India and Pakistan moved
more effectively in the
direction of bilateral
normalisation in the year
2004. On the Indian side
there was general approval
of the initiative taken
by Prime Minister Mr Atal
Behari Vajpayee to pursue
peace talks with Pakistan.
The hawks kept their rhetoric
in check for fear of becoming
unpopular. This 'positive'
factor however did not
swing the 2004 Indian
election in favour of
the BJP alliance; yet
people also did not vote
the government out because
it had begun to normalise
with Pakistan. In Pakistan,
President Pervez Musharraf
was encouraged to pursue
his policy of normalising
with India by the positive
response of the general
public. Normally such
a response is difficult
to gauge, but during the
Indo-Pak cricket series
in Pakistan, it was so
palpable that the Pakistani
hawks could not deny it.
The
Congress Party has felt
an initial series of
jolts while settling
into the groove created
by BJP's Pakistan policy.
Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh has retreated
into his inscrutability
after one rather tentative
statement; and Foreign
Minister Natwar Singh
has fallen defensively
back on the admission
that border readjustments
were possible with Pakistan
if the latter would
show the kind of flexibility
on Kashmir it promised.
As if on cue, President
Pervez Musharraf has
reached out for his
primer on sustainable
ambiguity after another
sally on 'core issue'
Kashmir in May. In India,
the popular sentiment
for normalisation has
surged after the BJP
interregnum. The private
sector economy has new
muscle which the Congress
must recognise and see
Pakistan, not as America's
Cold War Trojan horse,
but as a transit country
that will play an ancillary
role to India's economic
self-image at the global
level. There are some
'reconstructed' Congress
personalities that bid
fair to take the centre
stage in the days to
come and push this view.
The
high point in the new
bilateral process came
in the January 6 Indo-Pak
Joint Statement during
the 12th SAARC summit
in Islamabad in which
the two sides pledged
to hold talks on all
bilateral disputes,
including the Kashmir
issue1. The 'composite'
dialogue was to begin
in June 2004 with a
foreign secretaries'
meeting as the first
step in the negotiating
spiral that was expected
to drag out incrementally
over a protracted period
of time. Meanwhile,
normalisation was to
be allowed to go ahead,
a break from the past
Pakistani position of
making normalisation
conditional to a substantial
breakthrough on Kashmir.
Ceasefire on the Line
of Control (LoC) in
Kashmir was enforced
and was held, which
meant normalisation
of daily life in the
Neelam Valley in Azad
Kashmir and an end to
expenditure of extra
funds on mobilisation
along the regular border.
Pakistan's need for
this respite was signalled
by the fact that it
did not react negatively
to the fencing of the
LoC by India while it
was discussing the bilateral
process with Pakistan.
Old travel routes between
India and Pakistan were
reopened and new ones
promised and there was
a general agreement
that this level of 'openness'
in allowing normalisation
of relations had not
happened before and
that this time the peace
overtures between the
countries were for real.
Unpressured from the
security establishment,
the businessmen of Pakistan
appeared less scared
of freeing the bilateral
trade with India.2
Durability
of India's New Self-perception
What propelled the two
states to move so realistically
towards normalisation
in 2004? What are the
chances of this normalisation
leading to the resolution
of disputes that have
bred so much hostility
between the two over
the past 57 years? Are
there fundamental changes
in the self-perception
of the two that now
require a readjustment
in the bilateral equation?
Is there a strategic
'revision' of objectives
on both sides and is
it planted deep enough
within the establishments
on both sides to endure?
Are there 'external
persuaders' in this
phase of unprecedented
bilateral optimism and
how effective and permanent
are they supposed to
be? What about the hardline
proponents of the old
assumptions of ideological
stasis between the two
states and the ability
of these elements to
refer successfully to
the overwhelming jurisprudence
of past hostility? How
realistic is the possibility
of rulers on both sides
abandoning the exercise
of 'ambiguity' and slipping
back into the politically
'safe' and 'unambiguous'
condition of bilateral
deadlock?
A vague compulsion for
normalisation and settlement
of disputes has been
felt time and again
by India and Pakistan
after the signing of
the Simla Agreement
in 1972. How the process
that emanated from this
compulsion unfolded
in the past 30 years
depended on the relative
economic and military
strength on both sides,
including strength derived
from international support.
General Zia-ul-Haq,
involved in running
a strategically important
jihad in Afghanistan
against the Soviet Union,
tried 'cricket diplomacy'
with India to keep the
eastern frontier quiet
but intervened in the
uprising in East Punjab
on the sly as a part
of the same policy3.
Had the Kashmir uprising
taken place then, he
would have sent in the
mujahideen into Indian-administered
Kashmir, depending very
much on the bulk of
trained jihadis till
then. After the end
of the Cold War, India
focused more on its
strategy of regional
dominance and moved
towards Islamabad to
oust America's growing
influence there. Inside
Pakistan the resistance
to normalisation within
the military-bureaucratic
establishment was overwhelming
in the 1990s. International
pressure for a bilateral
thaw and Pakistan's
own unprecedented economic
decline persuaded both
the mainstream parties,
Benazir Bhutto’s
Pakistan People’s
Party and Nawaz Sharif’s
Pakistan Muslim League
(N) to think of defusing
tensions with India.
Both were alternately
ousted from power.
Beginning
with the year 2000,
Pakistan and India seem
to have accepted a revision
in their self-perceptions;
India triumphantly as
the status quo power
and Pakistan somewhat
dangerously as a rebuffed
revisionist state. In
India the pacifist recommends
generosity towards Pakistan
in the interest of an
increase in the regional
and global status of
India, backed by an
economic take-off indicated
by high growth rates.
The aggressive strategist
recommends a diffusion
of focus on Pakistan
in favour of tying up
with the global power(s)
and thus becoming a
military power that
no one in the world
including Pakistan can
ignore. Both think that
India has neglected
to realise its potential
as a power among global
powers, that it has
been guilty of a strategic
'under-stretch' and
it can only transcend
its strait-jacket of
a regional state by
ending its neighbourhood
entanglements.
The
pacifist strategist
in India is exemplified
by nuclear physicist
C Raja Mohan who thinks
that India has now made
its break with its socialist
past final and is looking
forward to cooperation
with the west, in general,
and the United States,
in particular. The plank
on which the new relationship
would be reared is democracy.
The new partnership
would be in the realm
of thought rather than
political expediency,
in the 'Enlightenment
project' that underpins
western values than
in the balance of power
politics in a region
where China is to be
countered. Europe, where
the nation-state is
in decline, is not the
arena where India is
to make its play, but
at the global level
where America still
follows raison d'etat
as the organising principle
of world politics recognised
by states like Pakistan
too, tackling with such
Hobbesian states as
Somalia and Afghanistan
where everyone fights
with everyone else.
‘The
unexpected support from
New Delhi to the Bush
Administration's controversial
positions (on war on
terrorism and doctrine
of pre-emption) is reflective
of a new India that
is breaking out of its
past and struggling
to find a new set of
organising principles
for its foreign and
national security policy.
The new Indian approach
to world affairs comes
on top of a steady evolution
of Indian security thinking
through the 1990s. Just
as Europe is moving
away from the ideas
that shaped its earlier
interaction with the
world, India's internal
positions too have evolved
amidst fundamental change
at home. No wonder then,
at the very moment when
Europe proclaims that
power politics are passé,
India is beginning to
de-emphasise the notion
of collective security
and to stress the importance
of comprehensive strength
and balance of power.
At a time when Europe
dismisses the notion
of national sovereignty
as the basis of dealing
with global issues,
India is committed to
strong defence of the
concept'.4
Raja
Mohan is the Indian
intellectual, in the
mould of K. Subrahmanyam,
whom the Americans used
as a channel of communication
with the BJP government
to signal their change
of attitude, but a more
important person in
terms of penetration
into the institutional
thinking of India is
Bharat Karnad who wrote:
'Recently, Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee
surprised many by talking
about ‘New unexpected
threats…constantly
emerging in the neighbourhood’
to an audience of the
heads of police, para-military
and Intelligence agencies
without once attributing
terrorism in Kashmir
to Pakistan. A day later
in his inaugural speech
to the Annual Combined
Armed Forces' Senior
Commanders' Conference
in New Delhi, the PM
shook up many more by
choosing to not delve
(sic!) at all on Pakistan
as any kind of threat
-- strategic, theatre-level
or even tactical. A
sensible case has been
made for many years
now that for India to
pack credibility as
a would-be great power
requires it to act its
weight and size and
to see Pakistan for
what it is, not a threat
but a strategic nuisance.
And that, to continue
to fixate on Pakistan
is for India to acquiesce
in Islamabad's paring
India down to its size
and for New Delhi to
wilfully engage in India's
‘strategic reduction’.
The Indian government
apparently has got round
to accepting this rational
assessment of what India's
policy should be. Indeed,
and this may be the
most far-reaching measure
of all in terms seeding
a more rational policy
mind set, foreign service
officers are being penalised
(in terms of extension
in service and promotion)
for excessive anti-Pakistan-ism!
(The new mindset) reflects
India's growing self-confidence
based on two trends:
the quiet satisfaction,
on the one hand, with
the underway programme
of thermonuclear and
nuclear weaponisation
and long-range missile
development coupled
to the encomiums India
has gathered from its
growing reputation for
‘responsible’
nuclear state behaviour.'5
Pakistan's
Post-jihad Realism
On the other hand, Pakistan
has been made to feel
that its two decades
of jihad have forced
it to commit the error
of a strategic 'over-stretch'.
It has neglected its
economy during the 1990s
when it was busy pursuing
'strategic depth' beyond
its borders. As Pakistan
endured its worst years
in relation to its economy,
India pulled out of
the trough of its 'Hindu
rate of growth' and
started attracting the
attention of the world
as a state of great
economic potential.
As luck would have it,
in the aftermath of
the Kargil Operation
in 1999, the army itself
was ruling in Pakistan
when the articles of
new strategy were read
out to Pakistan. After
the 9/11 incident, which
saved Pakistan from
the disastrous consequences
of its 'strategic over-stretch'
of the 1990s, these
lessons were driven
home through the instrumentality
of the UN Security Council.
President Pervez Musharraf
discovered that the
policy of low-intensity
conflict with India
(jihad) and 'highlighting'
of the Kashmir issue
through war had not
only isolated Pakistan
in the West because
of its subliminally
blackmailing aspects,
it had also alienated
the Islamic states that
had been paying lip-service
to the Kashmir jihad.
He was shocked to discover
that there was a Saudi-led
move inside the OIC
to accept India as a
full member of the organisation.6
The
changed situation has
forced some rethinking
in Pakistan, understandably
not among the official
organs of strategic
expression because of
the shift of paradigm
implied in it and the
fear of a public interpretation
of it as a 'defeat'.
Pakistani writer on
strategy Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
wrote recently: 'The
most noticeable feature
of the design of Pakistan's
security perception
is its rather simplistic
linearity that identifies
security and national
interest mainly as response
to an external threat…Interestingly,
such a view is held
despite the fact that
Islamabad itself is
keen on pursuing its
interests without creating
space for others. Such
an orientation, in turn,
has led to an approach
based on two opposing
ends of the spectrum:
confrontation punctuated
by short spells of rapprochement,
and seeking extra-regional
partnerships that could
provide Islamabad with
relative strength to
counter its traditional
adversary. In other
words, the continuously
high threat perception
has resulted in either
producing confrontational
linkages or alignments
that have been sought
by design primarily
to offset problems of
military inferiority
versus its main adversary
India. Hence, Islamabad's
alignments have never
been proactive and,
in fact, have been limited
to seeking military
or diplomatic assistance
that could bolster Pakistan's
position vis-à-vis
New Delhi…Pakistan
has never ventured to
extend its security
vision beyond India.
In fact, Islamabad's
view of the entire world
appears simplistic with
the world divided between
states that are considered
important for their
ability to provide any
direct or indirect help
in strengthening Pakistan
against India and those
that are of no relevance
in this regard. Or to
put it in another way,
from the Pakistani establishment's
perspective the international
community comprises
two categories: states
that are friendly to
India and are part of
the opposite camp, or
those whose friendship
must be sought for beefing
up Islamabad's military-strategic
position versus India.
Unfortunately, it is
this posture that contributed
towards the peculiar
makeup of Pakistan's
Afghan policy and later
in framing the response
towards the U.S. post-9/11.'7
On
the economic front,
the Pakistani business
community appeared less
'mercantilist' on the
subject of free or liberalised
trade with India in
2004. The pro-free trade
point of view, suppressed
during the chaotic ISI-dominated
1990s, was now allowed
to express itself. A
highly rated Pakistani
economist, who will
not be named, recommends
that Pakistan change
its policy of withholding
the granting of Most
Favoured Nation (MFN)
to India as a first
step towards eventual
free trade under SAARC.
He states: 'The gains
from MFN trade with
India are substantial.
All consumers -- Pakistanis
and Indians -- will
be unambiguously better
off. More goods means
variety and competition
among sellers and this
always works to the
consumers' advantage.
The government will
be better off because
legalised trade will
generate tax revenues
now lost to smuggling.
Framers will also benefit
because fresh produce
would be marketed in
towns and cities across
the eastern borders.
Competitive and efficient
manufacturers will gain
because access to the
much larger Indian market
will lower costs. Inefficient
and subsidy-dependent
manufacturers will lose
out and they will fight.
They will raise the
flag and/or will appeal
to religion, even Kashmir,
to protect their monopoly-ridden
gravy train. But they
are a tiny minority
compared to the beneficiaries
and their whining must
be taken in stride.
Liberalising trade with
India will create up-country
points of economic growth
and this is also good.
In time, Lahore will
re-emerge as the centre
of commerce and finance
serving many cities
across the border. A
soft border in Kashmir
will create another
growth centre in the
north-east heralding
an era of peace and
prosperity that Kashmiris
so badly need'.8
The
'Deniable' American
Factor
Those observers who
place a lot of premium
on the American factor
in South Asia, think
that the current process
of normalisation is
a part of India's own
final reconciliation
with the United States,
as indicated above in
C. Raja Mohan's comment.
New Delhi began to get
rid of its 'third world-ism'
and other isolationist
doctrines of the Non-Alignment
Movement in the 1990s
as a part of its foreign
policy during the 1990s.
Its Nehruvian socialist
paradigm was also at
an end in this interregnum.
It was rewarded for
this turn in foreign
policy by America when
President Clinton visited
India in 1990 and offered
India 'strategic partnership'
through membership in
the Community of Democracies
programme, pointedly
ignoring Pakistan where
General Musharraf had
just ousted the democratically
elected government of
Nawaz Sharif. Clinton
had earlier defused
the tense situation
in South Asia by getting
Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif to call off the
Kargil Operation, an
event that exacerbated
an already strained
relationship between
the Pakistani army chief
and the Pakistani Prime
Minister after a 'normalising'
visit by Indian Prime
Minister Vajpayee to
Lahore the same year.
However,
the American tilt, before
it could prove damaging
to Pakistan, was 'corrected'
in favour of Pakistan
by the terrorist attacks
in New York and Washington
on 11 September 2001.
America had to accept
Pakistan as a crucial
ally against Al Qaeda.
The Bush administration
had to keep the Indo-Pak
front peaceful to achieve
success in its anti-terrorist,
anti-Al Qaeda mission
in Afghanistan. To allay
fears in New Delhi,
it offered significant
concessions to India
on Kashmir: it accepted,
together with the European
Union, two general elections
in Indian-administered
Kashmir as fair, and
clearly switched off
its earlier support
to an 'independent'
Kashmir. India, while
verbally rejecting any
third-party mediation
resorted repeatedly
to 'facilitation' by
the United States in
its relations with Pakistan.
It was also made to
realise the efficacy
of American leverage
on its economy when
it was made to withdraw
its troops from the
Pakistani borders in
2003 after a wholesale
withdrawal of foreign
corporate presence from
the Indian soil. The
pro-peace captains of
the private sector economy
in India grew in influence
with New Delhi in this
period.
President
Pervez Musharraf had
to adjust to the changing
situation. He had stubbed
his toe in 2001 at the
bilateral summit in
Agra while vacillating
between his 'flexibility'
thesis and his popular
posturing for the primacy
of Kashmir in the agenda
of bilateral talks.
Prime Minister Vajpayee
eventually failed to
meet the challenge because
of infighting within
his own cabinet over
how far India could
go in accommodating
President Musharraf's
overture9. Both sides
had to be ambivalent
over Kashmir: President
Musharraf had to appear
not to be giving up
on the old Pakistani
stance on Kashmir, while
Prime Minister Vajpayee
had to keep his real
Kashmir cards hidden
from public view so
as not to betray the
all-party Lok Sabha
consensus on Kashmir
reached in 1994. There
was some 'wiggle-room'
for both. Musharraf
knew that the bilateral
nature of the UN resolutions
on Kashmir was no longer
relevant as the people
in Pakistan had gradually
accepted a third party
in the dispute: the
Kashmiris. He put forward
the safe formula of
a solution acceptable
to all the 'three' parties
on Kashmir and went
to the extent of saying
that he could even 'go
beyond' the UN resolutions
on Kashmir.
Post-BJP
Jolts
The change in government
in New Delhi has rocked
the boat of Indo-Pak
normalisation. First
Prime Mnister Manmohan
Singh was forced to
articulate his objection
to putting Kashmir forward
by President Musharraf
as the core issue: he
stated that India would
go forward in peace
talks with Pakistan
as long as they did
not include changing
the borders and holding
a plebiscite in Indian-administered
Kashmir. (One must keep
in mind the Congress
belief that Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
had promised conversion
of the cease-fire line
in Kashmir into an international
border at Simla in 1972.
This belief now makes
at least one subtext
of the policy on Simla
Agreement.10) What had
remained unexpressed
under Vajpayee was now
clearly asserted. Had
the Joint Statement
not been provided a
self-serving gloss by
President Musharraf
in his statement --
that he would not be
a part of the peace
process if Kashmir was
not accepted as a core
issue -- there was enough
ambiguity in the document
to allow the process
to go on under Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh.
Foreign
Minister Natwar Singh
was also given opportunity
by this 'breaking of
cover' to invite Pakistan
to follow the model
of India normalising
relations with China
without first deciding
the territorial dispute
dating from the 1962
Sino-Indian war11. Will
India and Pakistan start
going back to the old
conflictual pattern
in the days to come?
Is India under Congress
no longer a state conscious
of its 'under-stretch'
and ambitious to become
a global player after
'disentangling itself
from its neighbourhood
problems'? Does President
Musharraf really have
the option of returning
to jihad if India doesn't
budge under Congress,
especially as the militias
he would have to mobilise
for jihad in Kashmir
have tried to kill him?
12
The
Congress was just climbing
out of its Cold War
world view when its
handling of the Babri
Mosque incident in 1992
severely challenged
its monopoly on power
in India. The era of
coalitions that dawned
on India shattered a
number of Nehruvian
myths. Congress saw
BJP make its pitch successfully
against socialism as
the embedded creed of
Indian democracy and
boldly revised the global
outlook formed during
India's location within
the Soviet bloc. India
is no longer the same
state in 2004. The ideologues
of Congress have to
pick up the threads
where they had let them
drop after the tragically
shortened tenure of
Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi. India no longer
perceives Pakistan to
be a threat the way
it did during the Cold
War and has now to deal
with nuclear deterrence
in the region. Indian
secularism's paranoid
side has to go if it
has to stand up to the
bold revisionism of
Hindu nationalism. The
world dislikes BJP's
religious ideology but
if it has to weigh it
against the old hang-ups
of the Congress, it
will easily plump for
the BJP again.
There
are many in both India
and Pakistan who want
the détente to
continue and deliver
positive results in
the end. India's Praful
Bidwai attempts to explain
why the Congress and
its allies will have
to stick with the process
of dialogue with Pakistan:
'There
are at least three reasons
for taking Natwar Singh's
statement (in favour
of détente) seriously.
For one, Singh never
talked of the Simla
agreement by itself.
He also said that India
is committed to all
the post-Simla agreements
and declarations, including
Lahore, and the January
6 joint statement by
Prime Minister Vajpayee
and President Pervez
Musharraf. For another,
Singh's emphasis on
some particular aspects
of past agreements and
understandings between
India and Pakistan does
not devalue, leave alone
negate, the recent solemnly
agreed framework for
a ‘composite dialogue’
on all subjects, including
Kashmir. That framework
abides. And for a third,
the totality of the
UPA government's official
views and statements
on a dialogue with Pakistan
takes precedence over
Singh's emphasis, nuances
or preferences. That's
how foreign policy has
been made and implemented
in India, especially
on vital matters like
peace with Pakistan.
Or else, it would be
hard to explain why
India did not obstruct
Pakistan's return to
the Commonwealth and
its entry into the ASEAN
Regional Forum, which
too has been a subject
of bitter contention
since even before the
NDA/BJP came to power.
Clearly, the foreign
policy establishment
has changed its basic
stance and posture towards
Pakistan, from a confrontationist
to a cooperative one.
This is a wise move.
It is even more noteworthy
that as soon as he was
sworn in, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh emphasised
normalisation of relations
with Pakistan as a key
priority for his government.
The UPA, it is important
to remember, cannot
be reduced to the Congress
party or a collection
of old-fashioned politicians
mired in suspicion of
Pakistan. The alliance
is the result of an
embryonic new social
coalition between many
underprivileged strata,
which do not carry that
ideological baggage.'13
Reprieve
from 'Official' Nationalism?
There is no denying
that for the pessimist
there is much to go
on. It is difficult
to make a case in favour
of a continuing détente
on the basis of what
the politicians may
say. There is a dangerous
lack of political consensus
in Pakistan on virtually
all issues. One central
sticking point in this
atmosphere of dissension
is Pakistan's acceptance
of 'American dictation'
by the Pakistan army.
Significantly, the resolution
of the Kashmir issue
under 'changed conditions'
forms one important
element of this 'dictation',
as opinion-makers in
Pakistan would have
the people believe.
Kashmir is also the
central plank in Pakistan's
national consensus,
firmed up through years
of the army's paramountcy
as allowed by Pakistani
nationalism. The unspoken
agenda of the army has
been India’s defeat
and reclamation of Kashmir.
Pakistan has lost national
consensus for many reasons,
the major one being
its inability to defeat
India within a reasonable
period of time. The
time for revision of
Pakistani nationalism
has arrived without
a matching domestic
intellectual ability
to revise. In this intellectual
wasteland, Musharraf
is the best bet for
both Pakistan and India.
The state in Pakistan
no longer believes that
the nation can go on
seeking India's defeat
-- not even through
jihad or hoping that
India would somehow
collapse by itself for
following the flawed
doctrine of secularism.
The state wants to purge
the early consensual
folly of adopting the
formula of palpable
external threat. It
wants to replace the
threat-of-India theory
with a more realistic
economic dream. It wants
to 'rationalise' India
to be able to live alongside
it. But the doctrinal
demons it released earlier
in its history refuse
to exorcise. For once
the state, as moulded
by the military-bureaucratic
establishment in Pakistan,
is right; and civil
society, as led by the
politicians, is wrong.
In
India and Pakistan,
a reference to external
pressure implies that
the two states are incapable
of freeing themselves
from manipulation by
the global power(s).
One hopes that for whatever
reason, both India and
Pakistan will stick
with the composite dialogue
and allow further normalisation
without demanding interim
'results' according
to their separate wish
lists. An incremental
approach is possible
because of popular support
for it on both sides.
This incremental process
can be assisted by a
bilateral willingness
to agree on big projects.
For instance, Pakistan
will forget its coyness
about Kashmir if India
agrees to the Iranian
gas pipeline project
which allows Pakistan
an attractive transit
fee in return for a
number of internal changes
that it has not yet
calculated. For once
Pakistan, with its imagination
fired by the economic
significance of the
project, will shift
focus from the primacy
of the issue of Kashmir
that India finds inconvenient.
India's petroleum minister
Mani Shankar Aiyer,
who is said to favour
the Iranian pipeline,
will know fully well
what the pipeline means
in the context of the
bilateral talks.14
The
way India and Pakistan
have interacted after
the withdrawal of the
Indian troops from Pakistan's
borders in 2003 points
to the possible 'meta-structure'
of the talks expected
to begin in July 2004.
Prime Minister Vajpayee's
initiative with Pakistan
was pleasantly hijacked
by the atmospherics
released by the visit
of the Indian cricket
team to an already positively
conditioned Pakistan.
Well-timed announcements
of fresh opening of
communications disarmed
the people and forced
the hawks to tone down
their rhetoric. Such
announcements from the
Indian side must continue
even as India engages
in the closed-door composite
dialogue at various
levels. It has been
assumed in Pakistan
that this dialogue will
not come to a quick
conclusion; it is also
understood that while
a discussion of the
Kashmir issue would
be initiated along with
other issues, Pakistan
will not insist on 'meaningful'
progress on it as it
has in the past. Peripheral
issues, like the up-river
water projects by India,
or even Siachen, can
actually be used to
keep the public on board
in Pakistan and to relieve
pressure from President
Musharraf. India must
use the peripheral issues
to defuse the situation
and keep up the atmospherics
in return for a soft-pedalling
on Kashmir.
What
should the Congress
Party do in the months
to come to save the
current halcyon period
from returning to the
more comfortable state
of hostility of the
past? It is important
that it make up its
mind quickly about how
it is going to handle
the composite dialogue.
Foreign Minister Natwar
Singh's disastrously
unimpressive outing
in BBC's 'Hardtalk India'
on 11 June 2004 made
it clear that the ruling
coalition had not yet
decided how to handle
Pakistan after BJP.
The truth is that it
is the Congress Party
which has to make up
its mind; most of the
smaller partners in
the coalition are either
too regional to care
or already too left
of the big party with
regard to relations
with Pakistan. The party
must consider that the
reward for offering
a soft front to Pakistan
and making unilateral
concessions on the marginal
but high-profile issues
like the Baglihar Dam,
is a long-drawn-out
discussion on Kashmir
at the official level
without Islamabad getting
jumpy over it. The big
gestures that might
follow will disarm Pakistan,
especially in its current
mode of 'economic imagination'
after a period of 'jihad
fantasy', that is, switching
from using the collective
imagination based on
conquest through jihad
to using it to create
an economically viable
Pakistan that can actually
compete with India.
Both kinds of imagination
spring from Pakistan's
realisation of its geopolitical
location.
From
Jihad to Economic Imagination
If Pakistan can embark
on the building of another
deep-sea port at Gwadar
while its two Karachi
ports are under-utilised,
one can gauge the intensity
of its 'economic imagination'
behind the Iranian gas
pipeline project. It
realises that in many
ways, and in particular
in terms of finances,
the pipeline would be
more feasible. While
Gwadar relies on a number
of accounting variables,
the 'transit fee' from
the pipeline has a way
of appealing directly
to the mind in Islamabad
and the general Muslim
imagination. A go-ahead
from New Delhi will
have an incalculably
positive effect on the
tenor of composite talks.
After that Pakistan
will have to concentrate
its mind more on the
internal transformation
required in Balochistan
than on Kashmir.
There
was a time in the mid-1990s
when Pakistan too thought
that the pipeline could
be 'milked'. It then
supposedly had the upper
hand in Kashmir and
its hawks used the gas-into-bullets
argument, that is, 'if
gas is supplied to India,
its economy will boom
and allow it to buy
more bullets with which
to kill the Kashmiris'.
But the Indian economy
boomed thereafter and
the areas of boom required
energy that India's
heavily subsidised power
sector simply could
not supply. At the same
time, Pakistan had come
under pressure from
dubious contracts made
by a Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP) government
with foreign power supplying
companies. The power
tariffs were hiked up
on top of excess capacity.
India and Pakistan thought
for some time that they
could trade in electricity,
but political hurdles
came in the way and
no deal could be made.
Now in 2004 the Iranian
project has gained economic
salience as oil prices
touch the US$ 40 mark
in the international
market. India and Pakistan
both need to increase
their power generation
and to start producing
electricity through
gas-fired plants.
The
economists in India
say that there is no
alternative to the Iranian
gas pipeline even if
somehow New Delhi convinces
everyone that Pakistan
will shoot itself in
the foot and turn off
the gas to India in
times of Indo-Pak confrontation.
(Another report also
proved that India would
not be really hurt if
Pakistan did actually
turn off the gas). India
needs gas in the western
part of its territory
where the load-shedding
routine has grown over
the years. The only
gas available to it
is located in the eastern
part of Bangladesh,
which would have to
be piped across a difficult
terrain equally not
secure against terrorist
attacks of the sort
feared in the case of
Pakistan15. As India
weighs its options,
it becomes more and
more convinced that
the over-land Iranian
pipeline would be more
