In the present global order, the ways to perceive Europe cannot be appreciated, in South Asia as elsewhere, without reference to U.S. hyperpower. This concept, launched by former French Foreign Affairs Minister Hubert V?rine, offers an overarching definition of U.S. hegemony, not just in military and economic terms, but also in the fields of culture, information, and ideology. This ideology is self-defined as offering to the world what is supposed to be a model of life and society, based upon individual freedom, economic liberalism and consumerism.

The Question of Perceptions
Here start the difficulties, at three levels at least. First, Europe is often seen as being a part of the West, a concept which is too approximate for being always pertinent. But while Europe shares a number of values with USA, some European countries are also seen as not always joining the U.S. bandwagon, and even turning occasionally into strong critics of the way Washington looks at the world, defines its foreign policy and implements it. This was most obvious in the beginning of 2003, when the U.S. and some European allies, particularly Great Britain were preparing the war on Iraq.

Second, Europe is in a state of flux. The construction and the enlargement of the European Union is certainly a major historical event, but its process is still going on. Whatever aspirations European countries may share, the EU is still divided on a number of issues, one of them being the question of its defence and security status. Should Europe build up itself as a full-fledged power, having at its disposal an autonomous military force, or should Europe be just a space of prosperity and democracy, relying upon U.S. power and NATO forces for its security? The debate is on, and public opinion not just political leadership is divided on this point.

Third, when looking at Europe, one must not forget its tradition of active civil societies. Europe is a continent where protest, dissidence, reform, revolution are historical legacies, and various shades of the Left are still part of a scenario where NGOs and non-political activist groups are more and more vocal, addressing problems facing European citizens and migrants, as well as global challenges and regional issues.

The image of 'Fortress Europe', a space of prosperity protecting its economy by tariff and non tariff barriers and trying to control immigration, is only one side of the coin. The opening to the world is the other side of the coin: an opening which is multifaceted, and which includes the quest for markets and investments abroad as much as the concern for human rights and the attention paid to local conflicts.
In other words, a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between Europe and South Asia cannot be complete without referring to the perceptions of the civil societies, at all levels : the perceptions of the common man, who believes too often in clich? developed by a section of the media prone to talk or write about South Asia only when negative developments take place, as well as the perceptions of opinion groups more focussed in their fields of interests, and supposedly better informed, be they NGOs or chambers of commerce assessing markets, opportunities and risks.

No matter how important the role of civil societies could be, the policies of state actors and the game of economic interests remain crucial to the relationship between Europe and South Asia. Here again, complexity prevails, but at the risk of oversimplification, a few parameters can be found particularly significant: the extent of economic relations, the nature of the political dialogue, the matters of controversy, the unmet expectations, and other important questions such as the dichotomy between the European Union as a whole and its member states; the lessons of the Franco-German reconciliation; and the vision of Europe as an hypothetical pillar of multi-polarity.

Economy, Trade and Cooperation
If, at the national level, USA is the first economic partner of South Asia, the European Union as a whole overtakes the U.S. in the field. In 2001-02, the EU absorbed 22 percent of India's exports, and 27 percent of Pakistan's exports, and accounted for 20 percent of India's imports and 17 percent of Pakistan's imports, textile being the first item exported, machinery the first item imported. However, South Asian countries account for a very small share of the EU trade. The biggest South Asian partner, India, is ranked 20th exporter and 22nd importer as far as the EU is concerned (the trade between EU member states excluded): this was no more than 1.2 percent of EU trade with non-EU countries. Pakistan, the second South Asian country in line, ranked 48th exporter and 56th importer. Interestingly, many South Asian countries enjoy a trade surplus with the EU, despite the complaints voiced during the WTO ministerial meeting at Cancun by India, for once joined by Pakistan, against the subventions granted by the EU and by the U.S. to their farmers.

Trade with EU is, therefore, far more important for South Asia than trade with South Asia is for the European Union. This asymmetry characterises the pattern of foreign direct investment as well: the EU is a key provider of foreign investment in South Asia larger than the U.S. but the funds invested (in 2001, US$ 529 million in India, and US$ 119 million in Pakistan) are just a minor part of the total EU investment abroad.

However, such an asymmetry does not prevent European countries and the European Union as such to be major providers of economic cooperation and aid for all South Asian countries, in an extent which is not always clearly perceived, and not always rep orted by the media. There is a lengthy list of issues addressed in most of the South Asian countries, in collaboration with the South Asian governments and as far as possible with representatives of civil societies as well, through cooperation programmes developed in what the EU calls 'Country Strategic Papers': health and family welfare development (including HIV/AIDS), education (primary education particularly), food security, export promotion, norms, standards and quality controls, financial sector modernisation, eradication of child labour, improved governance particularly in devolution of decision making in favour of women and the weaker sections, water supply and sanitation, integrated watershed projects, land reclamation, forestry, preparedness for natural disasters, humanitarian assistance after natural disasters, support to displaced persons. The five year budgets of these EU package programmes are not negligible: 225 million Euros for India, 250 millions for Pakistan, 560 million for Bangladesh.

In addition, some all-Asia schemes financed by the European Union are also implemented in South Asia such as the Asia Urbs Programme in 19 large cities, the Asia Invest Programme for small and medium enterprises, the Asia-IT&C Programme, the Asia-Link for networking higher education institution. The link with civil societies is also developed through specific bilateral programmes, such as the EU-India Economic Cross Cultural Programme dedicated to collaborative projects run by non-profit organisations. The dialogue between European Union and South Asian Universities is also encouraged.

In short, the European Union is not simply promoting its economic interests. Its cooperation with South Asian countries and the emphasis on civil societies and governance whatever their limitations aims at implementing the EU's Asia strategy, which has identified six objectives:

i) Contribute to peace and security in the region
ii) Further strengthen our mutual trade and investments flows with the region and our dialogue on economic and financial policy
iii) Promote the development of the less prosperous countries of the region, addressing the root cause of poverty
iv) Contribute to the protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, governance and the rule of law
v) Build global partnership and alliances with Asian countries, in appropriate international fora, to help address both the challenges and the opportunity offered by globalisation, and to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues like climate change, migration and terrorism
vi) Help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia and vice versa.

Despite its emphasis on dialogue and partnership, such an agenda can obviously be sensitive if implementation goes beyond rhetoric: addressing 'the root cause of poverty' and improving governance may hurt vested interests, and the European Union as well as its members states have to define their external relations in a way to avoid ruffling national sensitivities. A distinction must be made here, regarding where European statements are coming from. The European Parliament, on such sensitive topics as human rights, governance, or rule of law, is often more forthright in statements emanating from its various committees than the executive body of the EU. The Commission and the Council are following the established diplomatic practices and calculations governing official external relations closely. In South Asia, one of the parameters the Commission and the Council would take into account is the Indo-Pak discord, which still defines greatly, if not totally, the paradigm governing the regional system, the limitations of SAARC, and the relationships developed by India and Pakistan with third parties. The 'zero-sum game' logic is discarded, but on the most sensitive issues, such as Kashmir and terrorism, one cannot deal with India or with Pakistan without anticipating the impact it may have on the other side.

Bilateral Dialogues: India's Special Status
We had noted before that in the field of economic assistance and cooperation, Bangladesh was receiving the largest financial support in South Asia (Afghanistan excluded), as defined by the 'Countries strategic papers' negotiated by the EU with each major South Asian country. At the political and geopolitical level, the EU has, however, clearly put India in a class apart when it added it, in 2000, to the short list of countries having with the EU a yearly summit, at the highest political level. The list includes only five other states: USA, Canada, Russia, China and Japan, and offers therefore an interesting image of what could be, as seen by Brussels, the key pillars of a multi-polar world to be joined probably in a not too distant future by a few additional countries, perhaps Brazil and South Africa. In fact, the first EU-India Summit, held in Portugal in 2000, explicitly referred to the partnership of both the participants in 'shaping the emerging multi-polar world'.

This special status granted to India is the direct result of the recognition of India's changing profile: as an emerging economy enjoying a fairly consistent growth rate; as a large market bound to be attracting investment, despite the pace of reforms considered too slow by many investors, injecting more funds in China than in India for the time being; as a booming technology base and services hub for multinational corporations; and finally as a billion plus nuclear country which will inevitably enhance its role in international relations, particularly in the strategic location it enjoys, along the maritime oil route of the India Ocean, close to the sensitive Afghan/Pakistan/Central Asia area, and as a potential counterpoint to China. The concern for Asian stability, a focal element of global security, cannot offer to dismiss India, for positive rather than negative reasons, whatever the discrepancy between New Delhi's official ambitions and India's present limitations.

The EU-India dialogue is comprehensive, addressing all types of issues: economy, trade, security, bilateral relations and also regional and global issues. This high level dialogue, however, is not conducted without differences. Some of them are related to the regulation of international trade (European subventions to agriculture, the question of textiles, etc?. Others are raised by statements emanating from the European Parliament on internal issues such as the Gujarat killings, or by statements made by official representatives of the EU, not totally adhering to the Indian stance on Kashmir (during the third EU-India summit held in Denmark in 2002, for instance).

On Kashmir, the European Commission is as careful as the governments of its member states are. Two months after September 11, 2001 (9/11), during the second EU-India summit held in 2001 in Delhi, the EU and India released a joint declaration against international terrorism, which, without quoting Pakistan, was close to the standard Indian references : 'All states have a responsibility to refrain from providing moral, material or diplomatic support to acts of terrorism, and prevent the use of their territory for sponsoring terrorists acts against other states', a point endorsed by General Musharraf in his 12 January, 2002 speech against jihad, with a caveat, as Pakistan still pledges moral and political support to the struggle of the Kashmiris, defined as a freedom struggle. However, New Delhi is not very happy with the European position, expressed by the EU and its member States.

The point is not so much the call for dialogue emanating from Brussels, Paris, Berlin or London, than a mixed sentiment regarding the European 'official' Kashmir policy if we may call by that name the official statements referring less to Kashmir as such than to the necessity to improve the Indo-Pak relationship. On the one hand, while trying to emphasise the question of 'terrorism in Kashmir' without willing to discuss with third parties the Kashmir issue as such, New Delhi feels that Europe, like the U.S., does not really understand what is happening across the Line of Control in Kashmir, and sometimes during terrorists attacks conducted in other Indian States. On the other hand, New Delhi believes that both the U.S. and the EU have deliberately chosen not to put too much pressure on Islamabad for crushing once and for all the jihadi groups created and nurtured during the 1990s by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). This is not totally wrong, as shown by a look at the EU-Pakistan relationship.

European Union and Pakistan: Tuning the Balance Game?
The present leading European perception of Pakistan starts with the nuclear tests conducted in 1998, but has really taken shape with the military take over of 1999 and with the regional consequences of 9/11. As for the Indian tests, European states have been divided on the open nuclearisation of Pakistan. If the condemnation has been general, the degree and the formulation of the 'regrets' have changed from country to country, France being probably the most open minded perhaps because of de Gaulle's choice of an autonomous nuclear force de-linked from U.S.-led NATO in the name of national sovereignty.

Not that the tests have been accepted without concern by those who did not apply sanctions. The deep mistrust and the conflict prone tradition governing Indo-Pak relations raised serious questions, in Europe as well as in America, as far as the logic of nuclear deterrence was concerned, besides the disturbing challenge of proliferation. Additional concerns were the fragility of Pakistan's democratic life, even under civilian rule, with the military obviously in control of the regional and security policy; and the instrumentalisation of radical Islamist forces, jihadis in Kashmir and Taliban in Afghanistan.

In such a context, the military coup led by General Musharraf after the Kargil fiasco seen as a risky upgrading of a low intensity conflict to a limited war under the nuclear umbrella was received with mixed feelings which, in a way, persist to this day. European States and the European Commission (not to mention the European Parliament) have no sympathy for military regimes, and have called consistently for returning to a regular electoral process bringing back civilians to power. But, contrary to the Indian discourses calling for labelling Pakistan as a terrorist state, the mainstream policy makers have preferred to see in General Musharraf a military leader deserving support, even if with a pinch of salt, more by default than for positive reasons.

The fear of a full-fledged destabilisation of a nuclear Pakistan risking to be eventually 'talibanised', particularly in a fragile economic context, was instrumental but never officially proclaimed in defining a line combining pressure, call for democracy and recognition of the military regime. The assumption was that the Jamaat-i- Islami and consorts, or hard-line officers having a specific vision of what an Islamic Pakistan should do, would have been worse than a general said to admire Kemal Ataturk. Musharraf's immediate answer to the challenge raised by 9/11 comforted this line seeking to keep on the dialogue with a country seen as at risk, and seen also as a potential risk. The main concerns were on the one hand the 'war against terror' and Al-Qaeda (perhaps less than in America however), and on the other hand the possibility of a full-fledged war with India (as much as in America, without Washington's degree of influence).

Such a line could frustrate many sides. In India, many were expecting stronger pressure from Europe upon Musharraf regarding the jihadis operating from Pakistan into Kashmir. In Pakistan, liberals and democrats were expecting clearer statements against military rule. In Kashmir also, the anti-India groups were expecting Europe to issue more focussed statements on human rights and self-determination. In Europe itself, such a line was seen as too benevolent by authors and journalists depicting Pakistan's territory as a hot spot where non-state actors, with or without official connections, play a very dangerous game mixing terror and possible proliferation. That has not prevented European States to acknowledge, when receiving the Pakistani President, after 9/11, his 'unswerving determination to eradicate terrorism', while reminding him that 'the consolidation of democracy, the pursuit of the fight against terrorism and the modernisation of the economy' are a must for the stability and the influence of Pakistan.

A close examination of the European policies during the troubled past few years brings to light a deliberate willingness to follow what could be defined as cooperation with comments. The overall policy of cooperation in the education sector, environmental and gender issues, eradication of child labour, fight against drug abuse, micro finance, trade and business links, financial sector reform and local empowerment, and the increase of the five-year aid budget from 165 to 250 million Euros 'in response to the crisis in the region', express a multi-faceted strategy addressing the structural factors of development and governance, seen as the key to future stability. That did not prevent the European Parliament to be more critical of Pakistan's political developments the nuclear tests, then Kargil, then the military take over, postponing for long the signature of the 'Third Generation Agreement' initialled between Pakistan and the EU in 1998, till the U-turn of Islamabad against the Taliban, which helped to upgrade the cooperation.

The Parliament, however, was then concerned by the evolution of the military rule, and sent to Pakistan a strong delegation to monitor the general elections in October 2002. The observers' conclusions were negative enough for recommending the postponement of the ratification of the Agreement, but the European Commission, on the other hand, decided to encourage the Jamali Government, and launched a series of assistance programmes 'in response to Pakistan's support in the fight on terrorism', and in concordance with the belief that employment, growth, education and social services are the most effective weapon against extremism. The same Commission had been very active, as were the Foreign Ministers of a few leading European countries, in trying to defuse the serious risk of war between India and Pakistan during the first six months of 2002.

Does Europe Count? More Than it Appears...
Seen from outside, Europe is a bit puzzling. In a world where the game of international relations is played mostly by states, and more and more by non state actors as well, the European Union is somehow a new type of political entity. South Asian states, as well as analysts, know how to conduct or to assess bilateral relations with, say, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy or for that matter Poland or Hungary. But how does one deal with or assess the EU, which is more than a regional grouping of the ASEAN type, but not a federation of states with a single central leadership ? In matters related to aid, economic development and grass-root programmes, the cooperation is not too different from the type of relationship established with other international donor agencies except that, as noted, the voices from the European Commission and those coming from the European Parliament are not always exactly the same.

And the European Union, obviously, is much more than a donor agency. The flexible geometry inside the Union might also add to the difficulty to assess it. The launching of the Euro was seen as a major step in establishing the EU as an economic global actor, but all EU members have not adopted the new currency. This structure in genesis, and the division of European countries those already in the EU or those joining it soon on a few much talked about issues, such as Iraq or the draft Constitution, is certainly blurring the image of the Union as a real international power. The EU-U.S. relationship adds to the confusion, for the old perception of the transatlantic linkage, embodied in NATO, still prevails in a number of minds, who believe that whatever be the occasional differences between Europe and America, the first is finally always joining the second, when it is not calling the U.S. forces to the rescue, as European countries did during the Kosovo war.

Other parameters might add to the perplexity. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the European Union is one of the key aid suppliers for rehabilitation and reconstruction in the North and East of the island. Its Conflict Assessment Mission has pleaded for a 'democratic pluralist social order' respecting all ethnic and religious communities, but it is a non-EU European country, Norway, which has mediated between Colombo and the LTTE, whatever will be the result of this mediation. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the European Union was not only supporting the German initiative behind the Bonn conference which defined the post-Taliban transition. The EU is also committing itself financially on a very large scale: one billion Euros have been pledged for the next five years. European troops are also engaged in the International Security Assistance Force, operating under UN mandate and NATO command. But the uncertain fate of Afghanistan seems more dependant from what would be the U.S. policy, apparently more focussed on chasing the resurrecting Taliban forces in the Eastern provinces, than interested in helping to rebuild the country on a sound political basis.

Must we therefore conclude that the European nations are too weak to play a leading role by themselves, and that the European Union acts more in South Asia as an agency dedicated to aid, cooperation, development and trade than as a political and strategic power of magnitude? The answer is more complex than it may appear. First, key European countries cannot be ignored as investors, partners in trade and technology cooperation and defence suppliers. Second, by developing 'strategic dialogues' with some of these European countries, India shows that its rapprochement with Washington is not a full fledged alignment.

After all, as far as post-Saddam Iraq is concerned, India and Pakistan, for different reasons, have declined the American demand for troops, just as France and Germany have done. Sending troops would be considered only under a clear UN mandate, and preferably if an unambiguous demand is articulated by a legitimate new Iraqi government yet to emerge. Third, whatever be the debates, and occasionally the divides, inside the European Union, the very existence of the Union and its expansion from the late 1950s from a steel and coal community to a common market, and from six to 15 and tomorrow, 25 countries, is sending a message which goes beyond the mere statistical data making the EU a key economic power and the third populated entity after China and Russia.

It is correct to underline Europe's difficulties, its setbacks and its shortcomings. But a fair assessment must as well recognise what is at stake in the construction of the European Union. South Asian analysts and decision-makers, might differ on the present role of the EU in world affairs : the 'realists' in India would consider that besides hectoring on human rights and democracy, the EU is shy on applying its principles to the region by putting Pakistan under stress on the issue of jihadis and terror. 'Realists' in Pakistan would return the compliment, and would call for more European pressure on India regarding Kashmir and Gujarat. A section of the 'realists' in India therefore conclude that India's interest is to come closer to America, whose interests converge with most of Indian goals, and whose discourse, under the Bush Administration combines the use of force and the call for democracy. However, both in India and in Pakistan, other analysts would prefer to read differently the Long March of European unity, both internally and externally.

Internally, they would recall how the story of the new Europe, rebuilt from the ashes of the Second World War (with U.S. aid) started with the process of reconciliation launched by two statesmen, French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, deciding that conflict was no more an option for the two countries which have fought three wars in 70 years. Is there, if not a lesson, at least a case to be considered in the light of the Indo-Pak tangle paralysing the take-off of SAARC? Expansion of a politico-economic construct between former enemies from the Middle Ages wars opposing the French and the British to the Cold War times divided Europe along the Iron Curtain is conducted since nearly five decades not through conquest, but through consensus. Should this be under-estimated?

The answer has to make sense with the most recent trends in the reshaping of the world order as per the credo of the neo-conservative U.S. ideologues presently in power. Despite its weakness and its shortcomings, Europe is moving towards greater unity, and will probably give itself stronger tools for assuring a growing autonomy of its forces: even Great Britain is considering a proposal to set up a European united command eventually de-linked from, but not opposed to, NATO. The point is not to define an anti-America agenda per se, but to offer an alternative multilateralism to the 'Project for a New American Century' nurturing George W. Bush's illusion that, unilaterally if needed, the U.S. 'mission' is to be the sheriff and the guide of the world for the benefit of democracy. Certainly, the European Union will not be able, nor will it be willing, to increase its defence budget in order to come close to the whopping US$ 400 billion is spending yearly on that account.

But the way to conduct its dialogue with foreign partners despite some serious divergences, as the WTO last meeting at Cancun has shown; the conviction that the logic of globalisation does not sign the death warrant of assistance and grass-root projects duly negotiated with partner countries illustrate, in fact, the belief that multi-polarity and development are the best ways to ensure global stability.

Such a line, as illustrated by Europe's South Asia policy, is not a panacea, and idealism can only ignore the compulsions of realpolitik at its cost. The member states of the EU, and the EU as a whole, are certainly not idealist actors. They admit compromises on sensitive issues, and they defend also their interests. But the spirit of dialogue and the quest for a balance of power, despite misunderstandings and occasional frustrations, is not lost on South Asian countries, just as the opposed interests in the global competition for employment do not prevent civil societies from Europe and South Asia to increase their interaction. Much more should be done, certainly, but encouraging steps have been made in the right direction.

(Jean-Luc Racine is senior fellow at Centre for South Asian Studies, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and Head of the International Programme for Advanced Studies, Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris.)

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