Introduction
Both India and Pakistan are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite the two countries long being considered to be on the threshold of a nuclear weapon capability, India and Pakistan never overtly challenged the NPT regime by claiming to be nuclear powers before May 1998. When it carried out a nuclear explosion test in May 1974, India announced it as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' and later, reiterated that it had not weaponised the explosive device. However, by conducting nuclear tests in mid-May, 1998, India became the first nation to declare a nuclear weapon capability in almost three decades. Pakistan, which has been confronting India since its birth in 1947, followed suit in the end of May 1998, and became the second nation to declare nuclear weapon capability.

This paper first explores India and Pakistan's motivations for developing nuclear weapons. It subsequently discusses possible impacts on the NPT regime and East Asian security environment, brought about by India and Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons. Lastly, the paper deals with ways to narrow the role of nuclear weapons, thereby, making them less threatening to international peace and stability.

Motives for India and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon Development
India's development of a nuclear weapon capability was gradual and reactive. The immediate impetus for India's development of its nuclear weapons can be found in its defeat in the 1962 Indo-Chinese border war and China's successful nuclear test in October, 1964.¹ Although India, which is acknowledged to be a major Asian power, long rivaled China for the leadership of regional affairs as well as of the non-aligned movement, it suffered defeat in the Indo-Chinese Himalayan border clash in 1962. In addition to this, China took the lead in developing nuclear weapons and succeeded in detonating its first nuclear weapon in October, 1964. It is not surprising that India felt bitter at China's success of nuclear weapon development and was threatened by an emerging Chinese nuclear capability. In addition, India's failed request for security guarantees against a plausible Chinese nuclear threat from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, was another element that drove India to its nuclear weapon development.

The more deep-seated reason for India's nuclear development is found in its desire for great power status. Due to its huge population, landmass, its historic position as one of the four ancient civilisations and its bitter experience of being colonised in recent times, the post-1947 India turned out to be a prestige-hungry country and maintained an ardent wish to be treated as a great power. India appears to consider the possession of nuclear weapons an indispensable attribute of great power status.²From the point of view of India, which is believed to be in rivalry with China and was deeply chagrined at China's attainment of a nuclear weapon capability, there was no reason for it to give up its own nuclear weapons. Thus, for India, the NPT which opened for signature in July, 1968 was nothing more than an unfair international agreement that effectively shut India out of a nuclear club and kept it as an underdog in the global power hierarchy.³

India carried out a nuclear explosion test in April, 1974. It, however, announced it as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' and made it clear that India had no intention of weaponising the nuclear explosive devices. India continued to maintain this stance, the so-called 'option policy,'⁴ until May 1998 when India conducted nuclear explosion tests and declared itself a 'nuclear-weapon state.'⁵ One factor that pushed India onto overt nuclearisation is India's mounting sense of being threatened by the suspected Chinese involvement in the development of Pakistan's missiles and nuclear weapons.⁶ India's concern about this Chinese assistance mounted as Pakistan's accomplishment of a nuclear weapon capability became clear. It is not easy to determine at what point Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapon capability, but in January 1987, Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon development, announced that Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapon capability.⁷ In order to neutralise Pakistan's nuclear capability, India moved a step closer to the weaponisation stage of its nuclear program. It is said that the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered the development of nuclear weapons in 1988.⁸

The second factor is the sense of crisis India felt about the gathering clout of the NPT regime. As the NPT regime had gathered momentum and influence in the wake of the cold war - South Africa's decision to scrap its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT; success of persuading Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to abandon the nuclear weapons they inherited upon the break-up of the Soviet Union and to sign the NPT; achieving consensus to extend the NPT indefinitely in May, 1995 and conclusion of the negotiations of the CTBT and opening for signature in September, 1996 - India must have felt that further indecision would cost the country a critical chance of securing status as a nuclear power. In other words, the reinforced NPT regime mounted a pressure on India to exhibit a nuclear weapon capability that had been held in the basement since 1974.

Although not as important as the first two factors, the third factor is India's domestic political conditions. The inauguration of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government precipitated India's decision on nuclear testing in May, 1998 and the announcement of the 'nuclear-weapon state' status. The BJP tends to be more nationalistic than other political parties in India and seeks for India's major power status in the international arena. Before forming a coalition government in March 1998, the BJP advocated for exercising the nuclear weapon option if the national interest warranted doing so.

In Pakistan's case, the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is clear, primarily for countering the overwhelming conventional military capabilities of its arch rival, India and, later, fledging India's nuclear weapon capabilities. This Pakistani position is illustrated in some of the principles of Pakistan's proclaimed nuclear policy: 1) Fits nuclear force will act as a force multiplier to balance the asymmetry in conventional forces; 2) nuclear threats warrant nuclear responses.'⁹ Pakistan and India fought three large wars since their independence in 1947. The third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 left the defeated country of Pakistan divided into two nations in which the former East Pakistan grew out to be a separate country of Bangladesh. Considering that Pakistan appears to have started the nuclear weapon development programme in the following year of 1972, Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war against India was an immediate impetus to the development of nuclear weapons.¹⁰ India's first nuclear explosion in May, 1974 simply accelerated Pakistan's efforts in the development of nuclear weapons.

Impacts on the NPT Regime
The decisions by India and Pakistan to overtly acquire nuclear weapons and their subsequent claims of becoming 'nuclear-weapon states' constitute a direct challenge to the NPT and the global norms based on the treaty. We have to recall that a 'nuclear-weapon state' is defined by Article IX of the NPT as the state that 'has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.' If the number of countries that rely on the threat of nuclear use for their security increases, the continued viability of the NPT will be seriously eroded. The state-parties to the NPT would be pressured to adopt a security policy of such reliance and become reluctant to rely on the NPT regime. India's defence specialists tend to justify India's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by arguing that, without nuclear weapons, India's proclamations for nuclear disarmament will not be taken seriously by the five NPT-permitted nuclear-weapon states. However, those Indian defence specialists must not forget that India's nuclear proliferation has increased the perceived value of nuclear weapons and made India an obstacle to, rather than an advocate for, nuclear disarmament.

Further, although India's and Pakistan's developments of nuclear weapons do not constitute a plain violation of international law, an increase in the number of states that maintain nuclear weapons heightens the danger of nuclear use. And as the employment of nuclear weapons is likely to cause devastating damages not only to the warring countries but also to their neighbouring countries, the development and maintenance of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan should be blamed on political, if not legal, grounds.

Some in India and Pakistan believe that possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan would bring about strategic stability between the two countries.¹¹ Although this result is far from immediate, the foundation of the NPT regime will be in serious question, if a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence emerges between India and Pakistan or if India gains confidence in its nuclear deterrent capability vis-á-vis China. This is because the fundamental assumption of creating the NPT regime is that proliferation of nuclear weapons will endanger international peace and stability. No doubt, it is desirable to see strategic stability between Indo-Pakistan and/or Indo-China relations, a development that bears considerable significance for peace and stability in South Asia. We may see, however, that some signatories of the NPT, suffering from long-standing confrontations with neighbouring countries, may take their cue from the Indo-Pak mutual deterrent relationship and opt for withdrawing from the NPT.

Accidental or intentional use of nuclear weapons by either Pakistan or India, the danger of which is not low considering recurring crises between India and Pakistan, will destroy the taboo against nuclear use that has gradually formed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both India and Pakistan are in the halfway of attaining a stable mutual deterrent relationship and have put in place some risk-reduction and confidence-building measures to avoid miscalculation.¹² However, drawbacks such as:

1) Pakistan's inferiority vis-á-vis India in conventional military strength,
2) geographical factors inherent in Indo-Pakistani relations,
3) emphasis by the two countries on ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles of nuclear
weapons, and
4) lack of robust early-warning mechanism in both sides¹³,

could increase instability in a crisis. Pakistan has adopted the nuclear 'first-use' option in order to neutralise India's overwhelming conventional military capabilities.¹⁴ In addition Pakistan may feel compelled to maintain nuclear weapons at high alert, because it does not enjoy strategic depth. Given the extremely short distances and flight times of the ballistic missiles involved, decisions in a crisis might have to be made in a matter of minutes, raising the likelihood of catastrophic miscalculation.

If nuclear weapons, which have not been used for more than half a century, come to be used even on a limited scale by India or Pakistan, considerable change could occur in the international community's perception of nuclear weapons. In other words, depending on the scale of damage incurred by employing nuclear weapons, a widely shared sense of taboo against the use of nuclear weapons that has been built since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, could grow stronger. On the contrary, it is also conceivable that the use of nuclear weapons could erode the moral and political threshold against the use of nuclear weapons. Although it is uncertain which way the perception of nuclear weapons will shift, if India and Pakistan achieve their intended political purpose by the use of their nuclear weapons, the foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime will be shaken.

Impacts on the East Asian Security Environment
Although more than five years have passed since India conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, China has not launched any salient nuclear weapon policy intended to counter a possible build-up of India's nuclear capabilities. One reason for this lukewarm response is China's geo-strategic advantage vis-á-vis India. While China could attack New Delhi with short-range ballistic missiles that have a range of about 500 kilometres launched from the north of the Himalayas, India has to develop and deploy new land-based ballistic missiles with a range of over 3,000 kilometres or ballistic missile submarines carrying SLBMs to hit targets in Beijing. India's current deployable longest-range ballistic missile, Agni II, has a range of 2,000-2,500 kilometres. An upgraded version, the range of which is expected to reach around 3,500 kilometres, is still under development¹⁵.

Concerning India's submarine forces, India has been devoted to develop nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), designated as the Advance Technology Vessel, for two decades but it remains plagued by serious design and development problems¹⁶. In short, it will take years for India to overcome disadvantage in geo-strategic conditions and to attain a position enabling it to practice reliable nuclear deterrence vis-á-vis China.

In the longer term, however, China may be forced to rearrange and/or strengthen the deployment of its nuclear force to meet the growing challenge posed by India. India announced an ambitious nuclear weapon deployment plan in August, 1999, in which it advocated to pursue a nuclear triad consisting of 'aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets.'¹⁷ In fact, in addition to SSBN/SLBM force, India is developing an ICBM known as Surya, based on its indigenous space launch vehicle.¹⁸ The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), formed in April 1987, by the G-7 countries, has, to some extent, contributed in curbing missile development, including India's.

However, one must realise that an export-control regime, MTCR or some other, cannot altogether stem the spread and increase in ballistic and cruise missiles. Determined states can build and accumulate indigenous missile technologies in the longer run. The burgeoning scientific and technological complex will become immune to MTCR controls. Thus India, although having once admitted that the MTCR delayed its missile development program,19 may ultimately succeed in deploying longer-range ballistic missiles capable of targeting all over the Chinese territory.

Should India's long-range nuclear capabilities grow and pose a serious challenge to China, there may emerge a possibility of acceleration of Chinese nuclear build-up that may, in turn, have a negative impact on the East Asian security environment. More menacing is the development of quadruple nuclear powers relations. Let us suppose that China and India, in addition to the United States and Russia, emerge as great nuclear powers armed with 1,000 to 2,000 deployed nuclear warheads and the four powers become rivals in each other's pursuit of national interests. If, probability aside, such a situation comes to pass, these four nuclear powers will conceivably be pressed to build retaliatory capability with a plural number of potential enemies in mind. Each will be pressed to further strengthen their nuclear capability.

As each country has to take into account the strengthening of its primary and secondary potential enemies' nuclear capability, it would be far more difficult to achieve arms race stability among the four nuclear powers than under the bipolar nuclear-power regime. Furthermore, if the time-urgent counter-force capability of any of the four countries grows visibly stronger than the others, it would be extremely difficult to achieve crisis stability among the four nuclear powers. In short, if three or four nuclear powers come to rival one another, it would be very difficult to attain strategic stability among those countries and build a retaliatory capability strong enough to ensure the security of each country.²⁰

Narrowing Down the Role of Nuclear Weapons
Even drastic nuclear reductions by the U.S., Russia and other NPT nuclear-weapon states, do not lead India and Pakistan to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Aside from the size of its arsenal, as long as China maintains nuclear weapons, India will not agree to scrap its nuclear weapons. Similarly, Pakistan will never give up its nuclear arsenal if India keeps hold of nuclear weapons. For its part, China will not dismantle its nuclear weapons provided that American and Russian nuclear weapons exist. Only the complete nuclear disarmament on the part of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states will enable a chance to persuade the South Asian de facto nuclear powers into destroying their nuclear weapons.

Yet, there is no prospect of complete disarmament of nuclear weapons. Man has acquired the knowledge and technology needed to build nuclear weapons and cannot undo this - nuclear weapons cannot be de-invented. Furthermore, eliminating nuclear weapons, while leaving the international security environment as it is, could have the paradoxical effect of increasing international instability and the likelihood of conflict.

That said, political and security values of nuclear weapons have been shrinking.²¹ Nuclear weapons neither provide national prestige to the possessor nor constitute an indispensable attribute of great power status. There are few who claim that a nuclear-armed North Korea is a great power. What matters are economic might, financial resources, advanced technology, powerful conventional military capabilities supported by superior technologies, cultural influence and international political leadership derived from these attributes.

From the point of view of security, the role of nuclear weapons is limited. The military utility of nuclear weapons has been increasingly called into question because of nuclear weapons' inherent self-contradiction that their destructive and killing power is too devastating to be of any practical use. For instance, there are several cases where a non-nuclear power employed armed force against a nuclear-armed power. Among these we should include non-nuclear China's attack on UN forces led by the nuclear-armed United States in the 1950-53 Korean War, the Vietnam War, the fourth Middle East War of 1973,²² the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, the Falklands War of 1982 and the armed resistance of Afghanistan against invading forces from the Soviet Union. One factor common to them all is that non-nuclear states took advantage of the drawback of nuclear weapons, which is that they cannot be used easily because of their awesome killing and destructive power. Although the use of nuclear weapons was considered in some of these wars, the nuclear powers gave up the idea. This suggests that the gravity of moral and political consequences accompanying the use of nuclear weapons outweighed the military advantage of using them.

Even the nuclear weapons' core role of deterring nuclear attack by nuclear power is not automatic. Mutual nuclear deterrence is feasible only under certain and limited conditions, namely that the effectiveness of each retaliatory capability does not deteriorate. However, it is not easy to maintain a credible retaliatory capability continuously, simply because it is difficult to determine the degree of a retaliatory capability sufficient to constitute a credible deterrence. Moreover, the retaliatory capability of a nuclear power tends constantly to be reduced by the strengthening of the counter-force capability of its adversaries. If a nuclear power tries to maintain its retaliatory capability under such circumstances, it has no choice but to strengthen its nuclear capability by diversifying its delivery vehicles, in addition to ensuring the survivability of its nuclear force. As a result, it has to deploy a large number of nuclear weapons.

If such a situation takes place, nuclear powers, contrary to their initial expectations, are forced to face a danger of nullifying the nuclear weaponsE effect of preventing nuclear war. This is because the danger of nuclear weapons being used would multiply in proportion to the increase in the number of deployed weapons. In short, although nuclear weapons are expected to play, under certain conditions, a role that other kinds of weapons cannot i.e., prevention of nuclear war, it is not easy to make the most of this attribute.

While nuclear weapons enjoy limited political and security values, actual employment of them is likely to bring about tremendous suffering not merely on warring states but also on the neighbouring countries. The desirable direction in dealing with nuclear weapons, therefore, is to explore ways to restrict the actual use of nuclear weapons to the level that would open the prospect for their elimination. Simplifying the above argument, we have to build an international security environment that enables us to narrow the role of nuclear weapons as much as possible to the following two missions: 1) a last-resort means to ensure the survival of a state²³ and 2) deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons by other nuclear powers. As nuclear weapons have not been used for more than half a century, one may conclude that their role has already been confined to these two purposes. However, if the declaratory policies of India and Pakistan, as well as the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, with respect to their use are any guide, some of them seem to plan to use nuclear weapons for contingencies less dire than the above two.

Narrowing down the role of nuclear weapons to deterring the use of nuclear weapons by other nuclear powers is synonymous with building a regime of 'no-first use' of nuclear weapons. If the pledge of no-first use can be institutionalised by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, not only will such undertaking narrow the role of nuclear weapons to deterring solely the use of nuclear weapons by other NPT nuclear powers, it will also raise the possibility of providing momentum for nuclear arms reduction and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

This is because if the only raison d'etre of nuclear weapons maintained by the NPT nuclear-weapon states were to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other NPT nuclear states, it would be logical to conclude that even if all the five nuclear-weapon states uniformly reduce and then completely scrap their nuclear weapons, they will lose nothing. Moreover, if the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT agree to institutionalise their no-first use pledges, non-nuclear-weapon states that do not deploy nuclear-weapon state's nuclear weapons, in principle, would, as a secondary effect of such a regime, not have to fear nuclear threats or attack. The political and security inequality between nuclear and non-nuclear states (the largest pending issue under the NPT regime) would be reduced, and the stability and reliability of the NPT regime definitely would be enhanced. In this way, the institutionalisation of no-first use of nuclear weapons would go a long way toward nuclear arms reduction and enhancing the stability and credibility of the NPT regime.

We have to note, however, that India, Pakistan and arguably Israel (nuclear-armed states that remain outside the NPT framework) cannot be urged to abide by a legally binding nuclear no-first-use regime. The reason is that making these nations party to a legally binding nuclear no-first-use agreement would be tantamount to legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons outside the NPT regime. Thus, for India and Pakistan, we cannot expect more than a politically binding pledge of no-first use of nuclear weapons.²⁴

Even if the NPT nuclear powers and India and Pakistan adopt a policy of nuclear no-first use, there seems to be no way of verifying their promises. Accordingly, the credibility and/or reliability of nuclear no-first use depends on whether and to what extent the international community can remove causes provoking the 'first-use' of nuclear weapons. As a start, efforts should be made to abolish chemical and biological weapons thoroughly. This should be done through, among other means, universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and early establishment of the verification mechanisms for the BWC. In addition, achieving an international political agreement of 'no-first use of weapons of mass destruction' as a transitional measure may accelerate the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. On top of that, the international community must make serious and sustained efforts to maintain the balance of conventional forces in each region or among rival countries, specifically in South Asia and the Middle East where de facto nuclear powers are located and armed conflicts occur repeatedly.

To limit the significance and the role of nuclear weapons, one should not overlook the necessity to maintain and strengthen the NPT, which stipulates both the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms reduction. This is because the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the build-up of nuclear forces mean an increase in the significance and the role of nuclear weapons. Today, the NPT regime is faced with several problems which, if left unattended, would threaten its reliability and stability. The issue with the highest priority of them all is nuclear arms reduction of the NPT-permitted nuclear-weapon states, the United States and Russia in particular. There are several factors j security concerns, regional hegemony and the acquisition of diplomatic bargaining chips j that prompt non-nuclear weapon states to embark on developing and possessing nuclear weapons.

Thus nuclear disarmament on the part of the United States and Russia and other NPT nuclear-weapon states will not necessarily dissuade non-nuclear-weapon states from developing nuclear weapons. However, maintaining sizable nuclear weapons, in itself, signifies the continued value and significance of nuclear weapons and induce nuclear proliferation. Also the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states have accepted the ban on the development and the possession of nuclear weapons on the assumption that nuclear-weapon states will carry out nuclear arms reduction. Therefore, if the NPT nuclear-weapon states overplay the significance of nuclear weapons or neglect to reduce their nuclear arsenal, the reliability and stability of the NPT will suffer.

The obligation to reduce nuclear arms prescribed in Article VI of the NPT rests primarily with the five nuclear-weapon states. Although the NPT nuclear-weapon states have accepted complete nuclear disarmament as the ultimate goal, so far they, as a whole, have not been exactly forthcoming in taking bold steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) offered in its advisory opinion an interpretation of Article VI of the NPT as imposing on the nuclear-weapon states not just general and theoretical obligations, but specific, concrete steps to reduce nuclear weapons.²⁵ At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the five nuclear-weapon states, at the strong request of non-nuclear states, committed to 'an unequivocal undertaking...to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals....'²⁶Accordingly, the interpretation of the obligations to reduce nuclear weapons as defined in Article VI of the NPT has become more specific and direct than that made by nuclear weapon states so far. It is necessary, therefore, for non-nuclear-weapon states to watch the attitude they take in coming years on matters related to the reduction of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, non-nuclear-weapon states cannot afford to remain passive onlookers or merely reproach the five nuclear-weapon states for non-performance of their treaty obligations. This is because to minimise the significance and the role of nuclear weapons or to create a security environment conducive to nuclear arms reduction, they too have to grapple with many agenda such as the abolition of chemical and biological weapons and the maintenance of a stable balance of conventional force.

Conclusion
Japanese criticism of India's development of nuclear weapons is often counter-argued by Indian defence experts that such criticism is unfair and hypocritical because Japan has been under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, there is a huge difference between the renunciation of possession of nuclear weapons and the possession of such weapons. In terms of seriousness of the security dilemma, for example, to be protected by the nuclear umbrella without introducing protector's nuclear weapons would not be the same with the possession of nuclear weapons. Indian defence experts should compare the security environment brought about by a nuclear Japan with the current one whereby Japan is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Nuclear weapons are detestable weapons in that they, once used, indiscriminately annihilate vast numbers of people: combatants and non-combatants, men and women of all ages. And when a number of nuclear weapons are used, they will no doubt inflict catastrophic destruction not only on warring countries but also on neighbouring ones. Viewed in this light, nuclear weapons are 'evil'. Even if nuclear weapons are necessary to deter the use of other nuclear weapons and a large-scale use of chemical and biological weapons, efforts should be made to reduce the dependence on them as long as they are evil. The international community must reduce the danger of using nuclear weapons and relegate them to the backstage of international politics.

(Shinichi OGAWA is a senior research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan. He has written on U.S.-Soviet/Russian strategic issues, nuclear arms control and the U.S.-Japan security relationship.)

References
(The opinions expressed in this essay are the author's alone and do not represent the view of the National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan.)

1. Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid,' Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, No. 5 (September/October, 1998), p. 42. Also see Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Division, 'India-Pakistan Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: Background, Status, and Issues for U.S. Policy,' CRS Report for Congress, December 16, 1996, pp. 25-6. 2. For a similar view, see Rodney W. Jones, 'Correspondence: Debating New Delhi's Nuclear Decision,' International Security, vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 2000), p. 186. 3. T.V. Paul, 'The Systemic Bases of India's Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,' The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall, 1998), pp. 1-2. 4. Jasjit Singh, former director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, explained the logic of this policy: 'it would, at some time, be closed, either by becoming non-nuclear if global abolition of nuclear weapons became a reality, or by weaponising if disarmament receded into a vague foggy future.' See Jasjit Singh, 'The Summer of '98: Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India,' India Perspective, special issue (August/September, 1998), p. 34. 5. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee declared, following the May, 1998 nuclear tests, that, 'India is a nuclear weapon state', quoted in Thomas Graham, Jr., and Douglas B. Shaw, 'Nearing a Fork in the Road: Proliferation of Nuclear Reversal ?' The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6 No. 1 (Fall, 1998), p. 72. Also see Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid,' pp. 46, 49. 6. For the reasons why China continued to assist Pakistan, see 'Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Division, ;India-Pakistan Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: Background, Status, and Issues for U.S. Policy', pp. 19-20. 7. Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid,' p. 51. However, one Pakistani defence analyst argues that Pakistan was pursuing a policy of non-weaponised nuclear deterrence ? the same policy India had maintained since its 1974 nuclear test ? until May, 1998. See Farah Zahra, 'Pakistan's Road to a Minimum Nuclear Deterrent,' Arms Control Today, vol. 29, No. 5 (July/August, 1999), p. 9. 8. Waheguru Pal