The adoption of the Hindu state in the 1990 Constitution of Nepal framed in the background of the movement for the restoration of democracy is, on the one hand, reverence to the uninterrupted history of Nepal's religious identity as a Hindu kingdom; but it is, on the other hand, contested by emerging trends of secularism under the democratic disposition in the post-1990 period. This paper is about state and religion in Nepal. The introduction deals with general observations on religious affairs, section two concentrates on the process of national integration through Hinduisation in the post-unification period and the last section examines emerging trends for the secularisation of the state.

Introduction
Since the pre-historic period, Nepal has always been known as a Hindu state, despite the unanswered question about which of the two religions, Hinduism and Buddhism, came to Nepal first. Nepal's recorded history is an account of rulers, not of people, but no evidence has yet been found that the King and the majority population followed different religions, as was the case of Kashmir and Hyderabad before their accession to India. Such a general belief is, however, contradicted by the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFEN)'s controversial stand, asserting the ethnic groups (originally non-Hindus) as the only original inhabitants of Nepali territory and labelling the Hindu caste groups as non-indigenous and new comers to Nepal.

Nonetheless, there is no record of tussle between the King and the people on the question of religion. There are only a few exceptional cases in history, of religious intolerance in Nepal, unlike several instances of communal violence between Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalis in Sri Lanka and between Hindus and Muslims in India. Besides, in Nepal there has never been any conflict between the King's temporal authority and the Brahmin's spiritual authority unlike the clash between monarchy and church in European countries in the medieval period.

It is important to understand why there has been an absence of religious tension of any kind in Nepal. On the liberal understanding and practice of religion in Nepal, a leading anthropologist argues that 'The Nepali word for religion is dharma, which also means duty, ethics, morality, rule, merit and pious acts. Therefore, when Nepalis discuss religion they understand it with a broader meaning than is usually applied in the West’ (Bista, 1991: 27). So, what does Hinduism mean in Nepal? Many native and foreign scholars believe that it is signs and symbols rather than concepts, ideas and fundamentals' (Sharma, 1989; Regmi, 1989; Sharma, 2002, 2003; Michaels, 1997; Gellner, 2001). In fact, religion in Nepal is primarily thought of in terms of ritual practices. Ritual practices are different from one locality to the other and from one group to the other, within and among the Nepali Hindus. The lack of a single uniform religious code, unlike in Catholic Christianity and Islam, is mainly due to the legacy of the amalgamation of traditionally non-Hindu groups into the Hindu fold, although they have retained their own cultural identity and traditional practices.

Prithivi Narayan Shah, the unifier of modern Nepal attributes to Nepal the features of ‘a garden of four varnas and thirty-six Jats’. The provision of the old Civil Code 1854 permitting customary practices of different Jats, can be referred to here in this regard, even though the period of the Shah and Rana regimes, from 1768 to 1950, was the time of aggressive Hinduisation. The path of cultural assimilation was not that of the Holocaust but somehow a blending of melting pot and salad-bowl models. This argument is, however, seriously contested mainly by native scholars belonging to various ethnic groups. They label it a ‘predatory Hindu state’ while referring to the state's designed project of national integration through Hinduisation (Gurung, 1998; Bhattachan, 1995, 2000; Lawati, 2002).

The modern state of Nepal has also contributed to promoting religion as ritual rather than as doctrine. Since Nepal started the modernisation and democratisation processes from 1951, dharmasastra has no longer remained the main source of laws or of the Constitution. Religion has also not yet been used for political mobilisation in competitive party politics in the post-1990 period. The following of the Hindu religion in Nepal, mainly as ritual rather than doctrine, has its own significance in preventing tension with the people of other religions in the country.

The religion of the majority group-Hindus constitute 80.6 percent according to the 2001 census-has not been threatened seriously. Other religions are so small in size that out of 75 districts of the country, non-Hindus are in the position of majority or as the largest population group in only 5 districts (Kirats in two and Buddhist in 3 districts). Buddhism, religion of the second largest group constituting 10.3 percent along with Hinduism is considered a home-grown religion unlike Islam and Christianity. Moreover, Hindus would like to include Buddhists in their enlarged fraternity, though it is contested by the emerging trend of seeking a separate identity from the dominant religion. Gautam Buddha is one of the national icons of Nepal. Buddhism being the second religion of the country has received continuous patronage throughout the history of the Hindu kingdom, reflected in the construction of Buddhist monasteries and chaityas mostly in the ancient and medieval period. The coexistence of Hinduism and Buddhism in Nepal is further evident that people of both religions are devoted to the same gods/goddesses and celebrate some festivals commonly. As Gellner has observed, the 'actual practice of religion in Nepal very rarely falls neatly into boxes labeled Hinduism and Buddhism' (Gellner, 2000).

Abroad, Nepal is also known as a Buddhist country mainly because Kapilbastu, Lumbini southwest of Nepal is the birthplace of Gautam Buddha. This image has also been reinforced and associated with identities of places and people for tourists/foreigners' attraction and concentration. For instance, Nepal is known as a country of the Himalayas and Mount Everest and the people inhabiting the zone profess Lamaistic Buddhism. Half of the Newars original inhabitants and dominant population of the Kathmandu valley, capital of the country are Buddhist. Besides, the state's concerted efforts to project Nepal's identity associated with Buddhism and commercialisation of the holy place of Lumbini, have complemented the objectives of its policy of diversification of foreign relations: the promotion of tourism and foreign aid from Buddhist countries, Japan in particular.

Integration Through Hinduisation
After the unification of the country in 1768, the unifier King Prithivi Narayan Shah called Nepal ‘asali Hindustan’ (pure land of Hindus) which indicated the state's roadmap of national integration under the Shah regime (1768-1846). The Hindu polity, in which monarchy and religion have decisive roles was further enacted more rigidly during the Rana period (1846-1951). The Rana prime ministers were also monarchs by title (Shree Tin Maharaj) and by the authority they enjoyed (Hachhethu, 2003). Jung Bahadur Rana, founder of the Rana regime, promulgated a Civil Code in 1854 providing the legal framework to Vedic prescriptions of the social order in an hierarchical society. In fact, the Hinduisation process in Nepal followed the structure of casteism. The caste system previously regulated by hukum of the King and bachan of the priests was standardised into state law by the Rana rulers. The Civil Code 1854 classified the people in three broad categories in a descending order: (a) Tagadhari (sacred-thread wearing castes) at the top (b) Matwali (alcohol drinking castes and ethnic groups) in the middle, and (c) 1. Sudra (impure but touchable) and 2. Acchut (impure and untouchable castes) at the lowest position. Putting ethnic groups into the fold of a Hindu-based hierarchical caste system, suggested a model of excessive Hinduisation.

In the post-Rana period, the Hinduisation process continued, albeit in a lesser degree and in a reformed way. The decade of the 1950s, with the first experiment with democracy, allowed some relaxation, but the reinstatement of absolute monarchy under a partyless panchayat system (1960-90) was tantamount to the revival of Hinduisation. The integration through Hinduisation during the panchayat period was somehow different from orthodoxy in the past under the Rana regime. The new Civil Code of 1963, in contrast to the old one, formally withdrew state's support to caste system. Though in a reformed way, the panchayat regime continued the state's policy of promoting Hinduism in various forms. For instance, national symbols set by the panchayat are associated with monarchy and Hinduism (Gurung 1997: 505).

The centrality of Hindusim in three different phases of modern history of Nepal (1768-1846 under the Shah's absolute regime, 1846-1951 under the Rana oligarchy and 1960-1990 under the Shah's authoritarian panchayat regime, is well reflected in the following observation: 'Prithvi Narayan Shah, and those after him, based the country's unification on four key ideas: the unquestioning power and authority of the Hindu King of Gorkha; the supremacy of the Hindu ethos in national life; and social integration through Hindu social system based on caste divisions; and recognition of Nepali as the language of government, administration and in more recent time, education' (Sharma, 1992: 7).

The promotion of Hindu nationalism by P.N. Shah and his successors, including the Rana rulers, was taken into consideration by two major factors/interests: legitimacy and nationalism vis-à-vis India. The Hindu polity places the King as a sovereign lord, a protector of territory and subjects, a guardian of moral order, an upholder of traditions, and the source of all spiritual and temporal power (Sharma, 1997: 475). The ruler's adherence to Hindu religion is well reflected in late King Birendra's perception of the source of legitimacy of monarchy. He said, 'In Nepal, the monarchy and its subjects have been governed by Dharma, a system drawn from the Hindu religion. The King cannot change this value system' (quoted in Shaha, 1975: 7).

Those rulers of the post-unification period who had greater legitimacy problem, from P. N. Shah to the present King Gyanendra, were more active about Hinduisation. P.N. Shah, the King of Gorkha principality who unified Nepal by conquest, introduced the Shah regime based on the right of sword. The authority acquired through the sword was not sufficient to establish legitimacy among the people of vanquished lands. So his project of making Nepal an asli Hindustan was guided by his interest to gain legitimacy in newly conquered lands. The need for the establishment of a new legitimacy also explains the reason behind the initiation for active and rigid Hinduisation by J. B. Rana, the founder of the hereditary Rana oligarchy in which the prime minister's position was that of a de facto ruler while the King's status was de jure. He also introduced the Rana regime by sword and his quest for religious legitimacy is well reflected in what he said: ‘In this age of Kali this is the only country where Hindu rule’ (quoted in Sharma, 2002: 25).

The revival of Hinduisation by King Mahendra is another example of invoking traditional legitimacy by a ruler who does not have popular legitimacy. By a royal coup in December 1960, he ended the multiparty system and introduced a partyless panchyat system. The Panchayat Constitution of 1962, unlike the previous Constitutions of 1951 and 1959, attributed Nepal as a Hindu state. The present King Gyanenda, brother of late King Birendra, succeeded to the throne in the background of the 1st June 2001 royal massacre in which King Birendra along with his all family members and five other royals were killed. Gyanendra's succession is in a horizontal continuation that is unnatural and against tradition, if not illegal, suggesting his legitimacy problem. He is trying his best to project the kingship as the core of Hindu institutions and also cultivating leverages of a Hindu monarchy for obvious reasons. In sum, the promotion of Hindu nationalism is closely linked with the legitimacy of Nepali rulers.

Another factor propelling Hindu nationalism is the need to give Nepal a distinct identity, apart from India. The projection of Nepal as the only Hindu state in the world is a two-pronged strategy: to put itself at a distance from the Indian state and, at the same time, to associate with the Hindu population of India for the interest of the Hindu King. By adopting an isolationist policy until the mid-20th century, both the Shah and Rana rulers projected Nepal's distinct identity as Hindu state. India's image changed despite the fact that it is a secular state as defined in its Constitution following its partition on religious lines and with the creation of Pakistan for Muslims. Thus, the declaration of Nepal as a Hindu state by the 1962 and 1990 Constitutions can be considered a continuity of Nepal's policy of projecting its distinct image different from secular India.

The interest behind promoting Hindu nationalism and the expansion of sources of legitimacy overlap in projecting Nepal's Hindu identity. Nepal's Hindu monarchs have tried their best to use their leverage among the Hindus of India to counter the possible alliance between secular forces of India and Nepal against their interests (Dangol, 1999). Nehru's reaction to King Mahendra's coup in December 1960 as ‘a setback to democracy’ is a point to mention here about the apprehension of the King and his use of Nepali identity as a Hindu state and Hindu monarch trying to minimise the threat against his regime and interest. King Gyanendra's visits to India twice within a year in 2002 and his visits to a number of religious places in India, demonstrate the continuity of Nepal's Hindu King's strategy to cultivate the Hindus of the world, those of India in particular ,in times of crisis. The 7th World Hindu Conference, held in Gorakhpur (India) in February 2003, passed a resolution to protect the Hindu state and monarchy in Nepal.

Threat to Hindu Identity
The 1990 Constitution of Nepal upholds a number of features of Hindu-based Nepali nationalism including the official title of Nepal as a Hindu state. The constitutional provision for the separation of politics from ethnicity and religion, the prohibition of cow slaughter, ban on proselytising, restriction to fundamental rights 'which may jeopardise communal harmony', etc., are for safeguarding the tradition of Hindu supremacy. But democratic Nepal, unlike in the past under dictatorial regimes, has its own limitations to espouse one particular religion since it has adopted the principle of equality, liberalism, pluralism and non-discrimination as core values of the new political disposition. Discontent with some signs and symbols associated with the Hindu state and Hindu monarchy i.e., national symbols, national anthem (phrased in a way equating patriotism with worship of the King), the use of Sanskrit language in education and media etc., have now turned into agendas of oppositional politics and minority movements. The religious identity of Nepal as a Hindu state is under attack from different corners.

The constitutional position of the Nepali state and nation seems contradictory. It proclaims Nepal as a Hindu state that is closely associated with monarchy, ‘an adherent of Aryan culture and a follower of Hindu religion’, whereas the nation constitutes the people irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe. The separation of state as Hindu kingdom and nation as the people attempted to be bridged by a provision that 'His Majesty is the symbol of Nepali nationality and the unity of the Nepali people'. Can a Hindu monarch be a true symbol of national unity for the people of other religions? Is the proclamation of a Hindu state in which other religions are naturally relegated to secondary status in conformity with the universal principle of equality and non-discrimination? The recognition of Nepal as multi-ethnic and multi-lingual, but the refusal to identify it as a multi-religious state, exposes the ambiguity and contradiction of the Constitution, and paves the way for the struggle against the identification of the modern state of Nepal with one particular religion.

The demand for a secular state is obviously the main agenda of minority religious groups. Unlike the history of the Hindu-Buddhist coexistence, now Buddhists have built an informal alliance with other minority religious groups in exerting pressure for secularism. But religious activism as an independent and separate movement is not much strong in Nepal and voices for a secular state have come up more vigorously from other forces, ethnic organisations and political parties.

Ethnicity is one of the dominant agendas in the present discourse of restructuring the Nepali state. The central thrust of the ethnic movement is to find inclusion from the long exclusion in the political and economic power structure of the country. In accelerating identity politics, ethnic organisations have created two platforms, one religious based and the other minority based. In addition to the alliance of minority religious groups on the agenda of secularism, they have cultivated all divisive lines among the Hindus on caste, language and regional grounds. Marginalised Hindu groups, i.e., Dalits, Newars, Madheshi (people of Tarai) etc., find themselves in the same camp with the ethnic groups fighting against dominant hill high caste Hindus, Brahmin and Chhetri.

The identity movement has had some visible impacts. The census reports of 1991 and 2001 showed that the people identified with Hindu religion decreased from 86.5 to 80.6. This is a result of the ethnic assertion to dissociate janajatis from the history of the post-unification period. The central thrust of the janajatis' movement for their distinct identity is to get themselves recognised as non-Hindus that contend against the historical process of Sanskritisation and Hinduisation. The boycott of Hindu festivals, including Dashain and Tihar, is a clear rejection of the domination of the parbatiya culture associated with Hindu religion. The emerging trend of the identity movement demands a change of national identity, from that of a Hindu state to a secular state.

The foreseeable change in the cultural domain of the country that is obviously against the supremacy of the Hindu religion would have natural repercussions on the legitimacy of any Hindu monarch. The threat to the survival of monarchy has largely come from the political sector. The post-1990 politics witnessed the emergence of communists (ideologically secular and republican) as one of the dominant forces. The Nepali Congress- the oldest and the most influential centrist party-recently changed its stand from a neutral position to one in support of a secular state. Moreover, the insurgent Maoist group whose presence is felt all over the country is the catalyst in bringing about a new political and ideological equation and it has a clear republican and secular agenda.

It has succeeded in discontinuing the singing of the national anthem and teaching of Sanskrit language symbolised with the monarchy and Hindu religion in its controlled areas. The question of legitimacy of Hindu monarch of Nepal has also come from another direction. The present King Gyanendra succeeded to the throne in the background of the 1st June 2001 royal massacre. By taking back executive power since 4th October 2002, King Gyanendra has opened up another battleground with parliamentary parties, in addition to fighting against insurgent Maoist groups since February 1996, which naturally aggravates the vulnerable position of the monarchy. The emerging political and ideological scenario has its own impact on the social bases of the monarchy. Now the King patron and promoter of Hindu religion is not as popular and respected as he was earlier. Can a King, whose support base is narrowing down to the armed forces, a conservative political party and the diplomatic circle, resist ever-increasing pressures for the restructuring of the Nepali state?

The project of state restructuring includes secularism. The reversal of the history of Hinduisation in the post-1990s is manifesting itself on accounts. Against the tradition of the coexistence between Hinduism and Buddhism, the Buddhist activists are projecting themselves as an adversary to the Hindu religion. Religious conversion into Christianity is increasing despite legal restriction. Muslims are also expanding madrassas. Minor religious groups are, however, too weak, both in size and strength, to challenge the centuries old Hindu nationalism of Nepal. But there are other forces i.e. parliamentary parties, the Maoist insurgent groups, ethnic organisations and civil society, who are championing the cause for a secular state. The accumulative effects of the Maoist insurgency, parliamentary parties' movements for restructuring of state, ethnic assertion for separate identity, minorities' religious activism and civil society's campaigns for liberal values, would certainly help in pushing Nepal towards a new direction different from its past history of Hinduisation.

(Dr. Krishna Hachhethu is Reader of Political Science, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan University. His publications include: Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership and People. 2002. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point).

References