Water-Use:
Inbound and Outbound
Government
figures indicate
that some 66 per
cent of the Nepalese
population has access
to safe drinking
water, but many
experts have reservations
about this data.
In the case of the
Nepalese Terai,
more than half of
the country's population
lives there, and
more than 95 per
cent of the people
use groundwater
through tube-wells
pumping from 20-100
feet deep. Nearly
800,000 tube-wells
are in the Terai
region, out of which
only 30,000 tube-wells
have been tested
for arsenic content.
In some 2000 tube-wells
arsenic content
was discovered.
WHO
standard for drinkable
water is up to 10
micro-gm per litre.
But India and Bangladesh
have accepted 50.
For instance, in
districts like Nawal
Parasi, Siraha,
Kailali and Rautahat
30, 18, 15 and 8
per cent tube-wells,
respectively, contain
arsenic above Nepalese
standard of 50 micro
gram per litre.
Harmful arsenic-poison
was first discovered
in Bangladesh some
24 years ago. Kathmandu's
drinking water is
not regarded as
safe and sufficient,
as per international
standards.
Regarding irrigation
issues in Nepal,
41 per cent of
the irrigated
land has 'year-round
irrigation' facility.
1.15 million ha.
land has access
to irrigation,
2/3rds of which
still follows
the traditional
method of the
farmers. After
the year 2000,
government has
stopped subsidies
to shallow tube-wells
but continuing
them for deep
tube-wells. The
deep tube-wells,
irrigating 30-40
hectares, are
found to be quite
useful in Nepal.
On the one hand,
Nepal depends
upon the tube-wells
for irrigation
and, on the other
hand, India through
the Sharada Barrage
alone, is irrigating
1.7 million hectares
of Nepal's soil.
Nepal's new 'Water
Plan' is being
formulated. It
is a follow-up
to the ' Water
Strategy - Nepal'
prepared in 2002,
which was for
25 years and precisely
divided into short,
medium and long
term strategies
starting from
2002. Lack of
resources and
conflict have
been the major
hurdles to the
plan.
Nepal is currently
working on six
major irrigation
projects. They
are: Pancheswore
Multi-Purpose
Project, Shikta
(Banke), Babai
(Bardiya), Kankai
Multi-Purpose
Project, Bagmati
and Kamala irrigation
projects - all
flowing five sub-basins
in India, namely:
Ghagra (Karnali,
Sharada, Rapti,
Babai, etc.);
Gandak, Budhi
Gandak (from the
vicinity of Birgunj;
Koshi (the Sapta
Koshis) and Mahananda
(Mechi, Kankai,
Tista, etc.).
Most of the rivers
flow to the Ganges
Basin. They have
the linkage to
India's ambitious
River Linking
Project, which
Bangladesh has
vehemently criticised.
Surprisingly,
Nepal has not
reacted officially
in this regard.
Some technical
experts confess
that Nepal has
not considered
the detrimental
effects of the
project.
The biggest constraints
regarding irrigation
developments in
Nepal at the moment
are two projects:
Babai and Shikta.
In Babai, according
to Nepal, nearly
half the work
was done and international
donors were ready
to invest. Similarly,
Shikta Irrigation
Project revised
its DPR some 25-30
years ago with
a target to irrigate
nearly 1 lac hectares.
The EU and Saudi
funds were available
for the implementation
of the project.
However, Nepal,
due to India's
stand on the basis
of the unilateral
downstream riparian
rights, has been
unable to implement
the projects.
The Ganges will
be hard-pressed
to meet the burgeoning
demands of the
densely populated
Indian heart-land
on its own, and
interventions
will have to be
made in its upper
reaches if natural
availability is
to be 'regulated'.
Irrigation Project
within 30 km from
the border, Bikas
Thapa observes
that stopping
the implementation
of Shikta, is
in direct contravention
to Nepalese sovereignty
and the Helsinki
Conventions.
Hydropower
Nepal's
first hydroelectric
installation was
the 500 kW turbine
in Pharping, built
in 1911 to supply
electricity to
Kathmandu. In
1934, another
installation of
900 kW -- now
640 kW -- followed
at Sundarijal,
but hydropower
generation was
not a government
priority and no
more installations
were built until
the 1960s.
Accordng to Jean
Marion Aitke,
Godfrey Cromwell
and Gregory Wishart,
from 1965 to 1975,
electricity came
to be seen as
an essential requirement
in the modernisation
of Nepal's economy.
During this period
five government
plants were commissioned,
bringing installed
capacity of 36
MW. By the Fiscal
Year 1986/87,
government-operated
hydro-stations
rose sharply to
a total of 161
MW.
It took a long
time for Nepalese
Parliament to
ratify the unsuccessful
Mahakali Agreement
of 1996. There
are also views
that as one of
the world's poorest
countries with
current per capita
income of less
than US $ 300.00
and an estimated
total GDP of around
US$ 3.00 billion,
the Nepalese economy
cannot tolerate
billion dollar
mistakes. P.J.
Thapa asks: 'Imagine
the long term
impact of investing
US$ 1 billion
on female education,
or on improved
rural credit and
communication
in rural Nepal
in lieu of Pancheswore?'
The bitter experience
of the rejection
of Arun III can
best be summed
up as: 'The withdrawal
of Arun III has
left multiple
effects in terms
of the sustainable
development of
the country. For
an LDC like Nepal,
such happenings
will make it difficult
to go ahead. The
situation has
compelled us to
think of alternatives.'
Arun III wasted
ten years as well
as large sums
of money to prepare
a feasibility
study. In 1995
another mega-project,
'Kali Gandaki-
A' of the capacity
of 144 MW was
forwarded to the
government of
Japan. It is today
regarded as a
successful project,
with the cooperation
of the then OECF
(Japan) and ADB,
in parallel to
HMG/Nepal; even
though the actual
costs exceeded
the initial estimation.
It has been estimated
that the cost
for the production
of Nepal's capacity
of 42,000 MW would
come roughly to
US$ 80.00 billion
and for 25,000
MW, it would be
around US$ 50,000.00
billion. Nepal's
Fiscal Budget
for 2004/2005
was nearly US$
1.6 billion; it
is thus impossible
for Nepal alone
to harness water
for hydropower
in a large scale.
But the Sharada
Dam constructed
through the Agreement
of 1927 between
British India
and the Rana regime
of Nepal in exchange
with some Sal
trees and (Indian
Rupees) IRs. 50,000.00
that time, Koshi
Agreement of April
25, 1954 and revised
on December 19,
1966 bearing technical
constraints of
the ' sluice gate'
, silt in the
Chatara canal
and change of
course of the
river etc. for
getting none or
little water to
the Nepal side
during dry season
and ' inundation'
during lean season;
Gandak Agreement
of December 4,
1959 with similar
technology, Dam
constructed in
Bhainsalotan;
and Tanakpur Agreement
done by G.P. Koirala
in 1991 became
' maiden shock'
to Nepal. Technically
the life of Koshi
Barrage is 50
years and for
the past 50 years,
no one has raised
any questions
concerning its
legitimacy and
significance of
the clause of
Koshi Agreement
of 1954 that binds
Nepal to provide
Koshi barrage
site on lease
for 199 years,
when the life
of the barrage
is only 50 years.
In 2004, Indian
Union Railway
Minister Laloo
Prasad Yadav inaugurated
the Koshi High
Dam Project, which,
in 1954, was rejected
on grounds of
high costs and
is highly criticised
in Nepal today.
Detailed plans
have not come
out to the public
yet. Among the
vehement critics
of the dam, Former
Water Resources
Minister Pradip
Nepal says: 'Koshi
High Dam is the
invitation to
destruction.'
It damages 155
villages and 236
wards in Nepal,
e.g., fertile
places like Khursanitaar,
Guthikhet, Triveni
and the others
at the banks of
Arun, Tamor and
Doodh Koshi. It
is estimated to
be 270 metres
high i.e. the
places below 1200
feet will be under
water. The opposition
started with the
notion that it
is another design
to control floods
in Bihar.
Out of 93000.00
MW total estimated
potential of the
Ganges System,
83,000 MW sites
are within Nepal
and out of 42,000
MW, Nepal has
been able to extract
less than 1 per
cent. Until 1994,
it was just 0.3
per cent where
as Brazil, Norway,
Bhutan, India
and China had
extracted 17.8,
69.00, 1.62, 11.9
and 8.0 per cent,
respectively.
Considering such
difficulties,
Nepal brought
out 'The Hydropower
Development Policy
2001', in which
the fundamental
problem of price
fixation of electricity
has been lessened
by converting
the existing Electricity
Tariff Fixation
Commission to
a regulatory body.
But this management
also could not
convince the external
buyer.
Due to poor motivation
of the local investors,
Nepal's cheapest
projects like
Upper Tamakoshi
have been wasted.
The Norwegian
Feasibility Study
reveals that nearly
US$ 300.00 million
is necessary for
the project including
65 KM road black
topping, 33 KM
of which is to
be newly constructed
to connect the
site. The cost
per unit thus
comes nearly 89
Nepali Paisa.
Money can be allocated
from: the remittances
of the Nepalese
workers abroad,
banks, provident
fund reserves,
etc., if the government
has zeal.
Upper Tamakoshi
is much cheaper
than the Upper
Karnali because
for 309 MW Upper
Tamakoshi's total
cost comes to
US$ 300.00 million,
while total cost
of the Upper Karnali
Hydroelectric
Project has been
revealed as US$
456.7 million
based at January
1998 price. Many
politicians and
scholars are not
happy with the
agreement made
with India, signed
recently with
70 per cent and
30 per cent ratio
of investment
by India and Nepal,
respectively.
The people of
Nepal have developed
a mistrust about
India due to past
agreements, starting
from 1927 for
Sharada Dam Construction,
Koshi Agreement
of 1954, Gandak
Agreement of 1959,
Tanakpur Agreement
of 1991 and the
Mahakali Treaty
of 1996. The Nepalese
feel that they
have been 'cheated'
in these agreements
and projects,
except the Mahakali
Treaty about which
people are divided.
The Mahakali Treaty
came to assess
extensive discussions
among responsible
people and experts.
In 1990, A.B.
Thapa in the Water
Energy Commission
on Mahakali Treaty
said that the
Treaty had been
hastily concluded,
hence the need
to analyse the
Treaty by both
the countries
to arrive at the
most correct interpretation.
On 'How not to
do a South Asian
Treaty', Iyer's
opinion (Iyer:
2001) that Nepal
could say 'No'
has been explored
by S.B. Pun. Once
the treaty has
been signed, it
does not mean
that it will be
applied forever.
Treaties can be
amended and canceled
as per the demand
of time, e.g.
1950 Treaty and
Letters of Exchange
of 1950 and 1965
signed at a crucial
time between Nepal
and India are
not practical
today, and the
SAFMA Declaration
of October 9-10,
2004 recommends
that they be reviewed.
Referring to the
passing of the
special suggestion
of the Nepalese
Parliament immediately
after passing
of the Mahakali
Treaty, the then
Indian Water Resources
Joint Secretary
had said, 'India
government is
interested only
in the actual
wordings of the
Treaty and not
in what such prastavs
say.'
Mini
Vs. Mega Projects
and ‘Eco-Romanticism’
Arundhati
Roy, in favour
of environment
protection, wrote
that she was not
an 'anti development
junkie' nor a
'proselytiser
for the eternal
upholding of custom
and tradition..',
but she respected
the environment.
R.N.A. Reddy is
of the opinion
that the development
of mega-power
projects suffered
from the 'Eco-romanticism'
of North America
and Europe. As
a matter of fact,
Arun III was '
eaten-up' by such
ghost opinions
which Reddy rightly
opposed. If not
so, why does the
U.S. not sign
the Kyoto Protocol?
Although the Japanese
side was fully
convinced, the
World Bank backed
out of Arun III.
The efforts made
were not a complete
waste. The GIF/Japan
and the UNU, Tokyo
organised 'Global
Infrastructure
Conference, October
31 - November
2, 1995, in which
two important
provisions were
passed as proposed
by Nepal: first,
Arun III should
be re-considered
and second, 'regional
navigation' and
'NIBB-C Water
Ways: 21st Century
Multi-Purpose
Project' be considered
by the world multi-national
companies and
donor agencies
had consented
to.
The mini and mega
projects' dilemma
has been overcome
by ' Plan for
Action for Integrated
Water Resource
Management' approach.
While Pundits
of water resources
argue for smaller
dams, biger dams
have their advocates
as well.
In this context,
Karnali (Chisapani)
Multipurpose Project
is of high concern.
This is a 'giant
project' , not
as big as 'Three
Gorges' of China's
or the newly proposed
40,000 MW Hydro-Electricity
Project at the
Inga Rapids, near
the mouth of the
Congo River, to
electrify Africa.
But Chisapaani
is yielding 10,800
MW and has 16.2
billion m3 live
storage capacity
project. The costs
at 1988 price
were calculated
at US$ 4,890.00
million but at
2000 price, with
an annual increase
of 1.45 per cent
it comes to be
US$ 5,836.00 million.
Since this project
is totally of
export-of-energy
purpose for Nepal
and multi-purpose
for India, the
Nepalese side
from the popular
front is still
sceptical of Indian
involvement. Nepal
feels that India
does not like
the fact that
Nepal develops
hydropower independently.
Between these
myths and reality
Enron was fully
disturbed to work
in Karnali (Chisapani).
The
Inundation Tragedy
The Third Bilateral
High Level Technical
Committee between
Nepal and India
(HLTC)
Meeting on the
inundation problem
in Nepal was held
in Kathmandu during
27-29 September68
and concluded
without any real
results. The current
problem zones
were due to Indian
Laxmanpur Barrage
vis-a-vis Rupandehi
and Rassyal Khurdalautan
vis-a-vis Banke
district of Nepal.
India agreed to
manage 'sluice
gate' regarding
Laxmanpur Bund
but regarding
the threat of
inundation to
Lumbini, the birthplace
of Lord Buddha,
India rejected
the maps presented
by the Nepalese
side. Following
the failed 3rd
HLTC Meeting in
Kathmandu, the
13th Meeting of
the Bilateral
Standing Committee
on Inundation
Problem (SCIP)
on 30 October,
2004 in Kathmandu
and immediately
later the secretary-level
meetings in New
Delhi also failed.
Leader of the
SCIP
discussion from
the Nepalese side,
S. B Regmi in
an interview said
that inundation
problems starting
from 1985 to 2
October 2004 were
extensively discussed,
e.g. issues on
Mahalisagar arrangements
vis-a-vis Kapilvastu
to Koilabas barrage
of Dang to the
matter of Ring
Bund endangering
Rautahat. He further
added that Nepal
is facing big
difficulties,
at least in 17
places, due to
Indian construction
works.
Dipak Gyawali,
Former Minister
for Water Resources
says that disputes
over allocation
of water rights
either achieve
celebrity status
or remain simmering
until they erupt.
Some of the projects
to the Indian
side are constructed
just in a 300
meter distance
from No Man's
Land.
Conclusion
In South
Asia 45 per cent
of the population
falls below the
poverty line,
i.e. less than
1.00 US$ income
per head per day.
The global share
of income of this
region is just
1.3 percent but
it is home to
nearly 1/5th of
the world's population.
Nearly 400 million
people live in
the Ganges, Brahmaputra
and Meghna (GBM)
region alone.
It will be 600
million in the
next half of the
century. This
area is the largest
concentration
of the poorest
people of the
world.
Considering
these factors,
the policy-makers,
decision makers
and implementing
agencies of this
region need to
think of new development
approaches. Managing
and harnessing
waters could be
an important initiative
to reduce poverty
and uplift the
standard of living
of the people
for which massive
employment generation
is a must.
Hence, countries
should conduct
a preliminary
survey on 'NIBB-C
Water Ways : 21st
Century Water
Ways Multi-Purpose
Project'. NIBB-C
represents riparian
countries: Nepal,
India, Bangladesh,
Bhutan and China.
Being the largest
benefiting country
of the region,
India's role in
this is crucial.
It is envisioned
that NIBB-C
Water Ways can
change the fate
of the people
of this region.
It is a gega-project
inviting multi-national
companies and
donor agencies
to invest multi-billion
dollars. Under
