Sri Lanka: Peace Process under Threat

Dr S I Keethaponcalan

Ever since war broke out between Sri Lanka's armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the mid-1980s, there have been attempts to resolve the conflict through political negotiations. The last such endeavor was launched with the signing of a ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the two parties in February 2002, followed by six rounds of talks in Asia and Europe. Although the process was suspended because of internal political melees between the two major political parties in the south, the CFA held despite escalating violence and the process did not collapse completely. Observers felt that the country was slowly sliding back into war. It was against this backdrop that Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected the fifth executive president of the country on 17 November 2005.

Peace Process 20051
The 2001 war plunged Sri Lanka into deep crisis. The economy seemed extremely vulnerable and the government found it impossible to fight the LTTE effectively. The LTTE also faced financial and manpower issues, despite its success on the battlefield: it could not continue its violent campaign for a separate state since the international community had mobilised against terrorism under the leadership of the US. Since the LTTE had already been banned in certain states as a terrorist organisation, it was also brought under the grand umbrella of terrorism without much hesitation. By the end of 2001, the international as well as domestic milieu was causing mutual damage to both parties, forcing them into a new peace process to find a solution to the ethno-political conflict.

However, a radical change in the political system was needed for a fresh initiative, which was brought about by the United National Party (UNP)'s ascendancy to power in December 2001. Sensing general public dissatisfaction with the policy adopted by the ruling People's Alliance in relation to the ethnic conflict, the UNP advocated a fresh peace process during its election campaign. The LTTE, on the other hand, signaled to the southern electorate that it was willing to deal with a new government headed by the UNP. Hence, the electoral victory of the UNP in 2001 was considered a mandate for peace talks with the LTTE, leading to CFA of 2002. The successful conclusion of the CFA led to six rounds of direct talks between the two parties at various international venues. Although the talks were initially fruitful, both parties later found it difficult to move forward. As the process failed to transfer what is popularly called the “peace dividend” to conflict-affected areas, the LTTE demanded an interim administration for the northern and eastern provinces. The LTTE also suspended participation in the peace process due to non-implementation of the agreed provisions put forward by the government in mid-2003.
Since direct talks had ceased, the two parties had to communicate through the official facilitators of the peace process, the Norwegians. More often than not, interaction took place in the public arena, enabling the people and other stakeholders to bear witness to the nature and substance of the proposals exchanged between the parties. In response to the LTTE's demand for an interim administration, the government presented three proposals, all of which were rejected because they did not meet the expectations of the rebels. When the third proposal was dismissed as inadequate, the LTTE agreed to present its own proposal, which was completed with the assistance of international consultation in late 2003. The LTTE espoused an extreme form of devolution, where the proposed interim administration was to function as an autonomous body with loose links with the central government in Colombo. This implied a radical shift from the accepted federal principles, igniting a political crisis in the south.

Meanwhile, a political struggle between the president and the government ensued in the south almost immediately after the UNP was elected to office. The Sri Lankan constitution provides for a president and a government, both elected independently by the people in separate elections. When both entities are from the same party, the system operates without problems because, as chief executive, the president wields control over all other state organs. Now, for the first time, two different parties occupied the presidency and government, and the UNP wanted total control over state affairs on the premise that it had been given a new mandate to rule. Since then, a tug of war has continued between President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the government headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Kumaratunga, who opposed the way in which the peace process was being carried out and the proposal to set up an interim administration, exploited the LTTE's proposal to undermine the government. Claiming that the LTTE proposal violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, she removed three vital ministries from the government in November 2003. With the takeover of the ministries of defence, internal affairs, and mass communication, the peace process was suspended. The president's alliance with the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), an anti-devolution party, led to fresh elections in April 2004. A new alliance, the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), won the snap election, which effectively closed the door on the peace process. Although, the new government re-invited the Norwegian peace facilitators, no meaningful steps were taken to commence dialogue with the LTTE largely due the attitude of the JVP; the peace process remained deadlocked. It was against this backdrop that the 2005 presidential election took place, in which Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected the fifth executive president of the country.

Presidential Elections, 2005
Although a large number of candidates contested the election, the real race was between UNP candidate Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. In Sri Lanka, the presidential election is about alliances and pre-poll deals, as small parties, especially minority parties, wield the power to determine the outcome of the election. Since the UNP, under the leadership of Wickremesignhe, had established a pro-minority outlook, his alliance comprised some of the major minority parties, e.g., the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC); Wickremesinghe was also expected to gain the endorsement of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Rajapaksa, on the other hand, built the largest possible coalition with more than twenty small parties and splinter groups. His alliance included two crucial partners: the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Both parties have been built on incompatible political philosophies. The JVP was a Marxist socialist entity that tried capturing power by violence, first in the early 1970s and then in the late 1980s. Since both rebellions failed miserably, the group transformed itself into a political party albeit with its original socialist objectives and contested elections.2 The JHU was formed in 2004 by a group of politically motivated Buddhist monks with the aim of establishing a darmarajya (righteous state) in Sri Lanka. It is evident that, while the former is a socialist Marxist political entity, the latter is founded on religious philosophies. Despite their electoral rivalries and contest for the same block of votes, both parties share the conviction that what plagues Sri Lanka is terrorism rather than ethno-political conflict. Hence, both parties are apt to reject proposals to devolve powers seriously to the disputed regions, and prefer a military solution, if feasible.

In order to gain the endorsement of these two Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist parties, Rajapaksa, as the SLFP's presidential candidate, had to accept many of the conditions they put forward. Characteristically, most of these conditions related to the ethnic question and to peace talks with the LTTE. Rajapaksa agreed, for instance, to preserve the unitary structure of the state when it was evident that devolving powers beyond the existing unitary constitution was essential to resolving the ethnic conflict peacefully. Inspired by the JVP and JHU, Rajapaksa, in his election manifesto Mahinda Chinthanaya (Mahinda Vision,) rejected some of the basic concepts of the Tamil struggle for self-determination in what they call their historical homeland. In his election manifesto, Rajapaksa declared that “my primary aim would be to arrive at a peaceful political settlement where the power of each and every citizen is strengthened to the maximum, without being trapped within concepts such as traditional homelands and right to self determination.”3 During his campaign, he and his followers reiterated their belief in a unitary structure for the state, projecting the impression that he would adopt a hard-line approach to resolving the ethnic conflict.

Wickremesinghe contested the election on the slogan of federalism as an answer to the ethnic issue. This generated the impression that the Tamil minorities preferred Wickremesinghe over Rajapaksa's hard-line position. It is also imperative to note that presidential elections in Sri Lanka are generally won by candidates who manage to gain the confidence of minority ethnic communities. This reality enforced the belief that Wickremesinghe could easily overpower Rajapaksa since he had secured the formal endorsement of principal political parties representing the minorities.

However, the LTTE had other plans. At the eleventh hour, it announced that the Tamil people would boycott the presidential election on the premise that it was an affair of the Sinhala nation and the Tamil nation had nothing to do with southern politics. It was suggested that the LTTE was disappointed by the UNP's general attitude towards the peace talks, where it failed to deliver on some of the major demands of the LTTE, e.g., its demand for removal of the High Security Zones in the Jaffna peninsula, or the demand for an interim administration. Instead, the UNP focused on building what was termed an international safety net against the rebels. Regarding Wickremesinghe's approach, LTTE leader Pirabakaran had this to say in his Heroes Day speech in 2005: “It is suffice to say that Mr. Wickremesinghe's administration was unable to resolve even the basic existential hardships and urgent humanitarian needs of our people. Adopting delaying tactics, Ranil's governemnt was primarily focusing on setting up an international safety net aiming at decommissioning our weapons [sic].”4

The LTTE's decision to boycott the polls was a major setback for Wickremesinghe's campaign, and indeed played a major role in the electoral defeat of the UNP in November 2005. Rajapaksa won the election by a margin of about 200,000 votes. His hard-line slogans were popular within the Sinhala-majority areas and accepted by the majority of people. The vote for Rajapaksa reinforced the Sinhala conviction of and desire to preserve the unitary structure of the state. Hence, the likes of the JVP and JHU painted the outcome of the presidential election in 2005 as a mandate given to preserve the unitary state, which was also acknowledged by some independent observers. It was against this backdrop that Rajapaksa, as president of the country, had to deal with the peace process in general and the LTTE in particular.

The LTTE's Reaction
Within ten days of the election of the new president, LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabakaran delivered his annual speech commemorating the dead cadres. The speech attracted a great deal of domestic and international attention, as the LTTE leader was expected to spell out his assessment of the new president and prospects for future engagement. On 27 November 2005, Pirabakaran proclaimed that he had no faith in the peace process or the ability of the Sinhala leadership to offer a reasonable solution to the problems of the Tamil people. With regard to President Rajapaksa's stance on the ethnic question, Pirabakaran contended that “having carefully examined his (Rajapaksa's) policy statement in depth, we have come to a conclusion that President Rajapkse has not grasped the fundamentals, the basic concepts underlying the Tamil national question. In terms of policy, the distance between him and us is vast. However, President Rajapakse is considered a realist committed to pragmatic politics, we wish to find out, first of all, how he is going to handle the peace process and whether he will offer justice to our people. We have, therefore, decided to wait and observe, for sometime, his political maneuvers and actions.”5

What was evident from this statement was that, although the LTTE hierarchy was not optimistic about Rajapaksa, it wanted to give the new administration some space to prove its will and capacity to deliver. There were two major reasons for this seemingly flexible approach. First, despite the fact that President Rajapaksa was elected on the strength of a hard-line policy, he had reiterated his willingness to engage the LTTE in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. Although some of his policy positions, such as transforming the bilateral mode of negotiation into a multi-party framework, had been detrimental to the peace process, he had constantly insisted on his desire to terminate the conflict by peaceful means.6 Second, the LTTE could not recommence its violent struggle for self-determination without giving the new administration an opportunity because this would have ignited international backlash against the rebels. The LTTE leader maintained that the movement would intensify the struggle for self-determination, giving the Rajapaksa administration about a year to deliver.7 These statements of the two leaders opened up a window of opportunity to recommence the stalled peace talks. Nonetheless, international pressure on the LTTE and domestic economic compulsions on the government played a major role in pushing the parties to the negotiating table.

The Geneva Talks
Taking advantage of the changing domestic scenario, the third-party facilitator proposed holding talks in Geneva. This required both the government and LTTE to alter their positions, as they had originally wished to have the meeting in Oslo and at an Asian destination, respectively. Once they had agreed to meet in Geneva, the LTTE proposed discussing only the implementation of the CFA as a first step. Proper implementation of the CFA also assumed significance as the level of violence had reached a dangerous proportion, with killings taking place in the government as well as in LTTE-held territories. Discussing the CFA as a first step was considered fitting by many observes. However, the government was annoyed by the LTTE's attitude and its refusal to discuss other relevant issues.

One of the reasons why the LTTE was adamant about discussing the proper implementation of the CFA was that it wanted to halt the activities of the Tamil paramilitary groups, which, in collusion with state-armed forces, continued to attack the LTTE interests. Article 1.8 of the CFA provided that “Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 days at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.”8

Although, a number of Tamil paramilitary groups have been operating against the LTTE in the northern and eastern provinces, the LTTE was distressed most by the activities of what is popularly called the “Karuna group”, which was originally part of the LTTE but broke away along regional lines in early 2004. Group leader Muralitharan, also known as “Karuna”, was number two in the LTTE and had participated in the first phase of talks between the LTTE and UNP government. Following allegations of financial irregularities by the LTTE leadership, Karuna declared his intension to operate independently from the mainstream group; at the time of the split, he commanded about 5,000 cadres. The mainstream group staged a military assault on the Karuna cadres within a few months and overran its bases in the eastern province. Karuna disbanded his units and escaped to an undisclosed destination, presumably with the assistance of the Sri Lankan government. Since then, his followers had been collaborating with the Sri Lankan armed forces against the LTTE. Hence, the LTTE now wanted to persuade the Sri Lankan government to disarm all paramilitary groups according to the provisions of the CFA.

In Geneva, the delegations of the government and LTTE engaged in a contest of accusations instead of meaningful dialogue because the Sri Lankan government in particular was playing to its hard-line constituency. The focus was more on projecting an unbending image to domestic political partners. At one stage, the Geneva talks were on the verge of collapse, which would not have benefited the government since it was not prepared to wage war immediately. The parties renewed their commitment to the peace process. A press release issues by the Norwegian government at the end of the talks declared that “the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) and the LTTE are committed to respecting and upholding the Ceasefire Agreement, and reconfirmed their commitment to fully cooperate with and respect the rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).”9 Moreover, the parties also agreed to meet again in Geneva in April 2006.

The LTTE interpreted the agreement to uphold the CFA as an undertaking to disarm the Karuna group. The government delegation, however, came under severe criticism, especially from nationalistic elements in the south, for agreeing to the LTTE's demand. This forced the government to maintain in Colombo that it had not agreed to disarm the paramilitaries. The government held an ambiguous position with regard to the Karuna group and put forward different arguments to protect it. Initially, Rajapaksa's administration maintained that the armed forces had no links with the group. Rajapaksa himself claimed that “my government knows nothing about such paramilitaries or even Karuna.”10 The general secretary of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat on the other hand maintained that “there may be low level contacts with cadres of Karuna group. There has been a ceasefire and may be security personnel could have had personal contacts with other groups.”11 Some members of the government were of the opinion that the government was not obliged to disarm Karuna since it was not a paramilitary group but part of the LTTE when the CFA was signed.

Disarming the group was not an easy issue to handle. First and foremost, Karuna could be of immense value in conditions of war. As a person who had been part of the LTTE leadership, Karuna might possess invaluable knowledge about the organization that would prove useful if and when war resumed. Hence, the government was not eager to renounce a military asset that easily. In addition, there was immense pressure on the Rajapaksa administration from coalition partners, namely the JVP and JHU, not to concede to the demands of the LTTE. These parties preferred a military solution to the ethnic conflict and expected a situation of war sooner rather than later. It was also possible that a segment of the armed forces might also resist such a move in view of the prevailing violent environment. Evidently, the government could not disarm the Karuna group as demanded by the LTTE. The rebels, on the other hand, refused to participate in the second round of talks that were to be held in Geneva on the premise that the government had not fulfilled its promises made in Geneva. Since, then the process that was initiated in Geneva remains deadlocked, contributing to insecurity and more violence.

Immediate Issues
The deadlock has been caused by many factors, but two major elements can be pointed out as immediate causes. First, the prevailing political realities in the south do not allow a flexible approach by the Rajapaksa administration. Its political alliance with the JVP and JHU hinders meaningful measures to promote conflict resolution. The ruling UPFA commands 105 seats in a 225-seat legislature, including the members of the JVP. However, since 39 members of the JVP function as a separate entity in parliament, President Rajapaksa is left with only 66 seats of his own. This forces him to depend heavily on the JVP and JHU for the survival of his own administration. These parties have threatened to withdraw their support if Rajapaksa adopts a flexible approach vis-à-vis the LTTE.

Second, the mistrust between the government and LTTE has remained extremely high since Rajapaksa assumed office. The LTTE does not believe that this administration will do justice to the problems of the Tamil people. This is why Pirabakaran pointed out that “Over the last three decades of our national liberation struggle we have observed ceasefires and participated in peace talks at different periods of time in different historical circumstances. We knew that our enemy was dishonest and devious. We knew that these peace talks would not produce any positive results.”12 The LTTE has turned increasingly to violent methods to achieve its political objectives despite the CFA. It is also evident from international sources that the LTTE has been preparing for a final war. The LTTE may very well resume its struggle for self-determination by the end of the year. Partly because of the assumption that the LTTE will opt for full-scale war and partly because of its own conviction that the rebels can be defeated by military means, the government is also preparing for another war. Initially, it had approached India for military assistance, but since India withdrew from Sri Lanka following a bitter war with the LTTE and on the Sri Lankan government's request to end its involvement, it is not eager to become directly involved in Sri Lanka's affairs. Now, the government has turned to China and Pakistan for weapons procurements, intensifying the scheme to increase its military preparedness.

The government has been waging war more actively in the international arena. During the last four years, the state has spent little or no energy in rebuilding its machinery of war due to monetary constrains. The LTTE, however, was preparing for war while talking peace, because it never believed that the talks would lead to a permanent solution. Therefore, the government is not certain about taking on the LTTE immediately. Currently, it is buying time to strengthen the capacity of the armed forces, while waging active war internationally. The LTTE has been funded heavily by the Tamil diaspora scattered in various Western countries. The government is convinced that it is this financial support that makes it difficult to beat the LTTE. By exhausting its source of funding, some policymakers believe that the LTTE could be forced to compromise or even be defeated if and when war resumes. The government is therefore engaged in an active campaign to have the LTTE banned in the West. This process was initiated by former foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and pursued vigorously by the Rajapaksa administration. Consequently, the LTTE was proscribed as a terrorist organization by the US, UK, and India. Finally, in mid-2006, the European Union (EU) also banned the LTTE. The EU ban was a major setback for the rebels internationally and could affect the organisation in terms of financial resources in the long run. However, it is extremely unlikely that the organisation will be affected by the ban in the short term.

What is however imperative is the impact of the ban on the peace process. Although international opinion does not determine the decisions of the LTTE, it obviously has some influence. Many LTTE projects may have been suppressed due to fear of international backlash. This is truer in a post-9/11 world. Despite serious violations of the CFA, the factor that has sustained the peace process so far has been the involvement of the international community. Against this backdrop, the EU ban could be a setback in view of the peace process, as the LTTE has no need to worry about international opinion any longer. If the LTTE is warming up for another war, the decision will not be too difficult to make since the international community has now lost its influence over the LTTE.

Conclusion
When Rajapaksa assumed office as the fifth executive president of Sri Lanka in November 2005, the peace process was deadlocked. Although Rajapaksa advocated a hard-line approach towards the peace process, he expressed his desire to talk to the LTTE, leading to Geneva talks in February 2006. Although both parties agreed to uphold the CFA, violations continued on both sides. The government could not or did not want to disarm the Tamil paramilitary groups working with state-armed forces. The LTTE refused to participate in any further negotiations with the government until and unless the paramilitary groups were disarmed, contributing to another deadlock. Currently, the parties are unable to introduce meaningful measures to break the deadlock due to the political realities prevailing in the south and the high level of mistrust. The situation is deteriorating rapidly, intensifying the fear that another round of war may start sooner rather than later.

End Notes
1. For a detailed analysis of the peace process between 2002 and 2004 see, S.I.Keethaponcalan, “Sri Lanka Peace Process, 2002-2004: Another Opportunity Lost,” in Regional Studies, 2006, Vol-XXIV, No-2, pp. 81 104.
2. Jayadeva Uyangoda (2003) “Social Conflict, Radical Resistance and Projects of State Power in Southern Sri Lanka: The case of JVP,” in Markus Mayer, Darini Rajasingham Senanayake, & Yuvi Thangarajah (eds) Building Local Capacities for Peace, Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: MacMillan).
3. For the election manifesto see Mahinda Chinthana 2005, p.32. Available http://www.mahindarajapaksa.com/PENews/oct1805_01.php
4. “LTTE to Intensify Struggle for Self Determination if Reasonable Political Solution is not offered Soon,” Tamilnet.com, November 27, 2005.
5. Ibid.
6. V.S.Sambandan, “ A Narrow Victory,” Frontline, Vol-22, Issue-25.
7. “LTTE to Intensify Struggle for Self Determination if Reasonable Political Solution is not offered Soon,” Tamilnet.com, November 27, 2005.
8. See the cease-fire agreement. Available
Http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/peace2005/Insidepage/Agreements/agceasefire.asp
9. To see the press release, check “Statement Sri Lanka Talks,” available http://odin.dep.no/ud/english/news/news/032171-990305/dok-bn.html
10. For an interview with the Sri Lankan President see, “I Want Lasting Peace,” <http:service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,402078,00.html>
11. “President Faces Crisis of Credibility,” The Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), May 28, 2006, p.10.
12. Heroes day speech, 2005. See “LTTE to Intensify Struggle for Self Determination if Reasonable Political Solution is not offered Soon,” Tamilnet.com, November 27, 2005.