At last, the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan are meeting on 14 November 2006 in New Delhi, to resume the composite dialogue process that was put on hold in the wake of the 11 July serial train blasts by terrorists in Mumbai, which killed around 181 innocent people. The Havana summit meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf not only broke the deadlock on the resumption of bilateral dialogue, but also paved the way for the creation of an “India-Pakistan institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations”. Both leaders seem to have covered some distance in bridging their differences, agreeing on measures to curb terrorism, and exploring ways towards conflict resolution. But the future prospects of the whole process depend on how far Islamabad tries its best to satisfy India in curbing India-specific terrorism and cross-border infiltration on the one hand, and on whether New Delhi appropriately responds to the flexibility being shown by President Musharraf on the tedious issue of Kashmir, on the other.
Followed by the Havana summit and yet-to-be-created joint anti-terrorism institutional mechanism, India has formally charged 11 Pakistanis for having allegedly carried out the Mumbai blasts, implicating the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), two Pakistan-based outlawed militant outfits, and the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Addressing a conference of armed forces' commanders, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has “put Pakistan on notice that any democratic government of India would find it difficult to continue on the present path (of dialogue) to address all outstanding issues unless the government of Pakistan clearly deals with the issue of terrorism”. While India has provided “evidence” to other powers, Islamabad has yet not received any kind of brief on Indian investigations into the Mumbai blasts. It has to be appreciated, however, that it was President Musharraf who raised the issue of hostility among the intelligence services of the two countries against the backdrop of charges and counter-charges of interference in each other's internal affairs, and who proposed, in his interview with Frontline, that “the intelligence agencies of both sides should reach an agreement to stop interfering in each other's internal affairs”.
Expressing their resolve at the Havana summit to sustain the peace process and underlying the importance of its success for the whole South Asian region, Mr. Singh and Mr. Musharraf decided “to continue the joint search for a peaceful settlement of all issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, in a sincere and purposeful manner”. In the context of the dispute over Kashmir, they agreed to “build on convergences and narrow down divergences”. What are the convergences and divergences, one might ask, over a most divisive issue?
Already, the two sides have drawn their bottom lines: India is not ready to alter borders and any further divide on religious lines; and Pakistan is not ready to accept the Line of Control (LoC) as an international border permanently dividing the Kashmiris. However, both have agreed to make LoC “irrelevant” or, as Manmohan Singh said on 25 May 2006, “just a line on the map”. If President Musharraf has spoken about the “joint management” of the two parts of Kashmir, Mr. Singh prefers the expression, “institutional arrangements”. On the Kashmiris' right to self-rule, Musharraf is for “self-governance” and India is traditionally for maximum “autonomy”, barring sovereignty. Both are against conceding “independence” to the Kashmiris. The divergences are on what areas constitute Kashmir; whether Jammu, Ladakh, and the Northern Areas will be out of it; the quantum of autonomy; exact nature of joint-management/institutional arrangement between the two parts of Kashmir; the autonomy component and residual powers to be retained by the two countries; and the Indo-Pak coordinating “superstructure” and the nature of Kashmiris' representation, demilitarization/end to militancy and security, etc.
If there is enough political will on both sides, as convergences expand, the remaining divergences can be bridged and certain patterns and legal frameworks can be adapted from the resolution of other such disputes, as on Kashmir, to suit our peculiar circumstances. The dispute over Kashmir has lingered on for too long and has cost too much, not only for the Kashmiris, but also for 1.4 billion people in the Subcontinent. It may take time to set an irreversible process in motion to settle the issue, but it must be resolved and removed from the gambit of Indo-Pak relations. Given their past animosity, even the most ancillary issues have turned into perennial issues, such as Siachin and Sir Creek, which could be solved without haggling over details and wasting time. On water issues, both countries remain committed to the Indus Water Treaty.
The real issue, or what we can describe as the core issue, is what kind of relationship the twin-brothers of the Subcontinent might evolve while overcoming past enmities and the mindset of enmity. No doubt, the bloody partition of the Subcontinent left deep scars on both sides, yet the countries could have healed the wounds and started a new chapter of a fraternal relationship. But this did not happen because the Indians refused to accept the new reality and the Pakistanis continued to perceive India as an eternal enemy, while both sides took opposite roads in entering into hostile international alignments. This approach did not come to an end even after the end of the Cold War.
The time has come to evolve a new paradigm of fraternal and mutually beneficial partnership and cooperative relationship in the region and on the world stage. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah wanted a fraternal relationship between the two independent states. Instead of competing in an arms race and planning to destroy each other, they need to develop cooperative security, including measures to stabilise the nuclear regime, and universal nuclear disarmament while in the same boat. Indeed, there are particular legitimate national interests to pursue, but why should they be brought into conflict with our shared destiny?
As India and Pakistan continue their efforts to peacefully resolve their contentious issues, all areas of potential cooperation, both bilateral and regional, should be fully exploited to the best advantage of our respective peoples. If Pakistan should grant Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India and allow trade and investment between the two countries, India needs to lower its tariffs and remove non/para-tariff barriers to trade. While New Delhi repeatedly claims that India offers a great economic opportunity to its neighbours, it should be taking concrete measures to translate its words into deeds. Both big brothers of South Asia must, in the mean while, continue the process of converting SAARC into a vibrant economic union.
The next phase of dialogue should be made productive and useful while narrowing down the areas of differences to be resolved at the political level and fully implementing the agreements already reached and various joint statements signed between the two sides since 6 January 2004. For this to happen, Pakistan and India must jointly curb the scourge of terrorism that threatens both countries, show greater forbearance and patience for a better tomorrow, and not let terrorists derail the peace process. In the mean while, let the two sides remove all hurdles in the way of people-to-people contact by radically liberalising their visa regimes and removing all curbs on the free flow of people and information across our borders to strengthen solidarity and friendship among the people. Together with other South Asian countries, India and Pakistan must strive to make the region yet another powerhouse of economic growth and prosperity, side by side with our neighbour China, and not let others make Asians fight Asians.
