India’s South Asian neighbourhood
Edited by K. K. Katyal

(India’s perspective on South Asia and options for constructive engagement were the subject of a major seminar in New Delhi recently. It was held under the auspices of the Association of Indian Diplomats, a non-profit organisation formed by retired ambassadors and secretaries of the Ministry of External Affairs. A report of its proceedings has been published in a book form. Reproduced below is the abridged overview of the document.)

There are three kinds of arguments involved in the matter of how we look at South Asia, or what is our most advantageous perspective: whether we should look at it as part of a wider region, what is often called an extended neighbourhood, which means also that this extended neighbourhood should be brought into the picture when we think of cooperating in various ways. Consistency is lacking in this regard, since not all those who think in terms of an extended neighbourhood would also bring that concept into cooperative ventures with our immediate neighbours. Secondly, whether we should promote constructive engagement bilaterally, regionally or some blend of the two, if some such blend is, indeed, possible. Thirdly, whether Pakistan, which of course occupies a special position by virtue of the trouble it can cause and sometimes almost insuperable difficulties of getting into any kind of cooperative relationship with it, should be treated differently, or just as another smaller neighbour.

Extended neighbourhood
Firstly, when we talk of South Asia the view was strongly expressed that we should consider it in terms of an extended neighbourhood. We keep on talking about South Asia but not much attention gets focussed on the fact that we should be dealing with, just to begin with, a wider South Asian region. Myanmar is integral to our security concerns, given our long borders there. Tibet is there, of course. Then of course Afghanistan has also been affecting and impacting on our foreign policy. So, instead of South Asia as restricted to the seven states of the SAARC region, it is better we think in terms of Indian foreign policy towards a larger South Asian region. It is very difficult, for instance, to maintain that you can devise optimal schemes of economic cooperation and integration (like the development of the water resources of the Himalayan rivers) among South Asians without bringing in, at least for some projects, a country like Myanmar or in other projects a country like China. There is also the potential that growth triangles and growth quadrangles hold for cooperation in this area. We are not giving them the importance that they deserve and we are raising artificial issues in rejecting them, particularly those involving China.

The whole argument that if you have a growth quadrangle between the Yunnan province of China, Myanmar, India and Bangladesh or even Thailand, then your security will be compromised and you will be flooded by Chinese goods, is a very ill-informed view. The fact is that China is a member of the WTO. There are rules in the framework of the WTO as to what you can do for a sudden surge in imports and you are free to apply the rules. China is now committed to a degree of transparency regarding its pricing policy, regarding its export-import policy and if it does not adhere to that transparency it can be hauled up in the dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, if they can flood you through the border, they can equally flood you through other routes. So this fear is totally exaggerated, and this is yet another example of how we allow the short-term considerations to come into the realisation of our long-term vision in the area.

Bilateral plus
On the second argument, there is scope-perhaps this is not totally absent-for a balanced political perspective. Of the components of this balanced political perspective, the first is to divest ourselves of this unnecessary conflict, at least in debate, and perhaps in our mindset, of the regional approach versus the bilateral approach. We probably have not been able to evolve a regional approach and fit our bilateral relations within that framework. We often preferred a bilateral approach. In this regional vs. bilateral debate, it can be seen that the two can be synthesised and harmonised. But we have always seen a contradiction between the two. It is this contradiction which many times impinges both on bilateral relations as well as regional issues.

The Pakistan focus
About the third kind of argument-on what are the options for constructive engagement with these countries-one has to treat Pakistan on a different footing from the other countries. There is no doubt that Pakistan's entire identity is based on hostility towards India. Over years and decades it has developed attitudes, norms and national values which are inimical towards India. It has tried to restore military parity. Therefore, with Pakistan we have to have a very different set of policies. One thing is that we have to remain militarily prepared. Actually the real difference in our relationship with Pakistan can be made when our military superiority over Pakistan is overwhelming. So long as there is parity, the scope of manoeuvrability in our relationship with Pakistan is very limited. That depends upon the steps that we take in developing our second strike capability in the present context.

It is also arguable that our neighbourhood policy is too concentrated on Pakistan. So our neighbours see it as adversely affecting their relations with us and the question arises, can anything be done about it? The dilemma stems from the fact that if Pakistan's entire policy and identity is based on hostility towards India, then we can ignore this, and treat Pakistan as just another neighbour, only at our peril, and if we pay Pakistan the attention that the threat perception from there demands, then an excessive amount of time is inevitably devoted to it at the expense of our other neighbours, who may also be led to feel that nuisance value gets more attention.

Constructive engagement: The imperatives

Security
The primary imperative of our neighbourhood policy is that of security, though others are also important. Our relationship with the neighbouring countries is the core of the making and conduct of our foreign policy. It is hardly necessary to underline the importance of the South Asian region, peace and harmony in the region for the benefit of all concerned, including India. We are all aware of it. Nevertheless, we generally under-estimate the importance of the neighbouring countries in our foreign policy calculations.

That developments in our neighbourhood impinge very strongly and importantly on our security is not only true of Pakistan but of other neighbours also. But Pakistan is of course a direct and immediate threat to our security. Even with other neighbours, developments in these countries and developments across borders with these countries affect our internal stability, our law and order, the very nature of our society and our long-term economic prosperity.

The costs of non-cooperation: Economic
We have talked a great deal about the opportunity costs of not having been able to forge an optimal relationship with our neighbours. Here are some of them:

Just imagine how much we have lost by way of economic prosperity because of not having been able to persuade Nepal to agree to a single mega project for harnessing the common rivers. The potentiality of a single project amounts to thousands of megawatts. Just imagine how much we have lost by way of the siltation of the northern plain of India and the instability that it has caused in the rivers of the entire Gangetic basin because of not harnessing these rivers. Just imagine how much we have lost by not having been able to persuade Bangladesh to allow transit through their country to the eastern parts of our country. Also imagine how much of a problem has already been created and is likely to be created by the continuing migration of Bangladeshis to India.These are the opportunity costs which can be seen in a very stark form and are of considerable magnitude.

Even in the modern context, the transaction cost in trading with neighbours is so small that the comparative cost and advantage becomes manifest in trading with them once the artificial barriers to trade are removed. This has become very clear after most of these countries embraced the policy of liberalisation and globalisation. We have seen our exports to Bangladesh increase to 1 -1.5 billion dollars from a very small figure which was there till ten years ago. To that you can add two billion dollars as illegal exports, so 3 - 3.5 billion dollars. This export is more than our export to almost all the European countries. If you take individually France, U.K. Switzerland, Sweden, the trade with Bangladesh is by a big percentage margin larger than that. If you take the off-take of our manufactured goods, perhaps it is the second or third biggest in the world. And we do not realise the importance of it. After the adoption of the policy of liberalisation by Sri Lanka, we have now surpassed Japan and Singapore in being the most important exporters to Sri Lanka. Even with Pakistan it is said that the clandestine trade is up to one billion dollars per annum. If you add it up, if you calculate your exports to the umpteen number of countries, 60 or 70 countries all over the world, it is many times more than all of them put together. This is the kind of stake involved in our neighbours.

The costs: Political
It goes without saying, also, that outsiders judge us through the prism of our neighbours' perception of us. And our entire standing in the international community very much depends upon how the outsiders see us as assessed, evaluated by our neighbours. Our standing in the international community gets substantially reduced if we are not seen to be at peace with our neighbours.

Constructive engagement: The obstacles

Perceptions of Indian dominance
One viewpoint rests on awareness of the facts of history and geography. We are large, much larger than all the other South Asian neighbours put together, in size and in population. If we take the seven nation SMRC region, India comprises 75 percent in area, in population, in GNP; in things like industry and technology we occupy a larger percentage. We have a much larger and more highly industrialised, technologically advanced economy and we are seen by outsiders as an example of political stability and democratic pluralism. Interestingly, India also encompasses all the cultures-the languages, religions and ethnic identities on which the separate identities of our immediate neighbours are based. And many of our neighbours look at us as a role model. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, one participant mentioned this is very much correct. In fact, there is also to be found a lot of envy as well as respect for India among the ordinary Pakistanis. So this is an aspect that we should not squander by pursuing policies which would be considered to be interventionist, especially with a small neighbour like Bangladesh.

Clearly India alone is not responsible for the problems we have in our neighbourhood relations. Our neighbours have their own problems and the largest of these is that they have not been able to figure out how to adjust with a big country which they cannot get rid of and from whom they have so many expectations. And they have not really been able to level that perception and most of the problems arise out of that perception. Certainly there are problems arising from the neighbourhood but the focus here, the concentration is on the Indian side.

The assertion of separateness
And all this leads to a strong proclivity among our neighbours to assert the separateness of their respective identities and many times it borders on hostility towards India, a policy yielding what some among the leaders in the neighbourhood see as domestic political and international diplomat dividends. If that was all, one could perhaps live with it. But this tends to prevent the development of the full potential of mutually beneficial economic, commercial, cultural and other relations and in this we are all losers.

On the other hand, there have been some positive developments in the last half a century of our recent history. As against adverse propaganda, promotion of dissidence, insurgency, terrorism and even wars, we have examples of political cooperation, agreements on the sharing of waters, benefits of hydel projects, some expansion of trade and tariff concessions, easing of travel restrictions, cultural exchanges and other positive developments leading to the assumption that some of our neighbours realise the benefits of mutual cooperation with us. The experience of other big countries in other regions in similar circumstances could also have some relevance for us.

The contrary view
There is, however, a contrary viewpoint that our South Asian neighbours see us not as too strong but as weak. This contrary viewpoint relates to the power differential. Here Tulsidas was quoted as saying that there is no deference without fear. So power has a very critical role to play. Now if India appears weak, neighbours will not respect us. There has been a transition after 1962. 1965 would not have happened if 1962 did not happen. Mahendra would not have defied Nehru if 1962 had not happened. There are so many other developments in this line. So on the one count is this question of your power profile and the capabilities which you can muster or harness on a certain policy decision-in terms of economic and military strength. But that is not enough. If you have enough military and economic strength and you cannot bring to bear it upon a certain decision, then again you will have no respect and no deference from your neighbours in one way or the other. Now we are tremendously powerful as compared to our 1962 situation. But still the neighbours do not respect us. Would they respect you in the way Operation Parakram was carried out? If you cannot logically carry out what you put before yourself, then you cannot blame them that they are not really respecting you.
There are lots of wheels within wheels in this question. One wheel within wheels is coalition governments-this again is debatable. Coalition governments are often seen to be weak, in India and, therefore, countries want to extract concessions from them. The most valid hypothesis is that you can give concessions only when you are strong. You cannot give concessions when you are weak. Rajiv Gandhi gave a lot of concessions to the neighbours, a lot of gestures which were tremendously generous in terms of whether it is Uri char or whether it is accepting that on water issues, we will agree to the trilateral approach. He said, let Bangladesh and Nepal get together and find out a solution and if it is acceptable to both of you we will accept it. It was a gesture he knew would not come up that way, but the very fact that a confident government could give this sort of a concession; it is not related to a weak coalition government. If a very strong government cannot really accommodate, with confidence, without hurting your national interest, then there is a problem.

Furthermore, we find that in many of the critical decisions in India vis-á-vis the neighbours, there are many kinds of unidentifiable lobbies and pressure groups which come into play. Again, an example can be taken from Rajiv Gandhi's time when a hard decision on Nepal was taken. Religious and military lobbies, the other social groups, those who had matrimonial relations in Nepal, started impinging on the decision. The neighbours have created these lobbies in order to soften many of these decisions. Unfortunately, we have not been able to create counter lobbies in each of these countries who would work when there is a crisis situation there. That also gives an appearance for the government-it is strong, it is militarily very powerful, economically very powerful, politically very cohesive, and still it cannot carry out certain decisions which have been taken, and problems arise out of that. So, when we talk of power differential we have to take these components into account, not simply the military might or the economic capabilities.

Yet another point which goes against the presumption that India is seen as a giant with enormous power to hurt the smaller neighbours, relates to our relations with great powers. This is a point coming out of whatever information we get, of what is happening in Sri Lanka and Nepal, for instance. If we are seen to be following a big power they will also look towards that big power. We have shrunk our strategic space in our neighbouring countries by certain policy projections and they are playing that big neighbour, the US, today against us whenever they want to balance us. Earlier they did it in relation to China, but any small country would do that kind of an exercise. The point is, what is the margin which we are going to accept of a pro-active role of an extra regional power in the sensitive neighbourhood.

India's diplomacy: Political and economic
There are bound to be problems with the neighbours and we have to accept that fact. There are problems even between Malaysia and Singapore. But what is very important while dealing with the neighbours is that we should not create a situation that will accelerate the problems. That is like the recent case of how we were dealing with the migration from Bangladesh. There has also been a singular lack of long term vision in dealing with our neighbours. We have concentrated more on managing our relationship with our neighbours rather than shaping it and giving direction to it with a long term objective and vision in mind. A more general view was that lofty pronouncements of good intentions, such as the Gujral Doctrine, are useful. At a rhetorical level there is, or may be, an advantage - and this is something which should be studied. But unless at least the basic substance of what is suggested in the doctrine can be implemented, it can only make temporary waves, and in the end it can do more harm than good to the overall environment of credibility in terms of India's intentions.

The contrary view was also expressed; that in our normal diplomatic dealings with neighbours we tend to think that excellence lies in doing tough bargaining with them, exacting a quid pro quo and even more in our negotiations with them and sometimes even in scoring points. Number 1, we have a particularly inward-looking, restricted, out-dated attitude to nationalism and our dealings with neighbours. It won't work. Number 2, the other aspect you function as if you are a Marwari.

This relates directly to the role of economic clout. The component of a Marwari psyche in our economic policy has got to be shed off. That we want to seek a reciprocal and equal advantage of every act of aid, grant or generosity which we are doing, would not do. Because then India appears to the neighbours not only as a giver but also as a taker. Hydropower is one such example. Transit route to Bangladesh is another. Gas to Bangladesh is another example. Not that they are not in our interest-they are in our prime interest. But if we appear to be saying that, look, without this we are not able to do things properly, then they will bargain, and that is what they have been doing. They would bargain and go into the denial regime to an extent of hurting their own interest.

That we ought to have a bigger vision was another angle on the same general view. At some point all this area was one economic unit. If you have problems with your neighbours, it is intelligent to create-though it cannot be done overnight-a situation that is congenial. Don't drive a hard bargain. But it seems that it is possible to start gently, slowly, the process of creating an economic zone. Maybe you can start with trade matters. For instance-declare unilaterally-because we are a big country and this is something valuable to our neighbours, we declare the Indian market-the economy is something else-open to all our neighbours without any restrictions, without any constraints of quota and such like, subject to two conditions. One, the things they send here shall only be of local produce, not imported from Italy, or Germany or wherever. Second, the payment shall be only in rupees. It is a small step, it is open to them and we are not driving a bargain. It seems that it will be in the interest of our neighbours to accept that. Those of them who might not initially accept the offer, for instance, Pakistan, will find that they have been left out and it is possible that their own population will be up against them for leaving them out of this kind of a set up.

And we should not allow local or vested interests to block cooperation. The regional and trade issues have been taken on in our relations with Sri Lanka. The Nilgiri tea growers have sabotaged, weakened or eroded the free trade agreement with Sri Lanka on the tea sector. Now, Nilgiri tea growers are within their rights to assert, but if we allow this vested interest perspective to dominate our national approach, then these kinds of responses will become common.

Labour migration should also be integrated with the overall economic integration approach. Illegal migration actually is a labour migration. We have made with Bangladesh, an issue of it. But it is very important in case of Nepal also. In spite of the treaty, people come, take jobs, and all those who are getting jobs, earning money, sending remittances are not necessarily pro-India. When they go back, they do not constitute a lobby or a group which will stand for India in one way or the other. So we should look at this in a different way.

Constructive engagement: Available options

General considerations
A general comment on relations with neighbours was whether we are the only country in the world which has difficult neighbours? When you look at the map, the United States has borders with Canada and Mexico. Egypt has problems with Sudan, China has difficult neighbours, and Thailand has difficult neighbours. Are there any studies to throw light on how they tackled their problems, and if so can we learn from their experience? If nothing else, at least we can get consolation that there are others who are suffering like us. The nearest example should not be Thailand but really the Americas because that is more like having smaller neighbours rather than big countries. And there is a resemblance both in Mexico and in Canada and the entire hemisphere there about the American power. But that is why we should take a leaf from the American book. They talk soft with a big stick, but we unfortunately talk loudly and carry the small stick.

Another general comment was that if our size is conceived as a problem and if any initiatives for mutually beneficial relations are seen as attempted hegemony, then these factors are obviously going to be with us for the foreseeable future. So should we continue to take initiatives or should we leave it to our neighbours to take initiatives and we respond positively? Should we concentrate on our own economic strength which would eventually attract our neighbours towards greater cooperation with us? As a big neighbour we are expected to go more than half the way in accommodating our smaller neighbours and yet there is a feeling that our neighbours are not sensitive to our vital interests. What can be done about it? These questions are only indicative, they are not exhaustive.

Ideology versus pragmatism
At the broadest level, there is the component of ideology in our neighbourhood policy, and this again is an intensely debated point.

Our present foreign minister has been quoted to say that 'we must promote democracy', When it comes to the neighbourhood, two values of India are extremely critical - democracy and secularism. There is the argument and it is debated very strongly, that we can adjust with any kind of a regime. Yes, we can adjust. We have to adjust, many times, more in the far off countries than in the neighbourhood. It has been suggested that we should not talk to the military leadership in Myanmar, for example with Pervez Musharraf because he was not an elected leader. We did, of course, invite him to Agra and we do talk to somebody who is in de facto control. However, the factor of ideology is there and that we can't take a moral high ground being the land of Gandhiji and Buddha and at the same time think of talking to leaders like the military regime in Myanmar.

On this question of military regimes and democracy, there are situations in a country where a simple ideological position may not be sustained. There you have to engage yourself with the powers that be. But this engagement should be based on the potential possibilities of the democratic regime coming back. In fact, the way we are engaging with the Myanmar junta, we should also keep the option of contacts and channels of communication open, with the other democratic forces. As for Pakistan, since 1954 we have somehow realised that the army is a major factor in Pakistan, but we have not engaged with it, not only in terms of doing business, but also in terms of understanding and possibly overcoming the adversarial effect.

The fact is that the Americans (for reasons which are perhaps understandable the U.S. was given as some sort of example more frequently than any other country during the seminar) talk all the time of democracy, freedom, etc. and at the same time they talk of international community and UN, but when it suits them, they act regardless of them when they want to. So there is no conflict between pursuing the national interest and taking a moral high ground, and talking about it.

In the neighbourhood, ideology coincides with national interests. This again is a point which needs to be debated but it is extremely critical to understanding. If we accept that democracy and secularism are in our interests, then there are two or three things which follow. First, we have to perform ourselves as a better democracy. We cannot go on parading democracy as a cause anywhere else if we are faltering on that. Similarly, on secularism. Second, we have not done anything-probably we would have still failed-we have not done anything to resist the rise of the sectarian state in our neighbourhood, which has been a cause behind many of our problems. And it is this sectarian state in the neighbourhood which has created conflict and problems in the neighbouring countries, the spill over of which we have had to deal with. But we have not seen this as a part of our policy and we have somehow not gone into that. To this extent the ideological component in terms of secularism and democracy is critical.

Friends of India
Thirdly, we have not succeeded-we must have tried, but not succeeded-in building alliances with individual leaders and political groups in the neighbourhood. Is not it an unfortunate aspect that in the neighbourhood there is nobody who can stick his or her neck out and say 'I stand for India'? There are very few and there are reasons behind it. There are reasons on the other side because the domestic politics is very controversial. And they look at their own political survival on the basis of what such a stand can do for them. But partly it is our responsibility that we have not been able to create an atmosphere and vested interest-political vested interest, not economic. Not that we have not helped them in one way or the other, but we have not been able to create political vested interests where they can stand up and say, look, these are India's interests which are in my interest also, my country’s interest also, and I would stand for that, and you cannot label me anti-national only because I am going to do that. This kind of cultivation, and there are examples from China, the way China has cultivated people-Sihanouk is just one example-how individual leaders and political forces have been cultivated to an extent that no matter what is the situation in a particular country these groups and leaders would stand up and say this is what the line of policy is, unfortunately we have very few leaders and groups in the neighbourhood who can stand for us in this way.

The Pakistan factor
Specifically on relations with Pakistan, there are two relevant considerations. The first is that we should be prepared to talk to them. But we should give a clear signal that what we want to talk about is an improvement in the overall bilateral relations. If there is no clear signal from them regarding improvement, then there is no need for us-you can do it for international salesmanship to engage in a talk-but we can be sure there cannot be any meaningful talk unless their interest is also in improving the overall bilateral relations and not only in solving the Kashmir problem according to their dictates. The other consideration is that people-to-people contact should be maintained in the worst of circumstances. Because of our open society, we are likely to influence them much more than they are ever likely to influence us. The invoking of the security considerations for interrupting or blocking people-to-people contact is very short-sighted and is exaggerated. Actually it is difficult to see how granting a visa to Asma Jehangir can create a security problem for India. This is what we did a couple of months ago. Linked to this, Track II is absolutely essential, especially with Pakistan.
It is very strange that while we are following a liberal policy for seminars and discussions between India and other countries there are special rules to deal with the neighbours. We do not want the neighbours to come and have an open discussion, and if we have that policy, we are not able to change their mindset. They already have a fixed mindset. If they come to us with more openness we will be in a better position to try to change that mindset. We have to invest more in youth and student exchanges and people-to-people contact. We do not want them to have a closed mind, so dialogue is absolutely essential. We have to learn from each other and exchange views. We have to build up not only a constituency there among the neighbours but a lot more. We should never think of leaders in terms of pro-India and deal only with them. Our stress should be dealing more with the people who are anti-India also. We should be equally open. Even when we have a policy of inviting delegations or people we should be more open to that.

Recommendations

1. Because of our relative size and strength, irritants in our relations with South Asian neighbours are likely to continue. Despite such irritants - and even occasional hostility-we should continue to assure our neighbours, through words and deeds, that we respect their sovereign equality, territorial integrity and legitimate national interests, and that we are willing to help, if such help is needed and practical.

2. However, it should be made equally clear that we expect reciprocal respect for our own fundamental national interests, including security, political stability and economic development and that we cannot accept any adverse developments in this regard.

3. Regarding cooperation for mutual benefit in different areas, we should be clear that while we are large enough to stand on our own, we would welcome such cooperation, if our neighbours are convinced that it is in their national interests. As a long-term policy we should painstakingly develop and maintain contacts with those among our neighbours and within the region who are wedded to democratic values and a pluralistic society.

4. For various reasons, a disproportionate amount of time and effort has been spent on our relations with Pakistan. This can, and does, have an impact on our relations with other neighbours. This imbalance needs to be corrected. If Pakistan has decided to have minimal relations with us, there is no reason why we should not go ahead with developing mutually beneficial relations with other neighbours in political, economic, cultural and other fields.

5. With Bangladesh, the sharing of river waters has worked satisfactorily so far. Discussions for long term augmentation of water should continue, with an open mind on both sides. On the trade and economic front we should try and accommodate Bangladesh. At the same time, we should make it clear that problems like illegal immigration and the presence within Bangladesh of elements inimical to India cannot be wished away and have to be tackled through discussions.

6. Bhutan and India have both benefited from the development of hydel resources in Bhutan. This cooperation should continue; so should cooperation on the presence of insurgents in Bhutan. In fact, this model of mutually beneficial cooperation can be replicated with other interested neighbours.

7. We need to pay greater attention to Myanmar for various reasons. Border infrastructure and border trade need to be strengthened; opportunities like a natural gas grid, use of Yangon port and other avenues for economic cooperation need to be explored-irrespective of developments in their internal affairs.

8. Nepal's internal affairs are essentially their own business. But for obvious reasons, we are concerned and should offer practical help, without appearing to be interfering. Vast possibilities in the development of water and hydel resources have been a saga of missed opportunities. While our efforts to persuade Nepal should continue, it is up to that country to review its priorities, identify its national interests and consider mutually beneficial cooperation in these fields in a timely manner.

9. It is obvious that there can be no substantial discussions with Pakistan till it stops cross-border terrorism and the export of terrorism to India. Diplomatic presence in both countries should, however, be maintained as a channel of communication, though substantially reduced in view of the minimalist relations. Any normalisation of relations will have to await a basic change in Pakistan's policy of hostility towards India.

10. We should continue to give pro-active support to the peace process in Sri Lanka and be prepared to make our contribution to the re-building process in the time to come. We should also be accommodative on the question of trade and other economic matters.

11. There is much we can learn from Sri Lanka on liberalisation and other economic reforms, and from Maldives on the development of eco-friendly tourism.

12. Regarding SAARC, we should continue to indicate our willingness to move forward on a sub-regional basis, responding positively to any initiatives taken bilaterally or otherwise by our neighbours.

(K.K. Katyal is Consulting Editor of The Hindu).