Pakistan,
India and Regional Cooperation Shahid
Javed Burki
Introduction
The main conclusion
reached in this essay
is that the full and
unconstrained resumption
of trade on the basis
of MFN (most favoured
nation) status granted
by India and Pakistan
to each other, as required
by the World Trade Organisation,
holds great promise.
It has been seen in
many parts of the globe
that deep animosities
among nations can be
overcome by trade which
produces a dynamic of
interdependence between
people and the owners
of production systems.
It has often been claimed
that democracies don't
go to war with one another.
That may be true to
some extent. It can
also be maintained that
countries that have
tied their economic
systems with bilateral
and regional trade agreements
find it difficult to
use military force to
settle differences.
The main line of thought
to be advanced in this
article is that the
peace process between
India and Pakistan would
succeed if it is supported
vigorously by trade.
However, to make sure
that the two countries
don't use 'trade wars'
as they did in the 1940s
and 1950s to make political
points against one another,
it would be a good strategic
move to fix Pakistan
and India into a regional
trading arrangement.
This thesis is developed
in four sections in
addition to the introduction
and conclusion.
Section
one looks at regionalism
in trade and how the
lessons learnt from
the experience of
other regions in the
world could be applied
to South Asia.
The
second section examines
Pakistan's recent economic
situation and explains
why a leap frog strategy
of growth, adopted within
the context of a South
Asian regional trading
arrangement could help
the country improve
on its recent growth
performance.
The
third section analyses
the Indian situation
and focuses on how trade
in 'knowledge-intensive'
goods and services is
helping India turn its
population into an economic
asset.
The
fourth section provides
in rough form the contour
of the regional trading
arrangement that could
emerge in the region
for the next one decade,
say by the year 2015.
I.
Why Regional Trade?
Economic theory is ambivalent
about regionalism- an
arrangement that provides
the members of a regional
association preferential
access to each others'
markets. The purists have
no time for such an approach1.
They maintain that the
only way to promote trade
for individual countries
is not to worry about
how their partners reciprocate
if they themselves open
their borders. Borders
not only in the developing
countries but all across
the world are blocked
with all manner of barriers.
They cover the entire
gamut of restrictions
governments place in the
free flow of goods across
their frontiers. These
restrictions include tariffs,
quantitative restrictions,
and a vast variety of
non-tariff barriers. The
last category encompasses
practices such as health,
labour and environmental
standards importers impose
on the exporters. Sometimes
importers also include
the requirement that the
products imported by them
contain a certain amount
of raw material that originates
with them. How to dismantle
these barriers? According
to pure economic theory,
unilateralism is the only
way to proceed since the
advantages of free trade
are far greater than the
damages they may cause.
However,
since that is not the
way the world functions,
purists are prepared to
make room for global trading
arrangements such as the
one that led to the creation
of the World Trade Organisation.
The WTO is the second
best route towards free
trade. This is about as
far as pure theory is
prepared to go in terms
of promoting global trade.
It has no patience with
regional trading arrangements
(RTAs).
But
there are pragmatists
who argue that in an imperfect
world, regional trading
arrangements (RTAs) play
an important and productive
role. But, argue the proponents,
such arrangements must
be open, they must not
discriminate too much
against those who are
not included within their
purview. Open regionalism
of this type is useful
for a number of reasons.
To begin with, it locks
in a government's commitment
to lower tariffs and to
the removal of other constraints
against a relatively free
movement of goods. Countries
operating on their own
can- and often do- change
trade regulations in response
to pressures by vested
interests or to meet resource
shortfalls. This has been
sdone very frequently
in Pakistan by a device
called the SRO, issued
from time to time by the
Central Board of Revenue,
usually in response to
pressure from vested interests.
Such unilateral actions
are difficult to take
when countries surrender
some of their rights and
a bit of their sovereignty
to regional trading arrangements.
RTAs
also lead to greater foreign
direct investment. Foreign
investors operating within
RTAs have the comfort
that government policies
will not change suddenly.
They can also access much
larger markets. They can
locate their investments
in one place and expect
to sell their goods in
a wider market. Some RTAs
also tie their member
countries to follow certain
rules in the areas of
politics, human rights,
governance and the like.
Mercosur- an arrangement
between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay-
makes it incumbent upon
the member countries to
design their political
systems in line with the
basic principles of liberal,
representative democracies.
Any sharp deviation from
this type of governance
can lead to expulsion
from the arrangement.
It was this requirement
in the treaty that originally
set up Mercosur that prevented
a military take-over in
the perpetually troubled
Paraguay in the late 1990s.
When
we talk about regional
cooperation from Pakistan's
perspective, should we
talk only about South
Asia or should we also
look at other possibilities
including regional alliances
with the non-Arab countries
of the Middle East, the
Muslim countries of Central
Asia, even bilateral trading
and economic arrangements
with China, Asia's largest
and most dynamic economy?
We should certainly look
at all these possibilities.
We will for the moment
concentrate on the subject
of regional cooperation
in South Asia.
Three
of South Asia's largest
economies, Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan, were
once part of a single
political entity- British
India. It was, therefore,
inevitable that even after
partition, there would
be considerable inter-country
flow of goods and commodities.
This happened, but only
for a while. In 1948-49,
the first full year after
partition, 32 per cent
of Pakistani imports came
from India while India
bought 56 per cent of
Pakistan's exports. Fifty
two years later, the situation
was dramatically different.
In 2000-01, India imported
only 0.42 per cent of
Pakistan's exports and
provided only 0.13 per
cent of the latter country's
imports.
In
absolute terms, Indian
exports to Pakistan in
2000-01 were valued at
only US$ 186 million out
of a total of US$ 44 billion.
In the same year India
imported only US$ 65 million
worth of goods and commodities
from its northern neighbour
while its total imports
were US$ 50 billion. While
politics have obviously
interfered in the conduct
of trade between India
and Pakistan, other countries
have not done well either.
South Asian intra-regional
trade declined from 19
per cent in 1948-49 to
12 per cent in the early
1950s to only 2-5 per
cent in recent years.
These
official numbers, however,
underestimate the real
volume of trade between
the countries in the region,
particularly between India
and Pakistan. Estimates
of illegal trade between
these two countries through
smuggling or through third
countries (for example
Singapore and Dubai) put
its value at one billion
dollars a year. From being
major trading partners
at the time of their birth,
India and Pakistan now
exchange very little of
the goods, commodities
and services they produce.
While
political quarrels between
India and Pakistan have
caused many problems,
they are not the only
reason why intra-regional
trade did so poorly in
South Asia. There were
several other causes as
well, among them the autarkic
economic policies followed
by all countries in the
region, poor communication
links among the countries
and lack of complementarity
in the products produced
by the regional economies.
Let me deal with each
of these three factors.
The
South Asians, under the
influence of Fabian socialism
bought to the region by
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's
first prime minister,
and later adopted by Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto in Pakistan and
Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh's
first president for his
country, gave a large
role to the South Asian
state. In turn, the governments
of the region pursued
import substituting policies
in both industry and agriculture,
de-emphasising export
led growth that brought
economic miracles to East
Asia.
The
South Asians, having taken
the decision to delink
their economies, made
no effort to improve intra-regional
communications. This was
an incredibly short sighted
and economically self-defeating
policy to adopt. The British
had left a fairly well
developed road and railways
network that linked all
parts of their large empire
in India. The North Western
Railway linked Karachi
with Delhi and the fabled
Grand Trunk Road connected
Peshawar through Delhi
with Calcutta. The railway
and road network that
was built with the NWR
and the GT Road as their
backbones could have been
of considerable economic
value had the two countries
continued to develop them.
That, of course, did not
happen.
And
in so far as the complementarities
among the regional economies
are concerned, these were
not sufficiently pronounced
for several decades to
warrant the development
of strong regional trading
ties. It is only in recent
years, with the IT sector
becoming a leading player
in the Indian economy,
that Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
and Pakistan can begin
to take advantage of what
India has already achieved.
Even
if Pakistan and India
have the political will
to open their presently
closed borders to inter-country
trade, it would be better
to do it initially in
the context of a regional
arrangement. Using such
an arrangement will reduce
the temptation for either
country to use trade as
a weapon of diplomacy.
The time has come to build
these relations on a more
robust foundation.
II.
Growth Strategy for Pakistan
Once Pakistani policymakers
begin to factor in international
trade as an important
determinant of development,
they could adopt an entirely
new strategy of growth.
This strategy, as we will
suggest below, would not
necessarily follow those
that propelled the region
of East Asia and China
towards relative prosperity.
It would also not seek
to build the knowledge-intensive
export sector to the extent
India has done. Instead,
it could follow a strategy
of its own- a kind of
hybrid based on the experiences
of other Asian nations.
Pakistan
could follow one of the
three models that have
been tried successfully
by various Asian countries.
The first of these is
the model that produced
the 'miracle economies'
of East Asia. Also called
'tigers' and 'cubs,' these
economies essentially
tapped the large export
markets available in the
industrial world. This
strategy essentially duplicated
what Japan had done in
the 1950s and 1960s. In
following export led strategies,
the industrial sectors
in the miracle countries
were guided by the state
which identified areas
for them to expand into.
The industries that were
being helped were almost
always privately owned.
Nonetheless,
the state not only helped
industries identify markets
abroad, it also got the
financial sector to lend
large amounts of money
to the chosen industries
at below market rates.
In the parlance of economics
this was called 'directed
credit'- credit provided
by banks to industries
at the direction of the
state. This connection
between industry and finance
proved remarkably successful
but it also led to the
financial crisis of 1997-98.
What came to be called
'crony capitalism'- that
is how directed credit
evolved- worked for a
while but had to be adjusted
once the financial crisis
exposed its weaknesses.
This has been done successfully
and the East Asians are
back on the high growth
trajectory- something
few analysts expected
at the peak of the crisis.
The
other model that Pakistan
could adopt was pursued
by China. It focused on
developing the human resource
by providing all people-
boys and girls, men and
women, and residents in
all parts of the country-
with free education and
health. China's human
resource development occurred
in an environment of authoritarian
management of the economy
and of the political system.
Either by design or purely
because of pragmatism,
the Chinese, starting
in the 1970s, released
the enormous energies
of this well educated
and healthy labour by
gradually loosening the
political and social controls
they had placed on them.
First agriculture and
then small scale and privately
owned industries responded
to these incentives. The
rest, as they say, is
history.
Then
there is the Indian model,
one aspect of which we
will discuss below in
some detail. What is today
known as the 'Indian way'
was not a well thought-out
strategy initially. In
fact, the explicit Indian
strategy for development
adopted by the country's
first generation of leaders
achieved a result exactly
the opposite of that intended.
It constrained growth
rather than accelerating
it. In the period between
the mid 1950s and the
mid 1980s, the Indian
economy chugged along
at what came to be called
the 'Hindu rate of growth'
a growth rate of some
3-3.5 per cent a year.
The model being followed
now is the product of
a series of accidents
and ad hoc decisions.
It
has as its foundation
Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru's decision taken
in the 1950s to set up
half a dozen institutes
of technology. When these
institutes began to produce
thousands of engineers
and science graduates,
there were very few employment
opportunities available
within the state dominated,
moribund, highly inefficient
and stagnant industries.
A large number of graduates
of the now famous IITs
had to look outside India
for jobs and they found
thousands of them in the
telecommunications, information
and communication technology
(ICT) industry in the
West. When, in the late
1990s and the era of dotcom
explosion, the U.S. industry
ran into serious skill
shortages, a significant
part of this was met by
labour imports from India.
Thus the Indian Diaspora
was created which in the
1980s and 1990s not only
acquired great wealth
but also considerable
experience and expertise.
Once the non-resident
Indian community had become
viable in terms of size,
wealth, income, and expertise,
it was able to help with
the development of the
ICT industry back in the
homeland. Consequently,
India's IT sector became
one of the most vibrant
in the world.
What
we see in India today
is an economy that is
being pushed forward by
a growth rate which has
relied very heavily on
knowledge accumulation
as an important contributor
to growth. India's policymakers
are now confident that,
based on the recent transformation
of the economy, they will
be able to get their country
to climb on to the same
growth trajectory on which
China is proceeding. This,
in sum, is the much applauded
Indian model of economic
success.
Looking
at the future, but also
looking back at the experience
of the various successful
Asian countries, what
strategy should Pakistan
follow? Islamabad has
a menu of options available.
It could use private industry
to aggressively enter
the export sector, exploiting
the abundant financial
resources now available
within the reformed financial
sector. This would mean
following the track previously
travelled by the miracle
economies of East Asia.
But, unfortunately for
Pakistan, there is not
much synergy between the
structure of Pakistan's
industrial sector and
the nature of demand in
the world's large markets.
Pakistan will not be able
to duplicate the experience
of East Asia.
Or,
alternatively, Pakistan
could invest massively
in developing its large
human resource by providing
it with education, health
and opportunities for
skill development and
knowledge accumulation.
Such a strategy could
work if Pakistan had the
resources but more importantly
the political will. When
China went on that track
it saved about 42 per
cent of its gross national
income, a proportion more
than three times Pakistan's
abysmally low saving rate
of today. China's human
resource oriented strategy
produced results after
two generations, or at
least a generation and
a half, had been sacrificed
for the sake of the future.
Pakistan neither has the
luxury of time nor the
political will on the
part of its leaders to
take the country through
such a grind.
Finally,
Pakistan could follow
the Indian approach of
concentrating on the accumulation
of skills and knowledge
by one segment of the
population. A small (small
relatively to the size
of the population but
still numbering in the
millions) highly skilled
workforce could enter
the growth niches available
in the global markets.
This is the strategy adopted
by the first administration
of President Pervez Musharraf.
It was championed with
great energy by the then
Minister of Science and
Technology, Dr. Atta-ur-Rahman.
Unfortunately, it did
not produce the promised
results.
I would
advocate, instead, an
approach that draws a
bit on the Indian experience
but then moves on an altogether
different track. This
two pronged approach would
still emphasise knowledge
and skill development
as India has done so successfully.
Based on a well equipped
workforce, Pakistan could
either export its abundant
workforce or take part
in the rapidly evolving
'outsourcing' opportunities
that are changing the
global production system.
On the other track, Pakistan
could become the hub of
north-south and east-west
commerce. The north-south
track could link Central
Asia, including Afghanistan,
with India and points
beyond. The east-west
track could connect the
western parts of China
with the Arabian Sea through
the ports of Karachi and
Gwadar. These two tracks
will cross in Pakistan
and bring enormous benefits
to the country.
For
Pakistan to follow such
a strategy, it will have
to undertake large investments
in improving the physical
infrastructure- roads,
railways, ports and airports.
It will also need to develop
its economy to supply
this transit trade with
the services it needs
including insurance, finance,
warehousing, processing,
transhipment, etc. Modernisation
of the service sector
to facilitate such a strategy
would mean focusing on
creating appropriate levels
of skills within the country
in a number of diverse
areas.
What I have spelt out
above is a strategy for
sustained growth and development
suitable for a country
in Pakistan's situation.
Pakistan could successfully
exploit its young people
to work for the skill-short
sectors in the western
economies. It could, at
the same time, use its
geography as a point of
transit for two routes-
new versions of the old
Silk Route- that would
allow commerce to flow
from different parts of
the world. Following this
two-pronged approach,
Pakistan could leap frog
into the future without
going through the paces
of development followed
by other Asian countries.
But a great deal of thought
and planning will need
to be done to develop
and implement this novel
strategy. And, most important
of all, for this strategy
to succeed Pakistan will
need to draw strength
from its neighbours, particularly
India, and work within
the frameworks of regional
trading arrangements.
In the section that follows,
I will examine how India
has fared in the last
few years after analysing
how Pakistan could benefit
from its neighbour's experience.
III.
A Resurgent India
Pakistan's rapidly improving
relations with India should
produce economic opportunities
that could be successfully
employed. One of them
is in the sector of information
and communications technology,
or ICT, where India has
begun to experience shortages
of skilled workers. There
are reports of reverse
migrations of Indians
from the United States
back to their homeland.
There are also reports
of Indian companies entering
into strategic alliances
with firms in Asia in
order to enter the rapidly
expanding markets of the
region. Could Pakistan
take advantage of these
developments? To answer
this question, let us
first look at the IT sector.
The
global economy, in spite
of some recent hiccups,
has begun to respond to
some extraordinary developments
in information and communication
technologies. Rapid progress
in electronics, telecommunications,
and satellite technologies
over the last two decades
permit high-capacity data
transmissions at a very
low cost. This has brought
about a quasi-neutralisation
of physical distance as
a barrier to communication
and as a factor in economic
competitiveness. As Andrew
S. Grove, founder and
CEO of Intel Corporation,
said at a software conference
in October 2003, 'from
a technical and productivity
standpoint, the engineer
sitting 6,000 miles away
might as well be in the
next cubicle and on the
local area network.'
It
is the enormous reduction
in the cost of communicating
with distant places and
the ease with which enormous
amount of data and information
can flow instantaneously
that has brought about
the shrinking of physical
space. For instance, in
1985 the cost of sending
45 million bits of information
per second over one kilometre
of optical fibre was close
to one hundred dollars;
in 1997 it was possible
to send 45,000 million
bits per second at a cost
of just 0.05 cents. This
has led to the redefinition
of the work place. Even
those working on a single
project, such as the architectural
design of a new building,
don't have to sit together
or be located in adjacent
offices. They can easily
communicate with one another
over the internet.
All
change is unsettling;
rapid change such as the
one brought about by the
revolution in ICT has
had the same effect in
many different ways. Initially
the fear was that this
extraordinary development
will produce an unbridgeable
digital divide between
the rich and the poor
across the globe as well
as within countries. This
fear led the UNDP to devote
the better part of its
Human Development Report,
published in 2001, to
this subject. The authors
of the report warned that
unless full cognizance
was taken of the adverse
consequences of the spread
of information technology,
there was a real possibility
that a couple of billion
of world citizens will
be condemned to live for
generations within impoverished
ghettos scattered all
around the globe.
However,
as with most technological
changes, the benefits
that accrued to both individuals
and countries that were
quick to participate in
this change far outweigh
the associated costs.
That notwithstanding,
there is now the opposite
fear, expressed by many
in the United States.
This concerns the possible
loss of jobs to places
such as India, a country
that has shown the ability
to turn their large and
young populations into
economic assets rather
than burdensome liabilities.
There is no doubt that
under the influence of
the IT revolution, the
global economic system
is going through a fundamental
transformation. One manifestation
of this is the way corporate
America is linking itself
with the high-technology
sector of India. But those
who are adversely affected
initially by this link
see it as a 'zero-sum'
development, in which
India's gain comes at
the cost of America's
loss. There is greater
likelihood that this will
prove to be a 'plus-sum'
game in which both sides,
India and the United States,
will gain.
Why
is India the most prominent
beneficiary in the developing
world of the ICT revolution?
This question has many
answers; of which two
provide a clue to what
is happening in that country.
One, India's great success
in the ICT sector, particularly
as an exporter, is owed
in part to a decision
taken half a century ago
by Jawaharlal Nehru, the
country's first prime
minister. When Washington
decided that the imperatives
of the cold war required
it to provide large amounts
of economic and technical
assistance to South Asia,
Nehru asked for the establishment
of institutions patterned
after the MIT. This initiative
led to the founding of
the Indian Institutes
of Technology at six different
locations. The IITs now
have the well-earned reputation
of producing world class
engineers and scientists.
However, these institutions
served only a small segment
of the country's vast
population. Last year,
for instance, they accepted
only 3,500 of 178,000
persons who applied for
admission. Very wisely,
the Indian government,
drawing a lesson from
the success of the IITs,
replicated them within
the large public sector.
While
the IITs became institutions
of excellence, the entire
public sector geared itself
to train tens of thousands
of scientists and engineers.
Consequently, India now
produces 3.1 million college
graduates a year, a number
that is expected to double
by 2010. The number of
engineering colleges is
expected to grow 50 per
cent, to nearly 1,600
in four years. Not all
the graduates are qualified
to do world class work
which is the reason why
there is a movement to
improve the quality of
teaching by offering much
higher salaries. Indians
living abroad are also
helping. The non-resident
Indians (NRIs) in the
United States have teamed
with Wharton School and
Northwestern University's
Kellog Graduate School
to found a new Indian
School of Business at
Hyderabad.
The
second reason for India's
attraction as a destination
for corporate back-office
work is the play on what
economists call 'wage-arbitrage.'
This is the difference
in the cost of labor in
the developed and developing
countries for doing the
same kind of work. To
take one example: it is
estimated that this year
the tax returns of some
20,000 were prepared in
India, a number set to
increase tenfold, to 200,000
next year. An Indian accountant
charges US$ 500 a month
for this work which is
equal to the amount paid
for a single day by an
American preparing the
same tax return.
The
Indians have been able
to forge alliances with
corporate America that
have brought enough employment
opportunities to the country
to accommodate a significant
number of graduates from
technology institutions.
By some estimates, at
least one-third of new
IT development work for
big U.S. companies is
done overseas, with India
the biggest site. By 2008,
forecasts McKinsey, the
consulting firm, IT services
and back-office work in
India will increase five-fold,
to a US$ 57 billion annual
export industry employing
four million people and
accounting for 7 per cent
of the country's gross
domestic product.
While
India has succeeded, is
there place for other
countries with young populations
for obtaining similar
benefits from the rapidly
changing structure of
the global economy? A
large part of the increment
to global output will
be in the knowledge-intensive
service sector. Manufacturing
in developed countries
accounts for just 14 per
cent of output and 11
per cent of jobs. It is
in this part of the economy
that initial outsourcing
occurred and East Asia
and China were the main
beneficiaries of that
development. The service
sector accounts for 60
per cent of the output
of developed economies
and more than two-thirds
of employment. It is in
this part of the economy
that the Indians have
taken a share. But the
sector is large and there
is space for other developing
countries. Consider one
developed country and
one part of the knowledge-intensive
service sector. The output
of America's IT sector
is estimated at US$ 240
billion. It is growing
at a rate of more than
8 per cent a year. Indians,
with exports to the U.S.
of about US$ 7 billion,
still have less than three
per cent share in the
market.
What
are the lessons available
to other developing countries
from the Indian experience?
There are at least four
and the most important
of these is to rapidly
develop tertiary education.
Second, to boost government
spending on research and
development, which is
quite properly the province
of government. Third,
provide public funding
for graduate science and
engineering students.
Fourth, develop financial
markets so that new technology
can be financed by institutions
such as Venture Capital
Firms or through instruments
such as high-yield bonds
and initial public offerings.
These lessons would be
transmitted more readily
within the context of
a regional trading arrangement
in which the Indian IT
sector becomes a major
player.
IV. A South Asian
Regional Arrangement
One way of promoting trade
relations with India is
to do it within the context
of a regional arrangement.
That could be one way
of overcoming the enormous
suspicion that exists
on both sides of the border.
This suspicion cannot
be suddenly willed away
in a season. Working with
India within the regional
context may be a good
way to start.
South
Asia has already paid
a heavy price for not
taking the regional route.
In the late 1950s, when
economic development was
adopted as a major goal
by all developing countries,
South Asia and East Asia
were at about the same
stage of development.
In the early years of
the 21st century, the
latter region has left
the former behind by a
very wide margin. In terms
of average incomes of
the citizens of the two
regions, East Asia is
about ten times richer
than South Asia. Even
if we assume that better
regional cooperation would
have added, on average,
one percentage point of
growth to the South Asian
regional output, the combined
GDP of South Asia today
would be at least 70 per
cent higher. This would
have translated into an
equivalent increase in
per capita income and
a considerable decline
in the number of people
living in poverty. It
would not be an exaggeration
to say that a significant
part of the persistence
of poverty in South Asia
can be attributed to the
lack of economic cooperation
among the countries of
the region.
Another
way of assessing the benefits
of closer economic cooperation
among the countries in
the area is to look at
the impact of open trade
between India and Pakistan,
the region's two largest
economies. A study prepared
for the World Bank in
1993 estimated that free
exchange of goods and
commodities between India
and Pakistan would have
resulted in a nine-fold
increase in the flow of
trade between them over
a period of five to ten
years. Simply removing
the import bans the two
countries have placed
on their exports to one
another could bring enormous
gain to both sides. For
instance, granting each
other the 'most favoured
nation' status but still
maintaining a 50 per cent
tariff would increase
the volume of trade between
the two countries by a
factor of three.
As
a member of the World
Trade Organisation, Pakistan
is supposed to grant the
'most favoured nation'
treatment to India. This
has not been done while
India has extended this
benefit to Pakistan. An
MFN status would help
to remove some of the
distortions that exist
in the flow of trade between
the two countries. But
such a move would still
be within the context
of bilateral relations.
To go beyond that and
cast relations within
a regional context, policymakers
in Islamabad may begin
to focus their attention
on the areas in which
such an arrangement could
work.
There
are four areas in particular
in which regional economic
cooperation holds considerable
promise. They are information
technology, energy, water,
and research and development.
Let us look at each of
these in turn.
India,
along with Israel and
Ireland- the three 'Is'-
are now major players
in the global IT sector.
As discussed in a previous
section, India has already
carved out a significant
place for itself in the
world in this sector.
There are many ways smaller
countries of South Asia
could benefit from the
enormous advances India
has made. Institutions
providing training in
IT could get affiliated
with the well-known and
highly developed science
and technology centre
in India. Fledging IT
companies in Bangladesh,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka
could form strategic alliances
with the larger companies
in India. Even though
India has a very large
population and thousands
of IT graduates are produced
by the training centres
in the country, there
are some labour shortages
that could be met by the
skilled workforces from
other countries. There
are many other opportunities
in the IT sector that
could be exploited.
There
are even more opportunities
available in the sector
of energy. Of all the
major economies on the
mainland of South Asia,
India is the most deficient
in energy and the existing
gap between demand and
supply will expand as
the economy continues
to grow. What are the
options available to India
for closing the gap? Currently,
oil and gas constitute
63 per cent of India's
primary energy consumption.
According to one estimate,
oil demand will increase
from 1.9 million barrels
per day to 4.9 million
by 2020, an annual rate
of growth of 4.6 per cent
a year, slightly less
than the expected rate
of increase in GDP. Two
thirds of oil and consumption
is now met from imports.
This places a very heavy
burden on the Indian economy
which could be lessened
somewhat by importing
cheaper electric power
and natural gas from a
number of countries in
the neighbourhood that
have deliverable surpluses.
Pakistan
is one source of energy
India could tap. Both