Prevalence of illegal arms now greater than that in '91 & '96,” The Daily Star, 6 August 2001.
20. This is according to a study report of the World Happiness Survey 2005. See, New Age, 17 January 2006, p.3.
21. This is based on the author's discussion with a cross-section of people in the flood-affected areas.