Nepal: A Tragedy of Triple Conflict Dr Bishnu Raj Upreti

Introduction

Nepal is facing an unprecedented crisis in its modern history. The 'people's war', started by a radical party, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), since 1996 has not only taken lives of more than ten thousand people and caused a loss of billions of rupees of property, but also challenged centuries-old authoritarian regime and structures. The circumstances in the current Nepalese polity are pointing towards a 'failed-state', i. e., sustained conflict between insurgents and the government has displaced the constitutional regime and has paralysed the whole system of governance with ruling elite incapable of finding a solution to both the constitutional crisis and the Maoist insurgency.

Three communist parties, who believed in Mao's ideology and a strategy of people's war, had formed Communist Party of Nepal-Unity Centre (CPN-UC), as a 'political front' to join the 1990s popular Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). They wanted more radical changes through a constituent assembly to decide the issues of constitution and monarchy. However, major MRD forces (Nepali Congress Party and United Leftist Front1) rejected the approach of convening a constituent assembly demanded by CPN-UC. The negotiations between the king and the major MRD parties led to a compromise on a constitutional monarchy.

Despite disappointment, the CPN-UC did participate in the 1991 national election, won nine out of 205 parliamentary seats and became the third largest party of Nepal. Their decision to participate in the parliamentary election was, however, tactical to 'lay-bare the contradictions and limits of the parliamentary system' (Misra, 2004). The CPN-UC wanted to implement political programme within the strict framework of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist ideology in accordance with the concrete situation of Nepal. After one year of underground preparation for the 'people's war', the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) was reorganised in 1995 who initiated a 'People's War' in February 1996 (Philipson, 2002; Nickson, 2003; Thapa, and Sijapati, 2003; Upreti, 2004). This armed conflict has severely shaken the existing political structures and governance system established by the 1990s political change.

Prior to 4th October, 2002, there were only two visible power centres in the conflict: Constitutional forces -- the king/parliamentary parties -- and the Maoists. However, after the dissolution of the parliament and removal of the elected government, the country is now divided among three forces: The Palace and pro-monarchy elements; political parties struggling for the restoration of constitutional rule; and the Maoists wanting a constituent assembly. However, the Maoists are in advantageous position vis-a-vis the newly-emerged power equation, as parliamentary parties and the Maoists are willy-nilly moving closer and the Palace is distancing from its traditional allies. Consequently, the republican slogans chanted by students and workers and systematically raised by the Maoists from the beginning of their insurgency, are finding concurrence on the streets. The parliamentary parties still committed to constitutional monarchy are not able to side-track the demand for a 'republic'. This may lead to extended confrontation between the Palace and traditional forces, on the one hand, and those who want a republic with no place for monarchy.

Causes of the Conflict

Nepal was a monolithic, feudal, autocratic, centralised and closed state for centuries (Thapa, 2003; Karki and Seddon, 2003). The governing system in the entire history of modern Nepal was orchestrated by combining threat of suppression and use of coercive power by the state (Kumar, 2004). Such characteristics of the state, consequently, excluded vast majority of Nepalese people from the nation-building process (Karki and Seddon, 2003; Thapa, 2003, Raj, 2004). Such a vast alienation of the masses virtually became a breeding ground for the peasant insurgency in Nepal. Rampant poverty, abject destitution, systematic and deliberate exclusion, multiple caste, gender, and ethnic discriminations, and greater injustice helped fuel insurgency. (Thapa, 2003; Karki and Seddon, 2003; Misra, 2004, Rana and Sharma, 2004; Upreti, 2004). These causes are also accepted by the Dhami (1997) and Deuba (2000) Commissions, which were constituted by the government to recommend ways to resolve the conflict. The Maoists started their 'people's war' when social conditions were ripe for that (Raj, 2004). According to the Maoists, 'the principal objective of the people's war is, thus, to develop the social productive forces and create a higher form of society through a continuous revolution… by putting 'politics in command' (Kumar, 2004). Therefore, the Maoists argue that they are not the problem but the solution to the problem facing the nation since long time2.

In a context of complex conflict, like the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, it is very hard to identify and separate causes and effects, as causes become effects and effects turns into causes. However, the following interrelated causes can help analyse the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and its consequences on the future of the state.

Structural Causes

Though political conflicts are an integral part of evolving system of governance (Pahari, 2003; Kumar, 2004); failure to ensure public participation, evolve mechanisms to resolve conflict and find ways to establish the writ of the state has resulted in a deep crisis. Centuries-old relations of production, archaic social structures and non-functional governance system maintained by the forces of past aligned with the monarchy, severely skewed resource distribution and perpetuated a system of injustice, racial, ethnic, geographical, gender and social discriminations, rampant poverty and unemployment that have helped ignite the insurgency (Thapa, 2003; Thapa and Sijapati, 2003; Upreti, 2004). The 1990s’ popular movement was the first attempt to dismantle this feudal system and some how succeeded in containing the interests of the feudal elite and traditional power groups. But, the traditional power centres continued to weaken the newly evolved democracy (Kumar, 2004). However, malpractice and irregularities observed in the 12 years of democratic rule coupled with the deliberate regressive attempts by the palace and traditional power centres to reverse the democratic process have caused disillusionment among the people about the future of democratic governance.

The monarchists were able to penetrate the political parties and pursue an undemocratic course to reverse the gains of the people. The undemocratic forces succeeded in splitting the major political parties and the democratic movement against regression (Thapa, 2003; Raj, 2004). Heterogeneous development and mismatch of social and political is another fundamental cause behind the conflict (Upreti, 2003). The following conceptual matrix presents this mismatch leading to violent conflict in Nepal:

The Mismatch between Development Practices as Source of Conflict

Conflict Prognosis	Political development	Social development	Economic development	Manifestation of effects of mismatch in Nepal
No overt conflict	High	High	High	Never observed high lovel of all three developments
Greatest propensity for overt conflict	High	Low	Low	The situation of current conflict
Medium propensity for overt conflict	High	High	Low	Not observed yet
Existence of latent (not overt) conflict, which may require multiple triggers to emerge	Low	Low	Low	Observed during autocratic panchyat political system before 1990
No overt conflict (mainly urban phenomenon)	Low	Low	High	Existing situation in urban areas and city centers

Source: Adapted from Upreti, 2004

Of the three, political development is the most sensitive indicator of conflict if it mismatches with the other two. In contrast, social development sans political and economic development does not lead to overt conflict, while economic empowerment alone leads to the further pursuit of economic wealth at least in the short and medium-term. Low development on all three indices leads to latent conflict, which may not erupt in violence for a long time. However, the grave potential for such situations becoming violent remains strong, and even insignificant triggers may result in a full-blown conflict. The 1990s’ popular movement is an example of manifestation of this situation. The post-1990 empowerment phenomena shows that overall political empowerment is high and social and economic empowerment is low and only elite, and neo-elite, benefited from socio-political development. Nepal's planned development has the proven history of grand failure (Pandey, 1999; Upreti, 2004) in terms of addressing root causes of the conflict, providing fertile breeding ground to the Maoist insurgency (Philipson, 2002; Raj, 2004; Upreti, 2004). Thus, it is imperative that mismatch between social, economic and political development and a lack of empowerment of the people are addressed.

Ideological Basis

There is strong ideological dimension to the Maoist conflict. Whether it is right or wrong, the Mao's ideology and 'people's war' strategy propounded by Mao Zedong to rely upon and mobilise the people guides and shapes the Maoist insurgency (Thapa and Sijapati, 2003). Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), insurgency of Peru, is also an inspiring source for the Maoist in Nepal (Nickson, 2003; Raj, 2004). The CPN (Maoist) is the founding member of the RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement) and CCOMPOSA (Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia). Perhaps CPN (M) is the most influential member of both the organisations. (It is yet to be seen whether the Maoists will, ultimately, take a political course allowing pluralism or that of Pol Pot which depends, essentially, upon the talks). {If the Maoists take the course of armed takeover of the capital they may bring havoc to Nepal and end up as an isolated dictatorship; and if they are brought into a pluralistic-democratic frame, they may help in the emergence of a republic attuned to people’s needs (Editor)}. The 'people's war' of Nepalese Maoists is ideologically influenced by RIM and CCOMPOSA (see box below).

Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)

1.	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
2.	Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)(People's War Group)
3.	Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)
4.	Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM)
5.	Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist)
6.	Communist Party of India (ML)(Naxalbari)
7.	Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (CC)
8.	Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punarghathan Kendra)
9.	Bangladesh Samyabadi Party (ML)
10	Communist Party of Ceylon (Maoist)
Source: Adapted from Upreti 2004

V. Triggers and Catalysts
Triggers or catalysts are (such) events that initiate or fuel conflict (Upreti, 2004). While looking to the Maoist conflict, several triggers or catalysts have tremendously contributed to escalate conflict. Some of them are:

i) Coercive approach
Although the mal-performance of parliamentary parities was not the fundamental cause behind the Maoist insurgency, failure to address causes of the conflict through radical reforms and good governance practices during their tenure show that they failed to come up to the expectations of the people (Upreti, 2004; Raj, 2004). They never tried sincerely and honestly to address the root causes behind the miseries of the people and to settle the conflict politically. Rather, they used the conflict as a means to grab or share power in a system that was least responsive to the needs of the people. They interpret the Maoist insurgency simply as a law and order problem and attempt to control it by using force (e.g., cordon and search-Killo Sera II operation). Special 'Armed Police Force' was created to control the insurgency. Later, they imposed a State of Emergency and mobilised military to control the insurgency. The government also declared the Maoists as terrorists, issued red warrants through Interpol and fixed bounty on the heads of the Maoist leaders. Consequently, the insurgency spread all over the countryside, mainly because of an extremely coercive approach.

ii) Royal massacre
The royal massacre (in extremely mysterious circumstances) added another complexity to the conflict. Immediately after the royal massacre, the Maoists publicly declared that the conventional Monarchy had come to an end and the circumstances had become favourable to install a republican setup in the country (Thapa and Sijapati, 2004). They concentrated their efforts at undermining the new king and weaken the monarchy. The royal massacre broke the myth of monarchy and created a void and an environment for Maoist cadres to attract people and organise them militarily to expand the base of insurgency.

iii) Terrorist attack of 11 September, 2001
The terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on 11 September, 2001 had direct impact on the Nepalese conflict. India, USA and some other countries supported Nepal with arms, technology and military aid to control terrorism. India also declared Maoists as terrorists and formally sealed the border. The Nepalese government got strong support from India to control the Maoists militarily. After 9/11, successive Nepali governments took an aggressive course. This approach worsened the situation and the conflict was further aggravated.

iv) 4th October, 2002
The ambition of the new king to be assertive, proactive and not only to be seen but also heard as a ruler of the 21st century Nepal and his subsequent action to sack the elected government has pushed the country into a deep crisis, further exacerbating the contradictions among the dominant elites. The king's action led to a deeper conflict between the parliamentary parties and the monarch. The Maoists successfully capitalised on the tussle between the king and the parliamentary parties to their advantage. Mobilisation of security forces (police force, Royal Nepal Army, state intelligence service) as a unified command under the Royal Nepal Army did not get full support of political parties. All democratic and civil institutions have been weakened. In the absence of a parliament, the country has been ruled by ordinances and royal decrees. This has great bearing on the expansion of Maoists. Almost 80 per cent of the country is said to be under the control of Maoist rebels at present.

v) Role of media
In the past, particularly before August 2003, the Nepalese media had disseminated sensational and escalatory news stories, instead of promoting peace. This has great impacts in escalating conflict (Upreti, 2004). There was no code of conduct while reporting the conflict. However, after August 2003, the role of media is becoming more responsible and positive in promoting peace.

vi) International dimensions
The role of major international and regional powers has been inconsistent, contradictory and often produced opposite results. It is very hard to assess the exact strategy of India towards resolving the Nepalese crisis. Its response towards the Maoists has always been contradictory and created doubts. For example, handing over some Maoist leaders arrested in Indian to the Nepalese government at one time, and taking legal action in the Indian courts against the others; supporting the military action, on the one hand, and insisting that the insurgency problem should be solved politically, on the other. Major routes and sources of arms and ammunitions for Maoists come through the Indian territories, but India is not doing enough to stop it. India does not like the involvement of international mediation of the conflict and has objected when UN showed interest in mediation.

The U.S. is another main international player in this conflict. It is more consistent in its approach towards dealing with the Maoists. The U.S. wants to control the Maoists militarily. Therefore, it is supporting the RNA in terms of financial and material resources as well as by supplying military equipments and training. The Maoists are also deadly opposed to the U.S. intervention. A vast majority of Nepalese people deeply suspect the U.S. approach of dealing with the Nepalese conflict, as it is worsening the situation instead of solving the problem.

The U.K. is also working with double standards in dealing with the Maoist insurgency. It is supplying arms and war planes to the RNA but says it should be resolved politically. However, the U.K. has shown greater concern for the violation of human rights. United Nations, European Union, Amnesty International, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ICRC are other major international actors devoted to resolve this conflict politically. However, their efforts are constrained or their role is minimised by the above-mentioned three international powers. Norway, Switzerland and many other West European countries are also trying to resolve this conflict peacefully but their role is again limited because of non cooperation from India and the U.S. It is extremely hard to settle this crisis without full support from India. However, India's role, so far, is not quite encouraging (Upreti, 2004).

vii) Attitude towards change

Power Dynamics and Attitude of Change in Nepal

Intension to change and radical reform	Major power centres
	The King and the post-October 4 governments	Parliamentary parties	Maoists
Resistant to change (guided practices)
Slow and peaceful change (democratic practices)
Quick and violent change (authoritarian)

The three major power centres have their own agendas of change shaped and orchestrated by perceived risks, unfounded imaginations and unrealistic ambitions. The establishment (the king and the post 4 October, 2002 nominated governments) want to pacify and slow down the much-desired change by ordinary citizens, especially. While perpetuating the status quo, the establishment makes the situation worse in a political vacuum, instead of bringing the democratic process back on the rail. The post-4 October, 2002 governing practices have demonstrated that 'guided democracy' seems to be the ruling framework of the king where changes will be regulated and controlled by him. Hence, major parliamentary parties are sidelined from the mainstream politics and the nominated governments, whose legitimacy is seriously questioned, have ruled the country through ordinances. The parliamentary parties are also not ready to initiate a radical reform agenda as they failed to implement their election manifestos when they were in power during the 12 years of democracy. They want some change in a slow and incremental manner. Perhaps, amid raised expectations for change by the Maoists, their agenda for change is too little and too slow. The Maoists want to change rather quickly although not all people believe the feasibility of their way of bringing change. In the current circumstances, none of them would be able to achieve alone what they wanted, without the support of at least another force. This is the real bottleneck which may not be solved and result in the failure of all centres of power to resolve the crisis either way.

viii) Brutalisation of society
One of the most serious implications of this insurgency is the widening of human insecurity. Amnesty International and other national human rights organisations, such as Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), have documented evidences on severe human rights violations during the conflict (INSEC, 2003). Air bombardment by the security forces (e.g., in Binayak and Mudvara VDCs of Doti districts) and mass abduction of villagers and school children by the Maoists from their areas of influence have created wide spread fear and uncertainty. Although no accurate data is available, more than 300,000 thousand people are estimated to have been internally displaced. Children, elderly people and women are the worst victims of the conflict.

ix) Denial psyche
The individual and collective political psyche has so far preferred to ignore the reality rather than accept the challenge (Upreti