Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies Bharat Bhushan

The resolution of the disputes over Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage, the Sir Creek boundary and the Siachen conflict can help change the parameters of India-Pakistan relations, enabling them to move forward on the more difficult issue of Kashmir. That this is not an impossible task has been evident for quite some time. But the two neighbours have been engaged in such one up-manship that nobody wants to give an inch even if the consequent peace dividend is evident.

India and Pakistan have, in the past, come fairly close to agreements on the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage dispute and the Siachen conflict. Just as nations deserve the political leadership they get, they also inherit their lack of vision from one generation to the next. Besides, successive weak governments in Islamabad and New Delhi have been forced to retreat from possible solutions lest they are seen as compromises. Only strong and popular governments can give concessions and be sure that they are not seen as compromising the national interest.

In a sense this article presents virtually nothing new. What it does, however, is to put together the various aspects of three of the less intractable disputes between the two countries and suggests not specific ways of resolving them but of surrounding them with measures to build confidence thereby making them amenable to resolution.

The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage Dispute

This dispute is over the Indian proposal to construct a barrage on the Jhelum River downstream from the Wullar Lake in Jammu & Kashmir. The project itself, in a sense, goes back to 1912. The then government of Punjab had approached the Maharaja of Kashmir seeking permission to construct a barrage on Wullar Lake. In 1924, the Punjab government renewed the proposal offering Rs. 1.85 lakh as annual royalty. The Maharaja, however, rejected the proposal as he was apprehensive that the construction of the barrage might lead to water-logging in Sopore and Baramulla.

The current dispute, though, arises from Pakistan viewing the construction of a barrage on the Wullar as a storage work. Islamabad refers to it as the Wullar Barrage dispute while India, which sees the project as an attempt to make the Jhelum navigable, calls it the Tulbul Navigation Project. The name Tulbul comes from a village at the western tip of the town of Sopore, although when the project was started by India in 1980 the site was shifted to Ningli, on the eastern side of Sopore which was nearer to the Wullar.
Pakistan's contention is that a barrage at the mouth of the Wullar is a contravention of the Indus Water Treaty. The 1960 Treaty assigned the unrestricted use of the eastern rivers of the Indus basin (including Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) to India and of the western rivers (including Chenab, Indus and Jhelum) to Pakistan.

It, however, permitted India the limited use of the western rivers for domestic and agricultural use, run-of-the-river hydroelectric generation and any non-consumptive use that did not diminish the water flow to Pakistan. The Treaty also permitted India limited storage of water of the western rivers -- a general storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet on the various channels of the Jhelum (excluding Jhelum Main) and 10,000 acre feet on the Jhelum Main itself.

Controlling water for navigation is a permissible activity under the Indus Water Treaty. The Indian position is that the Tulbul Navigation Project is neither an act of storage nor of impounding the waters of the Jhelum, but of controlling the flow for navigation. The project would leave the volume of water flowing to Pakistan intact. India maintains that the project would, in fact, help regulate the water flow in the Jhelum and would benefit power projects downstream both in the Indian side as well as Pakistani side of Jammu & Kashmir.

The problem of navigation in the Jhelum arises in the lean season from October to February. During this period, the flow of water in the river is 2,000 cubic feet per second and its depth is about 2.5 feet. This cannot support navigation. Around the year navigability requires double the flow and depth -- hence the barrage that would make the river navigable from between Sopore and Baramula.

The work on the barrage began in 1984 but was stopped in 1987 by the Rajiv Gandhi government after Pakistan protested. Many in India believe that stopping construction was a mistake and that the decision was taken by Rajiv Gandhi to please Benazir Bhutto. Since then there have been ten rounds of secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan to settle the Tulbul/Wullar Barrage dispute bilaterally. The last round was held in the first week of August, 2004. Although matters have not proceeded apace since then, the basic draft agreement on the dispute had been arrived at in October 1991.

Initially, the barrage was to be gated. After Pakistan's objections, it was decided to un-gate it. This is reflected in the stipulations of the 1991 draft agreement. In the agreement the two sides agreed that: (a) India would keep 6.2 meters of the barrage un-gated with a crest level at EL 1574.90 metres; (b) India would not make any alteration in the salient features of the project without mutual agreement between the two countries; (c) India shall forego the general storage capacity of 30,000 acre feet out of the provision permitted to it on the Jhelum (excluding Jhelum Main); (d) in return for this, the water level in the barrage will be allowed to attain the full operational level of 5177.90 feet -- the timing of the filling of the lake will be decided by the two Indus Water Commissioners and, should they fail to reach an agreement, the filling of the lake would be between June 21 and August 20; (e) except for the stipulation regarding the filling of the lake, India would let all the waters entering the Wullar Lake downstream; and (f) all differences will be settled under the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty.

Later, in addition to the above, Pakistan demanded that India forego the construction of the 390 MW Kishenganga hydroelectric project. Its argument was that this project would affect Pakistan's proposed Neelum-Jhelum power project. New Delhi did not give any such commitment. The 1991 draft was reproduced verbatim in the non-papers handed over to Pakistan by India in 1994. During the 1998 composite dialogue, the Pakistani delegation had apparently insisted on starting the talks afresh but then agreed to pick up the threads from the 1991 draft.

By the time the latest round of talks took place in August 2004, the Pakistani position seems to have hardened with Islamabad insisting that India gave up the project. New Delhi is of the view that there are two reasons for this: One, Pakistan has decided that no deviation from the Indus Water Treaty was acceptable to it; and two, wherever Pakistan can prevent India from taking up a project in Jammu and Kashmir it has decided to do so as a signal to the Kashmiris that Islamabad can exercise a veto.

Boundary Dispute along the Sir Creek

Whenever India and Pakistan begin to normalise ties, they begin by releasing fishermen and fishing boats seized by them for crossing over into their respective territorial waters. These fishermen and their boats are seized along the un-demarcated border of the Gujarat Coast.

This dispute of an un-demarcated boundary along the Arabian Sea and the Rann of Kutch straddling Paksitan's Sindh province and the Indian state of Gujarat is not limited only to fishermen and fishing. In August 1999, a Pakistani Atlantique surveillance aircraft was shot down by the Indian Air Force in the Rann of Kutch. New Delhi claimed that the Atlantique was on a spying mission and had violated India's airspace. The ten sailors and six crew members on board the aircraft died. India claimed that the debris fell two kilometres within its territory and Pakistan made a contrary claim. However, as it turned out, it actually fell on both sides of the border.

The next day when the Indian Air Force tried taking a group of journalists to the site where the debris had fallen, Pakistan apparently retaliated by firing on the Indian helicopters ferrying the media personnel. Pakistan's claim was that its ground-to-air missiles were aimed at the Indian fighter jets accompanying the helicopters which were apparently in violation of their airspace. The shooting down of the Atalntique was taken by Islamabad to the International Court of Justice. The verdict eventually came in India's favour i.e., the court accepted that India was justified in shooting down the intruding aircraft.

There is both an international border as well as an un-demarcated border in the Rann of Kutch between India and Pakistan. The incident of the Atalantique surveillance aircraft being shot down took place over the clearly demarcated international boundary -- to the north-east of the un-demarcated one. The 1965 India-Pakistan war also began in the Rann of Kutch.
The Sir Creek dispute, as the name indicates, is about the un-demarcated boundary because of the claims and counterclaims of India and Pakistan. The dispute is about a tidal channel called Sir Creek -- a 38 km estuary in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch. The boundary along this tidal channel between India and Pakistan has not been delimited.

There are two issues involved in the dispute -- the delimitation of the boundary along the creek and the demarcation of the maritime boundary from the mouth of the creek seawards in the Arabian Sea. The dispute is complicated by Pakistan linking its resolution with the Kashmir issue and its refusal to separate the resolution of the land boundary along the creek from demarcation of the maritime boundary. Without demarcating the maritime boundary, neither India nor Pakistan can exploit the ocean resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone (up to 200 nautical miles). As this area adjoins Bombay High where India has been exploiting sub-sea oil and gas deposits, there is some expectation of similar reserves in the adjoining disputed area.

Legend has it that the Sir Creek dispute began much before Indian independence in 1908 between the ruler of Sind and the Rao of Kutch over a pile of firewood lying on the banks of Kori Creek to the east of Sir Creek, which divided the two principalities. The dispute was referred to the British government in Bombay which gave its ruling in 1914 through a resolution which had a map attached to it. Up to the 1960s, the dispute remained unresolved but was dormant. Then Pakistan began claiming that half of Rann of Kutch along the 24th parallel belonged to it. The 1965 war that began in the Rann of Kutch followed this claim. The boundary dispute was referred to the India-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal. The tribunal was chaired by a Swedish judge, Gunnar Lagergren and comprised two others -- Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia (Indian nominee) and Nasorallah Intezam of Iran (Pakistan's nominee).

The two sides agreed before the tribunal that their dispute should be limited only to the boundary to the north. There was some agreement on the boundary to the south, which began at the head of Sir Creek and moved eastwards along the 24th parallel. India claimed that after moving eastwards for a short distance, the boundary turned sharply north at a right angle to meet the northern boundary of the Rann. Pakistan, on the other hand, claimed that it went on straight eastwards along the 24th parallel. The tribunal gave its award on February 19, 1968. It rejected Pakistan's claim that the border between Gujarat and Sindh should run roughly along the 24th parallel beginning at the head of Sir Creek, moving eastwards from there. This would have involved dividing the Rann in the middle and transferring about 3,500 sq miles of territory from India to Pakistan.

The tribunal upheld India's claim that the boundary line from the head of the Sir Creek went a short distance eastwards, then turned northwards at a right angle and then ran along the northern edge of the Rann (see map at the end of the article). This northern edge had also formed the boundary between the British Indian state of Sindh and the Kutch state before 1947. As a result of the tribunal broadly accepting the Indian contention, only about 300 sq miles of territory was awarded to Pakistan. The decision was accepted by both India and Pakistan.

This still left the boundary of the Sir Creek -- from its head in the marshy lands of the Rann to its mouth in the Arabian Sea -- and the maritime boundary between India and Pakistan un-demarcated. India and Pakistan had agreed not to refer this part of the un-demarcated boundary for adjudication to the tribunal. Because of this understanding between the parties, the tribunal had noted that it had not taken into consideration the boundary along the Sir Creek.

The dispute has festered since then. As a result, it is not possible for India and Pakistan to distinguish between their territorial waters (the zone up to 12 nautical miles, where states enjoy exclusive rights and can restrict passage of foreign boats), their contiguous zones (up to 24 nautical miles, where states can enforce custom and fiscal laws, fisheries laws and ban acts prejudicial to the state) or their Exclusive Economic Zones (up to 200 nautical miles extendable to 350 nautical miles for countries with continental shelf).

Pakistan's contention is that the boundary along the Sir Creek must lie along the eastern edge of the creek. India believes that the boundary should be along the middle of the creek; that it should be demarcated using the 'thalweg' or the mid-channel principle ('thal'- valley, 'weg' - way). The 'thalweg' principle lays down that boundaries along a river or a valley must lie along the line connecting the deepest points along a river channel or the lowest points along the valley floor. The case for a mid-channel boundary is based on the Sir Creek being a navigable channel throughout the year. Pakistan's contention is that the creek is not navigable and, therefore, the mid-channel principle does not apply.

India and Pakistan both refer to the 1914 resolution of the Bombay government about the dispute between Sindh and Kutch over the Kori Creek and the map attached to it. The map shows a green line running along the eastern edge of Sir Creek on the Kutch side and Pakistan claims that this was the boundary between Sindh and Kutch. This was the map that India had relied on prior to the constitution of the India-Paksitan Western Boundary Case Tribunal.

However, in 1958 Pakistan had itself admitted that this map was 'intended no more than an annexure to the Bombay Government resolution'. This resolution, according to veteran lawyer and analyst A. G. Noorani, has a reference to the Indian government's 'sanction' on November 11, 1913, of the Kutch-Sindh compromise over Kori Creek, which had been spelt out by the Bombay government in a letter of September 20, 1913. The letter referred to the line on the attached map 'from the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek.'

The letter also quoted the Sindh Commissioner as saying, '... the Sir Creek changes its course from time to time and the western boundary of the area, which it is proposed to surrender to the Rao [of Kutch] should, therefore, be described as “the centre of the navigable channel of the Sir Creek”.' This is seen as support for the Indian contention. The Secretary to the Bombay government commented on this, saying: 'I am to explain that the term 'navigable' is really inappropriate in the larger sense. The creek is, of course, tidal, and it is only at certain conditions of the tide that the channel is navigable and then only to the country craft as the point from which the proposed boundary turns due east from the creek.' Noorani concludes, 'This is not a rejection of the Sindh Commissioner's condition but essentially an acceptance of it.'

Today, the Sir Creek does not flow as shown in the 1914 map. It has shifted westwards i.e., towards Pakistan. However, the head of the creek, as it existed then, is marked by a boundary pillar, called Western Terminal -- it was from this point that some 38 pillars marked the horizontal boundary eastwards. Pakistan neither recognises the existence of the Western Terminal nor the pillar-based horizontal boundary eastwards. Pakistan's contention is that the eastward boundary should be based on the dotted line as drawn in the 1914 map. This line is below the boundary marked by the pillars. The contentious question is: What should be recognised -- the pillars on the ground or the line on the 1914 map? In the current climate, neither country is willing to concede territory.

So the dispute remains where it was -- with Pakistan insisting on the left bank of the creek and the dotted line on the 1914 map as the boundary and India insisting on the mid-channel of the creek and the pillars to the east as the boundary.

Meanwhile, under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLS) both countries have to bring their Maritime Zone laws in consonance with it by defining their base-line points to define their maritime boundary and its co-ordinates have to be deposited with the UN. Islamabad has, in an attempt to define its maritime boundary along the eastern edge of the Sir Creek in the 1914 map up to a point on an Indian low tide elevation. This would allow Pakistan not only to claim the Sir Creek entirely but even the Pir Sinai Creek to its east. This would not be acceptable to India and this claim is likely to be protested against.

India also has to deposit its baseline point co-ordinates with the UN. Once it does so, Pakistan may also object to the manner in which India defines its baseline point. There would be no way out but bilateral negotiations, provided for in UNCLS to sort this out. Why is this of any significance? Although the area under dispute along the Sir Creek is estimated to be only about six to seven square miles, it also involves as much as 250 sq. miles of ocean and ocean floor. If the boundary was moved by, say, one kilometre along the coastline, it could translate into the loss of a few hundreds of square kilometres of the Exclusive Economic Zone in an area which could be rich in oil and natural gas. The issue, therefore, not only concerns land claims but also sub-sea resources. Both Indian and Pakistani experts believe that the Sir Creek dispute is amenable to a solution. But their governments have been intransigent and there has been no real progress on the ground.

There are two simple ways of increasing cooperation between India and Pakistan in the Sir Creek area: One, by decreasing the area in dispute by settling those parts which are easier to resolve and leaving the more intractable parts for later; two, by leaving the boundary question aside for the time being and exploring cooperation in the non-boundary related areas which would have a direct and fruitful bearing on the disputed area in the long run.

To reduce the area of the dispute, India has proposed the median or the equidistant method where the demarcation of the maritime boundary would begin from the seaward side. This would involve taking a point 200 nautical miles from both Indian and Pakistani coasts and moving the point forward by drawing an equidistant line towards the coast. This series of equidistant points or equidistant line can move up to an agreed point towards the coast -- perhaps 50 nautical miles from the coast. This would help demarcate the boundary along the better part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the two countries and leaving the boundary near the coast undefined for the time being (see map at end of article).

This proposal has not been accepted by Pakistan. If the equidistant principle is not accepted by Pakistan, India may even be willing to take its baseline point on the coast and the Indian baseline point and use the trinagulation method to mark the boundary up to a certain mutually acceptable distance (say, 50 nautical miles once again) and narrow down the differences on the maritime boundary.

The second way out, some experts have suggested, is to temporarily set aside the boundary dispute and explore cooperative ventures in the region. The fishermen's unions in Gujarat and Sindh have suggested licensed joint fishing with quantity restrictions. They point out precedents for sharing border resources. The fish in Lake Victoria breed in the territorial waters of Kenya but then go off to Ugandan waters but this fact can be used to prevent the Kenyan fisherman from access to this resource, they point out. India and Sri Lanka have already agreed to declare their border fisheries a joint resource. The joint fishing licenses that the fishermen's unions of Sindh and Gujarat in India suggest could be photo-identity cards issued by the coastguards and the fishermen's unions jointly on either side. This would prevent unnecessary harassment of fishermen whose unions, in fact, enjoy excellent fraternal ties.

Some experts have also suggested that, since the marine environment of India and Pakistan along the Sindh and Gujarat coasts are closely linked, the two countries could conduct cooperative environmental studies and share data. These could, for example, relate to oil spills or preservation of mangroves.

Oil spills in this region are bound to go up over time as it is estimated that by the year 2007 nearly 50 per cent of India's oil imports would be through ports along this coast. In 2002, when an oil tanker broke near Karachi Port, the first thing that the Pakistani authorities did was to inform India of the oil spill and the danger it may pose to its marine environment. Pollution caused by oil and heavy metals seeping into the sea from ship-breaking activities have damaged marine life and also caused environmental concern in this area. The loss of coral reefs and mangroves due to pollution along the Gulf of Kutch has led to cyclones hitting the mainland with undiminished fury. Experts have also suggested that India and Pakistan should jointly study the threats to these mangroves and coral reefs. A mechanism for carrying out these studies already exists under the South Asian Seas Action Plan of which both India and Pakistan are signatories.

The Dispute over 'Mountain Rose'

Siachen is the world's highest battlefield with gunfire being exchanged at 16,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level. Nine out of ten deaths on the Siachen are due to climate with only one being combat-related. It is no wonder then that the Siachen dispute between India and Pakistan is described as one of the most futile and wasteful in the world both in material and human terms.

The defence secretaries of India and Pakistan have met eight times to discuss the Siachen dispute in an attempt to resolve it -- their last meeting being in August 2004. Twice the two sides came close to settling the dispute but the political climate was perhaps not right to reach a settlement. The solutions proposed include demilitarisation of the glacier and of creating a 'Zone of Disengagement'. However, mutual lack of trust has prevented a resolution of the dispute.

Siachen invokes strong passions in both India and Pakistan. It is the stuff of legends. It was for the brand rub-off offered by it that former Defence Minister of India George Fernandez visited the Glacier often on New Year's Eve or Christmas. For most Indians Siachen, symbolises unparalleled gallantry, bravery and a commitment to protect national interest. This was why the nation was shocked to know that last year some army officers had fabricated video evidence of fake encounters with Pakistani soldiers in the Siachen area to secure gallantry awards.

Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf's 'Siachen consciousness' is also very high. In September, 1987, as brigade commander of the Special Services Group, he was responsible for leading an attack on an Indian position at Bilafond La, one of the two main passes on the Soltoro ridge (the other being Sia La - 'La' means a mountain pass) to the Siachen Glacier from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. His forces had to retreat. Having also served as Pakistan's Commander of Northern Areas, he knows the Siachen dispute intimately.

Although the boundary dispute between India and Pakistan in this region is referred to as the Siachen dispute, the Siachen Glacier is in fact under Indian control. There is no battle raging on the glacier itself. Indian soldiers sit on the Soltoro ridge to the west of the Siachen Glacier (see map at end of article). Between the Pakistani forces and the Glacier, therefore, there are high mountain peaks controlled by India.

The Siachen Glacier flows in the valley formed by the Soltoro ridge to its west and the Eastern Karakorams. It is about 72 km long from its highest point at Indira Col to its snout. It gets its name from the wild mountain roses that grow near its snout. Siachen is the source of the Nubra River that meets the Shyok River, originating from the Eastern Karakorams, at Thois. Later, it feeds into the Indus.

Militarily, the Siachen Glacier can be divided into three parts. The Northern Glacier is the most difficult, containing the highest peaks. The Central part is where the glacier is broadest -- up to 20 km wide and this is where India has its Kumar Post from where expeditions are launched to the various Soltoro peaks. The Southern Glacier is narrow -- only four to five km wide. Helicopters maintain the entire Northern and Central Glacier while ponies and porters supply the Southern Glacier. There are stretches of a fair-weather road that also services the glacier.

The Indian army has taken 105 mm field guns to the glacier to support the peaks. They had to be knocked down for transport and reassembled. They are deployed at the lower end of the Northern glacier and in the Southern glacier. The Base Camp has 130 mm and the Bofors 155 mm guns. The difficulty in using field guns on the glacier arises from shifting ice which moves by about two inches a day in winters and 10 to 20 feet a day in summer. Registering a target and using the calculations to shoot after even a couple of days will not guarantee a hit because of shifting gun positions. At present three battalions of the Indian army are deployed in the Siachen region -- one each in the northern, central and southern parts of the glacier. At any point of time three battalions are deployed, three are in training and three awaiting orders. The soldiers manning the observation posts on the Soltoro and the camps have to be relieved every 30 days to three months.

The estimates of the costs of hostilities on Siachen vary. Lt. General (Retd) V. R. Raghavan in his definitive work 'Siachen - Conflict without end' says: 'No one has an accurate assessment, but everyone has a figure to quote and a point to make.' Without endorsing any estimate, he quotes cost figures ranging from US $ 1.2 million per day for both India and Pakistan; US$ 1.94 million a day for India alone; and Rs. 2.5 crore to Rs. 6.5 crore for India alone to US$ 18.5 million a day for Pakistan and thirty times that for India. Pakistan's former foreign secretary Shaharyar Khan once said that the cost of a roti (bread) for a Pakistani soldier posted in that region is more than Rs. 450. George Fernandes told the Indian Parliament that Siachen costs the exchequer Rs. three crore per day.

The Siachen dispute originated because the boundary in Jammu & Kashmir, after the Karachi Agreement of 1949, was not fully demarcated. A ceasefire line (CFL) on the map ended at a grid point with co-ordinates NJ-9842 on the Soltoro ridge. This was near the northern-most point where troops were deployed when the fighting ended in 1948. Although the CFL subsequently changed into the Line of Control (LoC) after the Simla Agreement of 1972, its end points remained the same.

The descriptive explanation of the boundary beyond NJ-9842 -- 'thence North to the Glaciers' -- has created confusion. India believes that this means that the boundary would go north through the nearest watershed, the Soltoro ridge. Pakistan draws a straight line from NJ-9842 going northeast to the Karakoram pass. The former interpretation gives the control of the Glacier to India, the latter, to Pakistan.

In 1978, the Indian army became aware of maps showing the LoC as a straight line extended from NJ-9842 to the Karakoram pass appearing in publications abroad. The same year an Indian army mountaineering expedition led by Colonel N. Kumar, brought back evidence of foreign mountaineering expeditions being launched into the Siachen area from Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Kumar's expedition also did not go unnoticed. Both sides were convinced that the other was trying to establish a military presence in the area. New Delhi and Islamabad began exchanging protest notes asking the other to desist from entering its territory. It was then that India realised that Pakistan was behind the extension of NJ-9842 to the Karakoram pass, claiming the Siachen glacier. India objected to this 'cartographic aggression' as it meant Pakistan claiming territory up to the Karakoram pass and preparing the ground for involving China in the India-Pakistan dispute.

The Indian Army believed that the choice before it was either to be blind to this activity or pre-empt Pakistan. In late 1983, India had intelligence that Pakistan was also purchasing large quantities of high altitude gear and its troops were planning to occupy the passes leading to the Siachen Glacier. Two months before the mountaineering season was to begin in April 1984, India airlifted two platoons of Kumaon Regiment and placed them on the two key passes of Bilafond La and Sia La on the Soltoro ridge. Pakistan had been effectively pre-empted. Both India and Pakistan see geo-political compulsions in fighting for Siachen. In 1963, Pakistan ceded 4,500 sq km of Kashmir, the Shaksgam Valley to the west of the Karakorams, to China because it wanted a border with China. But India believes that the disputed territory of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir was not Islamabad's to give away. India, therefore, did not recognise this settlement. However, New Delhi came to know of the Chinese activities in the area only a decade after China had built the Aksai Chin highway passing through it. The belated Indian presence on the Soltoro ridge abutting the Shaksgam Valley seeks to question the Sino-Pakistan 'border settlement'.

If there is no military presence on the Soltoro ridge, Indian military experts argue, then India would be blind to any activity inimical to its interests in and around the Soltoro ridge, in the eastern Karakorams and in what the Indian Army calls 'Sub-sector North' abutting the eastern Karakorams but contiguous to the Shaksgam Valley. Satellite pictures and air surveillance, they argue, provide only images but it is physical observation which indicates an adversary's intent. Initially, the Siachen conflict was also justified in terms of countering a threat to Ladakh from Pakistani forces coming down the Nubra Valley via Siachen. This is now considered logistically unviable.

That Siachen rankles in the Pakistani mind is evident from the fact that the Kargil misadventure, some in Pakistan claim, was aimed at undoing the Indian takeover of Siachen. One of its objectives apparently was to snatch Siachen from India by cutting off the Srinagar-Leh highway.

India and Pakistan have held eight rounds of talks on the Siachen dispute. They apparently came close to resolving the dispute in 1989 and then again in 1992. These attempts were unsuccessful because of two reasons: first, Pakistan wants India to withdraw to pre-Simla positions by vacating the Soltoro ridge but wants to retain its own military positions claiming that they are pre-1971; and second, to keep up the myth of engaging India on the Siachen glacier, it refuses to exchange maps marking the present ground positions. These would show that Pakistan is nowhere near the Siachen glacier and that its posts on the Soltoro are at much lower heights (9,000 to 15,000 feet) than India's.

Was there really a settlement in the offing in 1989? American scholar Robert Wirsig has claimed that India made six proposals to Pakistan in 1989: cessation of cartographic aggression by Pakistan (i.e. extending the LoC from NJ-9842 northeast to the Karakoram pass); establishing a demilitarised zone at the Siachen glacier; exchanging maps to show present positions on the ground; delimiting the border beyond NJ-9842 towards the China border based on ground realities; formulating ground rules for future military stand-off - a measure of last resort; and redeploying Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions.

Pakistan apparently countered this with two alternative proposals: deployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions held at the time of the 1971 ceasefire (pre-Simla positions); and only then, the delimitation of an extension of the LoC beyond NJ-9842.

There were differences over which should come first -- delimitation or the redeployment of forces. Re-deployment was seen as entirely an Indian withdrawal with Pakistan staying put. India was unwilling to accept demilitarisation to mean only an Indian pullout.

The sixth round of Siachen talks in 1992 also raised hopes for a solution. India claimed that there was a broad understanding on the redeployment of Indian and Pakistani troops and on creating a 'Zone of Disengagement' on either side of the Soltoro ridgeline -- although Pakistan was still unwilling to mark its current deployment on a map indicating the ground reality before disengagement. Whatever hopes that Indian officials had for a settlement even then were dashed when they approached the political leadership. The Zone of Disengagement Plan did not find political acceptance with Narasimha Rao's minority government.

In the seventh round of talks in November 1998, India referred only to the Soltoro range with no mention of the Siachen glacier. The proposal for a Zone of Disengagement was also dropped.

The 1998 proposals, instead, suggested a comprehensive ceasefire along the Soltoro region based on a freeze of the ground positions; discussions of the modalities of ceasefire in a definite time-frame; bilateral mechanisms for the ceasefire including flag meetings and hotlines between divisional commanders; and authenticating the existing position on the Soltoro range beyond NJ-9842. Pakistan rejected the proposals. The Indian position had clearly hardened in the face of Pakistan's refusal to recognise the ground reality.

The army has the dominant say in the Siachen dispute. The Indian army's position is that there should be no asymmetrical redeployment of troops. There is no glacier on the Pakistani side. To climb up the Soltoro peaks Pakistani army does not have to traverse a glacier - just mountaineering is enough. If there is a pullback by the Indian army to say, Leh or Turtuk but the Pakistanis stay in Skardu; then they can occupy the key positions on the Soltoro ridge in ten days' time. It would take India three to four months to do that.

Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, has apparently assured India that, should demilitarisation take place, his army would not reoccupy the crucial passes on the Soltoro ridge. However, after Pakistan's Kargil misadventure, his assurances are likely to be taken with a pinch of salt in India. All the same, the two sides have agreed to engage in a military-to-military dialogue to explore ways of disengaging from the Siachen Glacier and this may be a movement forward.

There have also been proposals for converting the Siachen Glacier area into a science park -- an environmental zone, jointly managed by both India and Paksitan. However, till such time as the entire area is demilitarised without either side feeling defeated, these proposals can only remain pipedreams.

Conclusion

There are some disputes between nations that have the potential of being addressed relatively easily but they get linked with bigger disputes and seem intractable. Yet, if these smaller contentious issues were analytically separated from the bigger ones and resolved, they could have a positive impact on the prospect of solving the bigger disputes.

The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage dispute is easily resolvable and there even exists a draft agreement on it. If, in return for allowing the project, Islamabad wants its pound of flesh in terms of a greater share of water from the Indus, it can bring such a proposal to the table. Obduracy would neither be in the interests of the people of Jammu & Kashmir nor of improving Indo-Pak relations.

Similarly, in the Sir Creek area, solutions or at least half-way houses are possible. As a small beginning, after the foreign secretary level talks of June 2004, the two sides have agreed to send a team to survey the boundary pillars east of head of the Sir Creek. This may not seem like much progress but it is a small co-operative step forward and should be viewed positively. In the case of the Siachen dispute, the political leadership both in Pakistan and in India seems far too weak at present to sell a complete solution to their people. The glacier, many people in India and Pakistan believe, has no strategic significance and its militarisation is the result of competing and irrational nationalisms. This irrationalism as well as competition needs to be downscaled. The disengagement in the Soltoro region would be a good beginning but this requires a decisive leadership both in India and Pakistan.

The status of Jammu & Kashmir is arguably the biggest contentious issue between India and Pakistan. There are some who argue that unless the Kashmir issue is addressed adequately nothing significant can be achieved between India and Pakistan. However, unless the overall atmosphere is improved between the two countries, a compromise on Kashmir would be difficult to sell for either Islamabad or New Delhi.
The need, therefore, is to change the parameters of the problem. Once its dimensions are changed -- for example by surrounding it with agreements on the relatively less difficult disputes between the two countries -- then psychologically at least Kashmir may not seem as intractable as it does now. On the other hand, if both India and Pakistan harden their stands on even the smaller disputes, engaging on Kashmir would become disproportionately difficult.

---

(Bharat Bhushan is the Editor of The Telegraph in Delhi. The views expressed in this article are his and do not represent the views of the newspaper. Mr. Bhushan may be contacted at bharat@abpmail.com)

Author’s Note: This article is largely based on a series of news reports that I wrote in the Hindustan Times (November 9-12, 1998) and for The Telegraph (December 18, 2003 and August 1, 2004) and a paper, 'India's Maritime Boundaries - The Case of Sir Creek, presented at the Media and Conflict workshop organised by the South Asia Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) in Kathmandu, Nepal in September, 2003.

Bibliography