Nepal: Under big neighbour’s shadow
Gopal Siwakoti 'Chintan'

The difficult transition
Nepal at the moment, as a result of various domestic and external contradictions that it is facing, is going through a most difficult time in its history. The country had not experienced the people's armed uprising against the state since its 'unification' by the Gorkha King, Prithvi Narayan Shah, in 1768-69 A.D¹. As a result, it is also facing the worst form of rapid militarisation and the most serious forms of human rights violations in recent years, particularly after the launch of the People’s War by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist CPN (M) in February 1996. The undemocratic takeover of the executive power by King Gyanendra through the dissolution of the elected government of Sher Bahadur Deuba in October 2002 has raised the question of whether Nepal has gone any further regarding the establishment of a true constitutional monarchy in the country in the past five decades. The political parties are also facing a difficult time due to the rise of the Maoists as the most organised and militant political force in the country in the past seven years, as well as the King's desire for grabbing more political power outside the constitutional framework.

The country is also facing serious problems with regard to the accommodation and integration of various Nepali ethnic nationalities, the indigenous populations and various minority groups. The main problem among these is the lack of transformation of the country into a democratic state. Despite occasional political and institutional changes, the main social and economic problems still remain the same which are based largely on feudalism and/or neo-liberal bureaucratic capitalism.

Currently, after seven years of the Peoples' War (or civil war) led by the CPN (M), Nepal has reached a ceasefire to allow the process of negotiations for a peaceful political transition. But it has not been moving fast and in the right direction as a result of growing external political interventions and totally unjustified military aid from India, the United States and the United Kingdom. Partially, the delay in the peace process has also been due to the conflict between the King and the parliamentary parties over the issue of the restoration of the Parliament and/or the formation of an all-party interim government. The King is not in an easy position with regard to the decision: Whether he should go for the demands of the parliamentary parties or pave the way for the formation of an interim government under the leadership of, or with, the participation of the CPN (M). There is also disagreement between the parliamentary parties and the CPN (M) on whether Nepal should seek political transformation through reforms of the 1991 constitution or by writing a new constitution. But in all these options, the role of the King has been seriously criticised for his motives and on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The King's recent moves provide clear signals regarding his interest in consolidating his power through military and foreign backing.

To pursue his agenda, he first dissolved the elected Deuba government and constituted a care-taker government under the premiership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand. The Chand government was forced to resign in May 2003 which was then replaced by Surya Bahadur Thapa. Both Chand and Thapa represent the past Panchayati regime in which both of them served as prime ministers on many occasions. The problem with the Chand government was that it failed to conclude peace negotiations with the Maoists and also could not gain the support of the parliamentary parties. He also lacked executive power. In the case of Prime Minister Thapa, he has been criticised for being a candidate allegedly backed by India². The King has transferred the executive power to Thapa, but the main problem, whether Nepal should move ahead with the restoration of the Parliament under the current constitution or take the direction of an interim government, following the election of a Constituent Assembly, still remains uncertain.

As a result of these undesirable and unconstitutional political steps, the country is now virtually under the control of the same pre-1990 Panchayati regime. They have mobilised the state power against all the democratic forces and the Maoists. The ganging up of the King, the military and the past reactionary forces, is nothing new, given the failure of the parliamentary parties in exercising their sovereign authority and leading the country towards real democracy and prosperity in the last 13 years. Most exceptional is the role and influence of the external forces, particularly the U.S, the United Kingdom and India against any solution to the present crisis in favour of Nepal's overall national interest.

Just in the past six months, since the ceasefire with the Maoists, Nepal has seen the visit of the Indian Commander-in-Chief who pleased the King and the government by providing military and political support and assistance to Nepal to suppress the 'terrorists'. The U.S has gone even further and signed a five-year counter-terrorism agreement with the regime. The U.K is following the same course in providing military assistance to Nepal. These unfortunate events have taken place in a situation when all Nepal's neighbours and friends around the world were expected to support the peace process and the post-conflict imperatives of reconstruction and building a democratic and prosperous Nepali society.

The success of the peace process seems very unlikely in such an environment and consequently, the prospects of Nepal moving towards a viable democratic state will be further diminished. There seem to be two main reasons behind this externally-funded militarisation of Nepal: a) common anti-communist agenda of both India and the West; and b) the use of Nepal as a military base, particularly by the U.S. as a forward security post against China and for monitoring South Asia. So far China has not shown its anger openly and is pursuing the same policies of friendliness towards Nepal. In light of these new developments, this article attempts to give a brief summary of what Nepal thinks about South Asia, and its relations with India and China.

Historical overview
Historically, Nepal has always been an independent and sovereign country. Nepal valiantly fought against the East India Company of the British Empire when it launched a war against Nepal in 1814. The main reason behind the war against Nepal was its non-cooperation with the British Raj in India which prevented it from expanding its political influence over Nepal and an increase in trade to Tibet. After the defeat in the war, Nepal was forced to sign a unilateral treaty, known as Sogowlee Treaty³ in 1916, resulting in the loss of almost three-quarters of Nepal's fertile land in the Terai, including Tista, Darjeeling, Kumau and Gadhawal. In addition, Nepal's external relations were also restricted to some extent⁴. The British also began to recruit the Nepali youth who were widely known as the Gurkhas in British-Indian troops , a practice which continues till today.

Since then, Nepal virtually remained a protectorate of British-India. Although it tried, Nepal could not maintain its strong position and influence as before. In the later part, the Rana families of Nepal, who ruled the kingdom for 104 years till 1950, maintained cordial and loyal relationships with the British Raj for their own political safety and survival which was being continuously threatened by internal rivalries and growing demands for democracy in the country. The supply of the young Gurkhas to the British-India army became a good bargain tool for the Ranas to seek political support, and for the British, the recruitment was contributing towards the weakening of Nepal's military strength. Jung Bahadur Rana, the first Prime Minister of the Rana autocracy, provided troops to suppress the 1857 police revolt in India. The Gurkhas were used throughout the British Raj, including the First and Second World War, in great numbers to fight for the British Empire. A tri-partite agreement was reached between the UK, independent India and Nepal in 1947 that still exists today. This Gurkha connection is considered one of the major milestones in Nepal-India and Nepal-U.K. relationships even today⁵.

Nepal-India relations
The independence of India in 1947 was a major breakthrough for Nepal's internal politics and its changing role in the region. The Ranas faced growing opposition to their family rule. The new leaders of India certainly played some positive role, but not without the political cost in the post-Rana Nepal. The new governments of independent India also had no moral choice but to support the process of democratic reforms in this country. However, India was never supportive of any role of the communists in Nepal even for the establishment of a bourgeois democracy. This attitude prevails even today⁶.

Back in 1960, India opposed the dissolution of the first-ever elected Parliament and the establishment of the Panchayati regime by late King Mahendra. It also gave political support to Nepali leaders who were sheltered in India, including the communists. But this support and tolerance was never significant to bring the required political change in Nepal. It became even more difficult to carry out the political activities on Indian soil after the declaration of the state of emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1977. It led to the voluntary return of Nepali Congress leader B.P. Koirala and others.

India's unilateral sanction against Nepal in 1989 over trade and transit disputes is another reminder of its hegemonic designs. Coincidentally, it was exaggerated as a token of support to the people's movement of 1990, which brought down the 30 years old absolute monarchy. The Nepali Congress paid this political price by signing a treaty with India for the construction of Tanakpur Barrange in Mahakali River in 1991.

The post-1990 situation, although fully governed by a relatively more democratic constitution was also not free of external influence in the management of Nepal's own domestic affairs, particularly in relation to the utilisation and sharing of its huge water resources. In fact, the deciding factor in the post-1947 Nepal-India relations has been largely limited to the exploitation of Nepal's water resources and the sharing of border-rivers in the interest of India. The controversies over the Kosi (1954 and 1966) and the Gandak (1959) agreements as being unjust and unfavourable to Nepal have long been criticised by the Nepali side. The opposition to these treaties has always been crucial in building strong nationalist-minded politics in Nepal, particularly for the left movement. But the reality is that the same leftist forces, particularly the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML), repeated the same mistakes by ratifying the Integrated Development of Mahakali River Treaty in 1996. The treaty, considered more controversial than the Kosi, Gandak and Tanakpur, was ratified by the Nepali Parliament after the whip issued by the CPN-UML in its favour. It was, in fact, the CPN-UML leader, Bamdev Gautam, the then Deputy-Prime Minister, who exchanged the letter of ratification of the Treaty with the then visiting Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral in 1997. The Mahakali Treaty, criticised on the grounds of the highhandedness of India⁷, not only led to the breakdown of the unity among the left forces in Nepal, but also the split in the CPN-UML.

Some still defend the Mahakali Treaty as a milestone in Nepal-India relations on the ground that it has laid the foundation for the sharing of international waters on an egalitarian basis. However, the facts prove otherwise. In the first place, the main provisions of the treaty have never been followed by either side, and Nepal can do nothing about this unless India takes a move towards its effective implementation. For example, the treaty provided for the preparation of the Detailed Project Report (DPR) in six months, the mobilisation of financial resources in a year's time and the construction of the Pancheshwar dam in 6-8 years. But six years have already gone by and there are no signs of even the DPR. Both countries are stuck over the issue of India's claim of the prior consumptive use of the water from Sharada Barrage. Furthermore, India also does not seem interested in building the Pancheshwar dam, but instead, it completed the Purnagiri as a storage dam in violation of the treaty provisions. It also breached the mutual understanding reached between the two countries to build such a storage dam in Rupalighat and not in Purnagiri. The main concern for Nepal over the Mahakali Treaty now is the realisation that India got what it wanted, the water, and not necessarily the Pancheshwar dam. The bitter reality is that Nepal seems to have lost the major portion of its rights just by signing the treaty. The benefits from the Pancheshwar dam may only remain a dream for Nepal even without considering the opposition to this giant dam both in Nepal and India on various economic, social and environmental grounds, as in the case of other large dams.

Furthermore, these days Nepal feels more betrayed and cheated by India in relation to the utilisation of the water resources. The latest river-linking project unilaterally launched by India without consulting any of its upper and lower riparian countries, Nepal and Bangladesh, further proves that India believes in regional hegemony rather than mutual co-operation⁸. The construction of a series of dams and barrages just on the other side of the Nepal-India border in recent years further shows that India does not care about what Nepal feels and also does not pay any attention to the effects on the thousands of hectares of land and the villages which will be submerged in water, particularly during the monsoons. There is no resettlement and no compensation plan for the displaced from either side. The Government of Nepal keeps objecting to India and the latter goes on building.

There are also other factors that define the nature of Nepal-India relations. The land-locked position of Nepal is actually India-locked-more losses for Nepal-although some Indian experts tend to argue the opposite. The trade and transit dispute has never been addressed and resolved on a permanent basis. The shorter the terms and the conditions of the agreements are, the better for India to exert pressure on Nepal depending on changing political situations and diverse interests in Nepal.

Another obstacle to the healthy growth of Nepal-India relations is the security aspect. At present, Nepal and India are bound by the provisions of the 1950 Nepal-India Peace and Friendship Treaty concluded at the outset of the downfall of the Rana regime. Even more disturbing provisions are provided under the half-secret Letter of Exchange of 1959 associated with the treaty, and the subsequent 1965 agreement relating to military cooperation. There are also reports of other secret memoranda of understanding signed even after the 1990 political change covering other aspects of Nepal-India relations on Indian terms. The essence of this security arrangement and military co-cooperation is the desire of India to keep Nepal under its security umbrella mainly due to its geo-political location. As a result, Nepal is not permitted to import any arms other than from India or a prior approval is required for import of arms from other sources. The 1989 embargo against Nepal was simply a unilateral punitive action against Kathmandu, since it imported some arms from China without any prior knowledge of or approval from India.

The treaty also provides for an open international border and the freedom of movement, residence, property, business and other benefits for each others' citizens on a reciprocal basis. But it is not the case in practice. India has put a number of restrictions on the travel of the Nepalese to India. It also has remained silent when Indians of Nepali origin, particularly in the states of Assam and Meghalaya, are killed or forcibly expelled by indigenous groups. Due to the provision of a free border, the displaced persons and families have become stateless in Nepal since they are not considered refugees. Instead, they are simply treated as the Indian-Nepalese coming from across the border. Additionally, Nepal also cannot accommodate the flow of all Indian immigrants. India could do so due to its geographic size. Nepal also cannot control anyone travelling to Nepal through India whom it calls 'terrorists' like those from Punjab, Kashmir, Sri Lanka or Pakistan.

The treaty between Nepal and India needs to be reviewed to redefine relations between the two countries on an equitable basis. What Nepal and India need to do is to agree on a long-term comprehensive treaty in all aspects of security; just utilisation of water resources; and the control of immigrants and refugees through the regulation of international borders. It needs to guarantee Nepal's free and unrestricted access to the outside world as a transit right, guaranteed under international law, and not according to what exclusively suits India. Otherwise, Nepal will never be able to formulate its economic, trade, social, political and foreign policies in a sustainable manner ⁹. This situation can never be considered suitable to an independent and sovereign Nepal. On the contrary, it merely makes Nepal a protectorate of India such as Bhutan. The time has now come for India to listen positively to the proposals of Nepal, to bring an end to the cold-war period 1950 Treaty framework and consider a comprehensive solution to the irritants between the two countries.

Nepal, China and India
China is a deciding factor in shaping the nature of Nepal-India relations. India considers Nepal a part of its regional security umbrella, particularly after Chinese takeover of Tibet in the sixties. There could be some justifications in these worries in the era of U.S.-Soviet cold war and the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations, but not any more. The world has changed drastically, but unfortunately for the worse due to the aggressive imposition of a unipolar world by the U.S., where the nations' physical borders do not count much. The long-range missiles and nuclear capabilities of these two Himalayan nations do not need a border anymore in case of war. China does not have to attack India through Nepal if it needs to. There are enough borders between China and India to do so and the 1962 war was not fought by China by using Nepali soil. On the positive side, China and India are also improving their bilateral relations to maintain the regional balance of power in a more non-confrontational manner ¹⁰. The recent visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to China has resulted in the softening of India's position on Tibet and the Chinese stand on Sikkim. It can also be regarded as an effort to counter the negative implications of globalisation and balance expanding U.S. domination in the region.

At the same time, India also needs to be sensitive to China's security interest when it comes to the foreign policy of Nepal. China also cannot tolerate the expansion of any Indian or western interests near the Tibetan border. In fact, Nepal's continuing efforts at maintaining a policy of non-alignment should be recognised as an equal advantage to both the countries. In the past, Nepal has paid a heavy price for being equally close to both to China and India. Any attempt by India or the U.S. in the present context to use Nepal as a location for their strategic military ambitions will be suicidal for Nepal and it will accentuate further tension in the region. Nepal has to avoid this situation more than ever before.

The dramatic change in the U.S. foreign policy towards Nepal also has more to do with its strategic interest of military surveillance not only over China, but also India and Pakistan. Given the recent political developments in the country, Nepal can never think of a government without the Left, or the Maoists, more specifically. Nepal's genuine friends should understand this reality well and not use it as an excuse for their intervention.

Nepal and other South Asian countries
Nepal has maintained a good relationship with all other countries of South Asia, except some irritant with Bhutan. In the case of Pakistan, Nepal has not much to gain economically or by trade unless India allows its territory as a route. Politically, Nepal is in favour of a peaceful resolution of the conflict over Kashmir and the de-militarisation and de-nuclearisation of both the poverty-stricken countries. Nepal, and for that matter the whole of the South Asian region, has a clear position with regard to the normalisation of Indo-Pak relations which is essential to for the peace and prosperity of this region. This will also be a key to the growth of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)¹¹ as a true regional body in defining and defending the interest of the region as is the case of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional groupings. The region could also significantly progress by developing a common regional power grid as well as the construction of regional highways and railways as in the case of European Union if we are to grow as strong a regional block¹². Adoption of regional human rights and environmental instruments and mechanisms, including resolution of all our border disputes in the region, is another way of promoting better regional cooperation and understanding. But this is not happening. Instead, the SAARC has not grown ¹³. This needs to change. India gains more by being a true leader of the region with harmony and cooperation. India further needs to recognise the South Asian sentiment that considers Pakistan as a balancing power to India.

Similarly, Nepal also maintains good relations with Bangladesh. They share the common pain inflicted by India, particularly on water-sharing. The trade between the two countries is very limited although they are just 18 kilometres away. Nepal has been doing all that it can to persuade India to allow a trade route to Bangladesh through Phulbari from the eastern border of Nepal. However, India has not been generous enough to provide such an access. On the other hand, when India asks favours from Nepal it ranges from 'compromise' over territorial integrity to the sell-out of the rivers. But when it comes to Nepal asking India for a favour, for example on trade and transit issues, India does not treat Nepal favourably.

With regard to Nepal-Bhutan relations, they have worsened in recent years. This problem is related to the Bhutanese refugee crisis that Nepal has been facing since 1989. There are over 100,000 Bhutanese refugees of Nepali origin in the various camps in Nepal. Nepal has been forced to unnecessarily take the burden of these refugees resulting from Bhutan's practice of ethnic cleansing of its own citizens and resident. In any case, it would be the responsibility of India to provide protection to Bhutanese refugees as the immediate country of asylum under international law. But India, in the first place, did not recognise them as refugees, and it also discouraged them to stay in India, forcing them to find a better shelter in Nepal.

India has a responsible role to play for the resolution of this problem, both as the first country of asylum as well as a regional leader. Nepal feels that Bhutan is not acting alone in not handling this crisis and suppresses the voice for democratic change in that country with the backing of India. It not only agreed to Bhutan's proposal of keeping all the Bhutanese 'criminals' in Nepal, but also allowed them to apply for Nepali citizenship, despite criticisms from many quarters. But the problems has yet to be resolved in a friendly and honest manner.

The other two neighbours, Maldives and Sri Lanka, are too distant for trade and business. One strong connection that Nepal has with Sri Lanka is the link of Buddhism and the contribution of Sri Lanka in preserving the birthplace of Buddha in Lumbini in Nepal one of the several World Heritage Sites in the country. There are also similarities in sufferings resulting from armed conflicts, although the nature of the conflict is different. Nepal is always sympathetic towards this most prosperous South Asian country which has been suffering so much due to ethnic conflict.

Conclusion
Nepal is well placed to maintain a balance between the two giants of Asia-China and India. Nepal, although landlocked, could, in fact, be as prosperous as modern Switzerland, if it has full cooperation from India in terms of free access to its market as well as trade and transit routes. Nepal's position towards Tibet should not be a problem anymore when even India has recognised the status of Tibet as an integral part of China.

The Nepalese policies towards South Asia and its neighbouring countries are largely dependent on the Indian policy towards Nepal. Nepal-India relations will never improve unless these outdated and unequal peace, friendship, military and water-related treaties are reviewed in a true spirit of mutual trust and equality. To say that Nepal and India have always remained special friends due to the sharing of the open border as well as the sharing of common religion and culture is meaningless in economic and political terms unless they facilitate mutually beneficial relations based on non-interference.

What the Nepalese expect from India is the positive role that it could and should play for the collective benefit of the whole region. Yes, India is facing both the economic and security challenges from China and the U.S. but it cannot make a counter-balance alone. It requires regional unity and solidarity which is lacking severely

('Chintan' is a lecturer of International Law and Human Rights at Nepal Law Campus and Director of Tribhuvan University Centre for Human Rights under the Faculty of Law in Kathmandu)

References

1.	See, generally, Rishikesh Shaha, The Rise of King Prithvinarayan Shah (1769-75), MODERN NEPAL: A POLITICAL HISTORY, Vol. I, Manohar (1996), New Delhi, pp. 23-41.
2.	Bipin Adhikari, Conflict illiteracy leading towards militarization, The Kathmandu Post, June 30 and July 1, 2003 (in two parts), Kathmandu.
3.	For treaties and documents on Nepal's relations with India and China, see, Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., NEPAL'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND CHINA (Documents 1947-1992), Vol. I & II, Siba Exim Pvt. Ltd. (1994), New Delhi.
4.	See, generally, Surendra K.C., NEPALKO BIDESHNITI TATHA BAIDESHIK SAMBANDHA (NEPALESE FOREIGN POLICY AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS), Sabita Prakashan (Taplejung), 2001.
5.	The author is fighting the legal battle in the British courts on behalf of the Gurkhas and their families for about two years. Most of the cases relating to equality have already been won by the end of February 2003.
6.	See, V.N. Khanna, FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. (1997), New Delhi.
7.	For detailed information about the activities of Indian Research Analysis Wing (RAW) in Nepal and in the region, see, Shahstra Dutta Pant, NEPALMA "RAW" KO CHALKHEL (MOVEMENT OF RAW IN NEPAL), Institute for Rural Development (2003), Kathmandu.
8.	India is planning to implement 30 river-linking projects all over India at the estimated financial cost of Rs. The project includes mainly the Kosi, Gandak and Mahakali Rivers from Nepal. It will also divert the water from Farakka and other rivers flowing to Bangladesh.
9.	See also, Prem R Uprety, NEPAL AND SOUTH ASIA: A STUDY ON CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, Commonwealth Publishers (1994), New Delhi.
10.	The two Asian giants coming closer would not only ensure the internal stability of the countries concerned, but would also be the best guarantee for a stable Asia in general, and smaller countries in particular. Nepal has special reasons to be happy because it always believes that the best of relationship between its southern and northern neighbours would help the region's and its own stability and prosperity. In brief, Indo-China relationship bound by mutual trust and confidence would result in automatic re-evaluation and recognition of Nepal's potential in contributing to the normalisation process. Nepal only stands to gain by this tie and will perhaps be able to explore more economic and diplomatic avenues with its immediate neighbours without any finger of suspicion being raised. The normalisation of ties between China and India can also be an example and guide to inspire the Indo-Pak initiative. After all, what cannot be achieved by war can always be attempted through diplomatic exercises. See the editorial, India-China ties, The Kathmandu Post, July 1, 2003, Kathmandu. Also, Bhagirath Yogi, Vajpayee's China visit: A Nepalese perspective, The Kathmandu Post, July 2, 2003.
11.	See, K. Bhushan & G. Katyal, SAARC: CHALLENGES BEFORE NEW MILLENNIUM, A P H Publishing Corporation (2002), New Delhi.
12.	Hiranya Lal Shrestha, Bhuparibesthit Mulukharooko Samasya ra Nepalko Bhumika (Problems of Land-locked Countries and the Role of Nepal), Spacetime Daily (Nepali), July 5, 2003, Kathmandu.
13.	See, generally, M.D. Dharamdasani, ed., INDIA AND NEPAL: BIG POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA, South Asian Publishers (2001), New Delhi.