Occasional ethnic tensions between Sri Lanka's majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil communities notwithstanding, both groups had lived together peacefully for centuries. Indeed, Sinhalese and Tamil elites collaborated to attain universal franchise from the British colonial authorities in 1931, merely three years before the British themselves enjoyed such egalitarian status, and their camaraderie also enabled the island to gain independence in 1948. But around 1955, just seven years after independence, the island's Sinhalese elites began outbidding each other on who could provide the best deal for their community at the expense of the Tamils. The ethnocentrism that was consequentially embedded led to the Tamils' marginalisation, and their reactive nationalism eventually unleashed a gruesome civil war that has killed nearly 70,000 persons and threatened to dismember Sri Lanka. In what follows, this paper will argue that (i) Sinhalese ethnocentrism contributed to the reactive Tamil nationalism that has now culminated in civil war, (ii) an arrangement that jettisons the unitary system and provides wide devolution to the mostly Tamil-speaking northeast region is the optimum way to end the ethnic conflict and (iii) Sri Lanka's very close relations with India should also help ensure that the country stays united.

Ethnic Outbidding and the Politics of Opportunism
English continued to operate as the official language when Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon) gained independence, despite only about 10 per cent of the population speaking it fluently. It was thus understandable why many Sinhalese and Tamil elites felt it was high time the vernacular languages were given their rightful place, and this led to a movement that called for replacing English with Sinhala and Tamil as official languages. Sri Lanka's politicians in the opposition, headed by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, however, realised that linguistic nationalism could be manipulated to attain power, and in 1955 his party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), began demanding that only Sinhala be made the official language. The irony is that Bandaranaike had been one of the strongest proponents of linguistic parity, arguing that 'it would be ungenerous on our part as Sinhalese not to give due recognition to the Tamil language1.' But eager to become prime minister, Bandaranaike changed stripes and began thundering that linguistic parity would spell 'disaster to the Sinhalese race2.' The island's Tamil leaders had collaborated with their Sinhalese counterparts to ensure that the transfer of power from the British to the Ceylonese was a tidy affair, and this was partly because Sinhalese elites had promised that they would not abuse their majority status and instead treat the minority communities fairly. The Sinhala-only movement was the first sign that the concord reached among the elites was about to be sundered.

Making Sinhala the only official language, especially at a time when the state was the largest employer, meant that those not speaking the majority community's language stood marginalised and their socio-economic upward mobility undermined. Part of the argument made by those clamouring for Sinhala-only was that British colonial policies had disproportionately benefited the minority communities. This was certainly the case, given the British proclivity to divide and rule. That noted, marginalising the Tamils and their legitimate aspirations signalled that the majority Sinhalese state was unwilling to treat its minorities fairly.

When it became clear that Bandaranaike was going to win the 1956 elections on the Sinhala-only platform, the governing United National Party (UNP), which had hitherto strongly supported linguistic parity, also changed positions, with Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala claiming that he wanted Sinhala 'to be the official language as long as the sun and moon shall last3.' Thereafter, the UNP and SLFP began outbidding each other on who could provide the best deal to the majority Sinhalese community at the expense of the minority community. It was the beginning of Sri Lanka's outbidding culture that has, in various other guises, continued to this day.

The political agitprop that Bandaranaike and his supporters resorted to, made many Sinhalese believe that their socio-economic conditions would be transformed overnight. This was pie-in-the-sky, and in trying to appease their disgruntled Sinhalese constituencies, subsequent Sinhalese politicians began promoting policies that further undermined the Tamils. Some of these policies saw Tamils forced to operate in Sinhala when dealing with the country's courts, traditionally Tamils areas colonised by transplanted Sinhalese settlers, resources earmarked for Tamil areas diverted to Sinhalese areas, Buddhism (which is practiced by the vast majority of Sinhalese) provided special status in the 1972 Constitution, and quota systems instituted for tertiary education so that fewer Tamils were admitted to the university system. The anti-Tamil riots that ensued in 1956 and 1958 further consolidated Tamil opinion that the Sinhalese were bent upon dominating and marginalising the minority communities. The Tamils initially resorted to non-violent protests when demanding that the language policies be reversed. But the numerous pro-Sinhalese and anti-Tamil policies that were instituted over the next two decades caused Tamil youths to mobilise seeking separation. The more Sinhalese politicians disregarded legitimate Tamil grievances -- so that even agreements reached between the two groups' elites were abrogated once Sinhalese nationalists put pressure on their leaders -- the more the moderate Tamil politicians were made to look impotent and ineffective. The military was stationed in Tamil areas in 1961, and the mostly Sinhalese soldiers soon began operating in a ham-fisted fashion. The more these miscreants in the military misbehaved with impunity, the more marginalised the Tamils started to feel and the more it undermined their confidence in the Sri Lankan state. A state may have a monopoly on the use of force, but that force is legitimate only if used in a fair and just fashion. Whenever state authorities resort to force to dominate and marginalise a minority community, and utilise such emotive issues as language and religion to stoke such subordination, a territorialised minority is likely to rebel. This is indeed what ensued in Sri Lanka4; especially after the 1983 anti-Tamil riots killed 400-2000 Tamils5

It is clear that the opportunistic practices adopted by Sri Lanka's Sinhalese elites, who cavalierly placed their personal political ambitions ahead of the island's national interests, were what legitimised Tamil extremism, though none could have envisioned it would lead to the emergence of a militant group, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), dominating the northeast. As Nigel Harris has aptly observed, 'Successive [Sinhalese] governments were more preoccupied with securing their own base among the Sinhalese. . . at virtually any cost -- or rather, in the political auction, preventing themselves being pushed out by their rivals. If the Tamils had not existed, Colombo would have had to invent them. And, in an important sense, it did. It was Colombo that forced the inhabitants of the north to become different, to cease to be Sri Lankan and become exclusively Tamil7.' Sri Lanka's present leaders also agree: for example, President Kumaratunga has repeatedly observed that the island has not succeeded in the crucial task of nation building because its governments 'failed to address the issue of building a truly pluralist nation state.' The former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has also noted that 'The Tamils tried peaceful protests which soon degenerated into violence. With the underlying grievances being unattended, the stage was set for terrorist groups to emerge. Whatever the cause, the reality became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam8.'

The LTTE is branded a terrorist outfit by a number of countries, and Sri Lanka's future as a united island now also depends on what its (LTTE's) leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, decides to ultimately settle for. Since Sri Lanka's Sinhalese leaders continue to try to outbid each other on all issues concerning the ethnic conflict, their numerous enlightened pronouncements notwithstanding, they are more interested in attaining and maintaining power than formulating a lasting settlement that may see Sinhalese and Tamils coalesce9. That the lessons learnt from 50 years of ethnic malpractice have not managed to coax them away from such expeditious behaviour is one of the attendant tragedies of the island's civil war

The Debate on Devolution
One would think that after all Sri Lanka has gone through there would not be much debate on how a more devolved structure -- federal or otherwise -- would be a welcome option, since that would maintain the country's unity even as it satisfies the vast majority of Tamils. Indeed, devolving power is the best option for both parties because it requires the predominantly Sinhalese state and the LTTE to compromise. Not only is devolution opposed by nationalist politicians whose monomania over maintaining the extant unitary state structure contributes to ethnocentric rhetoric, but the debate on devolution is also used by mainstream leaders who adeptly manipulate the issue (especially when in the opposition) to outbid their respective opponents.

The Sinhala-only language policy had legitimised the Tamil demand for increased autonomy in the northeast, which the Tamils have long considered their traditional homeland, and the Federal Party (FP), headed by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, made this its fundamental plank when negotiating with Sinhalese leaders. Indeed, the FP and Chelvanayakam were initially opposed to the country being divided and instead only demanded devolution, since they believed that would allow the Tamils to oversee their own affairs with some self respect and prevent further colonisation of the northeast by Sinhalese settlers10. Sinhalese nationalists, assisted by radical Buddhist monks, campaigned against any form of devolution, claiming that such a change would be the first step towards the island's dismemberment.

Indeed, the nationalist forces are assisted by the country's omnipresent Buddhist monks who command veneration and influence among the Sinhalese Buddhists11. Claiming that the island was destined to be a repository for the Buddhist faith, the most radical among these monks have promoted a military solution and long argued that all minorities in the island live under the sufferance of the Sinhalese Buddhists. These purportedly peace-loving monks have volunteered to go house-to-house to promote such an outcome, abused and attacked pro-peace activists, and even claimed that some of them are ready to disrobe to join the army. The radical monks' ferocity even led the state owned Sunday Observer to note that 'it is frightening to observe the insouciance with which the most revered prelates of the Maha Sangha talk of a recourse to arms12.' The monks were at the forefront in forcing S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and others to abrogate agreements that were reached with the Tamils, agreements that, if implemented, could have ended the Sinhalese-Tamil antipathy that followed the Sinhala only movement. But Sinhalese politicians have long pandered to the monks' every whim and fancy to unleash an invidious charade whereby the monks and the politicians shamelessly manipulate each other to perpetuate their corrupt and divisive designs13. These extremist monks in no way represent all monks in Sri Lanka and they certainly do not represent the views of most Buddhists14, have consequently had a baneful influence on the attempt to seek a solution to the ethnic conflict between the LTTE and the government.

The LTTE now oversees vast areas in the northeast, and the written proposals the organisation made to the previous United National Front (UNF) government in October 2003, if implemented, would enable a de facto statelet. The vast majority of Sri Lankans now agree that the ethnic issue may have been settled if Sinhalese leaders had agreed to the modest demands the FP made in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet many Sinhalese, no doubt influenced by the ethnocentric agitprop of the nationalists, oppose any form of devolution and argue that the LTTE should be militarily defeated. One president even had the chutzpah to argue that what the country faced was not an ethnic problem but a terrorist problem. That the terrorist problem was due to the majority community's chauvinism was conveniently disregarded. The LTTE has publicly stated that it could settle for a federal arrangement, though its demands are more in line with a confederal set up15. Indeed, it is highly questionable if the LTTE is sincere in its claim, though one cannot be fully certain of this until the Sinhalese parties craft a package that allows the northeast autonomy. The LTTE's practices -- i.e., forcibly recruiting child soldiers, unleashing suicide bombers, assassinating its Tamil rivals, and not tolerating a modicum of dissent -- have provided ample fodder for these nationalists to hold strongly to their extremist beliefs. The irony is that while it was the extremist and ethnocentric actions of the radical Sinhalese that legitimated the rise of the LTTE, now it is the LTTE's actions that have provided the extremist Sinhalese with the legitimacy to operate in the most intransigent fashion.

Those against devolution have also opposed the activities of civil society groups, and they pillory the Norwegians who have been facilitating the peace talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state. The nationalists and many Sinhalese consider the Norwegians to be biased in favour of the LTTE, and a member of the SLFP -- before the party, as part of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition, returned to power in April 2004 -- even derogatorily referred to the Norwegian representatives as 'salmon eating busybodies.' Civil society groups are especially lambasted as parasitic organisations that have used the ethnic conflict to pursue agendas inimical to the island's sovereignty and territorial integrity. As the newspaper Island, which toes the nationalist line, argued: 'Now, who constitutes Sri Lanka's civil society? Gullible foreign organisations have fallen into the trap of recognising groups of wishy-washy individuals who have no standing in Sri Lankan society. These groups hobnobbing at embassy functions, milking foreign monetary and travel grants are mostly those who have failed to gain entry to Sri Lankan universities and gone abroad on various scholarships . . . and come back with doctorates in law and other esoteric subjects. Others are those who have been sponsored by anti-national Sri Lankan interests, determined to change the religious and cultural outlook of this country and distort its history16.' Such caustic rhetoric stems from the nationalists; belief that the LTTE is not to be trusted and that the group does not qualify to be regarded as the Tamils' sole representative (a principle LTTE demand). They are most likely right, but two decades of war have proven that there is unlikely to be a military solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. The only reason successive governments have decided to talk peace with the LTTE is because of the rebels' military prowess. There can consequently be no peace to the island's ethnic imbroglio unless the government talks to the LTTE -- irrespective of whether the rebels at this stage are willing to settle for an arrangement short of eelam (Tamil state) or not. What will mostly help the government's position is a united southern front, whereby parties would come together across the ideological spectrum to form a national government determined to devolve power to the northeast in a fair fashion while maintaining the island's territorial integrity. But rampant ethnic outbidding among Sinhalese politicians has prevented such an association, and that by itself is reason enough for the LTTE to believe it has to keep the military option open.

The India Factor
There is no gainsaying that India's preferences will play a big role in how conflict resolution transpires in Sri Lanka. With only 22 miles of the shallow Palk Strait separating Sri Lanka from India, all parties well understand that an outcome undermining Indian interests in the region cannot be implemented17 As president Chandrika Kumaratunga has noted: 'India is our immediate neighbour, with whom we have been inextricably bound by ties, the origins of which have long been lost in the mist of time. We have with India the broadest and deepest interaction that we as a nation could have with another state. India therefore possesses the capacity, given her vastly disparate strength and influence, to help or hinder (us) to a great extent. In a word the India factor is crucial to the existence of our nation. Forging and sustaining a mutually trusting and supportive friendship with India must therefore be for us, not just a conscious and soundly judged policy . . . [but] a natural and vital ingredient for our national well being18.' Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar has likewise stated that 'there can be no viable solution to our problem without the support of India19.'

In a real sense, the policies pursued during the early years of the J. R. Jayewardene administration (1977-88) and India's angry reaction to these policies is what has convinced Sri Lankan leaders to scrupulously take Indian interests into account. The pro-west, pro-free trade Jayewardene administration disregarded India's strategic concerns and began promoting policies that India felt was inimical to its interests. The more the government's structural adjustment policies became tied to its legitimacy, the more it embraced the west and distanced itself from India. Its anti-Tamils actions further angered the Tamil Nadu electorate and Indian leaders20. Indira Gandhi and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) responded by arming and training Tamil rebels. The LTTE ultimately became the most dominant rebel group, and when an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) deployed in 1987 in the northeast failed to keep the peace, the IPKF ended up fighting the LTTE. What ensued has been branded 'India's Vietnam' and 'India's Afghanistan21.' Fearing that the IPKF may be redeployed if Rajiv Gandhi was to be re-elected, the LTTE used a suicide bomber to assassinate Gandhi in 1991. The IPKF experience and Gandhi's killing have made the Indians cautious -- and some would argue overcautious -- when dealing especially with Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, so much so that in May 2000 the Indians refused to directly intervene to save nearly 40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers when it seemed like they were on the verge of being captured by the LTTE22.

The LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and many Sri Lankan leaders using suicide bombers and the forcible recruitment of child soldiers are two reasons a number of states, including the United States, have branded the group a terrorist organisation. Though they initially opposed internationalising the conflict, successive Sri Lankan governments have welcomed the international involvement, as that has further marginalised the LTTE among the international community. Thus the Norwegians, much to the chagrin of Sinhalese nationalists, have operated as facilitators between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE while Japanese and European Union diplomats have also stepped in and conducted discussions between the two antagonists. Throughout, Sri Lankan leaders and their foreign counterparts have kept the Indians fully informed of their dealings with the LTTE. Indeed, Sri Lankan leaders in the past few years have travelled to New Delhi so frequently to genuflect before Indian leaders and, more ignominiously, to bicker about their respective political opponents that they are generally regarded an embarrassment to most independent minded Sri Lankans.

Soon after the UPFA came to power in April 2004, the new Sri Lankan foreign minister flew to New Delhi and asked the Indians to get more involved in the peace process. With the Indians unwilling to see a separate Tamil state created in Sri Lanka and also vehemently opposed to the LTTE's activities in the region -- especially the group's naval capability that is used to smuggle in arms and its harassment of Indian fishermenSri Lanka's leaders are right to want increased Indian involvement in the peace process. The problem, however, is that the LTTE is unlikely to consider India a dispassionate third party to the conflict given the IPKF-LTTE war and the undiminished Indian antipathy towards the group, the Indian warrant still in place for Vellupillai Prabhakaran's arrest (given his alleged involvement in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination), and the LTTE's continued proscription as a terrorist group in India. The Congress Party, for obvious reasons, has been more anti-LTTE, and it even made clear before the April-May 2004 Indian elections that Prabhakaran's extradition 'remains on the table and there is no question of it being withdrawn23.' The Congress, as a part of coalition, has now regained power in India, and this makes it even more unlikely India would act as a facilitator, although its preferences would continue to be taken into account and its military support for the government against the LTTE could most likely grow.

The Sri Lankan government under Sirimavo Bandaranaike (President Kumaratunga's mother) enjoyed exceedingly friendly relations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and there is every reason to believe that President Kumaratunga and Sonia Gandhi (representing Congress) would enjoy equally close relations. Indeed, both women have had similar experiences: belonging to political dynasties, raising two children as single mothers after their spouses were assassinated by extremists24, and replacing their husbands to head political parties. Both also aspire to see their children succeed them at the helm of their respective parties. Moreover, Kumaratunga escaped an assassination attempt by the LTTE, while Sonia (Gandhi)'s husband was killed by the LTTE, and this should intensify the empathy they are bound to have for each other. It is hard to predict how Dr Manmohan Singh, Sonia Gandhi and the Congress Party will deal with the LTTE. On the one hand, the parties Congress allied with in Tamil Nadu for the 2004 elections either sympathise with the LTTE (i.e., Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, DMK) or openly support it (i.e, Pattali Makkal Katchi and Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam), which suggests that Congress may not pursue too drastic a policy against the LTTE. On the other hand, it is also clear that as long as Sonia Gandhi and her children play a leading role in the Congress Party a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka, even if attained militarily, would never be condoned by the Indians, which is to say that it will also not be recognised internationally.

Some claim that the main reason India opposes an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka is because that would radicalise separatist elements in Tamil Nadu. This is a dubious argument, given the extent to which India has succeeded in making South Indians think of themselves as Indian -- something the Sri Lankan state has failed to do with its northern Tamils -- and given the impotence of these supposedly separatist elements in South India. This line of reasoning is also questionable given that the LTTE craves closer relations with India and would rather support Indian interests than be subjected to the ethnocentric dictates of predominantly Sinhalese governments. An independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka will no doubt embolden separatists in Kashmir and insurgents in India's northeast. Indeed, separatist elements throughout the world would likely wonder why they should not succeed in their quests for independence if the LTTE was able to carve out a separate state in a small island like Sri Lanka. However, separatist groups rarely achieve success25, which does not bode well for the LTTE's quest to create eelam (an independent Tamil state). Consequently, the LTTE may ultimately have to jettison the struggle for eelam and instead settle for a more devolved structure, albeit one with more autonomy for Tamils than India and Sri Lanka prefer. This, too, would depend on intra-Sinhalese politics and India's involvement in the island.

Conclusion
In the mid-1950s opportunistic and unprincipled Sinhalese leaders began sowing the seeds of ethnocentrism to capture power, and in doing so the island reaped an ethnic conflict. The subsequent civil war has caused untold misery to tens of thousands of innocent civilians and exacerbated the regional security dynamic in South Asia, even as it has allowed the country’s elites to continue to practice ethnic outbidding. Like a repetitive nightmare, Sri Lanka's politicians in the opposition keep coming up with reasons to disagree with the respective government's policies to bridge the ethnic divide, even when the policies advocated are the same as those the opposition may have propounded when in power. Thus, the United National Front, which was relegated to the opposition after the April 2, 2004 parliamentary elections, has threatened to oppose the UPFA's attempts to continue the peace process with the LTTE, claiming that the UPFA criticised the UNF's approach to peace when it was in the opposition but has now embraced the same positions merely because it wants to ensure a parliamentary majority26 and receive the billions of dollars pledged by international donors to the peace process27. Such political opportunism is the LTTE's best ally, and the resulting outbidding is also the LTTE's best argument as to why the Tamils cannot trust Sinhalese elites and therefore qualify to create eelam.

(Neil DeVotta is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hartwick College, New York)

End Notes