Introduction
India's support to Bangladesh's liberation struggle was primarily determined by its aspiration to overcome geo-strategic weakness vis-à-vis Pakistan. Extrication of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh indeed served India's vital strategic interest of having a neighbouring ally in its western front. However, shortly after the independence, the initial enthusiasm in the Indo-Bangladesh relations started ebbing; the logics of realpolitik came into play and the bilateral relationship was beset with scores of outstanding issues and disputes.

At present, caution, suspicion, mistrust and cooperation almost coincide in Indo-Bangladesh relations. As a territorially small country, surrounded on three sides by India, Bangladesh obviously faces a high level of security dilemma. Time and again Bangladesh's policy makers have sought to balance India's influence and power by developing ties with powerful countries outside the region. Suspicions about India's possible plans to dictate and control Bangladesh dominate its domestic political culture. For India, failure to have Bangladesh as a totally trustworthy ally remains a source of discontent and frustration. This article presents an assessment of the current divergences in Indo-Bangladesh relations and attempts to understand the sources of discords between these two countries.

A Victim of Geography?
The literature on India-Bangladesh relations often highlights the importance of geographical realties in depicting Bangladesh's security dilemma vis-à-vis India. Often termed as an India-locked country¹, Bangladesh shares 4,094 kilometres of land border on three sides, the fourth side opening to the Bay of Bengal². With the Indian plans to modernise its naval forces and transform it into a blue-water navy, Bangladesh's policy options on the southern vicinity is also highly restricted. Sharing common borders also creates a scope for generating a horde of disputed issues like illegal migration, cross-border criminal and terrorist activities and so on. More importantly, as a lower-riparian country, Bangladesh remains highly dependent on India for sufficient and regular flow of water in its 54 common rivers, which constitute the economic and environmental backbone of this agrarian country. Geographic realities often allow India to pressurise Bangladesh to comply with its demands or policies. The long-drawn Ganges Water Sharing dsispute is viewed by many authors as a perfect example of using geographical advantage for political leverage by India³. Indian allegations about cross border illegal migration or Bangladesh's support to anti-Indian insurgent activities in the border areas also reflect such geopolitical ploys. In Bangladesh, on the other hand, India's overwhelming geographic presence itself is almost always viewed as a constant source of security threat. Geographic realities often result in a stereo-typed vision about the Indian threat which hinders beneficial cooperative ventures with India. Thus in analysing the outstanding issues in the two countries relations, this geographic perspective would remain as a key factor.

Linking Rivers, De-linking Relations
Geographical dictates compel Bangladesh to be dependent on India for the flow of water for its 54 international rivers. The initial discord arose over determining the share of water flow of the Ganges River. India constructed Farakka barrage and feeder canal on the river Ganges to divert the water flow in the Bhagirati-Hoogli river along with flushing out the silts of the Kolkata port. The barrage was made operational from 1975 after which India continued unilateral withdrawal of water from the Ganges for a long period. Both the countries searched for an amicable solution to the problem during the 1970s and 1980s but failed to reach any agreement. In the mean time, the diversion of Ganges water at the Farakka point had a tremendous economic and environmental impact on Bangladesh. After several abortive attempts to develop a comprehensive framework of water sharing, finally Bangladesh and India signed a 30-year water sharing treaty in 12 December, 1996.

As both countries were able to reach at an amicable solution regarding the sharing of the Ganges water, it was anticipated that the goodwill of both governments would be helpful in resolving other outstanding issues as well. Moreover, as the issue of Ganges water sharing was somewhat settled, Bangladesh proposed for a comprehensive water sharing agreement with India regarding other 53 common international rivers. However, India's river linking project once again reinforced the water dispute between the two countries. In the latest plan, the government of India has proposed integrating 30 major international rivers to divert the flow of water towards the southeast and southwestern portion of the country, which are generally considered as drought-prone areas. At the same time, this plan aims at producing 34,000 megawatts of hydroelectricity along with increasing food production from US$ 40 per acre to over US$ 500 per acre. Thus, the plan is perceived as a combination of ensuring water flow in the drought-prone areas during the dry seasons as well as reducing India's acute power-shortage. The initial cost of the project has been estimated at between US$ 70-200 billion, making it the largest and most expensive water project of the world.⁴

This mega project of river linking and water diversion has its roots in a nineteenth century's proposal to build links for the purpose of promoting inland navigation for better transportation. Though the proposal did not materialise during that time, it was later revived twice in the 1970s in different forms, keeping the basic idea of river linking intact. However, the Indian Central Water Commission (CWC), in its feasibility survey, rejected these two plans as well. The Indian Ministry of Water Resources later established the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) that undertook studies on the optimum utilisation of peninsular and Himalayan rivers. The proposal contained a plan of linking the water flows almost all over India through connecting the Himalayan and Peninsular components by creating a total of 31 links among 36 rivers of the country. It will involve digging 600 canals, which could flood 3000 square miles of land, displacing 3 million people from their ancestral land. This project started gaining importance in the public domain after the Supreme Court of India passed an order on 31 October, 2002, to complete the river linking project within 12 years⁵.

There has been lack of proper understanding and adequate information regarding the justification of the multi-functional river linking project, as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of India was not willing to divulge the necessary information. The government, however, has provided several rationales in favour of carrying out the project. Important among these are the situation of drought in the southeast and southwest regions and floods in the east and northeast regions. This argument, often termed as a reductionist vision,⁶ takes into account the fact that the surplus of water causes flood in some parts of India while other parts suffer from acute water scarcity. Therefore, the easy solution is to divert the waterways in such a way so that instead of causing floods, the 'surplus' water would be channelled in the water scarce parts. The project also anticipates that this rerouting of waterways would essentially be used in ensuring food security in India by providing much-needed water for irrigation.

However, these arguments have been refuted by many in India on several accounts. These are: the issue of making the best use of surplus water by rerouting the flow is termed as ‘arithmetic hydrology’ which totally ignores the positive contribution of flooding such as ‘the source of free minerals for the enrichment of land, free recharge for the groundwater resources, free medium for the transportation of fish and conservation of biological diversity, free bumper harvest for the humans⁷’, among others. Moreover, questions have been raised regarding the way the river linking project would ensure food security of India as the very method of determining food-grain requirement used in the project is contested. In this context, Medha Patkar pointed out that for a real food-security, what is needed is ‘to revise the crop pattern, land-distribution, public distribution system and pricing and marketing of agricultural produce⁸.’ Thereby, some analysts have termed this project as a ‘vote-catching project’ put forward by the ruling BJP prior to the election to persuade the voters of the water stress basins⁹. However, the ploy did not make much of a difference in BJP’s electoral fate in the 2004 elections. Moreover, how to address the issues of water-logging, salinity that might be caused by water diversion are not also discussed in the proposed river linking project.¹⁰

As the government of India endorsed the project and started lobbying for international funding, the issue has also generated critical reactions from regional neighbours, particularly Bangladesh. As had been the case during the construction of Farakka Barrage, India did not formally inform either the upper-riparian country Nepal or the lower-riparian Bangladesh. But for Bangladesh, in particular, the effects of river-linking could be catastrophic. Already the Farakka Barrage has caused irreversible economic and environmental damage to the country. An additional 10-20 per cent water withdrawal by the current project could turn much of the areas in Bangladesh into deserts.

Professor Dipankar Chakraborti pointed out that since the proposed project would dry up the availability of fresh water in Bangladesh, people might have to rely more on groundwater sources which already contains arsenic, fluoride and other heavy metals which are detrimental to human health. Moreover, the project could also deepen the already existing arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh, which in the first place, is sometimes attributed to the construction of the Farakka barrage and withdrawal of water from the Ganges¹¹. Another serious consequence of the project would be the adverse effect on the Sunderbans, a world heritage sight shared by both India and Bangladesh. The world's largest coastal forest is already suffering from increasing salinity which might increase due to Indian continual search for water for its drought-prone regions.

Bangladesh's policy makers have reacted strongly against the Indian plan. Bangladesh has sent a 'note verbal' through diplomatic channel to India on August 13, 2003 regarding the river linking project but have not received any official response from India thus far¹². The issue has been further raised by Bangladesh in the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) meeting in September 2003. While Bangladesh insisted on putting the issue at the main agenda of discussion of the next JRC meeting, India obstinately refused the proposal arguing that it was still premature to discuss about the river linking project since the project is at an initial stage. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia, has pointed out that already the dry-season withdrawal of water by India caused drought, increased salinity and ecological imbalance in the country. Therefore, an added Indian plan to link more international water, which would reduce Bangladesh's share of water in the dry season, would bring catastrophic implications for Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh's concern seldom received importance in the Indian policy-making circles. The chief of the Indian task force on the river linking project, Suresh, Prabhu commented that since the per capita availability of water is twelve times higher in Bangladesh than in India, the proposed project would not have any negative impact on the country¹³. The same tone was echoed by a member of the task force, B.G. Verghese, who said that the plan would not have negative impact on Bangladesh's ecology and river system¹⁴. But the river linking project only reminds Bangladesh of its previous experience in dealing with India with regard to the Farakka issue, when defying international law and disregarding the rights of the lower riparian country, India went ahead with unilateral withdrawal of water from the Farakka point. If India goes ahead with its plan, it will definitely undermine bilateral relations severely.

Unresolved Border Issues
One of the outstanding issues between India and Bangladesh has been the issue over the demarcation of borders, both land and maritime. While sharing 4,096 kilometres of land border, only 6.5 kilometres of land along the Comilla-Tripura border is considered as officially disputed by the governments of both countries but the border disputes between Bangladesh and India are, by no means, confined to demarcation problems only. Rather, it is intrinsically linked with the issues of illegal migration of people and goods and cross-border criminal activities which often leads to skirmishes between the border security forces of the two countries.

Bangladesh inherited disputed border relations with India as a legacy of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The border between Pakistan and India was drawn only within six weeks by Sir Cyril Radcliffe on the basis of the Two Nation Theory. The arbitrary division resulted in India's control over 112 enclaves and Bangladesh's control over 32 enclaves based on the religious identities of the inhabitants of those areas. To prevent a violent outcome in the disputed border areas, Bangladesh was keen to settle the issue on an urgent basis with India. Although an agreement was signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1972, due to non-ratification by India the provisions could not be put into effect. On the other hand, Bangladesh immediately ratified the treaty, fulfilling its obligation and returning the disputed Berubari to India, while India gave Bangladesh the permission to use the Tin Bigha corridor, a gateway to Bangladeshi enclaves inside India, in 1992.¹⁵

The demarcation of maritime border is also another issue of controversy. While Bangladesh, having concave coastlines, delimits its sea border southward from the edge of its land boundary, India stretches its claim southeasterly, covering thousands of miles in the Bay of Bengal. Due to the competing claims of the two countries, the delimitation of sea boundary and determining Bangladesh's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) have remained unresolved. Moreover, in terms of determining the continental shelf, the presence of the Andamans and Nicobar Islands place India in a favourable condition.

The issue of demarcating territorial waters in fact led to serious differences between the two countries. The issue of ownership of a new-born island in the estuary of Haribhanga River on the border of the two countries has been a source of contention since the 1970s. This new-born island, known as South Talpatty to Bangladesh and New Moore/Purbasha to India was picked up in a satellite picture in 1975 and led both countries to lay competing claims on the island. While Bangladesh proposed sending a joint Indo-Bangladesh team to determine the flow of channels of the river on the basis of existing international river law to resolve the ownership of the island, the Indian authorities sent forces to establish claims by stationing naval troops on the island in 1981¹⁶. However, on the objection by Bangladesh, India withdrew its forces and agreed to resolve the issue through negotiations. The recent developments reported by the media last year show a renewal of tension regarding the unresolved issue since the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) has established a base in the island, which is being regularly visited by Indian naval forces.¹⁷ The recent Indian activities have been viewed with suspicion by Bangladesh as the sovereignty over the island is yet to be determined.

The boundary dispute between Bangladesh and India in April 2001 took the worst form since Bangladesh's independence. Border skirmishes occurred around the village of Padua (known as Pyrdiwah in India), adjoining Meghalaya state of India and Timbil area of Sylhet district in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government claimed that India held illegal possession of the area since 1971. As the Indian forces attempted to construct a footpath from an army outpost in Padua across a disputed territory some 300 metres wide to Meghalaya, the Bangladesh authorities drew attention to the disputed status of the area. The refusal of the Indian forces to withdraw resulted in the Bangladesh military initiating an offensive that lasted from April 16th to 19th and claimed lives of 16 Indian and three Bangladeshi soldiers. An estimated 10,000 people on Bangladesh side and 1000 people on Indian side were forced to flee from the disputed area as a result of the on-going tension.

The intensity of the border tension started to normalise as the Bangladesh military withdrew from the area to restore the status quo. Though the Indian press raised the issue of Indian soldiers' bodies being severely mutilated, the Indian government sought to downplay the magnitude of the claim as the Bangladeshi prime minister regretted at the sudden turn of events. However, the killing at the border areas did not stop with the reduction of apparent tension between the two countries. A Bangladeshi human rights organisation Odhikar reported in January 2004 that in the period from 2001-2003, India's Border Security Force and gangsters abducted 283 Bangladeshis, raped three women, detained 191 people and committed 30 robberies¹⁸. Also during this period, 243 people were killed as a result of exchange of firing between the border security forces of the two countries.¹⁹

The tension between the two countries resurfaced over the issues surrounding the nationalities of migrants, being deported by the two sides from the respective sides of the border and the presence of so-called illegal Bangladeshis in India severely affected Bangladesh-India relations since the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) came to power in October 2001. In January 2003, the former Deputy Prime Minister of India, L.K. Advani, announced the deportation of some three million Bangladeshis who were staying illegally in India. Bangladesh condemned the Indian accusation as completely baseless. The government of West Bengal State protested over the deportation of people before having absolute information about their national identities, this protest could not make any impact on the policy of the central government. The Indian authorities finally deported some 213 Bengali-speaking people of disputed nationality terming them ‘illegal migrants’ near Satgachi under Mathabhanga police station in Cooch Behar district, West Bengal, on 31 January. The group of people -- consisting of 68 women and 80 children -- were left in the no man's land for six days as the security forces of both Bangladesh and India refused their admission on the basis of contested nationality. This issue of ‘push-out and push-back’ took India-Bangladesh relations to their lowest point. In the middle of this wrangling between the two countries over the issue of the national identities of the deported people, the stranded 213 people disappeared on 5th February with Bangladeshi and Indian officials making contradictory statements about their whereabouts.

The Indian attempt to push-out Bengali-speaking Muslims into Bangladesh is not the first of its kind. In the year 2003 alone, India made 60 attempts to push thousands of people into Bangladesh from various points on the border²⁰. The issue of trafficking of women and children from Bangladesh in different parts of Asia, through the land border has been another concern in Indo-Bangladesh relations. According to one source, every year more than 15,000 women and children are trafficked out of Bangladesh, whereas over 50 women and children are trafficked out of Bangladesh through land border areas every day.²¹

Another controversial issue has been the counter blames by both Indian and Bangladeshi governments over the issue of patronising anti-Indian and anti-Bangladeshi elements in their respective countries. India has long been accusing Bangladesh for supporting the activities of Pakistan's security establishment and Islamic fundamentalists to provide assistance to the terrorists and insurgents who operate in northeast India. It is often complained that the ‘Pakistani agency was not only using West Bengal as a corridor to the northeastern region where it was supplying arms to the insurgents but the Muslim-dominated border districts of other eastern states were also getting its increasing attention.’²² However, Bangladesh has always maintained the Indian allegation as baseless since India could not provide any material proof of the accusation. However, in January 2004, at a high level meeting between the officials, both India and Bangladesh submitted lists of hostile camps hosted by each other. India produced a list of 194 camps inside Bangladeshi territory used as training camps for anti-Indian insurgents, while Bangladesh produced a list of 39 anti-Bangladeshi camps. In fact, India proposed to Bangladesh in March 2004 to carry out a joint crackdown along and across the border on insurgents, referring to the recent crackdown operation on Indian secessionists that the country undertook with Bhutan, which Bangladesh has rejected.²³

To stop illegal migration of people on Bangladesh-India border, which India perceives as demographic invasion by Bangladesh in the latter's territory, India has started fencing along the international border. Though Bangladesh protested against the Indian move as a violation of international law, India continued with the task and hitherto 1,357 km of the international border has been wire-fenced. India is planning to cover another 2,429.5 km in the second phase. Moreover, India is also planning to illuminate around 300 km of international border to prevent illegal migration. Both countries, however, are studying some proposed measures, including joint patrol in border areas, consular access to prisons and signing of an extradition treaty and have agreed to increase vigil with a view to checking drug trafficking, arms smuggling and trafficking in women and children.

Indo-Bangladesh Trade
Trade relationship between India and Bangladesh is yet another area that has a detrimental effect on bilateral relationship. The geographic proximity factor has made India Bangladesh's biggest trading partner. Bangladesh has a staggering trade deficit of more than one billion U.S. dollars with India²⁴. Bangladesh's imports from India figured US$ 1022 million in fiscal year 2001-02 while its exports to India were worth only US$ 50.28 million²⁵. The trade deficit between the two countries rose more than threefold in the last 10 years. One of the problems in this regard is that Bangladesh can offer only a limited number of export items while India has comparative advantage on a range of commodities. Moreover, informal trade carried out through porous land border between the two countries' also adds to the denial of legitimate customs value for both countries. To avoid such a situation and reduce the trade gap, Bangladesh has long been demanding reduction or abolition of trade barriers between the two countries, which is yet to be considered by India.

The issue of trade-deficit is not confined within the economic sphere only. Due to the specific nature of troubled political relations, trade-deficit has been yet another matter of contention between India and Bangladesh. Along with this issue, the issues of trans-shipment, transit and export of natural gas figure the other contentious issues in Indo-Bangladesh trade relations. While the business community sometimes showed positive response to these issues, political considerations generally overrode Bangladesh's decision with regard to settling these highly debatable issues.

Indian Hegemony as Seen by Bangladesh
The development of Bangladesh-India relations over the last 33 years certainly reflects the prominence of coercive elements in India's hegemonic role in South Asia. As the leading power of the region, India is indeed more prone to realise its domination by keeping diplomatic and military pressure upon the smaller neighbours. In 1988, Nepali decision to buy arms worth US$ 20 million from China bypassing India severely deteriorated Indo-Nepal relations that normalised only in 1990. Nepal's decision is at times referred to as ‘completely rejecting India's security concerns.’²⁶ Same has been India's reaction towards Bangladesh over the way the latter handled its outstanding issues with India. In an interview with a Bangladesh daily newspaper, the former Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha commented that India-Bangladesh bilateral relations have deteriorated due to Bangladesh's insensitivity to India's security. concerns. ²⁷

India's perception of hegemony seriously lacks any attempt to develop long term institutional relationship with smaller neighbours of South Asia. This has been clearly reflected in India's aversion towards multilateral cooperation frameworks like SAARC and lack of reciprocation in trade and economic cooperation with countries like Bangladesh. But as John Ikenberry has identified, the key to establishing a long term and enduring hegemonic order is to develop institutional relations with weaker countries which eliminates the fear of abandonment or domination by the powerful country²⁸. The U.S. hegemony thus relied heavily on security and economic cooperation institutions with its weaker allies. The formation of the NATO or NAFTA stands as its clear evidence. However, U.S.'s complete disregard towards institutions like the United Nations in the post-9/11 era is clearly challenging its acceptance as the world hegemon, which further proves the importance of institutionalisation for enduring hegemony. In a regional context, India's reliance on a coercive hegemonic doctrine, rather than an institutional one, is definitely resulting in discontents on part of the weaker neighbours. This is neither supporting India's long-term goal nor bolstering the weaker states' security. In fact, this parochial concept of hegemony is mostly a result of India's prolonged conflict and competition with Pakistan and China, respectively, which resulted in India's perception of regional relationships as a zero-sum game; any loss of control by India will result in strategic advantage for Pakistan and China.

India's hegemonic security doctrine, therefore, has a significant impact on Indo-Bangladesh relations. On the Indian side, questions have been raised on Bangladesh's antipathy towards India whereas ‘it was India, which brought them independence when the entire western world was against Indian intervention in erstwhile East Pakistan.’²⁹ On the other hand, many have pointed out that India's intervention in East Pakistan was based on ‘certain well-conceived and cogent calculations of its own.’³⁰ The sense of gratitude on part of Bangladesh for India largely evaporated due to the Indian army's involvement in plundering Bangladesh's material resources before its withdrawal from Bangladesh³¹. Therefore, some point out that it is rather a myth to identify that India turned hostile to Bangladesh only after the August coup, 1975, while India's policy maximisation vis-à-vis Bangladesh was always guided by its own self-interest since the early 1970s³². The development of Indo-Bangladesh relations, therefore, was seldom based on perpetual friendship.

This was also observed while Awami League was in power from 1996-2001, though initially India tried to provide Awami League with diplomatic victory by signing the Ganges Water Treaty and withdrawing its support for the insurgents at the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) regions. Also, India minimised the issue of border skirmishes that took place between the two countries in 2001, which many suspect was an act master-minded by pro-BNP elements in the Bangladesh Army to unsettle Awami League's relations with India³³. Even after the warm ties that existed between the two countries at the outset, it is often argued that during the last two years of the Awami League's tenure, a political party considered as pro-India in Bangladesh, given its historic ties with New Delhi while leading the independence struggle, Indo-Bangladesh relations became standoffish³⁴.

The relationship between the two countries reached at its nadir since the beginning of BNP's term in power, a party often termed as pro-Pakistan and marred by India's repeated accusation of Bangladesh's harbouring northeast Indian insurgents and providing logistical support to the fundamentalists and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence's to carry on activities inside Indian territory. The former deputy prime minister of India frequently claimed the majority of Bengali-speaking Muslims residing in India as illegal immigrants coming from Bangladesh. His government also maintained that the Muslims living in West Bengal and other northeast Indian states were mainly Bangladeshi.³⁵

Now the important question is whether the new Congress government in India, in alliance with the Left Front, will make a difference in Indo-Bangladesh relations? The history of bilateral relations suggests that the previous Congress governments during the 1970s and 1980s did not contribute much towards settling the disputes and differences with Bangladesh. Bangladesh's prime minister's congratulatory note to Sonia Gandhi after the election 2004 has already raised questions at the Indian policy makers' level as Bangladesh emphasised on the importance of strengthening both bilateral relations as well as multilateral cooperation through SAARC.³⁶

Unless India changes its approach of hegemony and realises the value of institutional cooperation, it will be difficult to overcome the complexities in two countries relationship. India's commitment towards further institutionalised cooperation in the areas of economy and security with Bangladesh can indeed play an important role in eliminating Bangladesh's fear and dissatisfaction and thus contribute towards a more stable and peaceful neighbourly relationship.

(Lailufar Yasmin is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Her research interests are in gender security, international security and contemporary South Asian issues)

References

1.	‘Akmal Hussain, ‘Geo-politics and Bangladesh Foreign Policy’, CLIO. June 1989, Vol 7. (2) pp. 99-100.
2.	Of this 4,094 kilometres of border, West Bengal shares 2,216 km, Tripura shares 856 km, Meghalaya shares 443 km, Mizoram shares 318 km and Assam shares 262 km.
3.	For example, see Ishtiaq Hossain, ‘Bangladesh-India Relations: Issues and Problems,’ in Emajuddin Ahamed (ed.), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State's Imperative, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: The University Press Limited, 1984).
4.	John Vidal, ‘Bangladesh fears disaster as India plans to divert rivers,’ The Guardian, July 25, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/24/1058853195225.html>
5.