South Asia's Unresolved Disputes
Khaled
Ahmed
|
States located in South Asia have taken
longer than expected
in overcoming
their mutual suspicion
and relating to
one another as
a bloc. Interstate
hostility has
lingered in the
region, while
in Southeast Asia
the states of
the Association
of South East
Asian Nations
(ASEAN) have overcome
far more complex
hurdles to successfully
activate a regional
trading bloc.
On the other hand,
South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) has not
taken off because
of bilateral impediments.
Politicians are
often heard saying
that regional
disputes should
be resolved first.
Outside observers
and a growing
community of intellectuals
in South Asia
recommend that
regional disputes
should be isolated
to pave the way
for a regionally
active SAARC.
The negative jurisprudence
of old and simmering
disputes has shaped
national politics
in the region;
and its inhabitants
are too deeply
indoctrinated
in it to allow
their governments
to move to a new
paradigm of relations.
The recent official
dialogue between
India and Pakistan
has aroused familiar
misgivings1. Democracy
may indeed be
a complicating
factor in the
most important
triangle of the
region: India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh.
Physical
imperatives of
the region place
India at the centre
of the problem.
It abuts on almost
all the South
Asian states while
these states are
separated from
one another by
natural features
or Indian territory.
India has a complex
and troubled relationship
with Pakistan,
giving rise to
the development
of country-specific
nationalisms on
both sides. It
began with the
single territorial
dispute of Kashmir
in 1948, but after
half a century
and three wars,
more disputes
have emerged in
a cumulative negative
process. The pattern
constantly anticipates
further proliferation
of disputes in
the future rather
than their isolation
in favour of resolution.
So far the tendency
to gestate and
produce new disputes
has been more
prominent than
the effort to
settle them. Because
India is the upper
riparian state,
bilateral tensions
are beginning
to focus more
urgently on water
than on territory.
The current movement
towards normalisation
of relations between
the two states
is underpinned
by efforts to
resolve the bilateral
disputes. The
process highlights
the tension between
the instinct to
settle the disputes
in accordance
with the nationalist
interpretation
placed on their
evolution, on
the one hand,
and the international
persuasion to
bring about a
new cooperative
mode of state
behaviour, on
the other.
India's relations
with Bangladesh
tend to fluctuate
while the bilateral
disputes remain
un-tackled. As
the upper riparian
state, India is
increasingly seen
in Bangladesh
as the enemy that
wants to squeeze
its traditional
water resources.
Hundreds of border
enclaves left
over from the
1947 boundary
demarcation have
not been streamlined
and continue to
give bilateral
trouble. Bangladesh
has problems with
India in the Bay
of Bengal, much
exacerbated by
a disputed silt
island in the
Bay. This dispute,
impacting on maritime
delineations of
territorial waters
and economic zones,
is remarkably
similar to the
Sir Creek dispute
India has with
Pakistan. Bangladesh's
nationalism has
become bifurcated
between the traditional
'painful birth'
syndrome, which
makes it anti-Pakistan;
and the constitutional
Islamisation of
the state, which
makes it anti-India2.
A two-party system,
which should normally
stabilise the
electoral system
in a democracy,
actually weakens
the state because
of the violently
polarised Bengali
and Bangladeshi
nationalisms espoused
by the Awami League
(AL) and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party
(BNP). After a
much disputed
effort made in
the 1990s by upper-riparian
India to resolve
the river water
disputes with
Bangladesh, the
new millennium
has seen new tensions
rather than cooperation
between the two
neighbours.
Sri Lanka has
feared India because
of its 'minority
complex' vis-à-vis
the 65 million
Tamils that live
in the Indian
state of India.
It began by seeking
settled maritime
boundaries with
India in the Palk
Strait and Gulf
of Mannar, then
put its diplomatic
pressure behind
the creation of
a UN-backed Zone
of Peace in the
Indian Ocean as
an instrument
of national security.
Sri Lanka tried
to avoid linkages
within the region
as a means of
achieving security.
It was lukewarm
about its membership
of SAARC and sought
extra-regional
relations with
the ASEAN states.
Yet out of all
the states in
the region, Sri
Lanka has behaved
more like a state
of the future.
It has rationalised
its relations
with 'hegemonic'
India and moved
more successfully
in the direction
of bilateral free
trade with it
than states have
within the SAARC
framework. It
looked at the
1987 Indian military
intervention with
suspicion but
then saw the withdrawal
of the Indian
troops from its
territory in 1989.
In the eyes of
many Sri Lankans,
after having failed
to negotiate an
independent position
for itself, Sri
Lanka implicitly
acknowledged India's
predominance before
signing the 1987
agreement that
brought the Indian
troops to Sri
Lanka.
Together with
Sri Lanka, Nepal
has a history
of interacting
with India before
1947 as an independent
state. It has
accepted the suzerainty
of the 'Indian
empire' in the
past, which it
continues to do
subliminally today
in a bilateral
framework that
it seeks also
to challenge.
Economically dominated
and much weakened
by cross-border
movement of populations,
it has sought
to balance its
relations with
India by reaching
out to China,
which India has
looked at with
suspicion. Nepal
views its 1950
security treaty
with India with
dissatisfaction
and would like
to renegotiate
it. India's own
unspoken security
doctrine hinges
on its strategy
of preventing
its neighbours
from communicating
with extra-regional
powers. To secure
this objective
it has signed
treaties with
Nepal, Bhutan
and Bangladesh,
binding the neighbours
to 'consult' India
as a first resort
to counter external
security threats
rather than allow
non-regional 'protectors'
to intervene.
Some critics have
called it the
'India Doctrine'
serving as a legal
prop to India's
hegemony in South
Asia.
India is the status
quo power in South
Asia in most discussions
relating to the
resolution of
disputes in the
region. India's
perception of
security compels
it to perceive
extra-regional
threats through
the instrumentality
of the states
situated on its
periphery. During
the Cold War,
when its security
perceptions were
formed, it acted
to prevent the
peripheral states
from joining up
with the wrong
ideological camp
at the global
level. If seen
transgressing,
it used its status
quo advantage
as a punitive
tool to bring
them to heel.
As it increasingly
perceived threat
from China and
Pakistan, it used
the punitive tool
effectively to
encourage a certain
pattern of behaviour
among the peripheral
states. From this
mode of behaviour
emerged more disputes
between it and
the neighbouring
states while the
old ones were
not resolved as
a matter of security
policy. However,
India's attitude
began to change
in the 1990s when
the Cold War came
to an end and
India's over-all
Nehruvian orientation
began to decline.
It saw rapid economic
growth and was
forced to look
at the peripheral
states more as
entities that
may assist in
the rapid expansion
of its economy
rather than as
rivals. More and
more intellectuals
in India are trying
to persuade the
strategic elite
in New Delhi to
move in the direction
of resolution
of disputes with
the peripheral
states in order
to attain the
global status
India deserves
as a nuclear and
economic power.
There could be
unspoken doctrines
behind policies
that resulted
in the non-resolution
of disputes. As
the upper riparian
state, India threatened
the lower-riparian
Pakistan (East
and West Pakistan
till 1971) with
economic damage
through control
of waters. As
time passed, lesser
disputes served
as disincentives
to the pursuit
of the large disputes.
One can say that
in the Indo-Pak
equation, smaller
disputes were
linked by India
to the politics
of preventing
Pakistan from
asserting its
rights on the
Kashmir dispute.
The proliferation
of disputes after
1947 seems to
flow from a policy
of actual creation
of smaller disputes.
Today, Kashmir
has come to be
labelled as a
'core' dispute
by Pakistan in
order to prevent
it from being
enumerated as
one of the 'non-core'
issues. The 'non-core'
disputes have
become linked
to conditions
placed by India
on Pakistan's
conduct. For instance,
disputes can be
discussed meaningfully
if Pakistan stops
its 'cross-border'
infiltration of
terrorists. In
this formulation,
the existence
of 'non-core'
issues can lessen
the compulsion
of discussing
Kashmir as the
irreducible quid
pro quo for Pakistan's
stopping its 'cross-border
terrorism'. Today
as India and Pakistan
once again engage
in a 'composite'
dialogue, the
two sides actually
betray their real
positions by insisting
on two different
approaches. Pakistan
wants the 'core
issue' discussed
on priority; India
wants it to be
a 'basket' among
other non-core
'baskets'.
The peripheral
states (Bangladesh
added after 1971)
have sought to
persuade India
to resolve the
bilateral disputes
through a variety
of policies. In
all cases, the
various strategies
of compelling
India to come
to the negotiating
table in a meaningful
way have failed.
This has, in turn,
resulted in the
weakening of the
peripheral states,
mostly accompanied
by instability
and internal division3.
Pakistan took
the most dangerous
course. It embraced
the doctrine of
low intensity
warfare after
1989 and sought
to bring India
under pressure
as the stronger
status quo power
through deniable
privatised jihad.
After a decade
of inflicting
considerable damage
on India, this
jihad has subsided
amid global condemnation.
Pakistan, not
able to see the
connection of
Kashmir jihad
with global terrorism,
is now a state
threatened by
the forces it
once unleashed
while in possession
of nuclear weapons.
If Bangladesh
thought that India's
policy over the
Ganges waters
emanated from
its conflict with
Pakistan and that
the Farakka Dam
dispute would
be resolved amicably
after the creation
of Bangladesh
under a pro-India
government, it
was gravely mistaken.
India's unwillingness
to discuss the
dam with Bangladesh
before commissioning
it has created
a great schism
in Bangladesh,
represented by
two violently
opposed political
parties. The instability
of Bangladesh
has pushed hundreds
of thousands of
Bangladeshis into
India illegally.
The non-resolution
of disputes between
India and its
neighbours appears
to be creating
a domain of disorder
in India's periphery.
In the long run
this disorder
will hinder India's
progression towards
the status of
the big power
it wants to be
at the global
level.
I.
India, Pakistan
and Kashmir
The
India-Pakistan
rivalry is mostly
understood in
the context of
the challenge
Pakistan has posed
to India on the
issue of Kashmir.
India annexed
Kashmir after
the ruler of Kashmir
acceded to India
in 1947. This
is contested by
Pakistan and by
some scholars
in the West4.
The first war
over Kashmir ended
in 1948 after
India went to
the UN Security
Council. The Security
Council recommended
plebiscite in
Kashmir which
could not be held
because of the
changed position
of India. There
were other ‘solutions'
floating around
too but none was
accepted seriously5.
In 1971, Pakistan
experienced civil
war in East Pakistan.
India responded
to the uprising
there and intervened.
Pakistan army
was defeated by
India and Pakistan
was dismembered.
One of the reasons
behind the uprising
was West Pakistan's
security doctrine
that posited defence
of East Pakistan
through enhanced
military capacity
in West Pakistan.
In 1972 the two
countries signed
the Simla Agreement,
binding themselves
to a resolution
of the Kashmir
issue through
bilateral talks.
The issue went
into cold storage
after 1972, only
to re-emerge in
1989 after an
uprising in Kashmir
which was caused
by India's misrule
in the state of
Jammu & Kashmir.
Pakistan decided
to start a low
intensity conflict
in Kashmir based
on the experience
gained from the
deniable war in
Afghanistan it
had pursued in
the 1980s together
with the United
States against
the Soviet Union.
General Zia-ul-Haq,
who died in 1988,
had transformed
Pakistan under
his strategy of
Islamisation.
Unwittingly, he
undermined Pakistan's
Kashmir cause
by introducing
laws in Pakistan
that reduced the
citizenship of
all non-Muslims.
It is moot whether
he could have
done so in the
midst of an uprising
in Kashmir with
chances of it
falling to Pakistan
along with its
3 million non-Muslims.
In the eyes of
the international
community it was
no longer acceptable
to give to Pakistan
the whole or a
part of Kashmir
inhabited by non-Muslims.
The world, therefore,
started thinking
more in terms
of compelling
India to award
more genuine autonomy
to the unhappy
Kashmiris in return
for a tacit conversion
of the Line of
Control (LoC)
into an international
border6. India
stood firm against
all international
pressure and hunkered
down to confronting
the unofficial
Pakistani jihad
in Kashmir under
an all-parties
consensus of 1993.
What followed
has been described
as a reign of
atrocities over
the Muslim Kashmiri
civilians. By
the end of the
decade India became
an offender of
human rights in
Kashmir and Pakistan
was identified
as a patron of
terrorism in the
name of jihad.
By the end of
the 1990s, Kashmir
jihad was increasingly
seen by the world
as terrorism or
cross-border terrorism,
as labelled by
India. Pakistan-based
militias began
to be declared
terrorists by
the United States
as it began to
bear the brunt
of Al Qaeda attacks
in different parts
of the world.
India increased
its military drive
against the uprising,
its troops committing
human rights violations
that the world
noticed but could
do nothing about.
The Indian point
of view, barring
a few knowledgeable
personalities,
remained supportive
of the Indian
military action.
On the Pakistani
side, the popular
view remained
supportive of
the proxy war
and no criticism
of the jihadi
militias could
be made public
without the fear
of being physically
attacked. Inside
Kashmir, the All-Parties
Hurriyat Conference
(APHC) represented
the popular rebellion
against India.
Most of the parties
comprising the
APHC demanded
'Azadi' or an
independent Kashmir
instead of a plebiscite
that would make
it possible for
Pakistan to annex
Kashmir. APHC
was also internally
divided, which
seemed to replicate
the Pakistani
experience with
the jihadi militias
in Afghanistan
against the Soviet
Union. In 1998
the Kashmir dispute
attained an extra
dimension when
India and Pakistan
tested their nuclear
devices and became
overt nuclear
powers. By the
time Pakistan
embarked on the
Kargil Operation
in 1999, the low-intensity
conflict in Kashmir
was yielding mostly
negative results
for Pakistan in
terms of international
support. The Kargil
Operation, ostensibly
meant to 'highlight'
the Kashmir cause,
collapsed to make
Pakistan realise
that it had become
too isolated internationally
for the policy
of 'highlighting'
to work.
Kargil was another
incident that
woke the world
to the possibility
of a major war
in South Asia.
In 1987, the Indian
exercise ‘Brasstacks’
triggered fears
in Pakistan of
an Indian invasion;
in 1990 India's
military exercise
‘Mahajan’
in Rajasthan is
said to have brought
the two 'recessed'
nuclear powers
to the brink of
a nuclear conflict7.
By 1999, the world
believed that
the theory of
nuclear deterrence
was not understood
in South Asia
the same way as
had been in the
West and that
India and Pakistan
could actually
go at each other
with nuclear bombs.
Kargil caused
the elected government
in Pakistan to
collapse; it strengthened
the right-wing
Hindu nationalist
Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) under
an upsurge of
nationalism in
the country. The
architect of Kargil,
General (now President)
Pervez Musharraf
went to a summit
with the then
Prime Minister
Vajpayee at Agra
in July 2001,
but failed to
get a 'flexible'
response from
him. The chastening
of Islamabad at
Kargil was not
in equal measure
with the moral
boost the operation
had yielded to
New Delhi. The
next trauma to
Pakistan was not
late in coming.
On 11 September
2001, Pakistan
suffered a blow
to its over-all
independence of
policy when the
United States
challenged it
to join the global
drive against
terrorism and
ban all the jihadi
militias operating
in Kashmir. To
compound Pakistan's
problems with
the world, the
jihadi militias
would not go away.
Jaish-e-Muhammad
struck in December
2001 in New Delhi,
this time in the
very heart of
India's democracy
-- the parliament
building. India
moved its forces
to the border
where they remained
for over a year.8
The world doesn't
care for Pakistan's
stand any more,
that is, it thinks
that the position
on plebiscite
is passé
and now the two
states must sit
down and evolve
a new solution
encompassing the
rights of the
Kashmiris within
or without India.
(The influential
view outside is
for a solution
within India.)
The world is also
conscious of India's
ability to withstand
all kinds of pressures
for the alteration
of the status
quo9. It is more
or less reconciled
to the Line of
Control (LoC)
as a permanent
frontier. But
it wants to use
the freezing of
the LoC as a lure
for India to give
genuine autonomy
to the Kashmiris.
However, to keep
the Pakistanis
within the loop,
a variety of new
solutions involving
Jammu & Kashmir
with soft borders
between the two
occupied territories
have been offered,
only to be rebuffed
-- mostly by India,
while Pakistan
plays its cards
close to the chest,
benefiting from
India's quick
rejectionism as
a status quo power.
In 2000, Farooq
Kathwari, head
of a New York-based
Kashmir Study
Group, floated
his paper Kashmir:
a way forward.
The report contained
five proposals
for the creation
of one or two
new states which
would together
constitute a 'sovereign
entity but one
without international
personality'.
An Indian journalist
cited the Kathwari
paper as saying:
'The new entity
would have its
own secular, democratic
constitution as
well as its own
citizenship, flag
and legislature,
which would legislate
on all matters
other than defence
and foreign affairs...
India and Pakistan
would be responsible
for the defence
of the Kashmir
entity, which
would itself maintain
police and gendarme
forces for internal
law and order
purposes. India
and Pakistan would
be expected to
work out financial
arrangements for
the Kashmir entity,
which include
a currency of
its own'10. The
Kashmir Study
Group came under
attack in India.
It had been drawing
upon the various
Kashmir-related
proposals made
by independent
Indian and Pakistani
personalities.
While Pakistan
has been insisting
on 'third party
mediation' (read
the U.S.) in Indo-Pak
talks, it is common
knowledge in Pakistan
that the U.S.
think-tanks favour
a solution based
on the conversion
of the Line of
Control (LoC)
into an international
border and a special
status in Indo-Pak
talks for the
Kashmiri leaders.
Indian diplomat
and journalist
Kuldip Nayar has
been discussing
the Trieste Model
which he claims
was personally
supported by former
Pakistan Prime
Minister Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto. In
1993, Indian journalist
Khushwant Singh
stated that India
should give serious
consideration
to allowing the
Vale (excluding
Ladakh and Jammu)
'to become an
autonomous entity
whose existence
is guaranteed
jointly by its
neighbours --
India and Pakistan'11.
In the 1960s,
Indian statesman
Jayaprakash Narayan
and Indian President
Rajagopalachari
favoured the aspirations
of the Kashmiris
which could then
be described as
'autonomy short
of independence'.
Alastair Lamb
studied these
various proposals
and thought they
all pointed to
the solution of
the Kashmir problem
on the 'Andorra'
model. His 'Andorra
Approach' refers
to the French-Spanish
'co-principality'
in the Pyrenees
which achieved
limited independence
through a constitution
in 199312. Finland
has been keen
that Pakistan
and India study
the League of
Nations case of
Aland Islands
between it and
Norway and draw
lessons from it.
The case of South
Tyrol between
Italy and Austria
has also been
held up as a model
if India and Pakistan
decide to resolve
the dispute by
becoming flexible
in their approach13.
Senior Congress
leader Mr Salman
Khurshid, speaking
at the SAFMA Conference
on 'Interstate
Conflicts in South
Asia' in New Delhi
on 10 October,
2004, referred
to the relevance
of the 'Irish
Formula' to the
Kashmir issue.
He thought that
India and Pakistan
could benefit
from the Good
Friday Agreement
of 1998 while
discussing the
dispute14. Earlier
in September 2004,
head of the Institute
of Strategic Studies
in Islamabad,
Ms. Shireen Mazari
had also favoured
the Irish Formula.
II.
Siachen, Wullar,
Sir Creek
‘Lesser'
disputes have
cropped up between
India and Pakistan
while the two
countries were
being persuaded
by the international
community to resolve
the big issue
of Kashmir. The
dispute over Siachen
surfaced in 1984
when the two faced
each other over
the glacier approximately
150 miles northwest
of Srinagar. Technically
a part of Jammu
& Kashmir,
Siachen is located
in a territory
not clearly defined
by the Simla Agreement.
The Line of Control
(LoC) established
by the Agreement
relied on the
1949 UN-mediated
Ceasefire Line
which was demarcated
up to NJ9842 on
the map. Beyond
this point the
document mentioned
only the glaciers
in general because
of their inaccessibility.
Both sides claimed
that the other
had provoked it
into high-altitude
deployment. India
claimed that it
wanted to secure
the glacier because
it formed a kind
of gateway to
Ladakh which was
a part of the
Indian-administered
Kashmir. It is
accepted on all
hands that India
had made the first
move on Siachen15.
The officers who
had planned the
operation tended
to relate it to
Chinese occupation
of Aksai Chin,
leading to the
India-China war
of 1962. Their
position was that
New Delhi had
not allowed reconnaissance
of the high mountains
in the 1950s,
thus making it
possible for the
Chinese to build
the secret Xinjiang-Tibet
road. Pakistan
mobilised claiming
that the Indian
move to Siachen
would interdict
Pakistan's communication
with its Northern
Areas.
The Indian and
Pakistani pickets
on the Siachen
glacier have fired
upon each other
for the last 20
years. Siachen
seems to have
become a permanent
dispute because
of (rather than
in spite of) the
Simla Agreement
provision that
all disputes would
be resolved through
bilateral discussion
for which there
is no enduring
mechanism. The
Agreement has
thus become a
kind of useful
docket in which
to regularly insert
new disputes.
The irony is that
the Siachen dispute
was first created
by violating the
Simla Agreement;
then Simla Agreement
was used as a
peg to make it
permanent. In
1985, Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi and
President Zia-ul-Haq
agreed to solve
the dispute through
talks, then in
1987 Siachen saw
one of its worst
incidents of fighting
on the glacier.
In 1989, foreign
secretaries from
both sides came
close to clinching
an accord on calling
the troops back
to pre-1984 positions,
but India backtracked,
saying the accord
had not been conclusive.
Some Indian experts
say that the Siachen
issue is now as
permanent as the
Kashmir dispute16.
Outside observers
think that Prime
Minister Rajiv
Gandhi backtracked
on Siachen because
electorally a
climb-down from
the Siachen would
have been seen
by the Indian
masses as a confession
of defeat at the
hands of Pakistan.
By 1993, six foreign
secretary-level
talks had taken
place without
any result while
much vitriol was
expended on both
sides on partisan
presentations
of the issue.
While the world
categorises the
war on Siachen
as one of the
most absurd undertakings
of the 20th century
it also looks
at Siachen as
a crisis 'successfully
managed' by New
Delhi and Pakistan.
This is the minimalist
view allowing
the two countries
to be seen as
reasonably competent
to isolate their
disputes and not
let them escalate
into bigger crises.
Since they are
accompanied by
flights of nationalist
imagination on
both sides,
