Background
The Kashmir issue is
simply this: People
of a large territory
which is not part of
any existing sovereign
state were assured by
the entire international
community represented
by the United Nations
that they would be enabled
to decide their future
by a free vote. Until
now, this assurance
has not been honoured.
The Kashmir dispute
primarily involves the
life and future of the
people of the land.
Because of its impact
on relations between
India and Pakistan,
however, it directly
affects the peace and
stability of the South
Asian subcontinent.
The region contains
a large segment of human
race. The dispute reaped
three wars. The possibility
of a fourth war- - probably
a nuclear holocaust
is looming large. The
dispute could have been
solved through peaceful
means, but it has not,
because the obduracy
of one of the parties
is encouraged by the
apathy of the world
outside. To cover its
wrongful occupation
of Kashmir, India has
skillfully propagated
a series of myths about
the genesis and nature
of the dispute.
I believe that the
United States can, and
should, lead the effort
to achieve a fair and
lasting settlement of
the dispute -fair to
the people most immediately
involved and fair to
its own commitment to
democracy and human
rights. By doing so,
the U.S. can strengthen
the principles of a
just world order. It
will also earn the gratitude
of generations in Kashmir,
in Pakistan and even
in India itself.
Kashmir As
It Is
Kashmir is situated
in the extreme north
of the India-Pakistan
subcontinent and at
the southern point of
Central Asia. With an
area of 86,000 square
miles and a population
currently estimated
at around 13 million
(Census of 1990), it
is surrounded by four
countries: China, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India,
with the narrow Wakhan
strip (in Afghanistan)
separating it from Tajikistan
and Krygstan. Its rivers
flow into Pakistan,
its traditional highways
have been towards Pakistan
with whom it shares
the larger part of its
border. In its middle
is the Vale of Kashmir.
Compared to the existing
191 sovereign states
in the world, taken
individually, Kashmir
is larger than 95 and
more populous than 121.
The cease-fire line
between the forces of
India and Pakistan has
currently divided Kashmir
into two parts. One
is under Indian occupation
that comprises 63 percent
of the whole territory
and includes the Vale
that has a population
of around 7.5 million.
The other with around
3 million people, includes
Azad (free) Kashmir,
which is under indirect
Pakistani control, and
the northern region
of Gilgit and Baltistan,
which is directly administered
by Islamabad. About
1.5 million Kashmiris
are refugees in Pakistan,
some 400,000 live in
Britain and about 250,000
are scattered around
the world. The present
arbitrary bifurcation
of Kashmir has divided
thousands of Kashmir
families.
A society with a historical
continuity of its own,
Kashmir remained independent
over long periods of
time spanning centuries.
During the colonial
era, however, it was
one of the principalities,
called states, which
were ruled by hereditary
feudal chiefs (Maharajahs)
and granted internal
autonomy by Britain
as the paramount power.
The Maharajah of Jammu
and Kashmir (the official
name given to the state)
was the descendent of
a freebooter who obtained
the territory from the
British East India Company
on lease. The resentment
of the people of Kashmir
at having been treated
as chattel in this lease-deed
remained inarticulate
during the early colonial
period but exploded
in a freedom movement
in 1931. It led to the
`Quit Kashmir' campaign
against the Maharajah
in 1946 and to the Azad
Kashmir movement which
gained momentum a year
later. The first armed
encounter between the
Maharajah's troops and
insurgent forces occurred
in August 1947.
At that time, Britain
was liquidating its
empire in the subcontinent.
The tripartite agreement
of Britain, the National
Congress (representing
Hindus) and the Muslim
League (representing
Muslims) partitioned
British India into two
independent countries:
one compromising Hindu-majority
areas retained the name
`India' and the other
comprising Muslim-majority
areas named Pakistan.
As this settlement also
meant the end of British
paramountcy over the
autonomous principalities,
called states, which
were supposed to merge
with one of the two
countries in accordance
with the wishes of the
people and the principle
of partition (Hindu-majority
states with India and
Muslim-majority states
with Pakistan). Kashmir
was a predominantly
Muslim-majority state,
besides, it was far
more contiguous with
Pakistan than India.
It was, therefore, expected
to accede to Pakistan.
But the Maharajah was
a Hindu. He rejected
the first option and
could not manage the
second.
Faced with the insurgency
of his people, which
had been joined by a
few hundred civilian
volunteers from Pakistan,
he fled the capital
Srinagar on 25 October,
1947 and arranged with
India to send its army
to help him crush the
rebellion. India, coveting
the territory, set one
condition on its armed
intervention. The condition
was that the Maharajah
must sign an Instrument
of Accession to India.
He agreed but India
did not wait for his
signature to fly its
troops into the state.
Thus a war-lord in
1846 had acquired Kashmir
as his fiefdom through
a sale-deed, so his
descendent in 1947 transferred
Kashmir as a property
to India. Although divided
by 101 years, the two
acts were identical
in nature, provoking
the same popular outrage
against colonial occupations.
One difference, however,
was that the first took
place in the colonial
era and required no
legitimacy; the second
occurred in the post-colonial
period after the United
Nations Charter came
into force.
Provisional
Accession
Though long planned
and swiftly executed,
the annexation of Kashmir
could not be a simple
affair for India. First,
there was the incongruity
of the act which clearly
violated the principle
of partition. Secondly,
while accepting the
instrument of accession
from the Maharajah,
India did not wish to
jeopardise its chances
of annexing two other
principalities or states
(Hyderabad and Junagadh)
which, in contrast with
Kashmir, had Hindu majorities
but Muslim rulers. It
had a stake; therefore,
in ostensibly preserving
the principle that in
case of conflict between
the ruler's and the
people's wishes, the
latter must prevail.
Under these compulsions,
India had to attach
a condition to the transaction
with the Maharajah:
the accession was made
subject to 'reference
to the people.'
On India's own showing,
therefore, the accession
had a provisional character;
one official representative
of India at the United
Nations termed it 'tentative.'
'We have given this
pledge,' said Jawaharlal
Nehru, the Prime Minister
of India, 'not only
to Kashmir, not only
to Pakistan, but to
the whole world, we
will not and cannot
back out of it.' On
8 November, 1947, he
proposed to the Prime
Minister of Pakistan
that: 'The governments
of India and Pakistan
should make a joint
request to the United
Nations to undertake
a plebiscite in Kashmir
at the earliest possible
date.'
The Kashmir
Question at the UN
Between October and
December of 1947, the
Azad Kashmir forces
successfully resisted
India's armed intervention
and liberated one-third
of the State. Realising
it could not quell the
resistance, India brought
the issue to the United
Nations in January 1948.
As the rebel forces
had been undoubtedly
joined by volunteers
from Pakistan, India
charged Pakistan with
having sent 'armed raiders'
into the state and urged
that the United Nations
call upon Pakistan to
withdraw them. This
was coupled with the
assurance that, once
the 'raiders' were withdrawn,
India would enable a
plebiscite to be held
under impartial auspices
to decide Kashmir's
future status. In reply,
Pakistan charged India
with having manoeuvred
the Maharajah's accession
through 'fraud and violence'
and in collaboration
with a 'discredited'
ruler. Pakistan's counter
complaint was also coupled
with the proposal of
a plebiscite under the
supervision and control
of the United Nations
to settle the dispute.
The Security Council
discussed the question
exhaustively from January
to April, 1948. It came
to the conclusion that
it would be impossible
to determine the responsibility
for the fighting and
futile to blame either
side. Since both parties
desired that the question
of accession should
be decided through an
impartial plebiscite,
the Council developed
proposals based on the
common ground between
them. These were embodied
in the resolution of
21 April, 1948 envisaging
a cease-fire, the withdrawal
of all outside forces
from the state and a
plebiscite under the
control of an administrator
who would be nominated
by the Secretary General.
For negotiating the
details of the plan,
the Council appointed
a five-member Commission
(including the United
States) which proceeded
to the subcontinent
in July the same year.
The International
Agreements
The United Nations Commission
for India and Pakistan
(UNCIP) worked out the
concrete terms of settlement
in close and continuous
consultations with both
sides. These were crystallised
in two resolutions adopted
on 13 August, 1948 and
5 January, 1949. As
both governments formally
expressed their acceptance
of the Commission's
proposals, these constituted
an international agreement
as binding as a treaty.
A cease-fire was immediately
enforced. The Commission
then started negotiations
to draw up a plan for
the withdrawal of Indian
and Pakistani armies
from the state in a
manner and sequence
that would not cause
disadvantage to either
side or imperil the
prospects of plebiscite.
Meanwhile, a distinguished
American, Admiral Chester
Nimitz, was designated
as Plebiscite Administrator.
There was much in these
submissions that was
controversial between
India and Pakistan,
but the proposal of
a plebiscite was not.
This is clear from the
statement made on 28
January, 1948 by the
President of the Council.
He said: '... the documents
at our disposal show
agreement between the
parties on the three
following points:
1) The question as
to whether the State
of Jammu and Kashmir
will accede to India
or to Pakistan shall
be decided by plebiscite;
2) This plebiscite must
be conducted under conditions
which will ensure complete
impartiality;
3) The plebiscite will
therefore be held under
the auspices of the
United Nations.'
Led by the United States
and Britain, the Council
adopted a resolution
on 21 April, 1948 which
noted 'with satisfaction
that both India and
Pakistan desire that
the question of accession
... should be decided
through the appointment
of a Commission of the
United Nations, of which
the United States became
a member, to work out
a plan for the demilitarisation
of Kashmir prior to
the plebiscite.
The United Nations
Commission for India
and Pakistan (UNCIP)
submitted proposals
to the two governments.
Formulated as resolutions,
they constituted an
international agreement
upon being accepted
in writing by both governments.
Part III of the Commission's
resolution of 13 August,
1948, agreed to by both
India and Pakistan,
states:
'The governments of
India and Pakistan reaffirm
their wish that the
future status of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir
shall be determined
in accordance with the
will of the people and,
to that end, upon acceptance
of their truce agreement,
both governments agree
to enter into consultations
with the Commission
to determine fair and
equitable conditions
whereby such free expression
will be assured.'
Why the Plebiscite
was not Held
What prevented the plebiscite
from taking place was
India's refusal to accept
any proposal that called
for her to withdraw
the bulk of her forces
from Kashmir and thus
conclude a truce leading
to the induction of
a Plebiscite Administrator.
When the Commission
reported this to the
Security Council, Sir
Owen Dixon, an eminent
jurist from Australia,
was appointed as United
Nations Representative
to negotiate the synchronised
withdrawal of all Indian
and Pakistani forces
in order to prepare
the stage for an impartial
plebiscite under United
Nations supervision.
After an intense effort,
he reported to the Security
Council on 15 September,
1950 that:
'In the end I became
convinced that India's
agreement would never
be obtained to demilitarisation
in any form or to the
provisions governing
the period of plebiscite
of any such character,
as would in my opinion,
permit the plebiscite
being conducted in conditions
sufficiently guarding
against intimidation
and other forms of influence
and abuse by which the
freedom and fairness
of the plebiscite might
be imperiled.'
Since the plebiscite
could not be impartial
unless both India and
Pakistan withdrew their
forces from Kashmir,
a stalemate was created.
This stalemate has now
lasted for more than
fifty years.
Plebiscite
Entirely Feasible
India's obdurate stand
has been effective in
creating the impression
among policymakers in
America and Britain
that the idea of a plebiscite
is unworkable. This,
however, cannot be a
considered conclusion.
There is no way the
dispute can be settled
once and for all except
in harmony with the
people's will, and there
is no way the people's
will can be ascertained
except through an impartial
vote. Secondly, there
are no insuperable obstacles
to the setting up of
a plebiscite administration
in Kashmir under the
aegis of the United
Nations. The world organization
has proved its ability,
even in the most forbidding
circumstances, to institute
an electoral process
under its supervision
and control and with
the help of a neutral
peace-keeping force.
The striking example
of this is Namibia,
which was peacefully
brought to independence
after seven decades
of occupation and control
by South Africa. Thirdly,
as Sir Owen Dixon, the
United Nations Representative,
envisaged four decades
ago, the plebiscite
can be so regionalised
that none of the different
zones of the state will
be forced to accept
an outcome contrary
to their wishes.
Finally, the idea of
a referendum or plebiscite
can be translated, without
derogation, into the
idea of elections to
one or more constituent
assemblies which will
determine the future
status of the state
or of its different
zones. The sole condition
is that the election
should be completely
free from undue pressure,
rigging or intimidation:
it must be conducted
under the control and
supervision of the United
Nations.
India's position, though
plainly untenable and
unjust, appeared to
gain some plausibility
during the cold war.
To demilitarise Kashmir
under those circumstances
was to expose it (and
India as well) to unpredictable
dangers - this was the
undertone of India's
pleas. Since India was
supported by the Soviet
Union and Pakistan had
allied itself with the
United States, the insinuation
was that Kashmir would
somehow become an American
base and thus a detriment
to India's professed
non-alignment.
With the end of the
cold war, this line
of argument - if argument
it ever was - is no
longer sustainable.
In the post-cold war
era, the demilitarisation
of Kashmir will not
cause a power vacuum
because a peacekeeping
force under United Nations
command will immediately
replace Indian and Pakistani
troops and remain there
until Kashmiris decide
the future status of
the territory. The imponderable
element was a fiction
contributed by India
that can no longer stand
against reality.
Arrangements
for Plebiscite
It is clear from this
historical narrative
that there is nothing
fuzzy about the modalities
of holding the plebiscite.
These were exhaustively
worked out during the
negotiations concluded
by the United Nations
about the implementation
of its peace plan for
Kashmir. The phased
withdrawal of forces
on both sides, the appointment
of the Plebiscite Administrator
by the United Nations
Secretary General, his
induction into office,
the institution of the
electoral process under
his authority, the exercise
of powers deemed necessary
by him-all these are
fully known to the parties.
If a credible peace
process is instituted,
some 'T's' will need
to be crossed and some
'I's' dotted, but given
the political will of
India and Pakistan to
implement their international
agreement, and the will
of the Security Council
to secure that implementation,
these can present no
obstacles.
It is not the inherent
difficulties of a solution,
but the lack of the
will to implement a
solution, that has caused
the prolonged deadlock
over the Kashmir dispute.
The deadlock has meant
indescribable agony
for the people of Kashmir
and incalculable loss
for both India and Pakistan.
If the new world order
is not to be an order
of insanity, injustice
and terror and thus
a permitted anarchy,
that agony should be
brought to an end and
that loss repaired.
The peace that has eluded
the South Asian subcontinent,
home to one-fifth of
humanity, should be
made secure.
Position of
Democratic Powers
The United States, Britain
and France have traditionally
been committed supporters
of the plebiscite agreement
as the only way to resolve
this issue. They sponsored
all of the Security
Council resolutions
which called for a plebiscite.
Their commitment was
indicated by a personal
appeal made by America's
President Truman and
Britain's Prime Minister
Clement Atlee that differences
over demilitarisation
be submitted to arbitration
by the Plebiscite Administrator,
a distinguished American
war hero: Admiral Chester
Nimitz. India rejected
this appeal and, later
on, objected to an American
acting as the Plebiscite
Administrator. As mentioned
earlier, American Senator
Frank Graham visited
the Subcontinent as
the United Nations Representative
to negotiate the demilitarisation
of Kashmir prior to
the plebiscite. India
rejected his proposals
as well.
The American position
was bipartisan and maintained
equally by Republicans
and Democrats. Secretary
of State John Foster
Dulles stated on 5 February,
1957 that: 'We continue
to believe that unless
the parties are able
to agree upon some other
solution, the solution
which was recommended
by the Security Council
should prevail, which
is that there should
be a plebiscite.'
On 15 June 1962, the
American representative
to the United Nations,
Adlai Stevenson, stated
that: 'The best approach
is to take for a point
of departure the area
of common ground which
exists between the parties.
I refer of course to
the resolutions which
were accepted by both
parties and which in
essence provide for
demilitarisation of
the territory and a
plebiscite whereby the
population may freely
decide the future status
of Jammu and Kashmir.
This is in full conformity
with the principle of
the self-determination
of people, enshrined
in Article I of the
Charter as one of the
key purposes for which
the United Nations exists."
Similarly in Britain,
both Labour and Conservative
governments consistently
upheld the position
that a plebiscite was
the only way the dispute
over Kashmir could be
democratically and peacefully
settled. When the dispute
first arose, Clement
Atlee launched a conciliatory
effort and conveyed
to the Pakistani Prime
Minister the assurance
of the Indian Prime
Minister that India
would allow Kashmir's
status to be determined
by the people's vote.
Two years later, the
Prime Ministers of the
Commonwealth informally
proposed alternative
arrangements for the
demilitarisation of
Kashmir prior to the
plebiscite. They suggested
that a neutral peacekeeping
force consisting either
of contingents from
the Commonwealth countries
or composed of local
troops from both sides
under the control of
the Plebiscite Administrator
could be stationed to
safeguard the state's
security. India rejected
all of these suggestions.
U.S. Involvement:
Past and Present
When the Kashmir dispute
erupted in 1947-48,
the United States championed
the stand that the future
status of Kashmir must
be ascertained in accordance
with the wishes and
aspirations of the people
of the territory. The
U.S. was a principal
sponsor of the resolution
which was adopted by
the Security Council
on 21 April, 1948 and
which was based on that
unchallenged principle.
Following the resolution,
the U.S. as a leading
member of the United
Nations Commission for
India and Pakistan,
adhered to that stand.
The basic formula for
settlement was incorporated
in the resolutions of
that Commission adopted
on 13 August, 1948 and
5 January, 1949.
It is commonly acknowledged
that, with India and
Pakistan both now being
nuclear-weapon states
directly confronting
each other, this dispute
is potentially the most
dangerous in the world.
It has, therefore, become
a major interest of
the U.S. to prevent
this dispute from exploding
into a conflict which
can be catastrophic
for a large proportion
of human race.
It is symptomatic of
the U.S. approach that
greater emphasis is
placed on the 'reduction
of tensions' than on
the settlement of the
core issue, i.e. Kashmir.
This encourages giving
importance to superficial
moves and temporary
solutions even though
it is known that such
moves and solutions
do not soften the animosities
of the parties nor allay
the life-and-death concerns
and anxieties of the
people most directly
affected.
An indication of this
misplaced focus is the
talk on the 'sanctity'
of the line of control
in Kashmir. It is forgotten
that this line continues
to exist only because
the international agreement
which had been concluded
between India and Pakistan,
with the full support
of the United States.
This line was originally
formalised by that agreement
as a 'temporary cease-fire
line' pending the demilitarisation
of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir and the
holding of a plebiscite
under impartial control
to determine its future.
As long as this line
remains clamped down
on the state, it will
continue to impose a
heavy toll of death
on the people of the
land. They have had
no hand in creating
it.
It has cut through their
homes, separated families
and, what is worse,
served as a protecting
wall for massive violations
of human rights. They
are not resigned to
its becoming some kind
of a border. To treat
this line overtly or
otherwise as a basis
for the partition of
the State is to reward
obduracy, countenance
iniquity, encourage
tyranny and oppression
and destroy the hopes
for peace in accordance
with justice and rationality
in Kashmir. To regard
this line as a solution
is to regard disease
as remedy. Any kind
of agreement procured
to that end will not
only not endure, it
will invite resentment
and revolt against whichever
leadership in Kashmir
will sponsor or subscribe
to it.
The mantra has been
repeated too often that
the U.S. has no alternative
to relying on bilateral
talks between India
and Pakistan to achieve
a settlement. The experience
of more than fifty years
is ignored. No bilateral
talks between India
and Pakistan have yielded
agreements without the
active role of an external
element. The missing
element is sustained
and coordinated diplomatic
pressure by peace-loving
democratic powers. If
the U.S. does not deem
it prudent to get directly
involved, there is no
reason why the Security
Council of the United
Nations or, with the
Council's support, the
Secretary General should
not be urged to play
a real facilitating
role.
I believe that the
United States can, and
should, lead the effort
to achieve a fair and
lasting settlement of
the dispute - fair to
the people most immediately
involved and fair to
its own commitments
to democracy and human
rights. By doing so,
the United States can
strengthen the principles
of a just world order.
The U.S. administration
has two choices before
it. One is to continue
confining itself to
warning both Pakistan
and India against going
to war with each other.
This policy bases the
no-war prospect in South
Asia on a very precarious
foundation. The prospect
of a nuclear exchange
in that vast subcontinent
cannot be dismissed
in the event of hostilities
breaking out between
the two countries.
The second option is
to play a more activist,
mediatory, role in regard
to Kashmir by initiating
a peace process. This
can take the shape of
a quadrilateral dialogue
-- U.S., India, Pakistan
and Kashmir --or an
appropriate use of the
newly-developed procedures
and mechanics at the
United Nations. In neither
case would the handling
of the dispute be a
rehash of the old, arid
and acrimonious debates
at the U.N. The U.S.,
by itself or through
the U.N., would supply
the catalyst that is
needed for a settlement.
A Peace Initiative
Peace and justice in
Kashmir are achievable
if all parties concerned
- India, Pakistan and
Kashmiris - make some
sacrifices. Each party
will have to modify
its position so that
common ground is found.
There are also alternative
courses of action which
can be spelled out and
involve a sequence of
interactive steps over
a period of time. None
of them would put the
peace process in the
strait-jacket of rigid
adherence to old texts.
But if a solution of
the problem will be
a graduated process,
consisting of incremental
measures, the violence
from all sides in Kashmir
must be brought to a
quick end in order to
set the stage for a
solution.
Let us mention some
of the solutions here:
