South Asian Water Concerns
Ramaswamy
R. Iyer |
This
paper aims at
presenting a synoptic
and objective
overview, in very
broad terms, of
the principal
national concerns
and issues relating
to water in South
Asian countries.
For the purpose
of the paper,
‘South Asia’
refers only to
the countries
in the subcontinental
mainland, i.e.,
Pakistan, India,
Nepal, Bhutan
and Bangladesh.
Besides, it is
concerned largely
with the northern
part of the subcontinent
where different
countries are
linked together
by the Himalayan
rivers.
National
Perspectives
Pakistan
The major part
of Pakistan --
leaving aside
the inland drainage
area of Balochistan,
as also the southern
coastal region
-- is in the Indus
Basin.
Water
deficit?
Most writings
on the water resources
of Pakistan refer
to water scarcity
(present or imminent),
but it is not
clear how much
of the projected
water and food
deficit will remain
if the ills of
poor water management
and inefficiencies
in irrigated agriculture
(on which there
is general agreement)
are remedied.
Water-logging
and salinity
The allocation
of the three western
rivers of the
Indus system to
Pakistan under
the 1960 Indus
Water Treaty,
and the development
of irrigated agriculture
that followed,
certainly brought
much prosperity
to the country
or to some sections
of the population,
but an unanticipated
outcome was the
emergence and
spread of the
ills of water-logging
and salinity.
Out of a total
of 18 million
hectares (mha)
of irrigated land
in Pakistan, about
6.22 mha are said
to be affected
by this menace.
In response to
this the Government
of Pakistan launched
different Salinity
Control and Reclamation
Projects (SCARP),
starting in 1959.
These do not seem
to have been very
successful. Among
the criticisms
of the SCARP
approach are design
defects, severe
environmental
impacts, and the
creation of secondary
problems that
are as bad as
the original ones
that the plan
had intended to
remedy. The impression
that one gets
is that Pakistan
is still struggling
with a gigantic
problem to which
satisfactory answers
have not yet been
found.
Inter-provincial
conflicts
Another major
national concern
is the persistence
of inter-provincial
conflicts over
water distribution.
These conflicts
have a long history,
going back to
the middle of
the 19th Century
when human intervention
in the natural
flow of the river
through the construction
of barrages and
canals began.
The old inter-provincial
conflicts and
the attempts to
resolve them were
followed after
Partition (1947)
by the India-Pakistan
dispute over the
Indus, which was
resolved by the
Indus Water Treaty
of 1960. The problems
of water-sharing
among the provinces
in Pakistan continued,
and were dealt
with by several
committees and
commissions. The
settlement currently
in force is the
Indus Water Accord
of 1991. However,
there are important
unresolved issues
with a crucial
bearing on water
distribution.
Issues of flood
management, not
discussed here,
also have inter-provincial
angles.
Kalabagh
controversy
A new dimension
has been added
to water-sharing
disputes by the
contentious Kalabagh
Dam Project. This
Project is the
centre of a major
controversy in
Pakistan. The
arguments are
familiar. The
case for the project
is argued on the
basis of a projected
water shortage
and the need for
and possibility
of one more dam
on the Indus system.
The opponents
of the project
argue that water
is not available
for the dam, that
the project is
not needed, and
that it will have
serious environmental
and human impacts.
There is also
an inter-provincial
angle: Sindh is
afraid that with
the Kalabagh dam,
more of the Indus
water will be
diverted by Punjab,
with serious consequences
for it (Sindh);
and the North
Western Frontier
Province (NWFP),
while it might
derive some benefits,
is seriously worried
about submergence
of land, displacement
of people, and
water-logging
problems.
Two
approaches
At the heart of
the Kalabagh controversy
lies the confrontation
between two divergent
approaches to
water-resource
policy, planning
and management,
encapsulated by
one writer (Bengali,
2003) as the 'techno-centric
approach' vis-à-vis
the 'socio-centric
approach'. As
summed up by him,
the former relies
wholly on technical
expertise and
engineering solutions,
whereas the latter
recognises that
'development,
management and
conservation cannot
be achieved in
a vacuum, and
social systems
and structures
and people's cultures
and lifestyles
also need to be
addressed'.
Other
issues
There are also
serious concerns
in Pakistan about
the pollution
of rivers, the
degradation of
coastal zones,
the problems of
sewage disposal
in urban areas,
and so on, but
limitations of
space prevent
this paper from
going into them.
India
(The Indian
concerns outlined
below may find
a resonance in
the other countries
of the region.)
Water
crisis?
An important and
widely shared
perception in
India is that
of an imminent
water crisis.
The crucial element
here is the demand
projection, and
that needs to
be looked at carefully.
In every kind
of water use,
major economies
are desirable
and possible,
though difficult.
If these are achieved,
the demand picture
will not remain
the same. Turning
to the supply
side, large-dam
projects are not
the only answer;
there are other
possibilities.
Local rainwater
harvesting (‘catching
the raindrop as
it falls’)
and watershed
development are
also part of the
supply-side answers
to the demand.
Through a combination
of these two approaches,
namely, on the
demand side, the
practice of the
utmost economy
and efficiency
in water-use and
of resource-conservation,
and on the supply
side, efforts
to augment the
availability of
`usable' water
through extensive
recourse to local
water-harvesting
and watershed
development, it
may be possible
to avert a crisis,
though the situation
will undoubtedly
be difficult and
will call for
careful management.
Divergence
on big projects
There is a widespread
perception that
the growth of
population, pace
of urbanisation
and economic development
will accentuate
the pressure of
increasing demand
on a finite resource,
and that the answer
lies in large
supply-side projects
and long-distance
water transfers.
That is the dominant
view in India,
but there is a
strong body of
opinion that challenges
that view.
The
Narmada, Tehri
Movements
The most dramatic
confrontation
between the two
views took place
in the case of
the Narmada (Sardar
Sarovar) and the
Tehri Hydro-Electric
Projects. In both
cases, the protest
movements and
their leaders
(Medha Patkar
and Sunderlal
Bahuguna) became
well-known nationally
and even internationally.
In both cases,
the battle has
been lost in the
Supreme Court,
and construction
activities --
stalled for a
while -- have
been resumed in
full force, but
the movements
cannot be adjudged
to have been failures:
they have changed
forever the way
people at every
level (including
the general public,
the media, policy-makers,
project-planners
and managers)
think about such
projects. In that
sense, the movements
have been enormously
influential.
‘Flood
control’
This is a controversial
subject, but it
is increasingly
recognised that
what we must learn
to do is not so
much to ‘control’
floods as to cope
with them when
they occur and
minimise damage,
partly through
‘flood-plain
zoning’
(i.e., regulation
of settlement
and activity in
the natural flood
plains of rivers)
and partly through
`disaster-preparedness'.
However, the notion
of ‘flood
control’
continues to hold
some sway over
people's minds,
and to influence
official thinking.
Inter-state
river water disputes
Most of the major
rivers in India
flow through more
than one (Indian)
state and are
therefore ‘inter-state
rivers’.
The constitutional/statutory
mechanism for
the resolution
of inter-state
conflicts within
India -- over
such rivers seemed
initially to be
working reasonably
well, but it has
run into difficulties
in recent years.
Two currently
outstanding disputes
are the Ravi-Beas
Dispute (Punjab
and Haryana) and
the Cauvery Dispute
(Karnataka, Tamil
Nadu, Kerala and
Pondicherry).
An early and satisfactory
resolution does
not seem to be
within sight in
either case. These
unresolved disputes
have implications
that go far beyond
water: they raise
questions about
Indian federalism.
The
groundwater crisis
Continuing reckless
exploitation of
groundwater, leading
to the rapid depletion
of aquifers in
many places, portends
disaster. The
situation, which
has been described
as ‘colossal
anarchy’
(Shah 2004), needs
to be quickly
brought under
control, but there
are enormous legal,
political and
practical difficulties
here. There may
be need for changes
in the law relating
to ownership rights
over groundwater,
enactment of new
state-level laws
for regulating
the extraction
and use of groundwater,
establishment
of regulatory
bodies, rationalisation
of power tariffs,
and so on. However,
with regard to
the very large
number of private
tube-wells in
the country (estimated
at 21 million)
and the fact that
most of these
are cases of ‘self-supply’,
i.e., outside
the purview of
supply systems,
public or private,
there is some
scepticism about
the feasibility
of `regulation'
and the efficacy
of changes in
policy or law
as remedies for
the depletion
and contamination
of groundwater
aquifers. No clear
solutions to this
difficult problem
are in sight as
yet and the debate
needs to be pursued
further.
Water
markets
Water markets
already exist
in India mainly
in the context
of extraction
of groundwater
through tube-wells
and bore-wells
but also in relation
to surface water
in some instances.
Many more instances
may emerge. There
are many who think
that this is the
route to follow
for the future;
there are others
who are deeply
uneasy at the
idea of water
markets and at
the underlying
perception of
water as a tradable
commodity.
The advocates
of water markets
(who view water
as a commodity)
recommend: ‘Define
property rights
and allow trading’,
but the citizen's
right to water
(for drinking,
cooking and washing)
is a part of the
right to life,
and the water
rights of a farmer
for irrigation
or those of an
industry for industrial
uses are use-rights;
treating either
of them as ‘tradable
property rights’
has serious implications
that need to be
studied carefully.
The supply of
water by private
tankers in urban
areas and the
burgeoning bottled-water
trade are also
instances of (entirely
avoidable) water
markets. If the
public system
provided an adequate,
reliable and safe
supply, the demand
for tankers or
for bottled water
may go down sharply.
Apart from that,
these supplies
(and the soft
drinks business)
have necessarily
to draw raw water
from somewhere,
and that draft
may be an unsustainable
or inequitable
one. The instance
of the bore-wells
of the Coca Cola
Company depriving
an entire area
in Kerala of its
water is well-known.
The case went
to the High Court
and the judgment
has invoked the
public trust doctrine,
but the story
is as yet unfinished,
as the case may
still go to the
Supreme Court.
Privatisation
The paucity of
financial resources
is pushing the
governments, central
and state, to
think in terms
of inviting private
sector participation
in dam and reservoir
projects, which
would earlier
have been exclusively
in the domain
of the state.
The new Indian
National Water
Policy, 2002 includes
a clause that
specifically provides
for this. There
has been much
opposition to
the idea of `privatisation
of water', whether
in relation to
projects or in
the context of
water services,
on several grounds.
There was a public
outcry against
the leasing of
a 20-km stretch
of the Shivalik
River in Chattisgarh
to a private corporate
entity for water
supply, and the
state tried to
cancel the lease
but encountered
legal difficulties.
This, like the
Coca Cola case
mentioned earlier,
is an unfinished
story.
Pricing
of water
The twin propositions
that water rates
should be regarded
as `user charges'
and not as a form
of taxation, and
that the principle
behind `user charges'
should be `full
cost recovery',
are important
elements in current
economic thinking.
They may be acceptable
in the context
of water as an
input into economic
activity: irrigation,
industrial use,
water for hotels.
However, these
principles cannot
apply without
modification to
`water for life'
(drinking water).
This too cannot
be free, but must
be priced reasonably,
with full economic
pricing to the
affluent, penal
pricing beyond
a certain level
of use, some degree
of subsidisation
to the less affluent,
and perhaps some
free supplies
to the very poor.
It cannot be said
that these issues
have been thought
through to clarity
and finality in
India.
Other
issues
There are many
other issues such
as the third tier
of local self-government
at the level of
villages (panchayats)
and cities (nagarpalikas)
introduced by
the 73rd and 74th
Amendments to
the Constitution.
Among the subjects
to be devolved
to these bodies
(known as panchayati
raj institutions
or PRIs) is water
management at
the local level.
The future role
of PRIs in relation
to water is a
matter of considerable
importance.
Another matter
which demands
urgent attention
is the problem
of the pollution
and contamination
of water sources
and systems that
steadily diminishes
the quantum available
for use.
Nepal
A large number
of rivers and
streams flow through
Nepal and into
India. The nature
of the terrain
immediately brings
to mind the possibility
of generation
of hydro-electric
power, and a number
of sites for large
projects have
been identified.
Only a small part
of the power so
generated can
be used in Nepal;
the rest would
have to be exported,
primarily to India.
India can also
use all the waters
that flow from
Nepal for irrigation,
and would further
like to minimise
the damage caused
by the floods
coming down those
rivers from time
to time. These
possibilities
give rise to the
idea of large
projects for building
dams and reservoirs
in Nepal. (Bangladesh,
for its part,
has for long been
arguing for seven
large projects
in Nepal for augmenting
the lean season
flows of the Ganges
at Farakka, where
the waters are
shared between
India and Bangladesh.)
Against this background,
there is a growing
sentiment in Nepal
that the country's
water resources
represent the
route through
which its visions
of prosperity
can best be realised;
that water is
to Nepal what
oil has been to
the Gulf countries,
namely, the source
of revenues and
wealth; and that
those revenues
will come principally
from the export
of hydro-electric
power to the neighbouring
countries, mainly
India.
Several multi-purpose
projects (Karnali,
Pancheswar, Saptkosi,
etc) have been
under discussion
between Nepal
and India for
over three decades,
but little progress
has been made
on any of them,
for several reasons:
the long history
of mistrust and
suspicion characterising
India-Nepal relations;
the growing salience
of environmental
concerns, concerns
about the displacement
of people, and
misgivin about
large projects
in the seismically
active Himalayan
region; and a
degree of dissent,
even within Nepal,
from the view
that the route
to prosperity
lies in large-scale
centralised generation
of hydro-electric
power for export.
There is an `alternative'
view in Nepal
that advocates
decentralised,
relatively small,
environmentally
benign projects
(whether for irrigation
or for hydro-electric
power) primarily
for Nepal's own
needs rather than
for meeting the
needs of other
countries. Export
of electricity
is not ruled out,
but large generation
primarily for
export to a single
large buyer (India)
under inter-governmental
arrangements is
not considered
desirable. It
is difficult to
say how widespread
the `alternative'
view is, but that
it commands a
degree of influence
cannot be denied.
Opposition to
the Arun III Hydro-Electric
Project did eventually
result in the
World Bank withdrawing
from the project;
this is regarded
as a great loss
by the water establishment
and other proponents
of the mainstream
position, but
celebrated as
an achievement
by critics who
argue that the
abandonment of
this unviable
project made created
a number of smaller,
cheaper and quicker
alternatives.
(For a short while
a leading proponent
of this view became
a government minister,
and for a brief
period the `alternative'
view became `mainstream',
but that is no
longer the case.)
Turning to another
aspect, Nepal
-- as a land-locked
country -- attaches
a great deal of
importance to
a navigational
outlet to the
sea (to a port
in India or Bangladesh).
At the moment
this is not physically
feasible, but
creating such
a possibility
as a part of one
of the projects
that are being
talked about remains
an important objective
of Nepal.
Bhutan
Bhutan, close
to Nepal and like
it a mountainous
country lying
on the southern
slopes of the
Himalaya between
China and India,
is flanked on
the western and
eastern sides
by the Indian
states of Sikkim
and Arunachal
Pradesh, with
Assam as the immediate
southern neighbour.
The country is
heavily forested
and richly endowed
with water resources.
The annual availability
of water per capita
is put at 75000
m3 in the Bhutan
Water Policy document,
but the environmental
information portal
of the World Resources
Institute gives
a per capita Internal
Renewable Water
Resources (IRWR)
figure of 43214
m.3 for the year
2001. It is not
clear how those
two figures are
related to each
other, but it
is clear enough
from either figure
that the country
is exceptionally
well-endowed with
water, though
even that abundance
is expected to
come under pressure
in the future
because of the
growth of population
and the processes
of economic development.
The most important
point to bear
in mind about
Bhutan is its
deep attachment
to its cultural
and natural heritage
and its determination
to preserve them.
It has adopted
what has been
described as `the
middle path' to
sustainable development.
At the same time,
the country is
(understandably)
not exempt from
the aspirations
that other countries
entertain for
economic development
and prosperity.
The contrary pulls
of these two strands
in Bhutanese thinking
are evident in
the Water Policy
document. For
instance, there
are fine statements
of the holistic
ecological point
of view and indications
of social and
human sensitivity;
at the same time,
the language of
economics, management
and the market-place
is also found
in many places.
It is hoped that
the floodtide
of `economic development'
and `modernity'
will not overwhelm
Bhutan and make
it indistinguishable
from the rest
of the world and
subject to the
same ills.
In pursuance of
the objective
of earning revenues
from the country's
hydro-power potential,
Bhutan has undertaken
certain projects
with Indian assistance.
It is not within
the scope of this
paper to go into
the details of
the projects that
are in operation;
under construction;
and in the visualisation/formulation/planning
stages (Chuka,
Chuka II, Tala,
Kurichu, Sunkosh,
Manas, etc). What
needs to be noted
is that Chuka
is widely regarded
as an example
of successful
inter-country
cooperation for
mutual benefit;
and that the inflow
of revenues from
the sale of electricity
to India has been
very large in
relation to the
country's GDP
and has made the
country prosperous
in economic terms,
with a per capita
income much higher
than that of its
neighbours. However,
the question whether
the transformation
in the economy
has been accompanied
by ecological
and social changes
and whether these
warrant any concern,
has not been adequately
debated. If further
expansions of,
and additions
to, hydro-electric
capacity take
place as planned,
would it be possible
for Bhutan to
continue to adhere
to the middle
path? That question
is of course one
for the Bhutanese
to reflect on.
Bangladesh
Crisscrossed by
rivers and streams,
Bangladesh is
a water-abundant
country with a
per capita water-availability
of 8444 m3 in
2002 (World Resources
Institute). (Another
study Ahmad et
al 2001 - puts
the annual per
capita water availability
at 12162 m3 in
1991, 10305 m3
in 2000, and 7670
m3 in 2025.) As
the country acts
as a narrow funnel
through which
three large river
systems (the Ganges,
Brahmaputra and
the Meghna) drain
into the sea,
its major national
problem is the
periodical occurrence
of disastrous
flooding. There
was catastrophic
flooding in 1988
and again in 1998.
However, though
floods dominate
the thinking of
Bangladesh, there
is also a perception
of a critical
shortage of water
in the lean season
in some parts
of the country.
Most Bangladeshi
writings on water
tend to make the
point that 94%
of the water resources
of the country
originate beyond
its borders, and
that 54 rivers
and streams flow
into Bangladesh
from India. This
consciousness,
combined with
that of India's
size, colours
Bangladeshi thinking
and gives it a
sense of vulnerability.
The water establishment
of Bangladesh
is acutely aware
that, for water
security as well
as for flood-management,
the country needs
Indian cooperation.
Against this background,
there are four
prominent concerns
in the national
thinking about
water: flood-management;
water-sharing
with the upper
riparian; internal
water-resource
management; and
the protection
and preservation
of the natural
environment.
The massive floods
of 1988 brought
international
attention to this
problem, resulting
in the Flood Action
Plan (FAP)
financed by a
large number of
donor countries.
The FAP
was a very large
programme consisting
of numerous studies
and some pilot
projects. However,
it was subjected
to severe criticism
right from the
beginning, and
soon fell into
disrepute, largely
because it was
perceived as a
top-down, non-participative
and essentially
donor-driven plan.
On water-sharing
with upper riparians,
treaties or understandings
with India on
several rivers
are favoured.
A Treaty with
India on water-sharing
in the Ganges
was signed on
12 December, 1996.
Similar understandings
are felt to be
necessary on at
least eight or
nine of the 54
rivers and streams
that cross the
India-Bangladesh
border. Currently,
talks are in progress
on water-sharing
on the Teesta.
(Another strong
Bangladeshi perception
is that of the
need for the augmentation
of the lean season
flows of the Ganges,
and the Government
of India is in
agreement with
that view, but
there is a divergence
between the two
countries on how
the augmentation
is to be brought
about).
Turning to internal
water-resource
management, the
work done under
the aegis of the
FAP (though there
was disenchantment
with that programme)
provided useful
inputs when, eventually,
the preparation
of a new National
Water Management
Plan and a National
Water Policy was
undertaken. (The
National Water
Policy was published
in 1999, but it
still remains
largely a declaration
of intent lacking
in formal backing
and not translated
into operational
plans.) In these
new initiatives,
the old top-down
engineering and
structural approaches
were moderated
by a greater awareness
of non-structural
measures; the
importance of
people's participation
in planning; environmental
concerns; and
institutional
change. At the
same time, the
influence of the
new processes
of `economic reform'
is seen in the
references to
water as an economic
good, the importance
of pricing as
an instrument
of water management,
private sector
participation,
and so on. The
balancing of these
divergent perceptions
seems somewhat
uneasy and precarious.
Environmental
concerns are now
part of the climate
of opinion and
have acquired
