Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
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Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
The foreign policy of a country is a reflection of its desire to attain economic prosperity. In pursuit of these objectives, decisions are taken at a given point in time. Explaining reasons for a particular foreign policy decision is not an easy task as a combination of many factors contributes towards the final calculation. Depending on assumptions, motives and objectives, one can develop a whole range of plausible explanations for a certain act of foreign policy.
Foreign policy is a product of a varied set of determinants which tend to make their contributions and influence the foreign policy making process. Among the determinants which no state can afford to ignore include the geo-strategic setting and geo-physical location of a country, ideology and historical traditions, national interest, societal and economic determinants. In addition, the operative external and systemic determinants influence the process considerably. A major global change tends to radically influence the states and force them to adjust to new realities.
The last two decades have witnessed two radical developments on the global scene. First, the death of the cold war which gave birth to many new trends. Among these trends the ascendancy of economic factor was perhaps the most important. During the cold war relations among nations were conducted more on the basis of political considerations whereas the post cold war era saw the emergence of ascendancy of economic factors and relations began to be influenced more by economic than political considerations.
The second pronounced trend that was identified was the simultaneous emergence of integrative and disintegrative forces. Many old empires and states were disintegrated into small units of the system. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are perhaps good examples of this trend. While some states disintegrated into smaller units, many smaller units began to work towards a larger grouping of states. The gradual emergence of European Union as a well knit group of states as well as the evolution of ASEAN is reflective of integrative trends.
The second major development which has radically influenced the existing system is the 11 September attack on the World Trade Centres in New York (“9/11”). The tragic events of 9/11 not only focused the spotlight on terrorism and the consequent formation of international coalition against terrorism but also caused US-led wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 9/11, debates over what exactly we mean by terrorism, its various categories (individual, group and state terrorism), the differences between terrorist activities and freedom struggles, and mechanism to combat terrorism, have started all over the world. Well-meaning and concerned individuals, groups, regional and universal organizations, almost regularly advance various interpretations. The debate has so far remained inconclusive but the countries interested to initiate some forms of action to counter what they perceived as terrorist activities have not waited for a consensus to develop and have already undertaken punitive pursuits. While the debate rages on, developments of far reaching consequences have impacted different regions and individual countries.
Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan can best be described as problematic and difficult. Many of the above mentioned determinants and some of the developments influenced the evolution of Pak-Afghan relations. This paper focuses on the initial problems and highlights the Pakhtoonistan issue followed by the Soviet invasion and its impact on Pakistan. It also deals with developments after the departure of the Soviets, including various accords among the Mujahideen and the rise of Talibans. The final section briefly covers the period after the events of September 11th 2001 and the war against terrorism.
The Pakhtoonistan Issue
One of the predominant factors that have substantively influenced Pakistan's Afghan policy is Pakistan's ideology and its quest to forge closer ties with all the Muslim countries. Being an Islamic State, Pakistan has always endeavored to employ extra considerations for cultivating all the Muslim countries. Afghanistan was viewed right from the beginning as a special case for three major considerations. Not only is it a Muslim state and physically located as an immediate neighbour, it also has a large Pakhtoon population in its own provinces of NWFP and Balochistan.
When it became clear that the British would soon leave India, the Afghan government approached the British government in 1944 and tried to seek assurances that in the event of British departure from India, the frontier areas would be given a choice between independence and rejoining their motherland. Simultaneously the Afghan government also made a demand that Afghanistan be given a corridor to the sea through Balochistan.1 As the partition date came nearer, the Afghan campaign intensified
At the time of partition of the Indian subcontinent a strange situation existed in NWFP with the Congress in power. The Congress government in NWFP wanted the province to join India but composition of the population and the geographic location of the NWFP made it extremely difficult to include the province into the territories that formed India. A compromise was worked out which entailed the holding of referendum in the area in order to ascertain the wishes of the people. Cognizant of erosion of its popularity among the people under the changed circumstances as the emergence of a Muslim homeland was gradually becoming a reality, the Congress also tried to have another clause inserted in the referendum by suggesting that referendum should not be confined to choosing India or Pakistan but the people should also be given the option of independence.2 The British did not agree to the suggestion. At the time the Congress leaders in NWFP also complained that the then Governor of NWFP, Sir Olaf Caroe, was sympathetic to the Muslim League. Mountbatten not only arranged to send the Governor on leave but also decided to show to the leader of Congress government in NWFP the list of 15 army officers who were selected to conduct the referendum.3
The referendum was duly held from 6-17 July 1947 in which an overwhelming majority voted for Pakistan. “Out of the total electorate of 572,798, just over 50% took part; Pakistan received 289,244 votes and India 2,874”.4 The absolute majority of the pro-Pakistan votes left no room for the British except to include the province into the territories that formed Pakistan. Despite the clear verdict of the NWFP referendum, the Afghan government continued to express its dissatisfaction as it did not include the choices the Afghan government had been pressing for.
The continuous Afghan pressure on Pakistan often resulted in a state of high tensions between the two countries. Following the establishment of Pakistan as an independent state, Pakistan applied for membership of the UN. When Pakistan's application came before the General Assembly on 30th September, the Afghanistan government decided to cast the only negative vote against Pakistan's membership. In November 1947 a special envoy of the Afghan King came to Pakistan and reportedly made three demands; tribal areas be constituted into a 'free, sovereign province', Pakistan must give Afghanistan access to the sea either by creating a free Afghan zone in Karachi or providing an Afghan corridor in West Balochistan, and finally that the two countries “should enter into a treaty which should permit one party to remain neutral if the other was attacked”.5 Being fully aware of the rights of a landlocked state, Pakistan agreed to provide facilities for Afghan goods to pass through Pakistani territory and allocated a number of railways carriages to transport Afghan goods.
The year 1948 saw another crisis which was engineered by the Afghan defense minister Sardar Dauod Khan who sent Afghan troops in traditional Pathan attire to infiltrate Pakistan's tribal areas which forced Pakistan to close the border.6 While normalcy was quickly restored, the main issue that impacted seriously upon Pak-Afghan relations was the issue of Pakhtoonistan which dominated during the period when Dauod became the Prime Minister of Afghanistan.
Pakhtoonistan Issue: Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan from the start straight to the Soviet invasions remained troubled primarily because of the Pakhtoonistan issue. The Afghan propaganda in favour of the establishment of an independent Pakhtoonistan remained a constant source of tension. During the 1950s, relations between the two countries deteriorated. Unable to convince the British to allow NWFP to join Afghanistan, the government of Afghanistan embarked upon a campaign for an independent Pakhtoonistan consisting of the Pakhtoon inhabited areas of Pakistan. The pro-Pakhtoonistan campaign was said to be actively supported by the Faqir of Ipi who caused many tribal uprisings during the days of British rule in India.7
Despite the Afghan government's persistent propaganda campaign against Pakistan and to win the support of the Pakhtoons living in Pakistan, the government of Pakistan opted for a correct attitude and continued to extend facilities for Afghan transit trade. The Prime Minister of Pakistan even declared that 'relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan could be very friendly if the Afghan government gave up senseless anti-Pakistan propaganda'.8 Throughout the 1950s the relations between the two countries did not register an upward surge. In 1955 not only did the Afghan government lodge a strong protest against Pakistan's one unit proposal to incorporate the NWFP in the province of West Pakistan, large scale demonstrations were also organised against Pakistan in Kabul, where Pakistan's Embassy got attacked. Pakistan alleged that during the attack the demonstrators tore down the Pakistani flag, ransacked the embassy and the ambassador's residence, injured embassy staff, wrecked office furniture and equipment and looted property. It was further alleged that during the attack the Afghan police did not take any preventive measures. On the contrary, the police encouraged the rioters.9 Similarly Pakistan's Consulates at Kandhar and Jalalabad were also attacked.
These attacks not only incensed the officials of Pakistan government but also led to widespread demonstrations in Pakistan resulting in an attack on the Afghan Consulate at Peshawar. In a broadcast on April 1st 1955, the Pakistani Prime Minister declared that the “ruling junta in Afghanistan talks of [the] Pakhtoonistan stunt in order to divert the Afghan people's attention from the autocratic nature of their own regime and emphasized that Pakistan would tolerate no interference by any country in her domestic affairs”.10 He further added, “We shall not rest content until an amende honorable is made for the sacrilege committed against our national flag and proper restitution made for the insult and damage caused to our honor and prestige”.11 Not only were protest notes exchanged between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan but many embassies in Kabul also handed protest notes to the Afghan government as they viewed the attack on any embassy as a serious violation of the diplomatic privilege. As a consequence of these developments, diplomatic relations were broken off and the Afghan-Pakistan border remained closed for almost five months. Due to the efforts of some Muslim countries diplomatic relations were later resumed.
It is pertinent to mention that the Soviet Union, angry over Pakistan's participation in the Western sponsored defense pacts, began to extend a patronising hand to Afghan policy on Pakhtoonistan. The involvement of super powers in this regional dispute further embittered Afghan-Pakistan relations.12 Encouraged by the outsiders, the Afghan government did not control its vilification campaign against Pakistan. During Ayub Khan's initial period the Soviet premier Khrushchev, while passing through Kabul, asserted “that the solution of [omitted] Pakhtoonistan should be reached by implementing the United Nations Charter's 'principle of self-determination”.13 Constant harassment of Pakistani staff attached to consulates both at Jalalabad and Kandhar led Pakistan to inform the Afghan government that it would close down its consulates and demanded the closure of Afghan Consulates and trade agencies in Quetta and Peshawar. The Afghan government retaliated by severing diplomatic relations with Pakistan and also closed the border. This phase of hostile relationship ended with the departure of Sardar Dauod in 1963, whose regime had made the Pakhtoonistan issue as the main plank of Afghanistan's Pakistan policy.
A brief examination of the Pakhtoonistan issue shows that the Afghan government advanced four sets of arguments. First and the most important argument advanced by the Afghanis says that the Durand Line was established under duress. An examination of how the Durand Line came into existence clearly indicates that there were no pressures applied by the British. In fact it was Amir Abdur Rehman who initiated the process of border finalisation. Second it was Amir who suggested the name of Sir Mortimer Durand to lead the British Indian Boundary commission.14 It was Amir who expressed his complete satisfaction after the Durand Line Agreement was signed in 1893. Amir had already accepted that the status of NWFP as was decided by the Treaty of Gandamak.15 The validity of the Durand agreement was reaffirmed by successive rulers of Afghanistan including Amir Abdur Rehman's son and grandson Amir Habib Ullah and Amir Aman Ullah, respectively.
The second strand of the Afghan argument was that the Durand Treaty was signed between the British Indian government and the ruler of Afghanistan and since the British had left the subcontinent, the treaty lapsed. International law clearly states that treaties of extinct states concerning boundary lines remain valid and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the successor nation which inherits treaty rights.16 Pakistan is the successor nation on the north western part of the Indian subcontinent.
The third argument of the Afghans is that even after the signing of the Durand treaty the tribal territories remained separate and independent. If this was the case why should the Afghans promote an independent Pakhtoonistan which was supposed to include tribal areas as well as NWFP? For administrative reasons, the NWFP was made a province whereas tribal areas were ruled through the administrative control of the political agents who were appointed by the British Indian government. A similar pattern continued even after the partition of India.
The fourth argument employed by the Afghans was that the inhabitants of Pakhtoonistan are one nation and the Durand line arbitrarily splits the nation into two. To begin with, the line was never arbitrarily drawn. 'It generally follows tribal boundaries, separating those tribes which go to markets in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank and Quetta from those with economic links with Khorasan,, having Kabul, Ghazni, Kandhar as their market towns'.17 The only tribes which were partly divided were the Mohmand and Waziri. Secondly, if Kabul was sincere in its efforts for the unity of the Pakhtoons, it would have agreed to include those Pakhtoons who live in Afghanistan. The Afghan concept of Pakhtoonistan consisted of only those Pakhtoons who live in Pakistan. Undoubtedly the Pakhtoons live on both sides of the Durand Line. When ever the idea of holding a plebiscite for a united Pakhtoon land was put forward the Afghan government always reacted angrily and rejected the idea. The Afghan concept of Pakhtoonistan only included Pakhtoons living on the Pakistani side of the Durand line. Perhaps that is why even the neutral observer viewed the case of Pakhtoonistan as no more than a 'veiled irredentism'.18 Most Pakistanis viewed it as a figment of Afghan imagination and some saw it as a device to divert attentions from internal troubles.19
In 1973 Dauod staged a coup d'etat and made Afghanistan a republic and with his arrival the issue of Pakhtoonistan was once again revived temporarily. However, the issue did not acquire the prominence it had experienced in 1950s. In 1975 Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto paid an official visit to Kabul and in 1976 Sardar Dauod paid a similar visit to Pakistan. A year later Bhutto was over thrown by General Zia ul Haq and Dauod and his family were killed in 1978 by the incoming communist regime.
The Soviet-Afghan War: Impact on Pakistan
The communist takeover in April 1978 lasted up to the end of 1979. The main problem confronting the communist regime was the infighting between the two main factions; the Percham and the Khalq. While it is not very clear why the rift developed when unity was most required, there is no doubt that an intense power struggle ensued right from the day the communists took over Afghanistan. The outcome of the power struggle was the gradual elimination of all Parchamites from high level government posts, including Babrak Karmal who was removed from the post of deputy prime minister. It was also alleged that some of the posts were filled by Persian speaking Soviet citizens from Central Asia.20 Throughout 1978 the Parchamites were purged continues which eventually resulted in great shortage of trained manpower and the increasing regime's dependency upon the Soviets and also caused considerable reduction in party sympathisers.
On the eve of revolution the Afghan society was not only in a state of appalling poverty and backwardness but had also inherited a very weak economy. The hurried attempts of Tarakai regime to push the socio-economic reforms further alienated both the rich and the poor. The poor were alienated by the new government's policies regarding the abolition of dowry and forced marriages, compulsory educationespecially women's educationand the replacement of Islamic green color with that of red in the national flag of Afghanistan. The rich were annoyed over the introduction of land reforms and increased official control of commercial activities'.21 Given the rapidly accumulated alienation, it was not surprising that that hasty implementation of Communist reform program backfired and the people who were supposed to benefit from the reforms decided to oppose the communisation of their society. The result was that within a year a series of localised outbursts of resistance began to manifest in one form or the other. The unrest soon saw the overthrow of the Tarakai regime by Hafizullah Amin who was, in turn, overthrown by the Soviet invasion which took place in late December 1979.
Apart from the above mentioned developments, many other factors influenced the Soviets to invade Afghanistan. First, the apprehension about the then prevalent wave of Islamic fundamentalism since the belief was that if the Soviets did not strengthen the communist control they would be replaced by the fundamentalist Islamic regime which could be dangerous for Muslim states of Soviet Union. Second, a firm foothold in Afghanistan provided a pressurising lever over both Pakistan and Iran. Third, the border sensitivity of the Soviets in terms of having buffer states around the Soviet Union also contributed substantively. Fourth, since Soviet behavior over Sino-Vietnam war generated the impression that the Soviet supports only major ally, the Afghanistan situation provided an opportunity to inject a corrective injection. Fifth, Afghanistan takeover could provide an opportunity to realise their age old quest for warm waters. Finally, cognizance of the American difficulties with both Iran and Pakistan must have convinced them that time was right and the Americans would have difficulties in reaching Afghanistan.22
The Americans, however, managed to influence Pakistan to support their efforts to counter the Soviets inroads into Afghanistan. Not only did the Americans encourage the existing resistance movements inside Afghanistan, they also invited guest warriors from all over the world to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Having been bled by the Soviet in the Vietnam War, the Americans did not want to miss this opportunity to do the same to the Soviets. The war lasted for ten years and eventually ended with the signing of the Geneva Accords on 14th April 1988.23 By February 1989 the Soviet forces pulled out of Afghanistan leaving Najib Ullah as their man in Afghanistan.
Undoubtedly the country that was most affected by the war was Pakistan. Not only did it become a base for the execution of American policy against Soviet-controlled Afghanistan, it also received around four million refugees. Most of the Afghan refugees are still living in Pakistan as the situation in Afghanistan is still far from satisfactory. The Afghanistan crisis, in general, and the large concentration of the refugees on Pakistani soil, in particular, had given birth to many complex problems which were perhaps less obvious but quite disturbing. These problems can be divided into five categories; economic, social, political, strategic and foreign policy.
Economic policy. In the early 1980s the cost of maintaining refugees was calculated around a million dollar a day but at that stage neither the flow of the refugees had stopped nor had the unregistered refugees been taken into consideration.24 Later the figures increased considerably. Most of the sources agree that half of the financial cost was met by the government of Pakistan and the other half was contributed by donor states, agencies and international organisations.25 While it is true that the cost was equally shared between the donors and Pakistan somewhat equally, when the invisible cost is added it becomes clear that Pakistan was paying much more than the donors' share. Among the invisible costs that Pakistan had to incur included deforestation, unauthorised use of grazing grounds, non payment of tolls tax by the Afghan truckers, unjustified increase of rent ceilings by the influx of affluent Afghan refugees, edging out and replacement of Pakistani labourers by the Afghans, taking a substantive chunk of transport business etc.
Social policy. Many economic issues were linked with social problems which, in turn, contributed enormously towards the existing level of tensions between the locals and the refugees. For example transport, grazing land, property purchase, rent ceilings, deforestation and unemployment all contributed towards increasing tensions. Among the new social problems that were the direct products of massive influx of Afghan refugees included the problem of drugs and the development of gun culture.26 Until the advent of the 1980s drug addiction was relatively unknown to most Pakistanis. Since arms were regularly supplied to the resistance groups by the American intelligence agency, some of these arms found their way into the Pakistani markets. The easy availability of arms in Pakistan contributed enormously towards an increase in the crime rate within the country.27
Political policy. The presence of a large number of Afghan refugees also created many political problems. The Pakhtoon tradition of panah (sanctuary) and the country's hospitable nature further complicated the situations. Until the advent of the 1980s, organised terrorism was virtually never experienced by the Pakistanis. Since the Afghan war against the Soviets, acts of terrorism have frequently occurred on Pakistan soil. During the initial period NWFP was particularly targeted. The Kabul regime had managed to penetrate the great reservoirs of resistance, namely the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Most acts of terrorism were undertaken by Khad agents under the supervision of KGB but the internal feuds of various resistance groups also contributed.28 Perhaps a more serious problem was the impact on domestic politics. Ordinarily most external crises tend to have a unifying effect on domestic politics but the Afghan crisis had sharply divided political opinions about the refugees. The access to these camps granted to some political parties further exacerbated the situation. Another aspect of the political problem was ethnic imbalance and increased sectarianism caused by the influx of refugees in many areas leading to period clashes. The Afghan refugees also injected corruption especially in their efforts to procure Pakistani identity cards. In addition it was also alleged that the refugees were being used to create dissension and disorder in academic institutions.29
Strategic policy. Strategically threats emanating from the Afghanistan crisis did not pose any major risk until the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion drastically complicated the security situation on Pakistan's western border. For Pakistan the dangers were manifold. First, the invasion had generated the apprehension that Pakistan would be the next target. Second, because of the presence of a large number of refugees on Pakistan's soil, Pakistan could be dragged into the Afghan cauldron willingly or unwillingly. Third, the Soviets may be tempted to exploit the internal situation of Pakistan, especially in NWFP and Balochistan. Besides, the special relationships between the Soviets and India could not be brushed aside.
Foreign policy. Sandwiched between hostile India and Soviet-controlled Afghanistan, Pakistan's security dilemma became rather acute and required changes in its policies in the emerging geopolitical environment. The major impact of the evolving situation was to move even closer to both US and China and make extra efforts to defuse threats on its eastern borders. In this connection two developments deserve mention here: the announcement of a verbal agreement not to attack on each other's nuclear installations and the birth of SAARC.
By and large, Pakistan suffered a lot and it still continues to suffer as most of the refugees are still living in Pakistan, despite the passage of 17 years after the Soviet left Afghanistan. The refugees are also confronted with a genuine problem. Most of them would like to return to their homes but the conditions inside Afghanistan are still far from the desired level of stability which, in turn, deters them from leaving Pakistan. Pakistan continues to play host and has agreed with the incumbent Afghan government to move them out of Pakistan gradually. No country has hosted such a large number of refugees for such a long time.
Civil War and the Rise of the Taliban
The third phase of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations covers the period from the departure of the Soviets troops to the end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In May 1986 Major General Najibullah replaced Babrak Karmal as the President of Afghanistan. As the Soviet casualties increased, Mikhail Garbachev called Afghanistan 'a bleeding wound' but continued for a military solution.30 In accordance with the requirements of the Geneva Accords (signed on April 14th 1988), the last Soviet soldier pulled out of Afghanistan by February 1989 leaving Najibullah in charge of Afghanistan. Almost at the same time the Mujahideen groups also formed a seven party alliance in Peshawar and announced an Afghan Interim Government (AIG). Najibullah made unsuccessful efforts with UN to transfer power but the Mujahideen, sensing victory, pressed for a military solution. Najibullah then tried to move out of Afghanistan with the aim to seek asylum in India but was unable to flee the country. As the Mujahideen forces marched to Kabul in April 1992, he took shelter in the UN compound where he spent few years until he was executed.
The period between the removal of Najibullah and the emergence of Taliban saw various Mujahideen efforts to rule the country. On April 24, 1992 the Mujahideen signed the Peshawar Accord. According to this accord it was decided that “Mujaddedi would be the acting president for two months and he would be replaced by Rabbani for the next four months”. After the six initial months a Shoora would be held to choose the government for the next eighteen months, after which elections would be held. The President would be answerable to the Council consisting of Mujahideen party leaders.31 After two months Mujaddedi stepped down and handed over to Rabbani who convened the Shoora and had himself declared as the president for next two years. Many prominent Mujahideen leaders did not approve this election and thus began another round of infightings.
Aware of the importance of a stable Afghanistan, the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initiated new mediation efforts in order to resolve the differences between the warring Afghan leaders. An Islamabad accord, a compromise formula, was signed on March 1993 in the presence of Pakistani Prime Minister, Saudi prince Tarki al Faisal and a deputy Foreign Minster of Iran.32 Unfortunately the accord met the same fate as that of the Peshawar accord and Afghanistan once again slipped into the throws of a civil war. According to the accord Rabbani was to stay as the president but the post of the prime minister went to Hekmat Yar who quickly dismissed Ahmad Shah Masood as the defence minister but Rabbani refused to accept this change. Fighting continued for some time, with Hekmat launching an attack on Kabul but being unable to capture it. Since no clear winner emerged, civil war continued.
In 1994 the UN appointed a new representative, Mahmood Mestiri who tried to restart the peace process. He tabled proposals for cease fire, the creation of neutral security force, and the summoning of a loya jirgaa representative councilto oversee the formation of a transitional government.33 In the October of 1994, Taliban, an unknown group, emerged on the scene by capturing Kandhar. During the next two years the Taliban gradually brought more and more areas of Afghanistan under their control and in September they captured Kabul. Soon after their take over of Kabul, the Taliban executed Najibullah. In October 1996, Rabbani formed an anti Taliban alliance called the Council for the Defence of Afghanistan with Karim Khalili, the leader of Hizb-i-Wahdat and General Dostum.34
Following the fall Najibuulah government the struggle for power among various Mujahideen groups of Afghanistan especially during 1992-96 had not only created a acute vacuum of leadership but also caused the death of more than 50,000 Afghans. Frustrated and fed up with the ongoing anarchy and civil war, the Afghans appeared to be willing to support any group that could inject stability. Undoubtedly the Talibans are products of political chaos and increased frustration with the civil war. Perhaps that is why the somewhat untrained Taliban with the sympathies of ordinary Afghans were soon able to capture more than 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory by 1997.
The Taliban emerged on the Afghan scene as a force in 1994. The Taliban is primarily a product of the unpopularity of the Afghan interim government along with the ongoing civil war. More Afghans died during the civil war than in the war against the Soviets. Since the incumbent regime of President Rabbani had turned against Pakistan, the Pakistanis not only welcomed the rise of Taliban to power but also assisted them in their process of consolidation. During the initial phase the Taliban ruler turned to Pakistan for assistance but once they were firmly installed themselves, they began to assert themselves and frequently undertook courses of action that ran contrary to Pakistan's advice. Soon Pakistan became somewhat disillusioned with themmore specifically over the lack of cooperation towards both the Pakistani authorities as well as the UN special representative, extreme religious views and their perceived involvement in international terrorism.
Once having taken over most of Afghanistan, the Taliban regime began to introduce reforms in accordance with their Islamic beliefs and what they deemed suitable for Afghanistan. The Taliban's harsh steps such as banning working women prompted strong reactions against their policies.35 However, it needs to be mentioned here that Talibans were successful in restoring the law and order situation in Afghanistan, de-weaponisation of the Afghan society, eliminating the warlords, filling the leadership vacuum, providing the people a sense of security, curtailing poppy cultivation and establishing a central government machinery.36 However, the human rights violationsmore specifically the deprivation of certain rights of the Afghan womenreceived attention within the international community.
Since 1996 the UN has been deeply involved in securing peace in Afghanistan. Many efforts were undertaken by the UN representatives. Due to UN efforts and concern by regional actors, the representatives of Taliban and the Northern Alliance, which was operating from a small territory in the north, began peace talks in Islamabad. In the last week of April 1998 the Northern Alliance and the Taliban began peace talks in Islamabad in which the head of UN Mission in Afghanistan, OIC's Assistant Secretary General, and the Pakistani Foreign Minister also participated but the talks did not yield any positive outcome and the two sides were unable to patch up their differences. In August 1998 the Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif, one of the strongholds of the Northern Alliance and due to this the attitude of the Taliban hardened, making them commit the blunder of killing the Iranian diplomats who were in Mazar-e-Sharif. The killing of the Iranian diplomats invoked a strong reaction among the international community. Despite Pakistan's efforts to prevent the killing of diplomats, the Iranians blamed Taliban and Pakistan. 'On September 22 1998, under the aegis of the UN, six neighbours of AfghanistanPakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, China, Turkmenistan and Tajikistanalong with the US and Russia, decided to send a fact-finding mission to investigate the killings in Mazar-e-Sharif'.37 They passed a resolution calling for negotiations between Talibans and other parties for a political settlement including an assertion that Afghanistan should stop providing refuge to international terrorist implying a clear reference to the presence of Osama Bin Laden. In addition the special envoy of the UN Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi visited Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to secure a consensus for restoration of peace and resumption of dialogue process but his mission ended in a failure.38
Afghanistan's refusal to cooperate with the UN and implement the Security Council's resolutions facilitated a tougher attitude of the UN authorities. In fact mandatory sanctions were passed when Taliban refused to extradite Osama putting Pakistan in a very difficult situation, as it had to comply with the UN resolutions. Pakistan's disillusionment further intensified when Mullah Omar refused to handover Pakistani criminals who had taken refuge in Afghanistan.
The attack on the twin towers had angered the Americans who put the blame entirely on Osama bin Laden and to give vent to their angered emotion decided to launch an attack upon Afghanistan. Just before the actual launch of the attack, the US President sought Pakistan's help in terms of airspace, intelligence and logistics. Cognizant of the ground realities, including the determination of the great military power to undertake tough action along with extremely non-cooperative attitudes of the Afghan rulers, Pakistan opted to provide the requisite support to the US-led coalition against the Taliban regime. Thus, Pakistan once again became a front line state. A combination of the above mentioned factors influenced the Pakistan's ruler's to opt for what was deemed best in Pakistan's national interest.
Many writers have already passed a sweeping judgment that Pakistan's Afghan policy has undertaken a dramatic U-turn. It seems that there are two categories of critics; those who look at Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in simpler terms and are unfamiliar with Pakistan's policy initiatives during the 12 months prior to 9/11 and those who understand the operative internal as well as external compulsions of Pakistan but prefer to be critical to cater to their own agenda.
The first category looks at Afghanistan as a next-door Muslim neighbour with whom the Pakistan has strong ethnic and religious bonds. Since Pakistan was deeply involved right at the outset in helping the friendly Taliban regime to consolidate its position in Afghanistan, it was expected that it would not abandon the Taliban regime. This group either refuses to acknowledge the ongoing disagreements with Taliban regime or is not convinced the kind of complex problem the government in Pakistan was confronted with because of its association with the Taliban regime. No Afghan government has been as friendly as was the Taliban's. They also argue that we left the Taliban to support the Americans who have never missed an opportunity to let Pakistan down.
Pakistan's association with Taliban was the product of its continuous efforts to have a secure border and a desire to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan. Following the establishment of Pakistan, relations with Afghanistan did not take off on the right footing. Despite its efforts to provide facilities to Afghanistan with regard to transit trade and help Afghanistan as much as it could, including hosting almost four million Afghan refugees for more than 15 years, the relationship somehow continued to remain problematic. A friendly Taliban regime provided an opportunity to safeguard it western border. During the initial stages of Taliban rise, the Taliban used to heed Pakistani advice but once they had consolidated their position and had also captured Mazar-e-Sharif, their attitude hardened and they began to disregard Pakistan's advice.
Pakistan's initiatives were not able to influence the Talibans during the year prior to 9/11 but this fact did not cut any ground with this group. The Talibans simply ignored almost all good advice extended by Pakistan including not to massacre the Iranian diplomats or destroy the Buddhist statues in Bamiyan and not to force the Hindus to wear a distinguishing sign etc. During the year 2001 the Taliban simply refused to entertain Pakistani requests including the one dealing with the return of Pakistanis criminals who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. Taliban curtly refused to hand them over. The argument that many of the Jihadi groups that were being trained in Afghanistan and later began to create problems for Pakistan was not entertained by them. Being associated with some religious parties in Pakistan, the trained cadres were indulging in acts that were severely damaging the law and order situation in Pakistan. The argument that drugs and terror were being exported to Pakistan inadvertently did not cut much ice with this group either. The detail of compulsions that caused the initiation of Pakistan's de-weaponisation policy was also unable to satisfy these critics.
The second group consists of critics who have a full comprehension of Pakistan's problems and operative compulsions. They recognise the nature of pressures to which Pakistan was subjected to but for some reasons would refrain from highlighting them. They even recognise that Pakistan was in a very difficult situation and was, more or less, compelled to undertake the course of action it opted for. However, they paint Pakistan's reversal of the Afghan policy as a dramatic U-turn and accuse Pakistan for abandoning the Afghans. Pakistan's efforts to secure recognition of the Taliban regime and its help for so many years are simply underplayed to avoid damage to their set agendas.
9/11 and the War against Terrorism
The tragic events of 11th September 2001 not only focused the spotlight on terrorism and the consequent formation of international coalition against terrorism but also caused a US-led war against Afghanistan. Since 9/11 debates over what exactly we mean by terrorism, its various categories (individual, group and state terrorism), the differences between terrorist activities and freedom struggles, and mechanism to combat terrorism have started all over the world. Well-meaning and concerned individuals, groups, regional and universal organizations, almost regularly advance various interpretations. The debate has so far remained inconclusive in many ways but the countries interested to initiate some forms of action to counter what they perceived as terrorist activities have not waited for consensus to develop and have already undertaken the selected punitive pursuits. While the debate rages on, developments of far reaching consequences have impacted upon different regions and the individual countries.
The terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 brought the attention of the international community to Afghanistan. When the Taliban regime refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda associates, the US-led coalition launched an attack on Afghanistan. While the coalition was soon able to oust Taliban from power in late 2001, the Taliban were never completely routed primarily because of the half hearted policies of the coalition. The Bonn Conference of December 2001 worked out a blue print for the political processes and reconstruction of Afghanistan. An international Security Force (ISAF) was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1386' in the same month in order to assist the interim Afghan regime in order to maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas.39
Since then the force has been trying to secure the desired level of stability but has not been all that successful. Three main reasons account for their inability to attain the stated objectives. First, the Taliban have been able to regroup and have increased their activities. In order to effectively deal with the situation much greater force than is available is needed. Second, the drug trade is not only flourishing but has become an integral part of commercial and political life in Afghanistan. 'The drug economy is now equal to 50-60 percent of Afghanistan's GDP, and around 87 percent of the world's heroin currently comes from Afghanistan'.40 Third, the local war lords, who have a track record of switching allegiance, have not only been indulging in human rights violation and criminal activities including the drug trade but have associations with both the government in Kabul and the Taliban insurgents.
As a consequence of Pakistan's participation in the international coalition against terrorism Pakistan has suffered a lot both internally as well as externally. Internally it has experienced severe damage to its economy while also having the society divided into two over this. Acts of terrorism have considerably increased. Within a span of a few weeks terrorist acts were experienced by many major cities of Pakistan. The terrorists have committed many heinous acts against the people of Pakistan. They have killed innocent civilians, violated the sanctity of places of worship by committing murder insides mosques and churches, murdered foreigners helping Pakistansuch as the French engineers on submarine projectmade repeated attempts to assassinate the heads of state and government, generated fear among the ordinary citizens etc. Periodic efforts to bomb were also made against foreign consulate. All such acts not only tarnished Pakistan's image but also took a heavy economic toll and deterred investment.
Contrary to the belief that Pakistan joined the international coalition to combat terrorism under pressure, the Pakistani authorities maintained that Pakistan joined the coalition for its own reasons as it had been a victim of frequent terrorist attacks within its own borders. Both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz have been subjected to terrorist attacks. In order to deal with the situation the government adopted a threefold policy; to launch a direct action against terrorist elements, to acquire more information about their networks and sponsors, and to focus on the root causes of the terrorism.41
Pakistan has been facing the charge that it has become a haven for terrorists. Undoubtedly over the years, especially after the end of Afghan war against the Soviets, many extremists groups in Pakistan have emerged. During the Afghan war against the Soviets many jihadis were invited by the Americans and were even welcomed as the 'Great Islamic warriors' by the Americans. Later when the war was over many of them were compelled to take refuge in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan as their own governments were unwilling to take them back.
The allegation that Pakistan is encouraging the insurgents is absurd. Ever since Pakistan de-linked itself from the Taliban, it has done everything possible to erode their power and influence among their sympathisers. However, one should not ignore the semi-autonomous nature of the tribal areas along with their ethnic and tribal linkages. One also needs to take full cognizance of the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border belt which enables the tribes to move around with relative ease.
Despite the complex nature of the situation in the tribal belt, the Pakistani authorities decided to take firm action against the insurgents and sent Pakistan army into the hitherto 'hands off' zone and established a number of posts. The army has suffered a number of casualties though the number is less than 100. In addition the government of Pakistan embarked upon a massive development program which would indeed facilitate the life in these tribal areas.
Without giving due recognition to the substantive efforts the government of Pakistan has already undertaken, the Afghan officials frequently assert that Pakistan can bring them (miscreants/insurgents) under its total control and, therefore, Pakistan should do more. Such assertions clearly reflect not only the ignorance of history, traditions, social conditions and geographical terrain but also non-recognition of Pakistan's concerted efforts. It is not too far fetched to assume that such an advice could be the product of those who do not wish to see improved Pak-Afghan relations.
Equally important is the question why the Afghan officials feel compelled to undertake such disinformation pursuits. Is it meant to cover their own incompetence? Are they being tutored by someone else or interested outsiders? Available evidence clearly points towards the existence of a combination of both these elements. If a comparative analysis of Pakistani efforts and the Afghan efforts to plug the Pak-Afghan border is made, one would indeed be surprised to learn how great efforts are undertaken by the Pakistani side. In fact some observers stress that there is no comparison. Compared to Pakistani efforts, the Afghan efforts are not only negligible but extremely limited.
The Pak-Afghan border has indeed become a source of constant accusations especially by the Afghan government officials who stress that Pakistan needs to do more because, according to them, many of the militants infiltrate from the Pakistani side of the border. On the other hand, the Pakistanis argue that not only have they developed an intelligence network with Afghanistan and regularly exchange information about terrorist activities, they have also sent more than 70,000 soldiers of Pakistan Army into the tribal areas in order to prevent infiltration and preserve the much desired stability of the region. A counter accusation from the Pakistani side is that the many Indian consulates in Afghanistan appear to be indulging in undesirable activities against Pakistan.
The opening of many Indian consulates in Afghanistan has indeed intensified Pakistani concerns. According to some Pakistani analysts believe that the Indians are using these consulates to foment troubles for Pakistan. A consulate is supposed to protect mutual trading interactions as well as ensure the interests of its nationals who are settled in that area. Admittedly the Indian are involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan in a rather impressive way but their trading interactions within the areas where the consulates are opened are extremely limited and even the settlements of the Indians are hardly visible. The deployment of Indian Special Forces at these consulates, especially in Kandahar, further raised the concern of the Pakistanis. For obvious reasons it is also the duty of the Kabul regime to ensure that these consulates do not indulge in undesirable activities against a third country.
Conclusion
Pakistan has always been deeply interested in the Afghans' welfare and has consistently extended its full cooperation. A shared and difficult border stretching over 1400 km, close ethnic linkages, shared historical experiences and trading interaction make Pakistan and Afghanistan work hard towards closer ties and increased cooperation in almost all fields.
In recent times the Pakistani forces have started an army action against the foreign militants who use the borders areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan for their corrupt designs. Pakistan's actions against the foreign militants in the tribal areas are not only meant to curtail their illegal activities but also to ensure peace and security in the area. It is not too far fetched to assume that some foreign militants may try to enter Afghanistan, fleeing from Pakistan. However, the Pakistani forces are engaged in ensuring that both sides of the border are safe and the terrorists are not allowed to enter Afghanistan. This does not mean that the entire border is effectively plugged and sealed. The activities of Taliban and warlords are also irritating the Kabul regime. Pakistan has undertaken effective measures to check the Taliban's activities alleged to have been taking place from Pakistani hideouts.
Undoubtedly there is a realisation that the two neighbours need to live in peace and harmony. Frequent contacts and visits of senior officials have been able to improve ties between the two countries considerably though some senior non-Pakhtoon officials of President Karazai's government along with American officials in Afghanistan did manage to sour relations between the two countries. However Pakistan's rational approach and sincere efforts to improve relations with Afghanistan have eventually resulted in a reasonable level of cordiality. Most Pakistanis never doubted President Karazai's sincerity; it was the elements within his cabinet and the American diplomatic representative in Kabul who often threw a spanner in the rapidly improving Pak-Afghan relations. The pledge to remove irritants and help each other in various fields certainly generates optimistic vibes which, in turn, invariably enable the two countries to cement existing ties. The contribution of Pakistan in facilitating the recent presidential election in Afghanistan especially the voting of Afghan refugees in Pakistan along with tough vigilance of borders is well appreciated by President Karazai.
Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have always been somewhat problematic, despite the existence of a realization that both need to have very cordial relations. While Pakistan's major objective is to have a friendly and stable Afghanistan on its western borders, the developments in Afghanistan have invariably influenced the Afghan decision makers to employ a strategy of shifting responsibilities in one form or the other. In addition Afghanistan has always remained a playground of outsiders which made it rather difficult for Afghanistan to pursue an independent policy of its own. A stable Afghanistan is certainly in the interests of its immediate neighbours as disturbing political developments inside Afghanistan will certainly have spill-over effects.42 The Afghan decision makers also need to learn a balancing act both in terms of their own heterogeneous nature and outsiders' varied interests.
End Notes
1. See S.M. Burke Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1973, pp.68-73.
2. ibid.
3. See Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1998, pp.48-52.
4. Burke, op.cit., pp.68-73
5. ibid, pp. 73-74.
6. See Frederic Grare Pakistan and the Afghan conflict, 1979-1985, Oxford University Press, UK., 2003, p.4.
7. See Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Nov.11-18, 1950, p.11077,
8. ibid.
9. Kissing's Contemporary Archives, May 21-28, 1955, p.14217
10. ibid.
11. ibid.
12. Grare, op. cit., p.5.
13. Dawn, March 6, 1960
14. For a detailed analysis see Amir Abdur Rahman, The Life of Amir Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan: An Autobiography that was edited by Mir Munshi Sultan Mohamed Khan, Jon Murrey, London, UK, 1900, vol.II, pp.154-64, 93-237. Also see Sir Percy Sykes, 'Sir Mortimer Durand; A Biography', Al-Biruni, Lahore 1977 (Reprint)pp.205-23.
15. Burke, op. cit., p. 85
16. ibid., pp.85-90. Also see Syed Abdul Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan: a geopolitical study, Ferozsons, Lahore, 1982, pp.141-57.
17. ibid.
18. See Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.- A.D. 1957, Oxford University Press, Karachi, (11th Edition) 2001, pp.435-38.
19. Quddus, op. cit., Pp.136-57.
20. For details see 'The Afghan coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security' by Hannah Negaran in Orbis, Vol 23 No.1, Spring 1979, USA, p.102.
21. see 'The Afghanistan Crsis' by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in Islamic Defence Review,ol.5, N0.2, Oct. 1980, UK, pp.11-19.
22. For a detailed analysis of various factors see 'The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma' by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in Asian Survey, Vol. xxiii, No.3, March 1983, pp.227-243.
23. For a detailed discussion of negotiations leading to the Geneva Accords see Riaz M. Khan Untying the Afghan Knot; Negotiating the Afghan Withdrawal, Progressive publishers, Lahore,1993.
24. The administrative cost of maintaining refugees was put around a million dollars a day in first half of the 80s. later the cost substantively increased. See' Along Afghanistan's War Torn Frontier' by Debra Danker in National Geographic, June 1985, p.788. Also see 'The Afghanistan Crisis and its Impact on Pakistan' by Hafeez Malik in Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.3, Spring 1982, pp.40-51.
25. Among the foreign donors were WFP, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNHCR along with most industrial rich states such as Japan etc. For a detailed analysis see 'Humanitarian Assistance and Implications' by Hasan-Askari Rizvi in Pakistan Horizon, Vol. xxxvii N0.1, 1st Quarter 1984, pp.40-61. An official summary of financial outlay for upkeep of 3 million refugees during the year 1984-85 was as follows:
Sources Amount Percentage
Government of Pakistan $ 205 million 49%
External sources $ 209 million 51%
See Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. A publication of the Chief Election Commissionerate, Government of Pakistan July 1984, p.17.
26. For details see 'Impact of the Afghan War' by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XLI, Jan. 1988, pp.23-45.
27. ibid.
28. See Hazards of Afghan crisis' by Khalid Akhtar in The Muslim, July 20, 1986. Also see Danker, op.cit. p.785. The War in Afghanistan; by Craig M. Karp in Foreign Affairs, Summer1996, pp.1026-47.
29. See 'The Impact of Afghanistan Crisis on Pakistan' in Afghanistan Today edited by Dr. Mohammad Shamsuddin Siddiqi, Area Study Centre(central Asia), University of Peshawar, 1987, pp.61-84.
30. See Michael Griffin 'Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan, Pluto Press, London, UK, 2001, pp. 1-16.
31. 'Pakistan's Afghanistan Policy: An Evaluation' by Dr. Babur Shah in The Foreign Policy Of Afghanistan by Musa Khan Jalalzai, Sang-E-Meel Publication, Lahore, 2003, PP.271-321.
32. ibid.
33. Griffin, op. cit, p.xiii
34. ibid, p.xv
35. See 'Pakistan-Afghan Relations, 1994-2000' by Mutahir Ahmed in The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives edited by K. Warikoo, Bhavana Books & Prints, New Delhi, India, 2002, pp.392-405.
36. Shah, op. cit., pp.293-94.
37. Mutihar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 398-99.
38. ibid.
39. See 'Precarious State: Afghanistan and the international and Australian response' by Elsina Wainwright in Strategic Insight, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 2006, p.2.
40. ibid., pp. 5-6.
41. See the interview of Minister of State for Interior on 'Pakistan's Intensified War on terrorism Got World Acclaim', in Solidarity International, Vol.1, Issue 7-8, July-August, 2005, pp.31-34.
42. In a recent statement the Pakistan Prime Minister categorically asserted that adverse developments in Afghanistan would have direct and immediate effect on Pakistan, therefore it would always be the endeavor of Pakistan to help and facilitate Afghanistan in securing desired levels of stability, unity, development and prosperity. See Dawn, June 10, 20
