Introduction
It has often been stated, both by Indian defence analysts and foreigners who survey the Indian security scene, that we in India lack strategic culture. Given the manner in which we have handled national security in the years since we secured independence, it would appear that there is some merit in such a conclusion.

In 1948, as we seemed to be attaining military ascendancy in dealing with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and regaining control over the whole state, the then political masters held back and took the issue to the United Nations. Over five and a half decades since, we continue to pay the price for that decision in the continued loss of lives of innocent civilians as well as security personnel through externally inspired and abetted terrorism in the state. Insurgency in the north-east has been with us for almost five decades, occasioned and sustained as much by initial neglect and callousness, as by subsequent political expediency and ineptness in dealing with the situation. The 1962 war with the Chinese was a supreme example of lack of a coherent national security policy and military preparedness. The gains of the 1965 war in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in the Kargil and Hajipir Pass sectors, were bartered away at the altar of political expediency; the outstanding military achievements in the 1971 war were squandered at Shimla.

The admirable efforts of our scientists enabled the conduct of a nuclear explosion in 1974 but lack of strategic foresight placed nuclear testing in a 'deep freeze', from which we only emerged in May 1998. The consequent inadequacy is only now being discussed in context of our declared nuclear doctrine, dealing with nuclear blackmail, and whether or not we need to conduct further tests. Our commitment of military forces in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s was probably well intentioned but ill-conceived. The jury is still out on the Kargil episode of mid-1999 and the 'Operation Parakram' deployment in 2002.

Lack of Strategic Culture
There are many reasons for what may be construed as lack of strategic culture in so far as our approach to national security is concerned. Prior to independence, the security of the subcontinent was the responsibility of the British; all strategic planning was done in London or Singapore. Our political leadership did not, therefore, have anything to do with this aspect. When they came to power on the strong moral plank of 'non-violence', it was not surprising that military capability and strategic security were furthest from the focus of the Indian political leadership of the time. India was to be an example of moral righteousness in thought and practice. Military strength as an instrument of power was unthinkable.

As a corollary to the democratic structures that evolved on the Westminster model, it was inevitable that civilian authority was to be supreme. But what was constitutionally intended as subordination of the military to civilian political authority was manipulated into making the military subordinate to the civilian bureaucracy as well. It is ironic that even today the military's views and perceptions have to be interpreted to the political leadership by the civilian bureaucracy. No one believes that the military-man's opinion is the final word on the nation's security. Whoever stated that 'war is too serious a business to be left solely to the generals', obviously knew what he was talking about. But the least that our political leadership must ensure is that the views of the military are heard at first hand, and factored into the processes that go into decision making on aspects pertaining to national security.

Under the false notion of the need to maintain secrecy in the conduct of its affairs, the armed forces have remained insulated from the public for too long since Independence. The positive aspect of public confidence in the forces has co-existed with the negative aspect of apathy towards them in the normal course. This insularity is undergoing significant change with a dismantling of the perception that the subjects of 'national security', 'defence' and the 'armed forces' are a taboo. There is an increasing quest for accountability and as a consequence, awareness within the armed forces of the need to accept and encourage transparency and greater public involvement in the management of national security.

Foundations of National Security
For many years after attaining Independence from the British, India appeared to be teetering between possible chaos or disintegration, and achievement of greatness as a nation. Today, one can say with some degree of confidence that the spectre of disintegration is behind us. India is ready to take its rightful place in the comity of nations at the global plane and, more particularly, as a regional power of some significance. To do so it must not only realise the potential it possesses, but also learn to think and behave like a major power and assume the role that others are willing to concede to it.

In the first place, there has to be a serious recognition of the importance our geo-strategic location confers on us. We need to make a realistic survey of where we stand today, and why we are not further ahead than we could (and should) have been, given such a location, size, population and enviable mineral and other resources. Secondly, there should be an urge to achieve the status of a major power within the parameters of accepted international practice.

In this context the enduring democratic traditions we have nurtured and built upon over the years, notwithstanding the many infirmities, are a source of great strength and pride that can provide the impetus. Thirdly, there should be a determination and commitment to provide our people with the quality of life that they can be proud of, and which they truly deserve in terms of economic security. While we can be legitimately proud of the economic reforms that have been introduced and sustained since the early 1990s, it may be useful to remind ourselves that we constitute a market that the industrialised and developed world is focussing on with some considerable enthusiasm. This we must exploit to full material and strategic advantage.

Fourthly, a sober analysis needs to be made of our energy requirements into the 21st century. How much of this would be forthcoming from external sources, and what needs to be done to harness the abundant renewable resources available within the country? Hence, the aspect of energy security assumes significance. Fifthly, the imperative requirement of ensuring that basic social needs like education and healthcare are readily available to all sections of society, namely provision of social security, must be recognised. Sixthly, in recognition of the growing awareness of the importance of the subject, environmental security will assume some significance - in this context the aspects of conservation of forests and harnessing of water resources are of particular significance. Finally, we must determine for ourselves the extent to which we wish to play a role regionally, as well as at the global plane.

All these parameters of vital importance to our recognition, survival and sustenance as a nation can only be effectively addressed in a setting free of tensions and apprehension from external aggression or pressures and internal strife. This means that we must have the military capability to deter any adversary from undertaking an adventure against India. Should such an adventure be undertaken, either by miscalculation or by intent, the adversary must be made to pay a price that draws more than blood and securing of territory - a price in economic terms must also be extracted. This goal can only be achieved if we are militarily strong. Military power is an extension of political power, if exercised judiciously. It is time the political leadership, the civilian bureaucracy and the intelligentsia in India recognised this and applied it to good effect. It is a matter of some satisfaction that the people at large are generally conscious of this fact.

The Dimensions of Conflict
Since a country's strategic perspective is largely dependent on external dimensions, it is necessary to analyse the global and regional forces at work before arriving at political, diplomatic and military options that we need to exercise. In the aftermath of the end of the cold war though, such analyses would still largely be concerned with the security of nation states, moves in the international arena towards demolition of totalitarian structures, greater democratisation and a broadening of the canvas that constitutes security, need to be taken into account. Besides the purely military aspect of territorial integrity, the concept of security now encompasses preservation of political systems, economic and social well-being of the people (namely, human security), preservation of essential energy resources, protection of the environment, including water resources, etc. Military theories are, therefore, being revised and possibly modified.

On the one hand, there is a view that military conflicts between the most advanced and major powers are unlikely because available military technology has made warfare in the classic sense too costly, and in fact, un-winnable. This is so except where the asymmetry is too large as in the case of the NATO operations against Yugoslavia in 1999, and the recent operations undertaken by the U.S. against Iraq. Even in the developing world, conventional war does not appear to be the preferred option. On the other hand, there are some social scientists and futurologists, who are of the opinion that in the 21st century, we are likely to experience war, violence, upheaval and change on an unprecedented scale. Notwithstanding the probability or otherwise of either view, there cannot be much argument that in the foreseeable future, there is unlikely to be any reduction in the current levels of ethnic, religious, theological, and other forms of 'low intensity' conflict.

A report brought out in 1998, by the Worldwatch Institute, titled 'Beyond Malthus' had some startling statistics. The population of India is apparently set to increase to 1,535 million by 2050, making it the most populated nation on earth; at that time, China's population is expected to be 1,517 million, and Pakistan would be the third most populous nation in the world, at 357 million. The pressures on available resources of food, water and so on, are easily deduced. The report stated that: 'As demographic fatigue sets in and the inability of governments to deal effectively with the consequences of rapid population growth becomes more evident, the resulting social stresses are likely to exacerbate conflicts among differing religious, ethnic, tribal or geographic groups within societies…Aside from the enormous social costs, these spreading conflicts could drive countless millions across national borders as they seek safety….'.

This latter aspect has some significance for India, in that, notwithstanding the severe strain on its already meagre resources to meet the demands of its own population, India is host to millions of refugees. When the pressures generated by population explosion and possible demographic movements are coupled with the increase in competition for scarce resources, the risks of conflict in society greatly increase.

One of the features of the century of industrial civilisation has been the almost total dependence on non-renewable sources of energy, namely fossil fuels, mainly oil. There is, therefore, a near inevitability of the possibility of international crises and conflict based on fierce competition for the fast-depleting oil resources on the planet. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the recent operations undertaken against Iraq show that the agenda for conflict in the 21st century will be set by the politics of petrol. During the cold war era, this aspect did not assume such vital significance because the former Soviet Union was self-sufficient in oil. It has since disintegrated and the Russian Federation is struggling to keep its economy afloat.

A major power centre emerging as a rival to the West is the People's Republic of China, now a net importer of oil, which it desperately needs to sustain its economic and military modernisation. Japan is an economic superpower, which is already totally dependent on oil imports. India, which has the potential of becoming an economic and military power of some significance, is also heavily dependent on external sources of oil to meet its energy needs. The scope for conflict to safeguard access to oil resources therefore exists. In addition to the existing oil rich locations in West Asia, the yet untapped reserves of hydrocarbon in Central Asia and the South China Sea will become the focus of attention.

Terrorism, coupled with drug trafficking, has been a source of major concern to many nations including India for some years now. In many cases it has been state sponsored and abetted in pursuit of national policies while in others, by fanatical groups and paid mercenaries to correct perceived imbalances or impositions. But the apparently well organised, well co-ordinated, daring and successful attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 introduced a totally new dimension that immediately had international ramifications. What was considered the impregnable American homeland had been attacked by a group of religious fanatics.

Whereas the attacks were generally condemned in the international community, there were some sections that applauded them as an Islamic response to U.S. global domination and imposition of western values within traditional societies. The war against terrorism immediately assumed global dimensions with the first target being the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The more frightening dimension of such terrorist groups having access to weapons of mass destruction is an aspect that the international community is beginning to address. This dimension was introduced as one of the factors in justification of the unilateral action taken against the Saddam regime in Iraq.

The Global Scene
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, triumphantly proclaimed as a victory of western capitalism had, in reality, shattered a political equilibrium that sustained the international community in the aftermath of the Second World War. Conflict in the cold war period, was centred on posturing in various fields: economic, scientific, technological, and nuclear. There never was any real reason for the two blocs to go to war. Hence, the euphoria that followed the end of the cold war was misplaced. As a result of this, many of the conclusions that the western world arrived at in terms of establishment of a new world order, were smashed to smithereens by the violent conflicts that raged in parts of the former Soviet Union, the Balkans and in Africa.

What needs to be understood and appropriate lessons drawn, is that the end of the cold war is not the end of history; it was the termination of an equilibrium that has in some ways upset a balanced co-relation of historical forces. The familiar bipolar equation having gone and replaced by an oppressive unipolar one with the sole super-power setting its own agenda, the international community is looking for some other form of balance. In this context, it is essential to look at certain trends and developments that may shape the course of events in the 21st century.

At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was thoroughly exhausted; it had suffered an unbelievable 25 million casualties. Its industries and infrastructure were ravaged and bombed out. It, therefore, of all the nations in the world, had the least interest to go to war again so soon. However, its attempts to match the militarisation of the Western Alliance became a ruinous exercise. The real surprise, therefore, is that the economic and internal collapse of the Soviet militarised state should have taken four decades. Under that shadow, Russia appeared to be increasingly taking on the contours of a Germany that surfaced from the Versailles Treaty following the First World War.

There was seething anger and economic discontent; a feeling of deprivation, of loss of prestige and injured ethnic pride. Given Russia's tremendous material resources, the inherent scientific and technological infrastructure and the pride and resilience of its people, it is inevitable that the nation will emerge strong and powerful once again. The speculation can only be how long this will take, and whether this process will generate sparks that may ignite conflict on a large scale.

Concurrently with this resurgence of the Russian Federation, will be the thrust towards a polycentric world order comprising large and medium powers. Whereas in the last few centuries, such an arrangement encompassed the European powers and Japan, the next century may well see a significant shift away from Europe towards the East. The Asian continent can be expected to take its place in the international arena with China, Russia, Japan, and possibly India, joining the U.S. and Europe as the major players. In this configuration, the U.S. will continue to be a dominant economic and military force for much of the 21st century, unless it degenerates under the contradictions of over-reaching itself in trying to run the world on its own. Unified Europe will also continue to be a significant player both economically and militarily; in the latter, as the main component of NATO or another structure like the European Security Defence Initiative.

It is yet to be seen whether the strains that developed over unilateral American actions against Iraq will translate into fissures within the trans-Atlantic Alliance. The Russian role will largely depend on the speed with which it is able to resurrect itself. Japan's economic status and role will continue to be a significant factor. Whether it will militarise remains a speculative issue, dependent on what the Chinese do in the East Asian region including the South China Sea. China's role will be a major determinant. She is already a power of some stature; developing at a fast pace economically and modernising her military with some urgency. Given her requirement of oil for economic growth, it is not inconceivable that she will spare no effort to secure for herself the oil-rich basin of the South China Sea. Equally, her western flank borders on the other known oil reserves of Central Asia, which she will strive to exploit to her advantage.

The Regional Scene
In analysing the security perspective of the South Asian region, the following factors that are a unique feature of the geography of the region, merit particular attention. The most unique aspect is India's sheer size in terms of landmass and population, resources and the consequent dominance. The second is that, of the seven states that constitute the immediate region, India has common borders with all except the Maldives. None of the other states have common borders with each other. The third is that, other than between Nepal and Bhutan to some extent, only India has shared ethnic affiliations with populations of the other nation states. An appreciation of this unique feature is important in evaluating the complex inter-state political and security dynamics.

In so far as the Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan are concerned, the only threat that may be perceived is of some rebel groups, maybe with some external backing, attempting to supplant the existing regimes. Of this, the most serious one at present is the Maoist rebel group operating in Nepal. Hence, any involvement of the other countries of South Asia would possibly be at the request of the legitimate governments, and may take the form of limited military assistance, either jointly, or on a bilateral basis. Should it be the latter, particularly should the request be made to India as happened a few years back, it may be good for the region to have the provision of such assistance endorsed by the other SAARC members.

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has drawn international attention resulting in a cease-fire agreement brokered by the Norwegian Government. Despite many infirmities, the agreement has held for a year and a half despite the temporary withdrawal of the LTTE from the talks in April 2003 and some signs of increasing tensions. With the intense involvement of some powerful members of the international community led by the U.S., Japan and the European Union politically as also in terms of economic assistance, the hope is that the situation will not be allowed to go out of control. Notwithstanding its reluctance to play an overt role as the pre-eminent power in the region, India is being kept fully apprised of the various initiatives by the Government of Sri Lanka as also by the other major players.

The primary concern that has surfaced with regard to Bangladesh relates to reports that some of the terrorist elements that escaped from Afghanistan may have sought refuge in Bangladesh and could be setting up recruiting and training infrastructure. This is an aspect that needs the attention of the international community, particularly in context of reports of similar infrastructure being built up in parts of South East Asia also.

The major source of international concern in the region relates, of course, to the continuing stand-off between India and Pakistan both of who possess nuclear capability. After a period of tension and mutual recrimination, the recent initiative of Prime Minister Vajpayee to enter into a dialogue with Pakistan appears to have provided the impetus to ease the situation on the subcontinent and move the bilateral relations forward in a purposeful manner. That notwithstanding, there are serious reservations in some sections of the international community about Pakistan's role in the sustenance of Al Qaeda and Taliban elements both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself, as also the sponsorship of terrorist activity in India.

India's internal problems persist, but are not debilitating. They are unlikely to result in the Balkanisation of the country as some of her adversaries would hope. Democratic roots, despite many inadequacies, have taken firm hold. With improvements in the lot of the common people, opening up of the economy, and greater accountability of the politicians and administrators being ensured by judicial activism, there is scope for India to attain a stature commensurate with her heritage, size, resources and potential. However, India is faced with a serious demographic problem of large-scale illegal migration from some neighbouring countries. Besides creating serious economic problems, this phenomenon could strain the social fabric in India severely. Hence, it is imperative that India display maturity and understanding in handling relations with the other states in the region.

In the extended region, it is essential that we continue to engage China and work towards mutual understanding and resolution of our border disputes with that country. However, it would be realistic to bear in mind that India and China will inevitably be economic and political rivals in the region. In recognition of that indisputable fact, whereas it would be a futile exercise to try and match China's military capability fully, it would be prudent for India to forge a military capability, including the nuclear dimension, which would deter China from undertaking a military adventure against India.

Myanmar remains an enigma. There is little doubt that the Chinese are attempting to extend their influence into that country to India's disadvantage. However, our efforts to neutralise those efforts must continue in the knowledge that historically, Myanmar has always resisted attempts at dominance. In Afghanistan it is imperative that India resuscitates its traditional links by unqualified support to the Karzai regime in its efforts to rebuild the country, provide an acceptable quality of life to its people and take it back within the fold of the international community. In this, India must coordinate its efforts with Iran and the Central Asian Republics.

India's National Security Options
The factors that could spark conflicts in the 21st century, the international and regional strategic environment, and the dimensions of possible conflicts, are aspects that need the focus of the Indian government and the strategic community in India, in order to assess their impact on the nation's security, economy and the social structure.

The connotations of demographic movements occasioned by the pressures of the population explosion in the neighbouring countries, is already an element that India has had to deal with in the last few decades, in context of the fact that it is host to a few million refugees. However, considering that the population explosion within India itself in the next 50 years, is likely to make it the world's most populated country, it would be stating the obvious that any additions to these numbers by migration from adjoining countries, will cause serious social tensions, economic upheaval, and environmental disaster. The challenge will, therefore, be to put in place appropriate structures to ensure that any migratory movements that may take place are part of mechanisms that are designed to absorb any adverse impact.

The only framework that would appear to lend itself to successful management of this challenge, is the institution of a South Asian Union on the lines of the European Union, with open borders and free trade, economic cohesion, including a common currency, and a cooperative political arrangement that is also answerable to the people of the region as whole. The feasibility of such an option lies in the common strains of ethnicity, culture, tradition, and aspirations of the peoples of the region. Needless to say, for such an arrangement to come into being, a very high order of statesmanship, determination, sagacity, and compromise, are required. India, with its size, geographic location, manpower and material resources, large industrial base, technical expertise, and well-established democratic traditions, will need to be the driving force. The developed world, particularly the U.S., Europe and possibly Japan, could act as a catalyst in this remarkable venture to make it happen.

The assistance that would be required is not in the form of doles (with the inevitable strings attached), but an infusion of investment particularly in the infrastructure sector of the South Asian countries, ready access to advanced technology in industry and agriculture, and more particularly in the exploitation of the renewable energy resources like solar energy, bio-technology, and the ocean bed. A tall order on all counts, but not impossible. Should such an arrangement come about, it would also provide a credible and effective apparatus for the security of the region from external conflict influences, with considerably reduced demands on the countries of the region for allocations for individual defence needs.

India's dependence on oil imports to meet its energy needs, and the fact that two oil rich areas, namely West Asia and Central Asia are in its proximity, has serious strategic implications for the country. Any conflict situation in either or both these areas would almost inevitably have a fall-out that will affect India. Firstly, the flow of oil could be stopped or curtailed, thus severely affecting every sphere of activity in the country. Secondly, the country could get drawn into the conflict, should it get enlarged. India has very close traditional and cultural links with many of the countries of both regions. The primary requirement in this context therefore, is for India to exploit its own oil resources to the extent feasible, but more importantly, to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, and exploit other abundant renewable sources of energy. In a country like India, the scope for extensive use of solar energy is limited only by the degree of determination to harness it.

Similarly, the application of biotechnology to generate energy has equally extensive scope; the fact that large sections of India's rural population are still in the 'bullock cart' age, may not be a bad thing after all. Harnessing the waters of the many great rivers that traverse the subcontinent, for the generation of hydroelectric power, is another area that will need more attention. India's capacity to generate nuclear power is established; it is only restricted by the technology control regimes imposed on it by the western world. Once the dependence on oil as the primary energy source is removed, the scope for the subcontinent to get drawn into any conflict scenario in West Asia or Central Asia is substantially reduced. Even so, it would be strategically prudent to institute arrangements diplomatically and commercially, with countries of West Asia, with whom India has always had excellent relations, to deal with crisis situations that may arise. Similarly, traditional links with countries of Central Asia like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan should be exploited.

While striving to take its rightful place in the international community by giving the right thrust and direction to its internal and external economic and commercial policies, and concurrently ensuring defence preparedness meets her national security concerns, India needs to set her diplomatic sights on affiliations and alignments that will deal with the international strategic environment. All the right reasons exist for durable and mutually satisfying alignments with the U.S. and Europe; provided there is an understanding that India is to be an equal partner, there is no reason why security arrangements cannot be entered into whereby regional or international threats to peace and security are met jointly. India's traditional and time-tested links with Russia must be nurtured, and in fact strengthened; both countries need to be equal partners (together with others, if necessary) in the diplomatic battles towards ensuring a polycentric world order.

In looking for other global and regional affiliations and alignments, it is essential that India shed her propensity for posturing. Japan, Vietnam, and countries like Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia, are natural allies, subject to our ability to garner their support on matters that concern international affairs. All of them, with others in East Asia and South East Asia, as also Australia, are concerned about the emergence of China as a potential super power that could flex its muscles to pursue policies towards total domination of the region. Hence, while pursuing a policy of engagement with the Peoples Republic of China, and seeking a solution to the border dispute, alignments with other countries in the region must be strengthened.

Similarly, close relations, including regional security arrangements, with the Central Asian Republics should be sought and, if brought to fruition, consolidated. Together with Iran, this could prove a decisive factor in stabilising the region. In West Asia, it would be to India's advantage to establish and nurture close links with Israel. On the African continent, there are many countries with which India has strong links; the best arrangement would be to strike alignments with the regional organisations that have been set up. South Africa must be recognised as a significant partner in this venture.

Needless to say, all these alignments and affiliations, or security links, would carry greater conviction and credibility if the South Asian region acted as one entity; that is the hope that will secure for the region the ability to concentrate on efforts directed towards the well being of its peoples.

Military Preparedness
In context of the global and regional environment and the national security responses discussed in preceding paragraphs, appropriate strategic measures and military preparedness need to be put in place. A viable military strategy in the current context should necessarily be one of deterrence, both conventional as well as nuclear, based on a credible military capability. The aim being prevention of war or adventurism by an adversary. Such a military capability must allow the Indian political and military establishment the option of waging a war that may be forced upon us by an adversary on one front, while ensuring a credible defensive capability on a second front. If a war is forced upon us, our armed forces should be able to prosecute it in such a manner as to achieve pre-determined objectives bearing in mind the need to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold.

Prosecution of a short and intense war, limited in scope and extent, would appear to be the option to be exercised. In doing so, the requirement to contain the internal dimension of terrorist attacks against military lines of communication, logistics infrastructure and the civilian population in order to c