South Asian Water Concerns Ramaswamy R. Iyer

This paper aims at presenting a synoptic and objective overview, in very broad terms, of the principal national concerns and issues relating to water in South Asian countries. For the purpose of the paper, ‘South Asia’ refers only to the countries in the subcontinental mainland, i.e., Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Besides, it is concerned largely with the northern part of the subcontinent where different countries are linked together by the Himalayan rivers.

National Perspectives

Pakistan
The major part of Pakistan -- leaving aside the inland drainage area of Balochistan, as also the southern coastal region -- is in the Indus Basin.

Water deficit?
Most writings on the water resources of Pakistan refer to water scarcity (present or imminent), but it is not clear how much of the projected water and food deficit will remain if the ills of poor water management and inefficiencies in irrigated agriculture (on which there is general agreement) are remedied.

Water-logging and salinity
The allocation of the three western rivers of the Indus system to Pakistan under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, and the development of irrigated agriculture that followed, certainly brought much prosperity to the country or to some sections of the population, but an unanticipated outcome was the emergence and spread of the ills of water-logging and salinity. Out of a total of 18 million hectares (mha) of irrigated land in Pakistan, about 6.22 mha are said to be affected by this menace. In response to this the Government of Pakistan launched different Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP), starting in 1959. These do not seem to have been very successful. Among the criticisms of the SCARP approach are design defects, severe environmental impacts, and the creation of secondary problems that are as bad as the original ones that the plan had intended to remedy. The impression that one gets is that Pakistan is still struggling with a gigantic problem to which satisfactory answers have not yet been found.

Inter-provincial conflicts
Another major national concern is the persistence of inter-provincial conflicts over water distribution. These conflicts have a long history, going back to the middle of the 19th Century when human intervention in the natural flow of the river through the construction of barrages and canals began. The old inter-provincial conflicts and the attempts to resolve them were followed after Partition (1947) by the India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus, which was resolved by the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The problems of water-sharing among the provinces in Pakistan continued, and were dealt with by several committees and commissions. The settlement currently in force is the Indus Water Accord of 1991. However, there are important unresolved issues with a crucial bearing on water distribution. Issues of flood management, not discussed here, also have inter-provincial angles.

Kalabagh controversy
A new dimension has been added to water-sharing disputes by the contentious Kalabagh Dam Project. This Project is the centre of a major controversy in Pakistan. The arguments are familiar. The case for the project is argued on the basis of a projected water shortage and the need for and possibility of one more dam on the Indus system. The opponents of the project argue that water is not available for the dam, that the project is not needed, and that it will have serious environmental and human impacts. There is also an inter-provincial angle: Sindh is afraid that with the Kalabagh dam, more of the Indus water will be diverted by Punjab, with serious consequences for it (Sindh); and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), while it might derive some benefits, is seriously worried about submergence of land, displacement of people, and water-logging problems.

Two approaches
At the heart of the Kalabagh controversy lies the confrontation between two divergent approaches to water-resource policy, planning and management, encapsulated by one writer (Bengali, 2003) as the 'techno-centric approach' vis-à-vis the 'socio-centric approach'. As summed up by him, the former relies wholly on technical expertise and engineering solutions, whereas the latter recognises that 'development, management and conservation cannot be achieved in a vacuum, and social systems and structures and people's cultures and lifestyles also need to be addressed'.

Other issues
There are also serious concerns in Pakistan about the pollution of rivers, the degradation of coastal zones, the problems of sewage disposal in urban areas, and so on, but limitations of space prevent this paper from going into them.

India
(The Indian concerns outlined below may find a resonance in the other countries of the region.)

Water crisis?
An important and widely shared perception in India is that of an imminent water crisis. The crucial element here is the demand projection, and that needs to be looked at carefully. In every kind of water use, major economies are desirable and possible, though difficult. If these are achieved, the demand picture will not remain the same. Turning to the supply side, large-dam projects are not the only answer; there are other possibilities. Local rainwater harvesting (‘catching the raindrop as it falls’) and watershed development are also part of the supply-side answers to the demand. Through a combination of these two approaches, namely, on the demand side, the practice of the utmost economy and efficiency in water-use and of resource-conservation, and on the supply side, efforts to augment the availability of `usable' water through extensive recourse to local water-harvesting and watershed development, it may be possible to avert a crisis, though the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and will call for careful management.

Divergence on big projects
There is a widespread perception that the growth of population, pace of urbanisation and economic development will accentuate the pressure of increasing demand on a finite resource, and that the answer lies in large supply-side projects and long-distance water transfers. That is the dominant view in India, but there is a strong body of opinion that challenges that view.

The Narmada, Tehri Movements
The most dramatic confrontation between the two views took place in the case of the Narmada (Sardar Sarovar) and the Tehri Hydro-Electric Projects. In both cases, the protest movements and their leaders (Medha Patkar and Sunderlal Bahuguna) became well-known nationally and even internationally. In both cases, the battle has been lost in the Supreme Court, and construction activities -- stalled for a while -- have been resumed in full force, but the movements cannot be adjudged to have been failures: they have changed forever the way people at every level (including the general public, the media, policy-makers, project-planners and managers) think about such projects. In that sense, the movements have been enormously influential.

‘Flood control’
This is a controversial subject, but it is increasingly recognised that what we must learn to do is not so much to ‘control’ floods as to cope with them when they occur and minimise damage, partly through ‘flood-plain zoning’ (i.e., regulation of settlement and activity in the natural flood plains of rivers) and partly through `disaster-preparedness'. However, the notion of ‘flood control’ continues to hold some sway over people's minds, and to influence official thinking.

Inter-state river water disputes
Most of the major rivers in India flow through more than one (Indian) state and are therefore ‘inter-state rivers’. The constitutional/statutory mechanism for the resolution of inter-state conflicts within India -- over such rivers seemed initially to be working reasonably well, but it has run into difficulties in recent years. Two currently outstanding disputes are the Ravi-Beas Dispute (Punjab and Haryana) and the Cauvery Dispute (Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry). An early and satisfactory resolution does not seem to be within sight in either case. These unresolved disputes have implications that go far beyond water: they raise questions about Indian federalism.

The groundwater crisis
Continuing reckless exploitation of groundwater, leading to the rapid depletion of aquifers in many places, portends disaster. The situation, which has been described as ‘colossal anarchy’ (Shah 2004), needs to be quickly brought under control, but there are enormous legal, political and practical difficulties here. There may be need for changes in the law relating to ownership rights over groundwater, enactment of new state-level laws for regulating the extraction and use of groundwater, establishment of regulatory bodies, rationalisation of power tariffs, and so on. However, with regard to the very large number of private tube-wells in the country (estimated at 21 million) and the fact that most of these are cases of ‘self-supply’, i.e., outside the purview of supply systems, public or private, there is some scepticism about the feasibility of `regulation' and the efficacy of changes in policy or law as remedies for the depletion and contamination of groundwater aquifers. No clear solutions to this difficult problem are in sight as yet and the debate needs to be pursued further.

Water markets
Water markets already exist in India mainly in the context of extraction of groundwater through tube-wells and bore-wells but also in relation to surface water in some instances. Many more instances may emerge. There are many who think that this is the route to follow for the future; there are others who are deeply uneasy at the idea of water markets and at the underlying perception of water as a tradable commodity.

The advocates of water markets (who view water as a commodity) recommend: ‘Define property rights and allow trading’, but the citizen's right to water (for drinking, cooking and washing) is a part of the right to life, and the water rights of a farmer for irrigation or those of an industry for industrial uses are use-rights; treating either of them as ‘tradable property rights’ has serious implications that need to be studied carefully.

The supply of water by private tankers in urban areas and the burgeoning bottled-water trade are also instances of (entirely avoidable) water markets. If the public system provided an adequate, reliable and safe supply, the demand for tankers or for bottled water may go down sharply. Apart from that, these supplies (and the soft drinks business) have necessarily to draw raw water from somewhere, and that draft may be an unsustainable or inequitable one. The instance of the bore-wells of the Coca Cola Company depriving an entire area in Kerala of its water is well-known. The case went to the High Court and the judgment has invoked the public trust doctrine, but the story is as yet unfinished, as the case may still go to the Supreme Court.

Privatisation
The paucity of financial resources is pushing the governments, central and state, to think in terms of inviting private sector participation in dam and reservoir projects, which would earlier have been exclusively in the domain of the state. The new Indian National Water Policy, 2002 includes a clause that specifically provides for this. There has been much opposition to the idea of `privatisation of water', whether in relation to projects or in the context of water services, on several grounds. There was a public outcry against the leasing of a 20-km stretch of the Shivalik River in Chattisgarh to a private corporate entity for water supply, and the state tried to cancel the lease but encountered legal difficulties. This, like the Coca Cola case mentioned earlier, is an unfinished story.

Pricing of water
The twin propositions that water rates should be regarded as `user charges' and not as a form of taxation, and that the principle behind `user charges' should be `full cost recovery', are important elements in current economic thinking. They may be acceptable in the context of water as an input into economic activity: irrigation, industrial use, water for hotels. However, these principles cannot apply without modification to `water for life' (drinking water). This too cannot be free, but must be priced reasonably, with full economic pricing to the affluent, penal pricing beyond a certain level of use, some degree of subsidisation to the less affluent, and perhaps some free supplies to the very poor. It cannot be said that these issues have been thought through to clarity and finality in India.

Other issues
There are many other issues such as the third tier of local self-government at the level of villages (panchayats) and cities (nagarpalikas) introduced by the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. Among the subjects to be devolved to these bodies (known as panchayati raj institutions or PRIs) is water management at the local level. The future role of PRIs in relation to water is a matter of considerable importance.

Another matter which demands urgent attention is the problem of the pollution and contamination of water sources and systems that steadily diminishes the quantum available for use.

Nepal
A large number of rivers and streams flow through Nepal and into India. The nature of the terrain immediately brings to mind the possibility of generation of hydro-electric power, and a number of sites for large projects have been identified. Only a small part of the power so generated can be used in Nepal; the rest would have to be exported, primarily to India. India can also use all the waters that flow from Nepal for irrigation, and would further like to minimise the damage caused by the floods coming down those rivers from time to time. These possibilities give rise to the idea of large projects for building dams and reservoirs in Nepal. (Bangladesh, for its part, has for long been arguing for seven large projects in Nepal for augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges at Farakka, where the waters are shared between India and Bangladesh.) Against this background, there is a growing sentiment in Nepal that the country's water resources represent the route through which its visions of prosperity can best be realised; that water is to Nepal what oil has been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source of revenues and wealth; and that those revenues will come principally from the export of hydro-electric power to the neighbouring countries, mainly India.

Several multi-purpose projects (Karnali, Pancheswar, Saptkosi, etc) have been under discussion between Nepal and India for over three decades, but little progress has been made on any of them, for several reasons: the long history of mistrust and suspicion characterising India-Nepal relations; the growing salience of environmental concerns, concerns about the displacement of people, and misgivin about large projects in the seismically active Himalayan region; and a degree of dissent, even within Nepal, from the view that the route to prosperity lies in large-scale centralised generation of hydro-electric power for export.

There is an `alternative' view in Nepal that advocates decentralised, relatively small, environmentally benign projects (whether for irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily for Nepal's own needs rather than for meeting the needs of other countries. Export of electricity is not ruled out, but large generation primarily for export to a single large buyer (India) under inter-governmental arrangements is not considered desirable. It is difficult to say how widespread the `alternative' view is, but that it commands a degree of influence cannot be denied. Opposition to the Arun III Hydro-Electric Project did eventually result in the World Bank withdrawing from the project; this is regarded as a great loss by the water establishment and other proponents of the mainstream position, but celebrated as an achievement by critics who argue that the abandonment of this unviable project made created a number of smaller, cheaper and quicker alternatives. (For a short while a leading proponent of this view became a government minister, and for a brief period the `alternative' view became `mainstream', but that is no longer the case.)

Turning to another aspect, Nepal -- as a land-locked country -- attaches a great deal of importance to a navigational outlet to the sea (to a port in India or Bangladesh). At the moment this is not physically feasible, but creating such a possibility as a part of one of the projects that are being talked about remains an important objective of Nepal.

Bhutan
Bhutan, close to Nepal and like it a mountainous country lying on the southern slopes of the Himalaya between China and India, is flanked on the western and eastern sides by the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, with Assam as the immediate southern neighbour. The country is heavily forested and richly endowed with water resources. The annual availability of water per capita is put at 75000 m3 in the Bhutan Water Policy document, but the environmental information portal of the World Resources Institute gives a per capita Internal Renewable Water Resources (IRWR) figure of 43214 m.3 for the year 2001. It is not clear how those two figures are related to each other, but it is clear enough from either figure that the country is exceptionally well-endowed with water, though even that abundance is expected to come under pressure in the future because of the growth of population and the processes of economic development.

The most important point to bear in mind about Bhutan is its deep attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its determination to preserve them. It has adopted what has been described as `the middle path' to sustainable development. At the same time, the country is (understandably) not exempt from the aspirations that other countries entertain for economic development and prosperity.

The contrary pulls of these two strands in Bhutanese thinking are evident in the Water Policy document. For instance, there are fine statements of the holistic ecological point of view and indications of social and human sensitivity; at the same time, the language of economics, management and the market-place is also found in many places. It is hoped that the floodtide of `economic development' and `modernity' will not overwhelm Bhutan and make it indistinguishable from the rest of the world and subject to the same ills.

In pursuance of the objective of earning revenues from the country's hydro-power potential, Bhutan has undertaken certain projects with Indian assistance. It is not within the scope of this paper to go into the details of the projects that are in operation; under construction; and in the visualisation/formulation/planning stages (Chuka, Chuka II, Tala, Kurichu, Sunkosh, Manas, etc). What needs to be noted is that Chuka is widely regarded as an example of successful inter-country cooperation for mutual benefit; and that the inflow of revenues from the sale of electricity to India has been very large in relation to the country's GDP and has made the country prosperous in economic terms, with a per capita income much higher than that of its neighbours. However, the question whether the transformation in the economy has been accompanied by ecological and social changes and whether these warrant any concern, has not been adequately debated. If further expansions of, and additions to, hydro-electric capacity take place as planned, would it be possible for Bhutan to continue to adhere to the middle path? That question is of course one for the Bhutanese to reflect on.

Bangladesh
Crisscrossed by rivers and streams, Bangladesh is a water-abundant country with a per capita water-availability of 8444 m3 in 2002 (World Resources Institute). (Another study Ahmad et al 2001 - puts the annual per capita water availability at 12162 m3 in 1991, 10305 m3 in 2000, and 7670 m3 in 2025.) As the country acts as a narrow funnel through which three large river systems (the Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Meghna) drain into the sea, its major national problem is the periodical occurrence of disastrous flooding. There was catastrophic flooding in 1988 and again in 1998. However, though floods dominate the thinking of Bangladesh, there is also a perception of a critical shortage of water in the lean season in some parts of the country.

Most Bangladeshi writings on water tend to make the point that 94% of the water resources of the country originate beyond its borders, and that 54 rivers and streams flow into Bangladesh from India. This consciousness, combined with that of India's size, colours Bangladeshi thinking and gives it a sense of vulnerability. The water establishment of Bangladesh is acutely aware that, for water security as well as for flood-management, the country needs Indian cooperation.

Against this background, there are four prominent concerns in the national thinking about water: flood-management; water-sharing with the upper riparian; internal water-resource management; and the protection and preservation of the natural environment.

The massive floods of 1988 brought international attention to this problem, resulting in the Flood Action Plan (FAP) financed by a large number of donor countries. The FAP was a very large programme consisting of numerous studies and some pilot projects. However, it was subjected to severe criticism right from the beginning, and soon fell into disrepute, largely because it was perceived as a top-down, non-participative and essentially donor-driven plan.

On water-sharing with upper riparians, treaties or understandings with India on several rivers are favoured. A Treaty with India on water-sharing in the Ganges was signed on 12 December, 1996. Similar understandings are felt to be necessary on at least eight or nine of the 54 rivers and streams that cross the India-Bangladesh border. Currently, talks are in progress on water-sharing on the Teesta. (Another strong Bangladeshi perception is that of the need for the augmentation of the lean season flows of the Ganges, and the Government of India is in agreement with that view, but there is a divergence between the two countries on how the augmentation is to be brought about).

Turning to internal water-resource management, the work done under the aegis of the FAP (though there was disenchantment with that programme) provided useful inputs when, eventually, the preparation of a new National Water Management Plan and a National Water Policy was undertaken. (The National Water Policy was published in 1999, but it still remains largely a declaration of intent lacking in formal backing and not translated into operational plans.) In these new initiatives, the old top-down engineering and structural approaches were moderated by a greater awareness of non-structural measures; the importance of people's participation in planning; environmental concerns; and institutional change. At the same time, the influence of the new processes of `economic reform' is seen in the references to water as an economic good, the importance of pricing as an instrument of water management, private sector participation, and so on. The balancing of these divergent perceptions seems somewhat uneasy and precarious.

Environmental concerns are now part of the climate of opinion and have acquired a degree of importance even in the water resources establishment that was earlier primarily driven by engineering considerations. The concern is largely focussed on the control of the incursion of salinity from the sea and on the protection of the wetlands (the Sunderbans).

In recent years, the presence of arsenic in groundwater has become a major concern. This problem has been experienced in parts of India as well, though perhaps not in as acute a form as in Bangladesh. Different explanations have been given for this phenomenon; expert opinions seem to vary on this (and therefore on the appropriate responses), and finality does not seem to have been reached. As groundwater `development' has been extensive in Bangladesh, this is a serious national problem.

Another emerging concern relates to the implications for Bangladesh of the predictions of climate change. This is a subject that is currently under study in both official and academic circles. As yet, there is much uncertainty as to what the future holds for the country. As the studies progress, this is bound to become a central concern.

Convergences and Divergences
Convergences
Concerns about food security and apprehensions of future water-scarcity are common to all the countries. The response to these concerns at the administrative, technical and planning levels in governments is generally characterised by a predilection in favour of big supply-side interventions, with some variations in the strength of this way of thinking from country to country. There is also some advocacy of `alternatives' in all the countries, again with variations from country to country. The philosophy of `middle path' is strongest in Bhutan. The `alternative voices' are moderately strong in Nepal, with a degree of influence on official thinking, but the mainstream view continues to regard water as Nepal's oil, i.e., as a potential source of revenue and wealth. In Pakistan and India there is a strong polarisation between the believers in big, centralised, technology-driven, supply-side projects as the only answers to future needs, and those who oppose the approach as unsustainable, destructive and inequitable, and advocate local, small, community-led alternatives that are (in their view) environmentally benign and socially just. The polarisation is particularly marked in India, with an inadequacy or even absence of constructive civil discourse between the `dam-builders' and the `environmentalists', either side describing the other as a `lobby'. In Bangladesh, there are not many possibilities of big projects, but the official water establishment, as in India, continues to be dominated by the engineering point of view. Apart from the already completed Teesta Barrage, the proposed Ganges Barrage is perhaps the one big project in view, and it is regarded as very important. Essentially, however, the `big project' point of view is reflected in the advocacy of several large dams in Nepal as a means of augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges.

There is also general agreement at the official levels and among the intelligentsia (especially the economists) on the `potential' of hydro-electric power that exists in the river systems of the countries, and, in particular, in the Himalayan rivers, and the need to exploit as much of that potential as possible. The critics question such projects on environmental and other grounds, and contend that the need for large centralised power-generation can be minimised by a combination of demand-management, efficiency in energy use, getting more energy out of capacities already created, extensive local decentralised generation, and so on. They also have strong doubts about the wisdom of building large reservoirs in the seismically active Himalayan region.

Environmental concerns are widely shared, but are not equally strong or influential in all countries. This is of course a central concern in Bhutan. There are powerful movements in Pakistan, India and Nepal, but they are not often very effective, and despite the existence of Ministries for Environment, the concern cannot be said to be `mainstream'. At the official level, and among the neo-liberal economists who are influential in the `economic reform' process, there is a tendency to juxtapose `development' and `environment' and to argue that the latter should not be over-emphasised to the detriment of the former. That (questionable) point of view finds much implicit (and sometimes explicit) support from the officials of the World Bank and the ADB.

Floods loom large in the thinking of both India and Bangladesh. Despite the disenchantment with the FAP, mainstream opinion in Bangladesh is not wholly negative about embankments. Similarly, despite the recognition of the weaknesses and failures of embankments official thinking in India still considers them necessary. An offshoot of the concern about floods is the Indian river-linking project.

The use of groundwater is massive in India and quite substantial in Bangladesh. The mining of groundwater and the rapid depletion of aquifers in some parts of the country is a major problem in India, and one which has not been attended to in any significant measure. In Bangladesh, the main problem is the extensive presence of arsenic, which is also experienced, though perhaps not to the same extent, in West Bengal and Bihar in India.

Another emerging concern in all the countries is the problem of pollution and contamination of water sources and systems. Potentially, this could be a major source of intra-country and inter-country friction. However, it cannot be said that there is adequate awareness of this problem in any of the countries. It follows that serious action to deal with this threat to resource-availability has not begun, or even been thought of.

Divergences
Divergences have occurred essentially in relation to water-sharing in (or projects on) rivers that cross (or flow along) national boundaries. Some of these have been resolved through treaties. However, some divergences continue.

The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan has acquired a reputation internationally as a successful instance of conflict-resolution, but currently there are a few unresolved disputes under the ambit of the Treaty. In particular, talks about the Baglihar hydro-electric project have failed, and Pakistan has moved for arbitration, invoking the arbitration clause of the Treaty for the first time in its history.

The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh (1996), after a shaky start due to low flows in 1997, has been working reasonably well, and neither country has asked for a review. Whether it will continue to work well will depend on the state of the political relationship between the two countries. In other words, here, as in the case of the Indus Treaty, it is politics and not water that will determine the future of the Treaty.

Apart from the Ganga (Ganges), there are many other rivers that cross the India-Bangladesh border, and agreements may be needed on some of them. However, the current state of India-Bangladesh relations is perhaps not conducive to the conclusion of further treaties.

Meanwhile the Government of India's announcement of a major river-linking project (including possible diversions from the Ganga and the Brahmaputra) has caused much concern in Bangladesh. However, with a change of Government in India, that project is under review.

As far as India-Nepal relations are concerned, a new chapter seemed to open with the Mahakali Treaty of February 1996, but action under the Treaty has remained stalled because of certain differences between the two countries. We need not go into those differences in detail, but the point is that much time has already been lost without a resolution of these differences, and nearly nine years after the signing of the Treaty there is still little progress on its implementation. It must also be noted that despite the ratification of the Treaty by the Parliament of Nepal, there is a significant body of opinion against the Treaty in the country. Further progress on these matters will have to wait for a degree of internal stability in Nepal.

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Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An Overview

This article focuses on issues and concerns rather than facts and figures or engineering details regarding the Indus Waters Treaty and the Baglihar controversy.

The Indus Water Treaty, 1960 is internationally regarded as a successful instance of conflict resolution between two countries that have otherwise been locked in conflict. It was also the practice until recently to express satisfaction at the fact that the arbitration provisions of the Treaty had not so far been invoked, but that record seems about to change. On the other hand, there are some who question the statement that the Treaty is a good example of conflict resolution; they feel that the surgery that it did on the river-system was harmful. There is also a body of opinion in both countries that the division of waters under the Treaty was unfair, but the unfairness alleged in one country is the exact opposite of that alleged in the other country. On the outstanding differences under the Treaty (relating to the Tulbul/Wullar, Baglihar and Kishenganga projects) there are divergent perceptions in the two countries as to the question of conformity to the Treaty. Where does the truth lie in relation to all these differences?

Conflict Resolution
Is the Treaty really a successful example of conflict-resolution?
The answer has to be `Yes and No'. The water-sharing under the Treaty was a simple allocation of three rivers to Pakistan and three to India, and there was nothing much thereafter to `operate'; there is no continuous water-sharing on the same river as in the case of the Ganges (between India and Bangladesh). It is much more difficult to operate the Ganges Treaty than the Indus Treaty, and high praise of the Indus Treaty as a successful instance of conflict-resolution is perhaps somewhat exaggerated. Having said that, one must give due credit to the fact that the Treaty has managed to survive three wars, that the Indus Commission has continued to meet even when the political relationship between the two countries was extremely bad, and that at the working level the relationship between the officials of the two countries has been marked by cordiality. At the same time, a few differences under the Treaty have proved quite intractable, and that is a poor reflection on the Treaty. On the claims of `successful conflict-resolution', the picture is, therefore, mixed, with the positive elements having a slight edge.

Was the `surgery' on the Indus system necessary and good?
We must note that the `surgery' on the river-systems (Indus in the west, GangesBrahmaputraMeghna in the east) was a part of the surgery on the subcontinent. That surgery is now a fact of history. However, without entering into a discussion of that division, it must be noted that in deciding whether the subcontinent should be divided, little (if any) attention was paid to the fact that major river-systems were going to be cut across. That did not figure as a factor in the decision-making but was only considered later as a consequence of a decision taken on other grounds.

Water Sharing Issues and Partition
Was the Treaty a good answer to the water-sharing problem that surfaced after the Partition of the subcontinent?
It has been argued that dividing the river-system into two segments was not the best thing to do, and that the better course would have been for the two countries jointly to manage the entire system in an integrated and holistic manner. However, given the circumstances of Partition and the difficult relationship between the two newly formed countries, it would have been naïve to expect that such a joint integrated cooperative approach would work. (If a constructive, integrated approach were possible in relation to the river system, then why not in relation to the totality of perceptions that led to the partition of the subcontinent? Obviously this speculation is pointless). An alternative possibility would have been to agree upon a sharing of waters between the two countries on each of the six rivers constituting the system. That might have been technically feasible but very difficult to operate. Continuous sharing on each river with joint monitoring arrangements and so on might have proved cumbersome, difficult and productive of endless disputes. Instead, the actual division agreed upon was the allocation of the three western rivers to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers to India. If the ideal solution is unavailable, the choice has to fall on the second-best solution; agreement of any kind is better than discord.

Was the sharing of waters fair?
Many in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of the waters to Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was an unfair settlement foolishly accepted by the Indian negotiators; and many in Pakistan argue that the territories that went to India under Partition were historically using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters.

Both are fallacious arguments. A share of 20 per cent is not ipso facto low; on the other hand, the level of historic use (10 per cent or whatever) does not necessarily determine a country's future needs or entitlements. A multiplicity of factors and criteria has to be applied, having regard to all the relevant circumstances; not a priori view on what is fair is possible. However, it is hardly necessary for us to go into this question. When prolonged inter-country negotiations by teams acting under governmental briefings led to a Treaty, and the Treaty was approved and signed at the highest levels, it must be presumed that it was the best outcome that could be negotiated under the given circumstances; either side is then precluded from saying that it was unfair, unequal, poorly negotiated, etc. If a degree of dissatisfaction with the Treaty arises in the course of operation of the Treaty, it would be a matter for inter-state discussions within the ambit of the Treaty, or a re-negotiation of the Treaty with much uncertainty as to the outcome. On the whole, it would probably be best to leave things as they are. The Treaty embodies a negotiated sharing that doubtless represents what was achievable.

Resolution of Differences
Why are certain differences (Tulbul, Baglihar, etc) proving intractable?
Ignoring the complexities involved in these cases and simplifying the issues, the Pakistani position is that these projects constitute violations of the Treaty by India which India denies. The Treaty precludes the building of any storages by India on the rivers allocated to Pakistan. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the projects proposed by India involve the creation of storages. That is not as simple a question as it might seem. The conventional engineering view is that a diversion barrage or a run-of-the-river hydroelectric project (unlike a dam and a reservoir) does not create any storage. However, even run-of-the-river projects involve structures, and any structure on a river does raise the water-level and create a minimal storage. The question then becomes one of the level and acceptability of that storage, and a difference of opinion on this is possible. It is the Pakistani view that the Indian projects mentioned above involve storages and are therefore unacceptable; Pakistan is also apprehensive of the structures in question giving India a measure of control over rivers allocated to Pakistan, and enabling India either to reduce water-flows to Pakistan or to release stored waters and cause floods. The Pakistani objections are thus partly water-related and partly security-related. The Indian position is that the security fears are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself first (such an explanation was earlier accepted by Pakistan in the case of the Salal Project); that its capacity to reduce flows to Pakistan is very limited; that the Treaty does give India some minimal rights on the western rivers, which India has not been able to use partly because no proposal, drawing, design or other technical detail submitted by it is ever cleared by Pakistan; and that Pakistan is deliberately unreasonable in its examination of such proposals, the aim being the obstruction of all efforts by India to use the limited rights given to it by the Treaty. It is the Indian perception (privately stated) that the operation of the Indus Treaty has been hamstrung by total and persistent Pakistani negativism. It is also the Indian perception that Pakistan's objections to Wullar (Tulbul), Baglihar, and Kishenganga are essentially political and not technical.

As mentioned above, one such project, namely Salal Hydroelectric Project, was (after many years of talks) cleared by Pakistan in the 1970s. Subsequently the relations between the two countries deteriorated and touched rock bottom in the post-Kargil period. It was unrealistic at that stage to expect the differences relating to Baglihar, etc, to be resolved. There was even some uncertainty in 2002 about the future of the Treaty itself, but that trouble blew over and the Treaty continued to function. However, there was a feeling that once the political relationship between the two countries improved, agreement would be reached on these outstanding issues. That expectation has been belied. While the two countries have begun to talk to each other, and a`peace process' has been put in motion, the talks over Baglihar have failed and Pakistan has invoked the arbitration provisions of the Treaty and asked the World Bank to nominate a neutral expert. It is a bit puzzling that this negative development that casts a shadow on the `peace process' has been allowed to occur.

There are two possible explanations to this unfortunate development. The first is that there is indeed a genuine and sharp difference between the two countries on the conformity of the Baglihar Project to the provisions of the Treaty, and perhaps the talks broke down on that issue. The other possibility is that Pakistan's objection continues to be political rather than technical, and that there has been a hardening of the Pakistani position on the talks with India. If this understanding is correct, the breakdown of the talks on Baglihar might be the result of a deliberate decision about political relations, unconnected with the details of the Baglihar case.

Is the invocation of the arbitration provisions a matter for regret?
It seems to this writer that there is no need for unhappiness at the invocation of the arbitration clause. The Treaty provides for arbitration. That would also be action under the Treaty. If India is convinced that its position is correct, it should be able to present its case strongly to the neutral expert, and eventually to the Court of Arbitration if that contingency arises. However, an agreed settlement is definitely preferable to arbitration, and India should continue to try to persuade Pakistan to return to the negotiating table.

Relation with the Kashmir Issue
Finally, what is the Jammu & Kashmir dimension of Baglihar, Wullar, etc?
There is a strong sense of grievance in Jammu & Kashmir that the Treaty has made it very difficult for it (J&K) to derive any benefit by way of irrigation, hydroelectric power or navigation from the rivers that flow through it but stand allocated to Pakistan. The Government of India would like to remove J&K's sense of grievance. However, the first step here is the communication of the technical details of the projects concerned to Pakistan. Things get stalled at that stage because of Pakistan's objections. Speculatively speaking, Pakistan is perhaps not keen on letting these projects go forward because (a) they are in what it regards as disputed territory, and (b) the benefits of the projects would go to J&K under Indian auspices. Hence, (presumably) the stalemate. Tulbul, Baglihar, etc, might not have proved so difficult to resolve if they had been located not in J&K but elsewhere. However, Pakistan did at one stage let Salal proceed under certain conditions; one had hoped that Baglihar would also be similarly allowed to proceed. That has not happened. One has to wait and see what the future holds.

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(Ramaswamy Iyer is a former Water Resources Secretary, Government of India and Honorary Research Professor at Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi)

Bibliography

Water Vision 2025 papers:

World Bank: