Indo-Pak Conflict and Possibilities
of Peace
Salman
Khurshid
|
The history of
our attempts to
resolve the Indo-Pak
conflict can,
at best, be summed
up as a combination
of wishful thinking,
self-righteousness,
hypocrisy and
acute myopia,
on both sides.
Unfortunately,
Pakistan has added
another ingredient
of coercion through
overt or covert
acts of violence
and disruption.
Now the cycle
has come full
circle, once again,
from confrontation
to conciliation.
We must all hope
that the progression
will be positive,
but it is yet
too early to base
that hope on firm
factors. However,
in order to make
tangible progress
we need to be
clear about what
it is that we
are trying to
address and whether
the cause of the
conflict is something
India and Pakistan
can agree about.
In a sense we
should be speaking
about the shape
and size of the
table (as in Vietnam
peace talks),
then proceed to
talk about talks,
then talk (perhaps
for a long time,
with expected
and unexpected
fluctuation in
temperature),
and finally arrive
at a solution
that can be sold
to the people
of the two countries
and the people
of Jammu &
Kashmir, some
will promptly
add.
What are political
conflicts about,
particularly between
two countries?
They are usually
about economic
matters , ‘papi
pet’ as
they say. If someone
else has an economic
asset -- mines,
petroleum, or
productive land,
and you have less
and need or want
more, there is
a good case for
conflict. It may
appear to be a
blind urge to
dominate for the
sake of domination,
but we should
not be misled
by appearances.
The protagonists
might talk of
ideology, but
we should not
be credulous and
believe that.
Ultimately, it
is really a matter
of trying to get
the largest piece
of the cake. All
wars have been
fought for that.
The world wars
were no exception.
In civil wars
and secessionist
movements the
ingredient mix
might vary and
ideological battle
may seem a little
more sincere,
but the basic
cause of conflict
is seldom different.
Applied to the
Indo-Pak conflict
that thesis holds
good, but only
up to a point.
However, it will
be argued here
that the original
cause of Indo-Pak
conflict may have
been lost sight
of over the five
decades since
Partition and,
therefore, the
thesis may have
become redundant
in this case.
Let us examine
the various descriptions
of the Indo-Pak
conflict:
-
It
is the unfinished
agenda of 1947
or an incomplete
or imperfect
Partition of
India.
-
It
is incomplete
and imperfect
because Jammu
& Kashmir,
as a Muslim
majority part
of India, must
be transferred
to Pakistan.
-
There
is an inherent
ideological
conflict between
the people of
India and Pakistan,
and Jammu &
Kashmir is only
one way of getting
at each other.
-
There
is a clash of
civilisation
between Islam
and Hinduism,
represented
in South Asia
by India and
Pakistan.
-
It
is nothing to
do with Pakistan
and a matter
of concern only
of people of
Jammu and Kashmir
who aspire to
an independent
existence based
on Kashmiriyat.
-
Pakistan
has got involved
on the basis
of ‘my
enemy's enemy
is my friend’.
An independent
country of Jammu
& Kashmir
as a Muslim
majority state
would be a good
ally of Pakistan.
-
It
is a territorial
dispute and
merely needs
appropriate
adjudication
for making boundary
adjustments
between the
two countries.
-
It
is a definitional
issue for India,
and attempt
by Pakistan
to change the
definition and
idea of India.
-
It
is for Pakistan
a cause of revenge
for India's
role in breaking
up East Pakistan.
-
Jammu
& Kashmir
was strategically
required by
Pakistan as
a U.S. ally
against the
USSR and China,
and later as
a friend of
China against
India.
Even
if one or more of
these propositions
were true at a given
time in the past
they are certainly
not true anymore.
So, more likely
than not, both sides
have forgotten what
the conflict is
all about. But somehow
in the absence of
a convenient or
visible exit the
conflict continues
with fluctuating
intensity. External
developments and
events, as well
as internal expectations
and circumstances,
continue to influence
the mood of the
parties to the conflict.
Kashmir's separatists
take offence at
our referring to
the conflict as
two-sided, but it
makes little sense
even from their
point of view to
call it a three-sided
dispute. It would
be better to see
it as two separate
conflicts -- first,
between India and
Pakistan; and second,
between nationalists
and separatists
(using those terms
entirely for convenience).
The most powerful
argument from Pakistan's
point of view is
obviously their
claim of being an
Islamic State. But
of course that might
not have been enough
because there are
other Islamic states
in the neighbourhood,
or to say the least,
states with Muslim
majority populations.
The Central Asian
countries are the
latest to join the
club although in
terms of governmental
institutions they
aspire to be secular.
But Pakistan could
have argued that
the issue was not
about any Islamic
country, but of
the Islamic country
carved out of British
India and that the
carving out was
incomplete. But
who made the ground
rules anyway? There
was no referendum
amongst Muslims
of undivided India
whether they wanted
partition, and whether
they would want
it if they had known
that it would involve
having to move from
where they lived
traditionally. Was
the Partition about
people or was it
actually about property?
Actually it was
about a mix of the
two and the mix
was not always the
same everywhere.
Most importantly,
a large number of
Muslims chose to
stay on, forming
10 per cent of the
remnant population
after Partition.
It may not be a
large percentage
of India's total
population, but
it is the second
largest Muslim population
in the world. For
Pakistan, to continue
the conflict with
India is also to
battle with the
very people it professes
to represent --
Muslims of the subcontinent.
This has been poignantly
underscored several
times -- by martyrs
like Brig. Usman,
Havildar Abdul Hameed,
Lt. Haniffuddin;
by cricket stars
like Nawab Pataudi,
Saleem Durrani,
Abbas Ali Baig.
Azharuddin, Mohd.
Kaif and Irfan Pathan;
hockey players like
Aslam Sher Khan,
and Zafar Iqbal;
scientists like
President Kalam
etc. It is a long
story with an impressive
list of distinguished
Indians. So how
will Pakistan pick
and choose? Why
only wish to represent
Kashmiri Muslims?
What about the Hindu
and Buddhist populations
of Jammu and Ladakh,
respectively? Why
not Uttar Pradesh
or Assam, both states
with large Muslim
populations?
The most powerful
argument available
to India is the
definitional argument.
India defined itself
to include all religions,
unlike Pakistan
that defined itself
to exclude non-Muslims.
Conceding Jammu
& Kashmir to
Pakistan on grounds
of religion would
amount to our willingness
to redefine ourselves.
This is the reason
why India cannot
accept even friendly
mediation to resolve
the dispute. Mediation
could be possible
for purely territorial
disputes. Of course
we may not even
need mediation if
the Indo-China peace
process model can
be used on the Pakistan
front as well, provided
of course it can
be restricted to
territorial adjustment.
Some people believe
that every conflict
has a particular
context. Major conflicts,
including the one
that led to the
two world wars and
the awful tragedy
of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, may have
ended because victory
and defeat was then
possible, although
at great cost. The
conflict between
U.S. and the USSR
during the Cold
War may have ended
because victory
or defeat, even
if theoretically
possible, had become
meaningless because
of the size of their
nuclear arsenals.
But more than that,
the entire context
changed as well
with the break up
of the Soviet Union.
If the change of
context and its
contribution to
the resolution of
long standing conflicts
is something to
go by, for Pakistan
the context has
changed several
times over Bangladesh;
the failure of insurgency
in Punjab; India's
slow but steady
rapprochement with
China; the breakup
of Soviet Union
and the end of the
Cold War; the several
wars that we fought
without any real
gain to either side;
holding of two successive
and successful elections
in Jammu & Kashmir;
Kargil and finally
9/11 should have
changed it.
The last three years
have been interesting
tight rope walk
years for the Pakistani
establishment. This
involves a curious
dilemma: There is
great reward in
pursuing an anti-fundamentalist
agenda and yet without
fundamentalism there
is no case for Jammu
& Kashmir. The
picture is not very
clear because the
'West' and 'East'
flanks of Pakistan
have separate considerations
and motivation.
There is no direct
quid pro quo for
Pakistan on the
Western flank, although
there might be something
in it for U.S. support
to the government.
But the Eastern
flank is quite different.
There must be an
incumbent expectation
of U.S. delivery
on the Jammu and
Kashmir front. Strategy
that fits with that
would be to reduce
the profile of cross
border terrorism
but continue to
utilise the period
for stocking up
for the contingency
of failure. For
India, therefore,
the good news about
the end of terrorism
may come with peacetime
pressures.
For India too the
context has changed
several times, usually
in tandem with the
change for Pakistan,
though not quite
as dramatically.
The last time we
thought it might
have changed so
dramatically so
as to end the problem
itself was in the
aftermath of 9/11.
But that did not
materialise, as
it could not have,
given the complexity
of the problem.
In a sense the worst
is over, but the
problem remains.
From Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee
in January, 2004
to Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh in
September, 2004,
we appear to be
breaking new grounds.
President Musharraf
too seems more confident
of being able to
break new ground,
or at least to give
up old ground. Yet
it is too early
to bet on conspicuous
movement forward.
In medical jargon
we are beginning
to talk about the
dreaded disease
as well as beginning
to treat its symptoms
seriously. In the
past we merely disagreed
on the nature of
the disease and
ignored the symptoms
repeatedly.
The search for a
solution has acquired
a new meaningful
context and urgency
because of the convergence
of changing contexts
for both countries.
But distressingly,
despite the BJP's
stated commitment
to peace in the
6th January 2004
joint statement
about a composite
dialogue on ‘all
issues including
Jammu and Kashmir’,
their response to
the September 24th,
2004 Manmohan Singh-Musharraf
Joint Statement
was curiously negative.
Their objections
may well be the
usual party political
damage control unrelated
to real positions
on bilateral issues.
But they do indicate
a naivetté
on the Jammu &
Kashmir matter.
Whether we say it
or not, we know
it and so does the
world that it is
Jammu & Kashmir
that has soured
relations between
India and Pakistan.
We all would, of
course, be very
happy if Pakistan
just forgot about
Jammu and Kashmir
and cut off the
oxygen to the terrorist
outfits that continue
to cause casualties
in Jammu & Kashmir.
Some people actually
believe this is
what the talks are
about with Pakistan.
In other words it
is not about 'what',
it is only about
'when' and 'how'.
But what is there
in it for Pakistan?
They would certainly
want to know why
did they had to
fight so long and
so disastrously,
if this is all that
could be achieved?
Similarly, for Pakistan
it would be misplaced
optimism to assume
that the changed
context in the world
and U.S. policy
planners' perception
of Pakistan -- having
acquired fresh strategic
significance in
the global war against
terrorism -- would
inevitably lead
to a ‘territory
for terrorism’
swap on the lines
of ‘land for
peace’ in
Palestine. Yet India
too has to watch
out for a unique
dilemma so long
as terrorist activity
continues, whether
we say it in joint
statements or we
don't, no Indian
government can talk
peace or show any
concession; but
if terrorism stops
there will be an
expectation on the
Pakistan side of
a ‘peace dividend’.
Something like that
happened in the
aftermath of 9/11
when the U.S. sought
a partnership with
both Pakistan and
India in the war
against terrorism
and disappointed
India. And to top
it, circumstances
made Pakistan more
critical to that
war.
So where does all
this take us? There
is too much at stake
for India to allow
our relations with
Pakistan to keep
us from seizing
the opportunities.
Pakistan, after
57 years of traumatic
existence, cannot
afford not to find
a national objective
and an aspiration
other than a myth
from the past. For
both sides to cling
on to a hope, indeed
a shortsighted expectation
of an ‘all
or nothing’
solution is detrimental
to their own interests.
If President Musharraf
has to rein in and
persuade his own
fundamentalists,
Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh too has to
carry the separatists
in Jammu & Kashmir
and at least silence
the saffron fringe.
Neither of them
has an easy task.
Nor do our two countries.
Common people do
usually prefer peace
over violence provided
the latter is not
given the colours
of romance (ideology).
But the romance
fades quickly as
violence draws closer
to home. Ironically
peace efforts have
the greatest chance
of success when
one side figures
out that it has
lost on when a stalemate
of continuing violence
begins to tire the
common folk. In
the India-Pakistan
relationship, the
former is now virtually
impossible and the
latter is only beginning
to happen. But it
seems that the world
is in a hurry and
in no mood to wait.
That can be an advantage
for both of us but
we both need some
understanding and
a lot of courage.
It seems that India
has toyed with some
ideas for solution
that depart from
the formally stated
position. Similarly,
Pakistan has lately
suggested a methodology
that in turn is
indicative of their
preference. The
past practice of
suspecting everything
said by the other
side and, therefore,
saying 'no' will
take its own time
to fade away. There
are several contemporary
models of successful
reconciliation and
transformations,
leading from hostility
to peace -- South
Africa, Berlin,
Vietnam, Palestine,
etc. One can pick
out interesting
pointers from each
one of those. However,
the most rewarding
exercise would be
to examine the IRA
peace agreement.
There are obviously
many layers and
dimensions to the
resolution of that
long and bloody
conflict but for
India and Pakistan
the particular aspect
of boundaries becoming
progressively irrelevant
is most interesting.
The growth of EU
as a supra-national
identity with the
attendant practical
conveniences, the
common market, easy
travel across frontiers
etc., had a psychological
impact that made
the ethnic/nationalist
concerns less dominant.
The opportunity
that came with the
union in a sense
blunted the complaints
of past injustice.
It thus became possible
to talk about and
embrace a solution,
if the traditional
or artificial sense
of nationalism and
territorial sovereignty
can be tempered
with a sense of
participation in
a greater enterprise.
Since all the imagined
or real reasons
of the conflict
have largely disappeared,
it remains for us
to overcome established
mind-sets. If Pakistan
can play India in
cricket and hockey
as equals, talk
to India as a nuclear
country to another,
why cannot we sit
as equals in the
pursuit of peace?
If Pakistani leadership
shows statesmanship
in working towards
a futuristic concept
that binds Pakistan,
rather than a genetically
flawed concept of
a state for Muslims
of the subcontinent
and Indian leadership
can achieve statesman-like
rapprochement with
our estranged compatriots
in Jammu & Kashmir,
we can come to the
table with the ability
to secure sustainable
peace. The mention
of the gas pipeline
in the Musharraf-Manmohan
Singh Joint Statement
may be the beginning
of a model of coexistence
or cooperation that
has eluded us for
half a century.
(Salman
Khurshid is a former
Indian diplomat
and currently the
President of the
Uttar Pradesh Congress
Committee)
|
