Bangladesh:
Perspectives on South Asia
Abul
Ahsan
Bangladesh's
attitude towards, and involvement
in, South Asia, and for that
matter, the world at large,
is based on some fundamental
realities facing the nation.
It is a small country with
a large population. The density
of population per square kilometre
at 1025 is one of the highest
in the world. Per capita income
is low ($370 per annum) and
about 29 percent of the population
lives on less than a dollar
a day1.
Even after the restoration
of democracy in 1991, political
process remains fragile because
of confrontation and lack
of accommodation on the part
of two main political parties,
the Awami League and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party.
The
country is all but surrounded
by its big neighbour India.
The only other country with
which it shares a common border
is Myanmar. As a nation, Bangladesh
faces the formidable challenges
of security, under-development,
integrating ethnic, linguistic
and religious minorities in
the main stream of national
life and establishing good
governance.
Bangladesh
has limited military and economic
power and its ability to project
that power outside its borders
is even more limited. The
physical infrastructure of
the country is yet to be developed
and harnessing the natural
resources, particularly water,
can best be done with the
co-operation of the adjoining
countries. Given this background,
Bangladesh has laid emphasis
on promoting peace and co-operation
in the region and the world.
It has consistently striven
to establish mutually beneficial
political, economic, cultural
and other relations with other
nations. As a small country,
particular effort was directed
to expand and deepen relations
with Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives,
and Sri Lanka next door. Within
the limits imposed by the
small size of economies of
each country and in many cases
the competitive nature of
production structures, these
have produced positive results.
Regular visits at the level
of heads of government and
cabinet ministers and exchange
of government and private
sector delegations have served
to establish personal contact
and promote goodwill and understanding.
Bangladesh’s
relations with Pakistan have
grown steadily. The legacy
of the pre-1971 era and the
questions of resolving outstanding
issues, such as those relating
to division of assets and
repatriation of Pakistani
nationals from the country,
have been overshadowed by
the growing mutuality of interest
in political, economic and
security fields. Bound together
by historical and religious
ties, the two countries have
worked together in the Organization
of Islamic Countries (OIC)
,the Commonwealth and the
United Nations on issues of
common concern, particularly
on economic and trade issues,
Middle East and Palestine.
Bangladesh's
relations with India are sensitive
and multi-faceted as they
are complex. In size, population,
economic and military strength,
India towers over Bangladesh.
The two countries share a
long and highly porous border
and there is the legacy of
the past, which sometimes
casts its shadow on relations
between them. For many Bangladeshis
the pre-dominant threat to
the country's security and
integrity comes from the big
neighbour.
This
notwithstanding, it must be
said that over the years the
two countries have managed
their bilateral relations
rather well. There has hardly
been any serious breach of
peace or dislocation of political
and economic relations as
many prophets of doom have
long suggested. Some of the
issues which once appeared
intractable, such as the division
of water of the Ganges, the
Chittagong Hill Tract refugees
in India and the demarcation
of land boundary, have largely
been resolved to mutual satisfaction.
Trade and economic relations
have increased steadily although
the balance of trade tilts
heavily in favour of India.
The formal and informal export
of India to Bangladesh now
totals about $ 3 billion a
year, making Bangladesh the
fourth largest importer of
Indian goods in the world2.
No doubt, some of the outstanding
problems, such as Indian allegations
of illegal Bangladeshi immigration
to India, providing safe haven
to Indian dissidents and rebels,
particularly from the northeast
and allowing Pakistani ISI
to operate against India from
Bangladesh territory, are
yet to be satisfactorily addressed.
On its part, Bangladesh is
keen to resolve the questions
of sharing waters of the remaining
common rivers with India,
stopping incursion of Indian
security forces into Bangladesh
which frequently leads to
death and destruction on the
Bangladesh side, speedy conclusion
of demarcation of maritime
boundaries and narrowing the
growing trade gap. Some of
these are, no doubt, serious
issues but what is important
is the realisation on both
sides that they can, and should
be, resolved peacefully through
discussion.
At
the regional level, security
is a predominant consideration
for Bangladesh as well as
other countries of South Asia
today. The most serious security
issue in the region arises
from highly charged and confrontational
relations between India and
Pakistan, who have already
fought three major wars. The
matter has assumed serious
dimensions since the two countries
acquired nuclear status and
missile technology. In recent
years, each of them has engaged
in a game of brinkmanship
to promote their political
and security agenda as evident
in the Kargil episode, mobilisation
of huge troops along the common
border and other similar activities.
These developments hang heavy
on the security environment
of the entire South Asian
region. Taking advantage of
the situation, militants,
religious fundamentalists
and gun runners on both sides
of the border and in some
cases extra-regional powers
are actively promoting their
own agenda further complicating
an already volatile and sensitive
situation. Meanwhile, non-traditional
security threats including
violence and terrorism along
ethnic and religious lines
as well as environmental security
threats relating to food,
water and land are undermining
the stability, sustainability
and sapping the vitality of
South Asian societies.
These
developments affect Bangladesh
and the whole of South Asia
in several ways. First, the
environment for peace and
stability in the region is
vitiated. Second, it adversely
impacts the SAARC process.
Third, the region becomes
open to intervention by outside
powers that have their own
design and interest in the
area. Fourth, much needed
resources are diverted to
defence at the cost of needs
of education, health and development
of infrastructure.
It
has been estimated that expenditure
on maintaining nuclear arsenals
including providing for safeguards,
training, command and control
will cost India and Pakistan
$ 15 billion for a ten year
period. As it is, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and India are estimated
to spend about 26, 10 and
13 percent of their annual
budget respectively on defence.
The amount represents 181,
40 and 57 percent of what
each of them spends on health
and education combined3.
Bangladesh has consistently
tried to remain neutral in
the disputes between India
and Pakistan or any other
bilateral issue anywhere in
the region. In fact, in its
own modest way, the leadership
of the country has tried to
diffuse tension through bilateral
engagements whenever the situation
assumed a degree of seriousness.
Poverty
and underdevelopment are also
serious problems for South
Asia, where average per capita
income of less than $500 is
lower than even Sub-Saharan
Africa. About 40 percent of
1.3 billion world’s
poor live in the region. The
rate of adult literacy is
low and female literacy is
a mere 36 percent. South Asia
accounts for only 2 percent
of the world's output and
2.3 percent of trade, although
one fifth of the world's population
lives in the area4.
In the context of the above
economic, political and security
situation facing South Asian
nations individually and collectively,
Bangladesh mooted the idea
of South Asian Association
for Regional Co-operation
(SAARC) in the early 80's.
Although the emphasis of the
initiative was economic cooperation
it was felt that contact and
co-operation resulting from
it would promote peace, friendship
and goodwill among member
states. Unfortunately, even
after two decades of its existence
and regular summits and ministerial
level meetings, SAARC has
not achieved the desired results.
Intra-regional
trade in South Asia is still
less than 5 percent of the
region's global trade. This
contrasts sharply with intra-regional
trade in the Association of
South East Asian States (ASEAN),
the European Union and the
North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA), which
stands at 32, 62 and 48 percent,
respectively5.
South Asian Preferential Trade
Area (SAPTA) launched a few
years ago, has not improved
the situation. The subsequent
move of the organisation to
establish a free trade area
has not seen any progress
either and a few deadlines
to finalise a draft agreement
have already been missed.
Similarly the progress in
attracting foreign private
investment, another notable
feature of all such arrangements,
has also been discouraging.
On
the other hand, net investment
in MERCOSUR, also called Southern
Common Market, increased 33
percent per year from 1992-966.
ASEAN has benefited from the
industrial complementation
project and joint investment
program activity supported
by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
Another major strategy of
any regional organisation
is to harness complementarities
and reap the benefit of economies
of scale through development
and strengthening of communication
network like roads, rails,
ports, etc. In South Asia,
even the historical network
has decayed and remains un-operational.
The recommendation of the
SAARC Group of Eminent Persons
to establish a South Asian
Economic Union by the year
2020 in phases (free trade
area, custom union and eventually
economic union) is making
little headway.
SAARC
remains mired in lack of commitment
and seriousness to the idea
on the part of the major South
Asian countries-India and
Pakistan and their conflict
and confrontation on Kashmir
and other political and security
issues. In this context it
may be underlined that from
the very beginning Bangladesh's
initiative was viewed with
suspicion as being a ploy
of outside powers and a measure
either to rally round small
nations against the biggest
of them or to formalise the
latter's domination in the
area7.
This
attitude has resulted in the
establishment of SAARC with
vague aims and purposes (improving
the quality of life of the
people and their welfare,
intensifying mutual co-operation).
The SAARC activities are to
be funded through voluntary
contributions. Bilateral and
contentious issues have been
left out of the SAARC agenda
and unanimity has been made
the basis of all decisions
of the organisation. For a
region which is starved of
capital involvement of donor
countries, international organisations
and private sector in SAARC
activities have been either
left out or subjected to strict
procedures8.
Cooperation in core economic
areas (trade, industry, finance)
which provide the vital rationale
for other regional organisations
was left out of South Asian
agenda until recently.
In
an era of economic liberalisation
and globalisation of production
and distribution which is
led by WTO, World Bank, IMF,
and multinational corporations,
there is no alternative for
South Asia but to integrate
with the world economy. But
in order to do so smoothly
the region must first go for
economic integration within
South Asia itself. It needs
to be underlined that in spite
of globalisation, regional
organisations still attract
serious attention both in
the developed as well as the
developing parts of the world9.
The European Union and ASEAN
have expanded membership in
recent years and widened and
deepened their economic co-operation.
Intra-regional trade in European
Union, NAFTA, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR
today stands at 61.5, 47.5,
25, and 22.8 percent of global
trade of member countries10.
This is because despite dramatic
development in information
and communication technology,
markets still remain fragmented
and cultural differences,
costs of transportation and
consumer preferences still
continue to play an important
role in trade and economic
exchanges.
As
is evident from the foregoing,
Bangladesh is in favour of
strengthening regional economic
co-operation in South Asia
and eventual establishment
of South Asian Economic Union.
No doubt, the matter should
be examined carefully and
special provisions made for
the weak and small economies
like Bangladesh for sufficient
lead and transition time to
avoid serious economic dislocation.
Equally there will be need
for special arrangements for
investment to allow diversification
of their base of production
and provide market access.
In similar circumstances,
these are common features
in other regional economic
organisations.
In
conclusion, it needs to be
emphasised that the concept
of national security has undergone
a qualitative change in recent
years. The spread of education,
democratisation of societies,
empowerment of people and
increasing transparency and
accountability of government
action domestically and in
foreign affairs underlie the
change. The emergence of instant
communication and active print
and specially the electronic
media are other important
factors.
But
South Asia seems to be still
bogged down in traditional
thinking and old mindset.
Much time and resources are
being wasted at the altar
of outmoded ideas about security
and national chivalry depriving
the common man of the opportunity
for a better life thrown open
by developments in modern
science and technology. At
a time when most parts of
the world are actively pursuing
a policy of reconciliation
and mutual accommodation with
neighbours to promote peace
stability and development
South Asia stands by and stagnates.
Through a process of realistic
review of national priorities
and pre-occupation not only
smaller states like Bangladesh,
but even India and Pakistan
would gain politically and
economically. A strong and
vibrant South Asia is sure
to improve the individual
and collective international
standing of member states
and enable them to play their
due role in the comity of
nations.
(Abul Ahsan is Vice-President
of Independent University
and a former foreign secretary
of Bangladesh).
References
| 1. |
World
Development Report 2003
World Bank Oxford University
Press New York 2003 p234,236 |
| 2. |
Prof.
Mustafiz ur Rahman, Bangladesh-India
Economic Relations: Current
status and unfinished
task Centre for Policy
Dialogue January 2001
Dhaka p5, 6. |
| 3. |
Human
Development in South Asia
1998, Human Development
Centre, Oxford University
Press, 1998 Karachi p184 |
| 4. |
Ibid
p15 |
| 5. |
Pascal
Petit and Luc Soete, ‘Globalization
In search of a Future’,
International Social Science
Journal, June 199 Globalization
Vol I& 2 p167-168 |
| 6. |
MERCOSUR
IN Brief US Doc MERCOSUR
Desk 2003 p1&2 |
| 7. |
Pervaiz
Iqbal Cheema, ‘SAARC
Needs Revamping’,
South Asian Survey Volume
1&2 Sage Publication
India Pvt. Ltd December
1996 p312-315 |
| 8. |
Abul
Ahsan, SAARC Perspective,
University Press Limited
P 55 (SAARC Charter) |
| 9. |
‘Economics’,
The Economist 1999,Profile
Books Ltd, London 2001
p14&15 |
| 10. |
Ibid
5 p 170 |
