Nuclear Stabilisation in South
Asia
Moeed
Yusuf
|
The
May, 1998 nuclear
tests by Pakistan
and India led
to a fundamental
change in the
Indo-Pak relationship.
The nuclear explosions
ended more than
a decade long
period of covert
nuclearisation
during which the
two sides had
exercised 'existential
deterrence'. Overt
nuclearisation
established a
new nuclear equation
raising hopes
that it would
bring stability
to the conflict
prone region.
Whether events
on ground in the
past five years
have actually
led to stable
deterrence, is
an ongoing debate.
One thing that
is obvious is
that the euphoria
of nuclear optimists
has been dented
by recurring crises
and the seeming
indifference of
both sides to
flirt with each
others' nuclear
threshold.
This paper analyses
the existing level
of stability in
the South Asian
nuclear regime
and suggest ways
in which nuclear
stability may
be enhanced. The
paper begins by
providing a brief
history of conflicts
and crises between
Pakistan and India.
Following that,
nuclear stability
is defined to
establish benchmarks
against which
the stability
of the current
regime is to be
assessed. The
benchmarks are
then applied to
evaluate the level
of existing stability,
differentiating
stability during
peace time and
periods of high
tensions. Finally,
ways to stabilise
the South Asian
nuclear regime
are highlighted.
Indo-Pak's
Troubled Past
The hostile
relationship between
Pakistan and India
needs no reiteration.
The two adversaries
have been involved
in several crises
and at least three
full-fledged conventional
wars in the past.
The first active
conflict was initiated
in Kashmir just
a year after they
gained independence1.
In 1965, the two
clashed again
on the Western
Front (West Pakistan),
and in 1971 yet
another conventional
war led to the
separation of
East Pakistan,
leaving a permanent
scar on Indo-Pak
relations2. Although
there remain numerous
contentious issues
between Pakistan
and India, undeniably
at the core of
their hostility
lies the dispute
over Kashmir.
The bottom line
is that Pakistanis
and Indians perceive
Kashmir to have
been responsible
for their troubled
relationship.
Before we move
on to the task
of defining stability,
it is important
to highlight the
essentials of
Indo-Pak crises
in which the aspect
of nuclear deterrence
featured in one
way or another.
Four crises fit
this criterion;
two took place
in the period
of covert nuclearisation
and two after
the nuclear capabilities
had become overt.
The first such
crisis took place
in 1986-87. It
developed when
India conducted
an extensive military
exercise, the
'Brasstacks',
20 miles from
the Pakistani
border3. The ultimate
aim of the exercise
that involved
quarter of a million
Indian troops
has been widely
debated. Opinions
vary greatly,
some labeling
it as an attempt
to put pressure
on Pakistan to
cease support
to Sikh infiltrators
in Eastern Punjab,
while others suggesting
that India had
planned a full-fledged
war to split Pakistani
territory4. In
any case, given
the sheer magnitude
and apparent hostile
nature of the
exercise, Pakistan
mobilised its
forces leading
to an eyeball-to-eyeball
deployment. For
the first time
during any Indo-Pak
crisis, covert
nuclear threats
emanated from
Islamabad. Dr.
A. Q. Khan, the
'father of Pakistan's
bomb' professed
Pakistan's nuclear
capability in
an interview with
an Indian journalist
stating, 'nobody
can undo Pakistan….We
are here to stay
and let it be
clear that we
shall use the
bomb if our existence
is threatened.'5
The statement
was carried in
all leading newspapers,
thus achieving
the aim of communicating
the existence
of the capability.
Next, in 1990,
following an upsurge
in violence in
Indian-administered
Kashmir and subsequent
Indian allegations
of Pakistani support
to the insurgents,
tensions between
Pakistan and India
heightened. A
crisis developed
as Pakistan conducted
'Zarb-e-Momin',
a major military
exercise that
India responded
to by its own
'precautionary'
reinforcements6.
Both forces were
put on high alert
and the crisis
seemed to be escalating
towards an active
conflict. Here
again, nuclear
overtones were
present, and there
is a wider consensus
that the nuclear
deterrent featured
to keep the crisis
from escalating.
Some reports even
suggest that Pakistan
had placed its
delivery aircraft
on full alert
and technicians
in its main nuclear
facility had been
ordered to assemble
nuclear weapons
in preparation
of a launch7.
While later studies
have discounted
such reports,
they all seem
to agree that
some nuclear preparations
were underway
from the Pakistani
side8. What exact
role the deterrent
played in Indian
calculations is
hard to determine.
The third crisis,
which escalated
to a limited conflict,
took place a year
after both counties
had declared their
nuclear capabilities.
In the spring
of 1999, about
2000 infiltrators
from Pakistan
crossed the Line
of Control and
captured Indian
army's posts in
the Kargil-Drass
area of Kashmir9.
This led to Indian
retaliation. However,
the conflict remained
limited as the
Indian military
was under strict
orders not to
carry the retaliation
across the Line
of Control10.
American involvement
made way for the
eventual withdrawal
of Pakistani troops11.
There is no doubt
that the nuclear
deterrent featured
prominently in
calculations on
both sides during
the crisis. Nuclear
threats were exchanged
openly12. One
report even suggests
that India had
maintained its
nuclear forces
at a high state
of readiness in
preparation for
retaliation13.
The Kargil crisis
is of consequence
for any analysis
of nuclear stability
in the region.
It demonstrated
the existence
of the 'stability-instability
paradox' in a
nuclear South
Asia, i.e. it
made limited conflict
(instability at
lower levels of
conflict) more
likely while inducing
stability at the
higher end of
the spectrum14.
The latest crisis
erupted after
a terrorist attack
on the Indian
parliament in
December 2001
and subsequent
allegations of
Pakistan's involvement
led to a massive
troop mobilisation
from the Indian
side15. With the
killing of families
of Indian military
personnel in Kaluchak
in May 2002, escalation
to a conventional
war seemed inevitable16.
The crisis caused
Pakistani counter-mobilisation,
leading to the
largest military
deployment in
South Asian history.
Nearly a million
troops were deployed
at the international
border17. As in
the 1999 crisis,
both countries
exchanged several
nuclear threats
that were to be
employed in case
of escalation18.
The nuclear equation
remained at the
forefront and
deterrence optimists
believe that in
the end existence
of stable nuclear
deterrence forced
the two sides
to withdraw their
forces19.
There are a few
lessons from these
four nuclear-related
crises which have
a bearing on any
discussion of
strategic stability
in South Asia.
First, is the
fact that, despite
the initial euphoria
after the 1998
tests, the existence
of nuclear weapons
has not eliminated
crises or conflicts
altogether. Second,
although crisis
situations have
developed, in
the end all crises
under the nuclear
umbrella have
either not escalated
to conflicts (1986-87,
1990, 2001-02),
or in the case
of Kargil, have
remained extremely
limited in nature.
Third, the reason
for successful
escalation control
in these crises
varies from crisis
to crisis and
cannot be attributed
to successful
deterrence in
all cases. As
mentioned, in
the first two
crises even the
fact that the
nuclear deterrent
featured in official
calculations is
debated. One common
element which
assisted in escalation
control in each
crisis, however,
was the crucial
role played by
the U.S20. Finally,
these crises,
especially the
ones that took
place during the
overt nuclearisation
phase bring us
to the sombre
realisation that
crises carry with
them the threat
of escalation
to a full-scale
conventional war,
which in turn
raises tremendously
the risk of a
nuclear exchange.
In other words,
moving along the
escalation ladder
to the highest
end of the spectrum
is a realistic
possibility in
South Asia.
Concept
of Stability
The Oxford English
dictionary defines
stability as 'permanence
of arrangement,
power of resisting
change of structure'
and 'immunity
from destruction
or essential change'.21
Within the military
context then,
this implies maintaining
a situation where
no development
disrupts the existing
equilibrium in
a way that it
results in active
conflict. For
a conflict implies
an essential change
and a lack of
power of resisting
change of structure.
In the nuclear
context, stability
points to the
concept of nuclear
deterrence, or
the ability to
deter an adversary
from taking an
offensive for
fear of punishment.
There is voluminous
literature that
deals with the
concept of nuclear
deterrence. Experts
have attempted
to determine the
necessary prerequisites
for establishing
deterrence stability
between two adversaries.
Broadly, there
are three prerequisites
according to the
rationalist deterrence
theory22:
(i)
Both countries
should have a
deliverable first
strike capability
and an ability
to sustain an
adversary's first
strike and conduct
a successful retaliatory
strike. This refers
to the concept
of survivability
of ones nuclear
arsenal. The idea
is to ensure that
a retaliatory
strike capability
remains intact
under any circumstances.
While the emphasis
rightly remains
on developing
a first and retaliatory
strike capability,
it must also be
pointed out that
establishing nuclear
deterrence is
a game of perceptions
as much as it
is of possessing
the capability
itself. The deterrent
effect remains
incomplete until
and unless the
credibility of
this capability
and the resolve
to implement it
is communicated
to the adversary.
As Bernard Brodie
wrote during the
Cold War, 'deterrence
depends on the
subjective feeling
compounded of
respect and fear….'.23
Therefore, while
analysing the
stability regime,
the perceptions
in the minds of
the involved parties
must also be judged
in addition to
the survivability
of the force itself.
(ii) Neither of
the two sides
should consider
a preventive or
pre-emptive strike
as a viable option
and should not
undertake any
action to this
effect. Prevention
reflects an attempt
at decimating
an adversary's
nuclear facilities
before they are
fully developed.
Pre-emption, on
the other hand,
refers to an attempt
to neutralise
an existing capability,
before the enemy
can launch a strike.
If either of these
two were exercised,
whether successfully
or otherwise,
the deterrent
effect of one's
arsenal would
of course have
failed.
(iii) Arsenals
of both countries
should be secure
against accidental
or unauthorised
use, or accidents
involving nuclear
weapons. This
subsumes both
the concept of
safety and security
of the nuclear
arsenal. By safety,
one implies that
nuclear weapons
function only
as and when intended.
Security refers
to establishing
adequate controls
over the nuclear
arsenal and sensitive
material to guard
against accidents.
To ensure that
nuclear weapons
are not employed
unless intended
by the legitimate
authorities and
are well protected
is a prerequisite
to maintaining
strategic stability.
In
this context,
the above benchmarks
for strategic
stability would
be used to evaluate
the existence
or lack thereof,
of strategic stability
between Pakistan
and India. Specifically,
we look to answer
the following
questions:
(i)
Are the nuclear
arsenals of Pakistan
and India survivable?
(ii) Is the credibility
and resolve to
employ the nuclear
option communicated
to the adversary?
(iii) What is
the likelihood
of either of the
two sides contemplating
pre-emption of
the other's nuclear
forces?
(iv) To what extent
are South Asian
nuclear arsenals
safe? In other
words, is there
a likelihood of
unauthorised or
inadvertent use?
(v) To what extent
are South Asian
nuclear arsenals
secure against
accidents involving
nuclear material?
Since
answers to some
of these questions
are likely to
vary significantly
during peace time
- as compared
to crisis situations,
their bearing
on stability of
the nuclear regime
will be highlighted
in both conditions.
In the following
section each of
the above listed
aspect of deterrence
is dealt with
individually.
Applying the Concept
of Stability to
South Asia
(i)
Survivability
of Indo-Pak nuclear
weapons
As
mentioned, survivability
implies that a
nuclear force
is functional
and is capable
of withstanding
an initial strike
and launching
a retaliatory
strike. Nuclear
optimists point
out that the mere
existence of a
second strike
capability is
enough to deter
an adversary from
contemplating
a first strike24.
In the South Asian
case, survivability
seems to be more
or less guaranteed.
Both Pakistan
and India demonstrated
their nuclear
capabilities through
the 1998 nuclear
tests. Although
the size of Pakistan
and India's nuclear
arsenal is miniscule
compared to that
of the Cold War
adversaries, it
is sufficient
to ensure that
a first strike
could be absorbed
while retaining
the retaliatory
capability.
Estimates for
nuclear weapon
equivalents (NWEs)
in terms of fissile
material for India
range from 60
to 110, depending
on which estimate
one goes by25.
For Pakistan the
range runs from
30 to 90 NWEs.26
Furthermore, both
countries continue
to aggressively
upgrade their
nuclear delivery
systems. Both
have aircraft
capable of delivering
nuclear weapons,
the F-16 and Mirage-5
in case of Pakistan,
and the SU-30,
Mirage-2000, and
MiG-27 in case
of India.27 In
addition, both
have well developed
ground-based missile
delivery systems
that can be launched
from mobile launchers,
virtually ensuring
an operational
delivery capability28.
The provision
of adequate dispersal
of missile batteries
combined with
an adequate number
of nuclear warheads
ensures that a
launching capability
would remain intact,
even if the adversary
managed to conduct
a first strike.
(ii)
Credibility and
resolve to employ
the nuclear option
Communicating
credibility and
resolve to employ
nuclear weapons
is referred to
as nuclear signalling.
For deterrence
to function, a
capability to
inflict nuclear
damage must be
perceived as real
by the enemy.
Otherwise it is
unlikely to have
any significant
impact on its
calculations.
Nuclear signalling
can be undertaken
in various forms.
Three major ways
to communicate
nuclear signals
can be highlighted.
First, resolve
to employ nuclear
weapons could
be communicated
tacitly -- by
actual demonstration
of a capability
or through an
official policy
pronouncement.
A demonstration
could entail testing
of nuclear weapons
as Pakistan did
in response to
India's tests
in 1998. Another
way to show seriousness
is by testing
nuclear capable
missiles. Both
Pakistan and India
have done so regularly
since 1998. Furthermore,
credibility of
the nuclear deterrent
could also be
demonstrated by
deploying operational
nuclear forces
and communicating
such a move to
the adversary.
Finally, resolve
could be signalled
through official
policy pronouncements.
For example, Pakistan's
rejection of a
'no-first use
policy' demonstrates
its resolve to
employ strategic
forces were it
threatened in
any conflict.
While demonstration
of a capability
does signal resolve,
it can also have
quite the opposite
impact -- that
of diluting deterrence
by leading to
inadvertent escalation.
There is only
a thin line between
communicating
resolve and creating
fear of an imminent
danger in the
adversary's mind
by pursuing overly
aggressive signalling.
As Bernard Brodie
has put it, 'it
is possible to
make him (the
adversary) fear
us too much, especially
if what we make
him fear is our
over-readiness
to react, whether
or not he translates
it into clear
evidence of our
aggressive intent.'29
If a perception
of imminent danger
develops in the
adversary's camp,
it could transform
a period of calm
into a crisis
situation. On
the other hand,
if such a perception
develops in the
midst of an ongoing
crisis, it could
cause the crisis
to move rapidly
along the escalation
ladder.
For Pakistan and
India, credibility
of an operational
nuclear force
and the resolve
to employ it is
well established.
In fact, their
active signalling
during past crises
reflects their
desire to show
resolve to respond
even if conflicts
remain limited.30
Pakistan and India
have conducted
missile tests
even in times
of crisis in the
past. During the
2001-02 standoff,
India tested its
Agni ballistic
missile followed
by a quick response
from Pakistan
with three tests
of its Ghauri,
Ghaznavi, and
Abdali missiles.31
In the Indo-Pak
context, what
is more worrying
is the overly
aggressive signalling.
Although the 2001-02
missile tests
were pre-notified,
concerns were
raised in the
media labelling
the tests as provocative
and irresponsible.
As for signalling
by deploying nuclear
forces, such a
risk does not
exist in peace
time. Neither
Pakistan nor India
have their nuclear
forces deployed
and are not likely
to do so in the
near future. In
a crisis situation,
however, any hint
of either side
initiating even
limited deployment
could cause a
reciprocal reaction
bringing the two
forces to a high
level of readiness
and underscoring
all dangers associated
with such a development.
Second, nuclear
signalling could
be undertaken
through direct
communication
between two adversaries.
This would entail
official contact
between the two
governments during
which a nuclear
threat, or an
absence of it,
is communicated.
The advantage
of such signalling
is that a message
is unambiguous
and allows ones
intentions to
be clearly revealed
to the adversary.
More than their
utility in communicating
resolve, official
communication
channels are extremely
useful when convincing
the adversary
of the reverse
-- lack of any
intention to use
nuclear forces.
For example, if
certain tacit
or indirect signals
have been misunderstood,
or if false intelligence
or rumours in
the press have
led one to believe
that employment
of nuclear weapons
by the adversary
is being contemplated,
an official contact
could help clarify
the absence of
any such threat.
While official
Indo-Pak communication
channels have
remained open
during peace time,
their actual utility
is during periods
of crises. Here,
history paints
a dismal picture.
Lack of official
communication
can arguably be
blamed for initiation
and the limited
escalation of
recent Indo-Pak
crises. Out of
the four nuclear
relevant crises,
it was only during
the 1986-87 crisis
that official
contact was utilised
to diffuse tensions.32
In the last three
crises, official
communication
was non-existent
with the result
that both parties
relied on indirect
communication,
sending unintended
and confusing
signals and adding
to the risk of
escalation.
One alternate
to direct communication
that both Pakistan
and India have
successfully employed
in crises is conducting
such communication
through an intermediary.
The intermediary
has been the U.S.
The U.S.' role
was present in
diffusing all
four nuclear relevant
crises.33 In the
1999 crisis, Washington's
involvement was
so proactive that
many believe it
to be the single
most important
factor in diffusing
tensions. However,
depending on the
U.S. to mediate
in every crisis
is dangerous for
two reasons. For
one, the U.S.
could find comfort
in the fact that
it has been successful
in bringing an
end to all past
crises and might
decide to leave
Pakistan and India
to their own crisis
prevention mechanisms
till the next
crisis erupts.34
Paradoxically,
Pakistan and India,
believing that
they could tap
the U.S. in times
of crises, might
be more willing
to undertake risky
behaviour.35 Were
the U.S. to fail
in its mediating
efforts in any
future crisis,
the risk of escalation
would increase
tremendously.
In short, banking
on the U.S. as
the sole means
of transmitting
official signals
is no alternate
to direct communication.
The third way
to transmit nuclear
signals is through
indirect means.
An example of
this would be
making press statements
addressed to a
general audience
but meant to send
a message to the
adversary. This
sort of signalling
is extremely risky
and ends up sending
unclear and confusing
signals. The actual
signal transmitted
solely depends
on the perception
of the recipient.
The danger of
misperception
is much greater
in times of crises
than in peace
time, as in a
heightened state
of tensions an
adversary's calculation
is bound to be
conservative.
Due to the lack
of direct communication
during crises,
Pakistan and India
have had to rely
on indirect signalling,
which has frequently
led to misunderstandings.
In fact, allegations
of sending provocative
and threatening
signals followed
by official clarifications
by the initial
message transmitter
are a common occurrence
in Indo-Pak crises.
This was witnessed
on numerous occasions
during the 2001-02
stand-off.36 Furthermore,
since indirect
communication
is also the principal
way to satisfy
domestic political
interests and
since pacifying
hard line elements
has always been
an important political
concern for governments
on both sides,
most indirect
signalling tends
to be provocative
in nature. During
the 2001-02 crisis
this was clearly
the case. Pakistani
President Pervez
Musharraf stated:
'even an inch
(of Indian incursion)
will unleash a
storm that will
sweep the enemy……inflicting
unbearable damage
to the enemy'.37
Ashraf Jahangir
Qazi, an ex-Army
General, in response
to war rhetoric
emanating from
New Delhi at the
time categorically
stated: '…what
is the damned
nuclear option
for. If Indians
will destroy most
of us, we too
will annihilate
parts of the adversary.'38
The Indian Defense
Minister was quick
to counter Pakistani
signalling with
India's own. In
a press conference
he stated: '….if
the deterrent
is not adequate
and Pakistan uses
the bomb, we will
suffer a little
but there will
be no Pakistan
left later.….Pakistan
should know its
strengths and
vulnerability
and stop making
these stupid statements.39
As the resolve
to match provocative
signalling from
the adversary
seems to have
paid off to Pakistan
and India in past
crises, it would
probably incentivise
a repeat of such
behaviour in the
future as well.40
This pattern would
virtually ensure
instability in
future crises.
To sum up, signalling
credibility and
resolve of employing
nuclear weapons
is well established
for Pakistan and
India. The concern
in this case seems
to be the opposite
-- predominance
of overly aggressive
and provocative
signalling. The
problem is compounded
by the lack of
direct communication
channels to clarify
any misinterpreted
signals. The issue
becomes much more
serious in times
of heightened
tensions as previous
Indo-Pak crises
have shown. To
ensure that signals
are not misinterpreted
and do not lead
to escalation
in crisis situations,
direct communication
channels must
remain open regardless
of the state bilateral
relations are
in.
(iii)
Pre-emption of
the other's nuclear
forces
The
second condition
of nuclear deterrence
necessitates absence
of a preventive
or pre-emptive
strike. While
no attempt at
either pre-emption
or prevention
has been executed
in South Asia,
they have been
contemplated previously.
In 1984-85, India
planned to conduct
a preventive strike
against Pakistan's
main nuclear facility
at Kahuta.41 As
for pre-emption,
Pakistani intelligence
claims to have
received credible
reports of an
Indian plan to
attack Kahuta
immediately after
India conducted
its nuclear tests.42
However, these
reports have never
been confirmed.
While such actions
might have been
possible in the
past, the current
status of Pakistani
and Indian nuclear
arsenals makes
any thought of
pre-emption a
virtual impossibility.
Given the sheer
size of India
makes Pakistani
pre-emption impossible.
However, some
fears of the reverse
-- India pre-empting
Pakistani nuclear
forces -- have
been raised citing
prior
