Bangladesh-India Relations
I.
P. Khosla
|
Introduction:
The Basic Elements
The
basic elements
in the bilateral
relationship between
India and Bangladesh
may be outlined
by examining the
evolution of the
foreign policies
of the two countries
and the way in
which each has
figured in the
changing foreign
policy framework
of the other.
In India's case,
these elements
are common to
India's relations
with some other
South Asian neighbours
too, though not
all. In order
to illustrate
this point a few
examples will
be given in what
follows.
The first element
is the Nehruvian
policy of India
playing a role
on the world stage
-- meaning the
neighbours get
less attention.
This is what attracts
the comment that
'good neighbourliness
as such is not
an Indian foreign
policy goal ...
the tendency is
to take things
for granted with
the neighbours
so that it can
pursue the broader
foreign policy
goals.1' It was
not until 1958,
when the security
threat from China
loomed on the
horizon, that
Nehru began to
focus on South
Asia. In this
respect, and of
relevance to Bangladesh,
former Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi's
eyes were turned
to broader global
issues like world
disarmament, and
wished to bestow
benign or benevolent
neglect on the
South Asian neighbourhood,
including Bangladesh.
The second element
is more closely
associated with
the prime ministership
of Indira Gandhi
who expected the
neighbours to
accept the reality
of the power differential,
that they will
not and cannot
be equals in their
dealings with
India and there
is, therefore,
no harm in India
showing its teeth
from time to time,
if needed. In
the matter of
security interests,
particularly,
there are policy
makers who believe
that to compromise
even in a local
and seemingly
unimportant matter,
like a minor border
incident with
Nepal or Bangladesh,
is to jeopardise
national security.
This parallels
the neighbour's
image of the bully.
India is, of course,
larger than any
of its neighbours.
Putting all the
South Asian countries
together, India
accounts for 75
per cent of the
area, of the population
and of the GNP.
In the size of
armed forces the
gap is not so
wide, but India
is still bigger
than all its smaller
neighbours put
together. In industry
and technology
the gap is really
wide; the neighbours
have very little
and India is among
the world's leading
players. If trade
is thrown open,
the Indian economy
seems likely to
overwhelm the
region.
The large difference
in size and power
does lead to the
view, held by
the neighbours,
reinforced by
others, and seemingly
validated by Indira
Gandhi' policy,
that India aspires
to be a regional
hegemon, a dominating
power which will
bully its way
on whichever issue.
That policy was
seen 'to become
a hegemonic power
in South Asia
by playing a much
more assertive
role that she
had ever done
before'2. A corollary
to this is that
India would like
to keep the region
as an exclusive
sphere of influence
in its own version
of the Monroe
doctrine3. One
Bangladeshi commentator
writes that after
1971 Indian strategists
evolved 'the South
Asian version
of the Monroe
doctrine, wherein
India views the
entire region
as a single strategic
unit and herself
as the sole custodian
of security and
stability in the
region.4' Another
Bangladeshi puts
the same thought
in somewhat different,
and Marxist, terms,
that the 'Indian
ruling class successfully
organised hegemony
over the nationalist
struggle in Bangladesh';
and 'hegemony
among the Indian
population with
respect to the
nationalist struggle
in Bangladesh';
and in the third
place 'organised
international
consent to back
India's role',
a sort of hegemony
over the international
sphere, making
a triple hegemony5.
Or put another
way and more simply,
after Nehru there
was a 'new Indian
determination
to dominate South
Asian politics'6.
The third element,
which first appeared
with the government
of Morarji Desai
in 1977, and was
later developed
in larger theoretical
terms, can be
encapsulated in
the Gujral doctrine,
which has been
interpreted variously
from, at one extreme,
generosity confined
to rhetoric, through
unilateral accommodation,
where possible,
in neighbours
interests without
demanding reciprocity
to, at the other
extreme, giving
away more than
is reasonable.
Gujral himself
put it that with
its smaller South
Asian neighbours
'India does not
ask for reciprocity
but gives and
accommodates what
it can in good
faith and trust.7'
This goes parallel
to the view among
the neighbours
that India must
go the extra mile.
In every issue
India should give
more than it gets
in order to demonstrate
that it is, indeed,
not a bully out
to dominate the
region. This has
been a consistent
component of the
price of friendship.
The elements in
Bangladesh's foreign
policy include
a global view.
It is a member
of the non-aligned
movement, of the
Commonwealth,
and, more important,
of the Organization
of Islamic Conference.
There is also
an important regional
parameter: SAARC
is a Bangladesh
initiative. Bilateral
differences had
been obstacles
to South Asian
cooperation in
the past, but
the letter written
by President Ziaur
Rahman to the
other South Asian
heads of state/government
in 1980, and the
successful examples
of regional cooperation
in other parts
of the world produced,
after much discussion,
a Charter which
could be a promise
for substantial
economic cooperation
This would certainly
have a positive
impact on solving
other problems.
But India looms
large. There is
no dearth of commentators
who have stressed
that 'India's
regional supremacy
has played a central
role in the development
of Bangladesh's
foreign relations.
For each of the
smaller South
Asian states,
India's intentions
are of great concern,
but particularly
to Bangladesh
because it is
'almost surrounded
by India' and
'because it lacks
the military strength
and extra-regional
alliances to withstand
a serious challenge.8'
Geography compounds
the impression
of size since
India seems to
surround that
country. It is
'India-locked',
as commentators
from Bangladesh
are fond of saying.
Tabarak Hussain,
a former Bangladesh
foreign secretary,
writes: 'Bangladesh's
neighbourhood
is dominated by
India's presence.
A sense of its
pervasiveness
seems to prevail.
Heavy imbalance
in the power equation
between the two
countries compounds
the situation'9.
One set of aspects
which runs like
a common thread
in the practice
of international
relations in South
Asia is the intimacy
and intricacy
with which domestic
and foreign policies
interact. There
is a long-term
sense in which
this is true for
foreign policy
in general. The
classic writings
on international
relations tell
us that national
power, national
ideology, geography,
economic strength
are among a large
number of factors
that influence
foreign policy
decisions. For
India the domestic
environment has
been identified,
it has 'a major
influence on the
formulation of
foreign policy.
The five essential
elements in the
domestic environment
of India are tradition
and history, democracy,
the economic factors,
the pluralist
nature of society
in India, and
Nehru's charismatic
leadership.10'
In the general
field of international
relations, however,
the interaction
with the domestic
has assumed a
new form since
the end of the
Cold War, and
particularly in
the wake of the
9/11 terrorist
attacks. The bipartisan
nature of foreign
policy has been
eroded; outcomes
of elections in
Europe or the
U.S. are seen
to be, and could
actually be, influenced
by decisions taken
on foreign policy.
In South Asia
this is true in
the more immediate
sense of a perceptible
tuning of daily
decisions to domestic
needs, an intensity
of foreign policy
rhetoric directed
for party political
purposes towards
a domestic audience,
a sense in which
this is not true
of the foreign
policies of South
Asian countries
towards other
regions or countries.
There are four
aspects. First,
every foreign
policy initiative,
peace with Pakistan,
trade with Nepal,
the sharing of
Ganga waters with
Bangladesh, can
be used for election
campaigns, as
was evident even
in the 2004 national
election in India,
and much more
so in every Bangladesh
election. This
has continued
ever since the
birth of Bangladesh.
The Awami League
leadership and
government from
1971-75 was seen
as 'pro-Indian',
among diverse
sections of political
opinion in Bangladesh
which wanted to
replace it. Indian
opinion helped
by agreeing to
this, so that
any understanding
with that government
was projected
as a sell-out
of national interests.
This had a major
consequence on
the evolution
of the domestic
polity. Foreign
policy decisions
seem to influence
the outcomes of
electoral processes
and the consequent
formation of governments.
The 'denial of
any place of honour
to the Awami League
in the memory
of the nationalist
struggle ... became
a major element
of the radical
political offensive
against the regime.
What is distinctly
noteworthy in
this regard is
the constitution
of India as a
hostile object
in the radical
political discourse'11.
This had a decisive
influence on the
self-identity
that Bangladesh
assumed over the
years, particularly
the period of
military rule,
since 'all the
military regimes
that have ruled
Bangladesh after
1975 appear to
have formulated
their foreign
policy ideologies
in opposition
to the possibilities
opened up by the
legacy of nationalism.12’
Second, as a perceptive
former foreign
minister of Bangladesh
put it, 'domestic
politics including
party rivalry
and regime perception
of its political
interests vis-a-vis
national interests
appeared to have
played a significant
role in impeding
or facilitating
the solution of
bilateral problems
between India
and Bangladesh.13'
Just as much as
bilateral issues
influence voting
patterns and government
formation, so
does government
formation influence
the settlement
of issues; a change
in government,
no matter how
much consistency
or bipartisanship
is proclaimed,
leads to change
in policy, in
India as much
as in the neighbourhood.
It was, for instance,
a fact that 'a
change of central
government in
the 1989 Indian
elections also
eased tensions
with Bangladesh
... India's External
Affairs Minister,
Inder Kumar Gujral,
emphasised his
government's willingness
to improve relations
with Bangladesh.14'
Third, bilateral
issues with neighbours
are such that
in India ministries
other than the
foreign office,
state governments,
other authorities
like the Border
Security Force
and the Bangladesh
Rifles (in the
case of Bangladesh),
are inseparably
involved in the
decision making
process on both
sides, and the
role of such ministries
and other authorities
is increasing;
it is no longer
possible for the
Foreign Office
to impose an agreement
which these regard
as damaging. Every
neighbour shares
a border with
an Indian state;
the hard political
reality is that
in India there
has been a gradual
shift of power
from the centre
to the states
and the interests
of the states
as seen by their
leaders are gaining
greater weight
in decision making.
This is particularly
the case with
Bangladesh's borders,
which have always
been porous and
often been troublesome.
Fourth, the same
is true of the
neighbours, though
somewhat less
so. Thus democratic
decentralisation,
however laudable
in general terms
of the spread
and consolidation
of people's participation
and empowerment,
has the effect
of localising
foreign affairs
in respect of
neighbours too.
Issues which should
be settled in
the reasoned atmosphere
of conference
rooms are dragged
out, aired in
public, cause
demonstrations,
lead to heated
political debate,
and are consequently
difficult to settle.
Identity
and Security
There
are two non-traditional
threats that Bangladesh
has perceived
to its identity
and security from
India. The first
is political.
India has the
widest spectrum
of political opinion
in the region
and is clearly
a successfully
functioning democracy.
Political parties
and groups among
the neighbours,
especially opposition
parties and dissident
groups can and
do find common
ground with one
political interest
group or another
in India, in terms
of paths to socio-economic
development, political
emancipation,
democratic pluralism
and empowerment.
There may be considerable
admiration among
the neighbours
for India as a
model of political
stability in a
democratic system.
But their leaders,
and this applies
more so to Bangladesh,
also think this
could become the
ground for subversive
attack for their
dissidents usually
turn to India
for support. And
they always find
it, if not in
government circles
then in the many
others that abound.
Comments by Indian
leaders that India
stands for 'progressive
democracy' or
secularism in
other countries,
that such and
such development
was a setback
to democracy in
a neighbouring
country, as also
a perceived reluctance
on India's part
to engage meaningfully
with non-democratic
governments in
the neighbourhood,
have fostered
the impression
that India prefers
the neighbouring
countries to take
a certain political
path. It is but
one step from
here to the conclusion
that the path
will be mapped
out by India.
In the case of
Bangladesh this
has a history.
Among the earliest
desires of the
leaders of Muslim
Bengal, as the
movement for Indian
independence began
to gather pace
over a hundred
years ago, was
for separate treatment
from the Hindus.
The desire was
articulated by
Urdu speaking,
westernised, politically
conservative Bengali
Muslims, supporters
of British rule,
who had little
respect for Bengali
culture or language.
And it was articulated
through their
support for Lord
Curzon's 1905
partition of Bengal,
despite antagonising
the Hindus on
this issue; in
their demand,
a year later,
for separate electorates
and representation
for Muslims in
the elective bodies;
and the key role
they played in
the movement leading
to the partition
of India in 1947.
The formation
of the All India
Muslim League
in December 1906
in Dhaka was at
the initiative
of the Nawab Salimullah
of that city,
'to protect and
advance the political
rights and interests
of the Mussulmans
of India'. A Bengali
Muslim leader,
A. K. Fazlul Haq,
moved the resolution
at the 1940 Lahore
session of the
Muslim League
demanding 'independent
states' in the
areas in which
the Muslims were
numerically in
majority, a resolution
which is usually
cited as the origin
of the partition.
The heart of the
Two-Nation Theory
beat strongest
in Bangladesh.
For India to expect
a secular Bangladesh
is to go against
the trend of this
entire history,
and produces corresponding
resentment there.
The second threat
is cultural. The
cultural mosaic
of India encompasses
all the cultures
of South Asia:
its languages
and literatures
and music, its
religions, its
ethnic identities,
its customs and
traditions. There
are more Muslims
in India than
in a Pakistan
created as the
homeland for the
Muslims of South
Asia (not correct,
since there are
more Muslims in
Pakistan, according
to the Indian
Census 2001 -
Ed.), half as
many Bengali speakers
as in a Bangladesh
created so that
the people could
speak their own
language the home
of which is in
India, many more
Hindus than in
Nepal, more Buddhists
than in Bhutan.
If globalisation
can be defined
in one version
as the spread
throughout the
globe of a pervasive
and homogenising
culture and value
system, then regionalisation
is what seems
to threaten India's
neighbours.
As a counter to
the influence
of socio-politics
and culture there
has developed
among India's
neighbours a strong
proclivity to
assert the separateness
of their identity.
This may find
recourse in the
adoption of an
ideology that
contrasts with
that of India
as when Bangladesh
adopted Islam
as the state religion
and criticised
India for what
it called an attempt
to foist an alien
culture that obliterates
the distinct culture
of the Bengali
Muslims. Or it
may lead to demonstrative
distancing, a
refusal to settle
issues on terms
which seem reasonable.
Indians often
bewail this. Commentators
from India continue
today to bewail
the passing of
secularism but
to do so is an
anachronism15.
They are of a
mind with those
who call Bangladesh
'an anachronism
within an anachronism'.
Such comments
lead to further
feelings of insecurity
in Bangladesh.
The response in
Bangladesh to
India's all-encompassing
cultural mosaic
has been more
vehemently self-assertive
than that of the
other neighbours.
This is because
it has been pushed
first one way,
then the other.
Pakistan thought
the promotion
of the Bengali
language was a
plot devised by
India to lure
the Eastern wing
away, so it tried
to impose Urdu
on the former
East Pakistan,
which led to the
language movement
and ultimately
the movement for
separation. Then
the Awami League
government in
the years 1971-75
tried to impose
a secular state
(and India tried
to integrate the
two economies,
making proposals
to integrate the
two transport
systems and to
link the power
systems into one
grid, which made
things worse),
and this swung
the pendulum in
the opposite direction.
Then the military
government which
followed abolished
secularism in
an effort to take
it back, a demonstrative
assertion of separateness
which India saw
as unfriendly,
even as the first
step in reuniting
Bangladesh with
Pakistan. Thus
Bangladesh swung
between the two
poles of secularism
and Islam, Bengali
and Bangladeshi;
the so-called
forces of 1971
and those of 1947,
pro-India and
anti-India.
In fact the average
Bangladeshi harmonises
religion and culture,
particularly language
well; politics,
helped by external
forces, have pulled
him first one
way, then the
other. It was
left to democratic
politics to re-establish
at state level
and in many of
the institutional
mechanisms of
government and
politics, some
of the harmony,
a development
that is not yet
complete.
Another response
was that Bangladesh
denied any significant
role to India
in its independence,
saying that instead
of Bangladesh
being grateful,
India should be;
it was a Bangladeshi
liberation war
which reduced
the size of, and
the security threat
from, Pakistan.
One refrain echoed
by those who considered
the matter of
being grateful
was that 'New
Delhi failed to
appreciate the
fact that while
India played a
crucial role in
the independence
of Bangladesh,
the latter also
played, on its
part, a crucial
role in making
India the unchallenged
regional power
in South Asia.
Therefore, gratefulness
should have been
reciprocal ...'16
The Indian refrain
is the opposite.
'Did they just
forget that it
was India which
brought them independence
when the entire
Western world
was against ..?
How could they
be so hostile?'17
Part of this defence
mechanism is that
domestic problems
have, almost invariably,
been seen (whether
that is factual
or not) to have
some link with
India. In conversation
and sometimes
in the press,
there is no shortage
of individuals
and groups who
are ready to blame
India for any
calamity that
strikes: for riverine
floods, for the
cyclones that
cause periodic
havoc along the
coast, and for
drought (in the
dry season), for
the disappearance
of fish from the
rivers and coastal
areas, for being
secular and for
being fundamentalist.
Yet another response
is the temptation
to bring in outsiders
for purposes of
balance. Pakistan's
alliance with
the U.S. was an
early step. Later,
as India-China
differences came
out into the open
some of the neighbours
'played the China
card'. Pakistan
was the first
to do this, but
Nepal and then
Bangladesh were
not far behind.
Sri Lanka was
tempted to give
facilities to
the U.S., and
then tried to
turn to ASEAN.
Terrorism
In
the Indian view
there is no doubt
that terrorist
groups, largely
those which target
India, do get
support in Bangladesh;
that a number
of terrorist actions
from the neighbourhood
against Indian
states have been
planned and carried
out by such groups;
and that the government
has, to say the
least, done much
less than it could
have to control
all this. Indeed,
faced with repeated
accusations on
this score Bangladesh
leaders sometimes
go on the offensive,
thus raising the
level of rhetoric.
When Bangladesh
Foreign Minister
Morshed Khan said
to a group of
journalists in
Dhaka on 7th September,
2004 that India's
Northeast was
Bangladesh-locked
and that Dhaka
could easily end
India's trade
surplus by banning
Indian goods,
this was a piece.
Bangladesh is
less than helpful
in the matter
of terrorism because
of the control
of the armed forces
over such operations.
Every government
after 1975, including
post-1991 governments,
has tried to ensure
that the armed
forces are kept
reasonably well
funded and equipped.
But the justification
for well-equipped
forces can only
be the threat
from India. Military
exercises in Bangladesh
are traditionally
conducted against
a fictitious 'Wolfland',
a thinly disguised
name for India.
Quite recently
a retired senior
military officer
described India
as Bangladesh's
greatest enemy,
while another
said the claim
of Bangladesh
to India's northeast
was greater than
that of India;
and there are
serving officers
who in published
articles have
recommended support
for insurgents
fighting in the
Northeast. There
was a time when
this enemy image
attached to India
acquired political
resonance, helping
the armed forces
to stay in power;
and that was the
time a variety
of operations
against India
were put into
the planning,
some of which
were initiated.
As a party initiated
by the armed forces,
and which is still
manned by a large
number of retired
officers -- the
Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP) continued
this thinking.
However, Sanjit
Deb Burman and
Anup Chetia, who
are wanted in
India, for whose
extradition repeated
requests have
unavailingly been
made, and who
are still living
a comfortable
life in Bangladesh,
were also there
during the Awami
League government.
The continued
existence of training
camps for insurgents
who operate against
Indian targets
cannot reasonably
be doubted; nor
can the fact that
specific organisations
like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami,
the Jamiatul Mujahideen
and possibly even
Al Qaeda, have
been operating
and have bases
in Bangladesh.
There can also
be little doubt
that the Pakistani
Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)
is particularly
active there,
and probably responsible
for most of the
activities directed
against India.
The government
there, of course,
has completely
denied this.
In India there
has been a temptation
to link all this
with the supposed
rise of fundamentalism
as seen in the
role of the Jamaat-e-Islami
and others which
have been part
of the democratic
process like the
Islamic Oikyo
Jote, or in the
actions of the
BNP. Ever since
the BNP government
came to power
in 2001, Indian
commentators,
especially those
from West Bengal,
have shackled
that government
with radical Islam,
anti-Indian sentiments
and actions, anti-secularism,
anti-democracy,
and pro-China
policies. These
shackles have
become stronger
with the years,
regardless of
the facts. An
early comment,
which started
a flood of articles
of similar nature,
was by a Hong
Kong based weekly,
that a 'revolution
is taking place
in Bangladesh
that threatens
trouble for the
region and beyond
if left unchallenged.
Islamic fundamentalism,
religious intolerance,
militant Muslim
groups with links
to international
terrorist groups...are
combining to transform
the nation.'18
Another comment
is: 'fundamentalism
seems to have
won the first
round in Bangladesh'19.
This is to push
politically motivated
dire warning well
beyond credibility.
Efforts have also
been made by Indian
commentators to
see Bangladesh
as a 'cocoon of
terror'. The 'disrupted
and dysfunctional
state of Bangladesh
is set to become
a monolith Islamic
state and a breeding
ground of Islamic
terror...will
be incalculably
disastrous for
India and the
rest of the South
Asian region.'20
In line with the
general tendency
for closer interaction
between foreign
policy and domestic
politics, this
became a battleground
between the two
main Bangladeshi
political parties,
as Awami League
