Indo-Pak Relations: Present and
Future
Najmuddin
A. Shaikh
|
This
paper was originally
designed to focus
on the possibility
of a future conflict
between Pakistan
and India in the
larger setting
of the prospects
of interstate
conflicts in South
Asia. It is, of
course, true that
in any consideration
of Indo-Pakistan
relations and
their future direction,
analysts and observers
-- guided by the
troubled relationship
of the past --
have invariably
to contend with
the fact that,
whatever the discerned
positive developments,
the possibility
of a deterioration
of relations and
the outbreak of
armed conflict
cannot be ruled
out. It is also
true that, since
the early 1980s,
security officials
in both India
and Pakistan were
forced by perceived
ground realities
to include in
their strategic
calculus the existence
of nuclear weapons
in the arsenal
of the other side.
The nuclear dimension
of any future
conflict was,
of course, underlined
by the demonstration
of this capability
by both India
and Pakistan in
quick succession
in May 1998. It
is my contention,
however, that
the acquisition
and subsequent
public demonstration
of nuclear capability
provided a spur
to efforts towards
peace and to ruling
out military conflict
as a means of
resolving Indo-Pak
disputes.
The Lahore Summit
and other positive
developments in
Indo-Pak relations
should be viewed
in this context.
Some analysts
have argued that,
following the
public demonstration
of nuclear capability,
leaders in both
countries were
anxious to take
steps that would
assuage the concerns
of the international
community, and
secure lifting
of the sanctions
that had been
imposed on both
countries. According
to these analysts,
this consideration
played a major
part in bringing
about the Lahore
Summit. But this
author would like
to believe that,
very largely,
it was a direct
consequence of
the realisation
that any future
Indo-Pak conflict
was fraught with
such danger that
it behoved visionary
or even pragmatic
leaders on both
sides to intensify
negotiations to
arrive at a peaceful
settlement of
outstanding disputes.
This is why the
Agra Summit took
place, despite
the bitter after-taste
of the Kargil
episode. This
is also why the
door to future
negotiations was
kept ajar despite
the ostensible
failure of that
summit.
Similarly there
are many analysts
who, in writing
about the Kargil
conflict or in
dissecting the
causes and consequences
of the mobilisation
of forces of December
2001 -- in the
aftermath of the
attack on the
Indian Parliament,
tended to argue
that the above
situations were
defused by the
active intervention
of the international
community. There
is no doubt that
the loudly expressed
concerns of the
international
community and
the diplomatic
efforts of the
international
community had
a great deal to
do with the dampening
of the prospects
of war but the
ultimate decision
to avoid war came
because leaders
on both sides
were responsible
enough to recognise
that in the new
strategic environment
nuclear blackmail
would not work;
a limited war
was not a viable
proposition and,
most importantly,
all-out war was
not an option.
In the light of
what many of us
remember of the
grim days in 2002,
of the stridency
of statements
from both sides,
of the apprehensions
of the international
community which
led to the departure
from both countries
of sorely needed
foreign experts
and the learned
commentaries of
regional and international
analysts, this
may appear to
be an overly optimistic
assessment but
justified, nonetheless.
I will deal later
with developments
that may call
this assessment,
into question
in the future
but for the moment
this is the thesis
on which the rest
of this presentation
will rest.
Looking at the
question of Pakistan's
alleged sense
of insecurity
and the relationship
this bears to
its perception
of the unresolved
issues -- primarily
Kashmir -- that
have bedevilled
its relations
with India, one
comes to a few
conclusions. There
is no doubt that
for the first
50 years of its
existence Pakistan's
foreign policy
had one objective:
ensuring its security
and territorial
integrity against
the perceived
threat from a
much larger India.
With military
conflict being
ruled out, what
are the impelling
forces or incentives
that can drive
the two sides,
or hinder such
efforts, to arrive
at a peaceful
resolution of
their disputes,
particularly the
dispute over Kashmir,
to which Pakistan
attaches the greatest
importance and
which, for India,
represents the
greatest challenge
in terms of its
democratic domestic
polity and its
international
standing? There
are many.
For the older
generation in
both countries
the mass migration
and bloodshed
that followed
independence is
a painful memory.
It will never
fade entirely
but for many this
is offset by a
recollection of
what the two (Pakistan
and India) had
in common. This
was underlined
when President
Musharraf, addressing
a press conference
at the UN before
his meeting with
Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh
said, 'After all,
he (Manmohan Singh)
was born in Pakistan
and I was born
in India. So there
is a good ground
for this understanding'.
Because of the
strained relationship
of the past, few
in the younger
generation know
their counterparts
on the other side.
Curiosity, more
than any other
emotion, seems
to characterise
the attitude of
the new generation
of the two countries
towards each other.
Surprisingly,
the stream of
government and
other vested interest
sponsored propaganda
on both sides
over the last
57 years has not
created among
them (the youth)
a hatred of their
counterparts.
Communal discord
and evidence of
intolerance in
either country
revives the pain
of the past for
the older generation
and may drive
the younger generation
towards hatred,
but currently
it seems that
there is a desire
to establish the
sort of relationship
which would enable
them to get to
know each better
and to prosper
together.
Economic planners
and businessmen
in both countries
are becoming acutely
aware of the drag
on economic development
that the tension
in the region
has caused. Leaders
have acknowledged
and repeatedly
paid lip service
to the notion
that the common
enemy both countries
have to fight
is the scourge
of poverty. This
identification
first appeared
in Prime Minister
Vajpayee's letter
of invitation
to President Musharraf
for the Agra Summit
and was endorsed
in Musharraf's
reply. Now it
appears that there
is a readiness
to go beyond mere
lip service. In
the press conference
referred to above,
President Musharraf
said, 'We are
like two elephants
in South Asia,
trampling the
grass in our fight….
Look where it
has taken us.
South Asia is
one of the poorest
regions and our
economy refuses
to take off because
of our preoccupation
with this dispute'.
At another time
and in another
ambience, President
Musharraf would
have spoken proudly
of the fact that
Pakistan achieved
6.4 per cent growth
in 2003-04 and
that in 2004-05
growth was expected
at 6.6 per cent,
despite the water
shortage1 and
Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh
would have riposted
with the fact
that in the first
quarter of 04-05
India's growth
rate was 7.2 per
cent and would
be about 6.6 per
cent for the year.
The fact of the
matter is that
without the constraints
and the expenditure
the tensions between
the two engender,
the growth rate
of each could
top or at least
come close to
10 per cent annually.
The proposed pipeline
from Iran to supply
gas to India provides
a simple illustration.
By one estimate,
transit fees from
the pipeline would
add US$ 500 million
or close to 1
per cent to Pakistan's
GDP while, in
the case of India,
the lower costs
of gas and its
transportation
costs would give
India an equal
percentage boost
in its much larger
GDP. This, of
course, is without
taking account
of the added economic
activity and employment
opportunities
the pipeline would
generate in the
areas through
which it would
pass.
Even more importantly
there is a realisation
that the concept
of global interdependence
has one of its
best illustrations
in South Asia.
If Pakistan is
to realise the
benefits of its
geo-strategic
location and act
as a bridge between
Central Asia and
South Asia, the
Middle East and
Central Asia and
the Middle East
and South Asia,
it can only happen
when it is prepared
to grant transit
facilities to
its neighbour.
If India is to
secure economic
access to the
energy it will
so desperately
need as its economy
takes off and
if it is to trade
profitably with
Central Asia and
the Middle East
by the cheaper
overland route,
it needs to use
this transit facility.
If a genuinely
viable Asian highway
and other communication
networks linking
the highly populated
and economically
significant areas
of Asia and the
Middle East are
to be constructed
India and Pakistan
must cooperate.
If the other South
Asian countries
are to benefit
from the economic
activity; that
will be generated
by the US$ 750
billion plan visualised
for the development
of the western
regions of China,
India and Pakistan
must cooperate.
If SAARC is ever
to rival ASEAN
as a regional
organisation or
provide incentives
for ECO and ASEAN
to seek cooperation
with South Asia
through the SAARC
mechanism, the
present political
barriers to the
development of
SAARC must be
done away with
and methodologies
must be designed
to ensure that
all SAARC members
benefit, in more
or less equal
measure, from
this organisation.
If there is to
be genuine free
trade in the region,
it must be ensured
that such trade
promotes a division
of labour that
will enable all
members to benefit
equally.
All this can only
happen if Pakistan
and India work
together. This,
in turn, can only
happen if they
resolve their
political disputes
or make visible
progress towards
their resolution.
There are the
usual clichés
used in making
suggestions on
how these problems
could be resolved
or visible progress
could be made
towards resolution:
Don't
cut your nose
to spite your
face.
Don't try to beggar
your neighbour.
Don't block proposals
that ease human
suffering.
Don't try and
use temporary
solutions for
humanitarian problems
to promote political
objectives.
Don't believe
that democracy
and repression
can long remain
compatible.
Look upon the
Composite dialogue
process as a kitchen
range on which
all burners are
in use. All the
dishes must be
ready for the
banquet. They
may cook at different
rates but there
cannot be, if
the Chefs are
to be complimented
on a magnificent
repast, too long
an interval between
the serving of
the appetizer
and the dessert.
In fact all preparatory
steps may need
to be taken to
prepare the dessert
before the cooking
of the entrée
starts.
While the above
mentioned are
clichés,
they are also
statements of
the obvious, particularly
as applied to
Indo-Pak relations.
To include in
the list:
The
resolution of
each of the issues
that the two sides
needed to discuss
could yield a
win-win result
if the two sides
agreed to so interpret
it.
Even where such
interpretation
became difficult
the long term
benefit would
far outweigh the
cost of the short-term
concession.
The benefits of
rapprochement
would flow not
only to the two
countries and
the region but
would also affect
a sea change internationally.
So how can this
be done? What
are the mechanisms
that can be devised
which would allow
matters to be
advanced without
providing opportunities
to the nay-sayers
in both countries
to sabotage the
process? The moment
seems propitious.
At no time in
recent years have
the statements
of leaders from
the two sides
been so positive.
Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh
spoke of his meeting
with President
Musharraf as an
'essay in mutual
comprehension'
and called it
'a historic day'.
The Joint Statement
which President
Musharraf read
out and which
he termed an agreement,
stated: 'They
also addressed
the issue of Jammu
& Kashmir
and agreed that
possible options
for a peaceful,
negotiated settlement
of the issue should
be explored in
a sincere spirit
and purposeful
manner'. It also
said that, 'They
[the two principals]
agreed that confidence-building
measures [CBMs]
of all categories
under discussion
between the two
governments should
be implemented
keeping in mind
practical possibilities'.
2
It appears to
be an open secret
that the groundwork
for this meeting
had been done
in meetings between
Mr. Dixit, the
Indian National
Security Adviser
and Mr. Tariq
Aziz, the Secretary
of the National
Security Council
in Pakistan3.
It also seems
to be an accepted
conjecture that,
even while working
from a draft already
prepared by the
two advisers,
the two principals
made their own
contribution to
the final wording.
This is important
since it signifies
a personal commitment
on the part of
the two leaders
to the content
and to its implementation.
It would be reasonable
to presume from
the manner in
which the statement
is worded that
the two leaders
have agreed that
the possible options
for a negotiated
settlement on
Kashmir will not
be negotiated
in the fora set
up for the 'composite
dialogue' but
will be entrusted
to the two advisers.
Many in this day
of open diplomacy
may find this
difficult to swallow.
But when 'options'
are being considered
and when these
options will entail
the abandonment
of long-held positions
it is best that
these discussions
be held outside
the glare of media
attention that
invariably focuses
on the meetings
planned for the
'composite dialogue'.
Sensitive issues
demand secret
diplomacy and
in Indo-Pak relations
this subject is
easily the most
important and
the most sensitive.
The Pakistani
president has
said that he is
not insisting
on a time frame
for the solution
of the problems
but he is insistent
that this is not
a process that
should be entirely
open-ended. If
an early solution
is to be found
then there is
all the more reason
that it be found
and agreed upon
in private negotiations
before being presented
to the people
of the two countries
and above all
to the Kashmiri
people for their
approval. Such
secret diplomacy
must of course
include consultations
with the Kashmiri
people. Their
leaders are, for
the most part,
pragmatic. They
will not necessarily
stick out for
the unattainable.
Assuming that
the Joint Statement
heralds the beginning
of a serious and
sincere effort
in secret negotiations
to settle the
Kashmir issue,
where does one
anticipate the
other elements
of the 'composite
dialogue' going
in the more public
series of meetings
that have been
planned? An American
observer of the
South Asian scene
has said, 'India
and Pakistan are
both masters of
the defensive
game and could
go on for years
in talks characterised
by more activity
than movement'4.
Pakistanis and
Indians are not
alone in having
mastered the diplomatic
technique of many
meetings and no
progress. The
Americans spent
many months arguing
with the Vietnamese
during their prolonged
negotiations on
the size and shape
of the table at
which the negotiations
would be conducted.
It is a useful
tool when the
governing principle
is 'talk talk,
fight fight' and
to let the situation
on the battlefield
determine what
is said in the
negotiations.
It would be a
pity, however,
if this cynical
observation were
to be borne out
in the Indo-Pak
context where
the purpose is
to put behind
the prospect of
conflict and to
give durability
to the peaceful
situation that
prevails on the
ground.
It is perhaps
presumptuous to
propose that the
axioms and analogies
suggested earlier
-- dismissed as
clichés
-- could be used
to ensure some
results. In Siachen,
if both sides
agree not to cut
their nose to
spite their face
(we will continue
to pay Rs. 500
for every Chappati
(bread) the Jawan
eats while stationed
in Siachen so
long as the Pakistanis
have to pay Rs.100
for every Chappati
fed to their Jawans
stationed in the
same frosty wastes),
the agreement
reached in 1989
can be signed
and implemented
quickly. One can
only hope that
when Defence Minister
Mr. Mukherjee,
in announcing
the resumption
of the talks between
the military officials
of both sides,
referred to the
history of past
negotiations this
was the direction
in which he was
pointing.
Similarly, the
settlement of
the Sir Creek
boundary along
the lines indicated
in all the maps
accepted by both
sides would enable
both countries
to demarcate not
only the land
border but also
the maritime boundary
in an area in
which there are
rumoured to be
substantial undersea
gas and oil deposits.
Whether one side
gets less and
another more should
be seen as less
important than
the fact that
both would benefit.
The same applies
to Tulbul; if
it is indeed no
more than a navigational
project and does
not involve any
obstruction to
the full flow
of water downstream
or if the obstruction
is of minor nature,
an agreement should
be reached. If
there is a substantial
difference, it
should, as provided
in the Indus Water
Treaty be referred
to international
arbitration. The
same position
should hold with
regard to Baglihar.
Such Kashmir-related
matters as the
Indian allegation
of cross-LoC infiltration
would probably
form part of the
secret diplomacy
but other humanitarian
measures such
as the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad
bus service will
form part of public
diplomacy. It
does seem rather
difficult to accept
that the use of
domicile certificates
rather than passports
for travel on
this service will,
in any way, erode
India's position.
After all, this
document is issued
by officials of
the government
in Srinagar5.
On the other hand,
travel on Indian
and Pakistani
passports would,
undoubtedly, be
used to establish
Pakistan's acceptance
of the LoC as
an international
border. The humanitarian
problem -- the
problem of divided
families needs
to be resolved
first, without
seeking a political
advantage.
The Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline is
another example
of what can be
called short-sighted
diplomacy. India
has reason, given
the past record
of distrust, to
feel concerned
about the security
of supplies from
a pipeline that
flows through
Pakistan. A solution
to this problem
can be found,
either through
some form of international
guarantees or
through an arrangement
for storage capacity
to meet requirements
during a temporary
stoppage. The
focus of the public
debate in India
is, however, shifting.
It is being argued
that India can,
in any case, meet
its needs by importing
LPG for which
it has entered
into deals with
Iran and possibly
Qatar. An effort
is being made
to suggest that
the pipeline --
if it is to be
built -- will
be a huge favour
by India and that
Pakistan should
reciprocate by
allowing India
transit facilities
to Afghanistan
and Iran by the
overland route.
The truth of the
matter is that
Pakistan will
benefit from the
royalties paid
for the transit
of the pipeline.
It will also benefit
from the ancillary
economic activity
that will be generated
along the path
the pipeline follows.
The major beneficiary
will, however,
be India. The
transportation
cost of piped
gas is about 30
per cent of the
cost incurred
on importing LPG
and the distribution
of LPG is far
more expensive
than that of piped
gas. No advances
in gas liquefaction
technology can,
in the foreseeable
future, change
this economic
reality.
With its burgeoning
energy needs,
India needs piped
gas not only from
Iran but also
perhaps from the
two other pipeline
projects that
have been mooted
-- the Qatar and
the Turkmen. For
all three suppliers,
for various reasons,
the overland South
Asian market is
far more attractive
than any other.
India, with Pakistan's
cooperation, is
in a favourable
negotiating position.
The Turkmen pipeline
has the added
advantage that
as and when it
is completed it
will give Afghanistan
sorely needed
revenues through
royalty payments
and added security
because of the
special force
that would be
created to guard
the pipeline.
While limitations
of space make
it impossible
to deal with all
the other issues
that form part
of the cluster
for the composite
dialogue, it is
important to touch
upon security.
It seems that
agreement will
be reached on
a formal pact
providing for
advance notification
of missile launches.
This will be a
good start even
though it will
only formalise
what is already
being done in
practice. It is
hoped that the
two will also
reach an agreement
on the non-deployment
of short-range
missiles in the
border areas.
Since both countries
have tested medium
range missiles
the effect of
this agreement
will be more symbolic
than real but
it will be an
important political
signal and an
indicator of the
intent of both
sides to minimise
the chances of
an accidental
or inadvertent
incident triggering
the wrong sort
of alarms in the
other country.
These measures,
as also the creation
of better communication
facilities between
the strategic
forces of the
two countries,
are important
but even more
important if we
are genuinely
seeking to jointly
wage a war against
poverty. We have
to find ways to
reduce our conventional
defence expenditure
and to ensure
that our nuclear
deterrent is maintained
at the minimum
level.
A sense of security
has been engendered
in Pakistan by
the acquisition
of a minimum nuclear
deterrent. Were
the value of the
deterrent to be
called into question
by the Indian
acquisition of
ABM weapon systems,
Pakistan would
have no choice
but to expend
its limited resources
on further strengthening
its deterrent.
As the example
of the Soviet
Union and the
United States
has shown, once
the two countries
step on top of
this slippery
slope there will
be no stopping.
The U.S. and the
Soviet Union spent
US$ 5.5 trillion
on building and
maintaining their
nuclear arsenals.
More importantly
they built powerful
lobbies within
their respective
countries. As
a result, the
United States
is budgeting for
research on new
nuclear weapons.
It has wasted
more than US$
70 billion on
the quest for
a missile defence
system, which
the United States
needs as much
as it needs a
hole in the head.
All it has to
show for it is
the so-called
deployment of
a system that,
according to experts,
cannot possibly
tackle the nonexistent
threat that it
is deployed against.
So do we want
to step on to
this path? Or
should we be sagacious
enough to agree
on a restraint
regime in both
the conventional
and nuclear field
that addresses
the differing
security concerns
of the two countries
but without exaggerating
the threat? The
answer is obvious.
Pakistan has proposed
a restraint regime.
Clearly it is
of greater benefit
to Pakistan, which
has a much smaller
resource base.
But no one should
doubt that it
is of benefit
also to India.
If we are not
playing 'beggar
thy neighbour'
the Pakistan proposal
deserves serious
consideration
and substantive
discussion.
This paper began
with from the
premise that war
is no longer an
option. It is
hoped that, given
sincerity and
a genuine recognition
of the interests
of the teeming
masses of South
Asia, the assumption
will hold true.
It may sound overly
optimistic but
the present leadership
will take steps,
with the full
support of the
people of both
countries, to
resolve existing
problems and to
realise in full
the advantages
that a cooperative
relationship between
the two countries
can bring.
(Najmuddin
A. Shaikh is former
foreign secretary
of Pakistan)
Author’s
Note: This paper
is based largely
on a presentation
made by the author
at the SAFMA conference
on ‘Interstate
Conflicts in South
