South Asia as seen by Pakistan
Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi

A region is a conceptual tool and a geographic, historical, political and economic reference point. It can be defined with reference to several criteria. These include geographic location, shared political experiences, values and goals, interests of the major powers which treat a group of countries as a region, and the security concerns and interests of the states of a particular geographic location. No doubt, the distinctive features are highlighted to identify a region and distinguish it from the rest of the world; no region can stay in isolation. Different regions or parts of the world have linkages and connections with each other in the present day world which has undergone a major revolution of means of communication and transportation.

South Asia is a relatively better defined geographical region with the Himalayas, the Karakoram and Hindukush ranges in the north, smaller mountains to the west and the east and a long coastline in the south. At times, there is a debate about its precise boundaries. Should Afghanistan and Myanmar (Burma) be included in it, given their historical and cultural linkages with the region generally described as South Asia? Some argue that China may be viewed as part of South Asia because its security policies have a strong impact on the region.

Traditionally, South Asia has been an attractive economic proposition for the non-region people. Initial migrations into the region came through the land route. Later, sea route was used by outsiders for penetrating the region. Today, a little over one-fifth of humanity lives in South Asia. Each country of the region has a varying degree of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity and some of these identities cut across the territorial boundaries of individual states. These diversities make South Asia a complex region and cause political management problems in the domestic context of each state, which often adversely affect inter-state relations in the region¹. The issues of national identity, religio-cultural accommodation and harmony, and political pluralism and participation are not yet fully settled. South Asia faces serious challenges of poverty and of underdevelopment, although all the states are striving to overcome these problems.

These issues produce conflicting pressures on the states of the region. They feel a 'pull' towards each other due to geographic proximity, shared political experiences going back to the colonial period and various ethnic, linguistic and religious continuities across their territorial boundaries. However, the same factors play a divisive role and 'push' the states of a region away from each other. This can happen when the ruling elite of a state come to the conclusion that a neighbouring state is either threatening its national interests or exploiting its internal diversity and discord to pursue its political agenda. If these apprehensions become strong, a sense of partnership cannot develop in a region. A state threatened in a local and regional context seeks counterbalancing diplomatic support from outside of the region.

Pakistan and South Asia
Pakistan views itself integral to South Asia. The roots of this relationship go back to the days of the Indus Valley civilisation. The history of the later period shows that the territories that are now designated as Pakistan were under various dynasties that ruled India over time. The strongest impact on Pakistan's legal, judicial, constitutional and political systems is that of the British rule.

However, Pakistan has not been able to articulate a strong sense of South Asian identity. A large number of Pakistanis do not see much relevance of the region for dealing with their individual, collective and nation-wide problems. There are weak or non-existent region-wide organizations and networks that could inculcate a strong sense of regional identity like the one developed in Europe, and, to some extent, in the ASEAN region. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been in operation for over eighteen years but it has not shaped into an effective regional organisation capable of showing that the individual states of the region gain by associating with it. As a matter of fact, SAARC is a hostage to the troubled relations between the two major states of the region, i.e. India and Pakistan.
Several factors explain Pakistan's dilemmas in its interaction within South Asia and its inability to develop a strong South Asian identity.

India-Pakistan problems
The troubled India-Pakistan relations are the main obstacles to developing a shared South Asian perspective and a sense of regional community. There are periods of cordial relations between India and Pakistan and they settled some of their bilateral problems. However, the conspicuous features of their bilateral relations are mutual distrust, acrimony and conflict. They fought three major wars (Kashmir: 1947-48, September 1965, the Bangladesh war 1971) and two limited wars (The Rann of Kutch: April 1965, Kargil: May-July 1999). Artillery exchanges on and violations of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir have now become a routine affair that adversely affects their bilateral relations². They were at the brink of a war in 1986-87 (Brasstacks), April-May 1990 (Kashmir) and in the summer of 2002 as the troops of two countries faced each other on the borders in an eye ball to eye ball confrontation.

The roots of Pakistan's distrust and fear of India can be traced back to the pre-independence period when the Congress Party and the Muslim League pleaded for two diametrically opposed nationalisms; the latter demanded the establishment of a separate state for the Muslims of South Asia after having failed to obtain credible safeguards for Muslim rights and interests under loose federal arrangements. Mutual distrust intensified as the two states entangled in problems in the immediate aftermath of independence. The major problems included the killings and two-way migrations at the time of the partition, disputes about the division of assets of the government of India and the Indian military, integration of the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir into India, the river water issue, problems about bilateral trade, and concentration of Indian troops on the Indo-Pakistani border. The dispute on the accession of Kashmir with India and the outbreak of the first Kashmir War (1948), caused the severest damage to India-Pakistan relations. Many in Pakistan interpreted India's approach towards Pakistan in the early years as a deliberate attempt to strangle Pakistan immediately after its establishment³. The Indian government did not make any positive gesture towards Pakistan to dispel this perception. Rather, India's policies strengthened its distrust and fear in Pakistan. These legacies haunted them in the subsequent years and they diverged in their approaches towards bilateral and regional issues and problems. Their bilateral interaction was marred by distrust, acrimony, conflict and war.

Pakistan's perception of acute insecurity from a militarily powerful India has dominated its diplomacy in South Asia and with the rest of the world. The search for military security and diplomatic support overrides other considerations. At the operational level, Pakistan's South Asia policy can be described as the India policy; other states of the region get lesser attention for understandable reasons.

Given the perennial problems in India-Pakistan relations, Pakistan is always on its guard in its interaction within the South Asian region. Pakistan's major concern is to keep track of the political agenda of the Indian state and how far its policies threaten Pakistan's interests. Pakistan's policy makers devise strategies to counter what they view as India's policies and efforts to undermine Pakistan's foreign policy goals and interests.

There are other aspects of India-Pakistan relations that weaken Pakistan's resolve to work for building a stronger regional community in South Asia. The experience of the European Union suggests that a shared perception of security facilities the growth of a sense of community in a region. This has not happened in South Asia. The states of South Asia, especially India and Pakistan, do not have a common vision of what constitutes security threats to the region and how should they cope with these threats? The states bordering India had a problem with it at one time or the other since the end of British rule. Their governments have complained periodically about India's domineering political and security posture⁴.

There are serious problems between India and Pakistan on the regional security profile. India's power elite often talk about a leadership and commanding role for India in South Asia in view of its size, population, industrial and technological advancement, military power and defence production. A powerful India capable of projecting its military and economic power in South Asia and outside is a guarantee of security and stability in the region. India's growing military power, according to this perspective, is no threat to any state of South Asia. Its military and industrial power will be used to cope with any threat to the states of South Asia from the outside. These states should not therefore pursue interaction with the rest of the world that conflicts with the imperatives of India's centrality and stabilising role in the region⁵.

Pakistan takes strong exception to such a power model for South Asia. It argues that a Delhi- centred model of regional security comes in conflict with the national aspirations of other states of the region. Pakistani civilian and military leaders advocate a pluralist and decentralised model of security that accommodates divergent perceptions of peace and security held by smaller states of South Asia, emphasising sovereign equality of all states, respect for each other's national sensitivities and a recognition of the right of each state to freely conduct its foreign and domestic affairs. The regional security has to be based on the shared principles evolved through a dialogue among the South Asian states⁶.

As long as India and Pakistan view each other as adversaries and maintain strong defences against each other, a regional entity is not likely to develop. The festering Kashmir problem has done the greatest damage to the efforts to improve India-Pakistan relations⁷. In the post-September 11, 2001 period, India projected the Kashmir problem solely as an issue of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan in order to mobilise support for its policies on Kashmir against the backdrop of global efforts to contain terrorism. It also used coercive diplomacy to pressurise Pakistan by moving its troops to India-Pakistan borders as a retaliatory move against what its policy makers described as Pakistan sponsored attack on Indian Parliament by Islamic militants on December 13, 2001. Pakistan responded by adopting counter military moves on the border which created a tense military situation between India and Pakistan until India decided to pull back its troops in October-November 2002.

The Government of Pakistan describes Kashmir as the core problem between India and Pakistan, whose solution is often described as a pre-requisite for any significant improvement of relations with India. From Pakistan's perspective, the core issue of Kashmir pertains to the political future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and human right violations by India's law enforcing and security agencies in Indian-administered Kashmir. At times, Pakistan pursued a single issue (Kashmir) policy towards India. The Indian government initially accepted UN resolutions for holding a fair and free plebiscite in Kashmir. Later, it changed its policy and denied Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite, declaring Kashmir to be India's integral part. It strongly objected to Pakistan's policy of raising the Kashmir problem at the international level.

India began to talk of Kashmir as a problem with reference to what it described as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan. From 2001 onwards, India also pursued a single-issue approach towards Pakistan, i.e. an end to cross border terrorism as a pre-requisite for talks with Pakistan. This policy changed in April 2003, when India's Prime Minister declared that India would be willing to open negotiations with Pakistan on all issues, including Kashmir.

India and Pakistan diverge on non-proliferation of atomic weapons. In May 1998, Pakistan exploded nuclear devices in response to similar explosion by India earlier in the month⁸. Had India not exploded nuclear devices, Pakistan would not have demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability. In the post explosion period, Pakistan talked of nuclear restraint regime for South Asia and emphasised 'minimum nuclear deterrence' to counter Indian superiority in conventional defence as well as to cope with India's nuclear weapons⁹. Unless India and Pakistan work towards finding mutually acceptable solutions to their bilateral problems and improve their bilateral relations, South Asia's regional profile will not be fully articulated and Pakistan will continue to adopt a cautious approach towards regional cooperation.

National identity and internal consolidation
The experience of a large number of countries suggests that if they face a serious problem of national identity and internal consolidation, they slow down on regional cooperation. Their attention is focused on coping with internal issues threatening their unity, national identity and territorial integrity. The internal threats include ethnic, linguistic and cultural cleavages, demand for autonomy, dissident and separatist movements, violence and civil strife.

These challenges become acute if the dominant elite in a state adopt a non-accommodating posture and use the coercive apparatus of the state in an indiscriminate manner to suppress sub-national identities and movements. At times, internal dissident movements cultivate external linkages due to ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious overlaps across the territorial boundaries, humanitarian and human rights issues and the political agendas of other, especially the neighbouring, states, vis-à-vis the state facing these problems. Such developments create tensions in the region. The neighbouring states have gone to war on such issues. Naturally, regional cooperation or a sense of regional identity cannot develop if the states of a region are facing such problems.

The states of South Asia suffer from the problems of internal discord and disharmony, dissident and separatist movements and civil strife, which adversely affect their bilateral relations and undermine their efforts to cultivate a shared regional profile¹⁰. We are concerned here with Pakistan only. Pakistan is a heterogeneous country with ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity and socio-economic disparities. Pakistan's track record in accommodating these identities and discontinuities in the national mainstream has been rather disappointing. A monolithic notion of national identity and an authoritarian political and economic management could not accommodate the demands for political participation and economic justice by these identities and interests. The break up of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh in December 1971 was Pakistan's internal failure to create a sense of participation and socio-economic justice among the Bengalis of the then East Pakistan, who constituted the majority of Pakistan's population. In a bid to cover up its failure, the Pakistani state used brute force in East Pakistan, inflicting innumerable atrocities on the Bengalis.

In the post-1971 period, the Pakistani state has shown reasonable accommodation towards sub-national identities which has somewhat defused internal discord, although the periodic breakdown of the participatory political process weakens the efforts for national consolidation. Pakistan accused India of exploiting its problems in the then East Pakistan in 1971 to settle the scores with its traditional adversary. Pakistan has also accused India of encouraging dissident and anti-government elements within Pakistan. It is pertinent to mention here that India frames similar charges against Pakistan with reference to dissident and separatist movements in India. When India sand Pakistan trade charges of intervention in each other's internal affairs, they will have reservations about transnational arrangements in South Asia.

The Islamic identity issue
The emphasis on Islamic identity influences Pakistan's disposition towards South Asia and it has led to a debate in Pakistan whether to project itself as a South Asian or Middle Eastern state.

Some people emphasise Pakistan's Islamic identity within South Asian context. Islam and its cultural influences entered South Asia either by sea from the Arabian Peninsula or through land route from Central Asia, Iran and Turkey. As Islam and the Muslims coming from the outside of South Asia interacted with India's land and people and settled down here, Islam developed a South Asian flavour at the operational level, which was different from Arabia or Central Asia, although cultural and linguistic linkages continued to exist. The advocates of this perspective see no conflict in Pakistan being a Muslim and South Asian state; Muslims live in all South Asian states. They do not disown the pre-Islamic past of the land where Pakistan is now located, although they attach greater importance to the period after the advent of Islam in South Asia and view themselves as a distinct identity within South Asia¹¹.

The orthodox and conservative sections in Pakistan project a puritanical notion of Islamic culture and identity. Disowning the pre-Islamic period of South Asian history, they link themselves with Arabia, Central Asia and Iran, and advocate that Pakistan must closely associate itself with the land and the people west or northwest of its border. Pakistan's Islamic identity will be reinforced by seeking identification with theses regions, and it must rid itself of the 'Hindu' or 'Indian' influences. They admit that Pakistan has to maintain interaction with all the neighbouring states, but Pakistani identity is linked with Islam, the Middle East and Central Asia. They either disown or downplay pre-Islamic history and cultures of South Asia (before the Arab invasion of Sindh, 711-712 AD) as cultural sources for Pakistan¹².

This conservative perspective increased during the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) who pampered conservative and orthodox religious elements to win support for his military rule. Pakistan's active role in Afghan resistance to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan also reinforced these trends. However, in the post-Zia period, another perspective is also being projected at the societal level. This debate has created an ambiguity about Pakistan's identification with South Asia.

In the post 1971 period, Pakistan developed very close ties with the Gulf and the Middle East states. A large number of Pakistanis went to these states for jobs and business and Pakistan provided military personnel to several Gulf states for training and staff assignments. In the mid-seventies, Pakistan received more economic assistance (grants, loans and investment) from the Gulf and the Middle Eastern states than from the Western countries. Given the material rewards accruing to Pakistan from the states west of its border, many supported the idea that Pakistan should project itself as a Middle Eastern state. This argument fitted well with the conservative perspective which advocated a puritanical notion of Pakistan's Islamic culture and its close links with the Middle East. However, this debate died down with the passage of time. Pakistan maintained cordial relations with the states of the Gulf and Middle Eastern region but stayed actively involved in South Asia.

It is interesting to note that some of the international financial institutions treat Pakistan as part of the Middle East. Pakistan is also part of the U.S. Central Command which covers the Middle Eastern region. The domain of the U.S. Central Command ends at the Pakistan-India border. India is included in the U.S. Pacific Command.

Trade and economic relations
Pakistan maintains limited economic ties with the states of South Asia, but its trade and economic links are very strong with the states outside of South Asia (This also applies to other states of South Asia). A good part of trade is linked with credit facilities and economic assistance which is offered to Pakistan by non-South Asian states. Similarly, Pakistan, like other South Asian states, looks towards developed and industrialised states for obtaining technology and technical know-how for economic development. Military equipment and weapons are also obtained from outside the region. Economic assistance (grants and loans) is obtained from the World Bank, IMF, the Paris Club, Asian Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank. These institutions are dominated by non-South Asian states. Therefore, Pakistan's interaction with other states, especially the U.S., the EU and Japan, acquires greater salience.

Pakistan and other states of South Asia depend heavily on the states and international institutions outside the region for trade, economic assistance and technological transfers. This relationship enjoys a clear priority over their interaction within the region. There are no signs that this trend will reverse in the near future. Furthermore, political obstacles in Pakistan's relations with India and a failure to agree on mutually advantageous arrangements for trade are additional constraints on the development of a smooth trade and economic interaction.

A strong fear exists in Pakistan that India wishes to use the cover of regional economic cooperation to secure markets in the neighbouring states and its policy makers are hardly concerned about the implications of such a policy for the economies of smaller states of South Asia. The threat of Indian domination of the market coupled with serious political differences that exist between India and Pakistan discourage the policy makers in Islamabad from pursuing a liberal policy on trade and economic relations with India.

Pakistan maintains cordial relations with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. However, Pakistan's economic and trade relations with these states are limited in scope. The leaders of Pakistan and these states often talk about rapid expansion of their trade and economic relations. Such declarations are not always followed up with specific policy measures. The same can be said about cultural and other exchanges. Pakistan and Sri Lanka will soon sign a Free Trade Agreement. Hopefully, this will increase the volume of trade between the two countries.

Pakistan's interaction with Bhutan is minimal. They do not have embassies in each other's capitals, although they agreed in 1988 to establish diplomatic relations. The Bhutan government operates under a constraint. It is treaty bound to seek India's advice on foreign policy matters¹³ which partly explains Bhutan's nominal interaction with Pakistan.

How to cope with the situation
Pakistan's perception of South Asia and the growth of regional cooperation in South Asia are distorted by India-Pakistan distrust and acrimony. Pakistan views South Asia from the perspective of its troubled relations with India which limits its positive and continued interaction in the region.

India and Pakistan are the major states of South Asia. If they cannot interact smoothly, a shared perception of South Asia as a region is not expected to develop, not to speak of sustaining it. India and Pakistan should downplay their differences and work towards resolving these. If an early solution is not possible, they should at least keep their problems and disputes within manageable limits. The decision of Indian and Pakistani governments in April 2003 to revive the bilateral dialogue process is a positive development¹⁴. It can defuse tension between the two countries, and thus contribute to promoting regional cooperation.

The states of South Asia should persuade Indian and Pakistani leaders to negotiate their differences so as to ensure stability and cordiality in the region. However, they can play a limited role because India does not favour any third state becoming active in connection with India-Pakistan disputes. Pakistan, on the other hand, welcomes any regional or international initiative for defusing tensions between India and Pakistan. Given India's sensitivity on this issue, South Asian states have to pursue quiet diplomacy to help India and Pakistan to adopt ways and means for peaceful resolution of their problems.

New parameters
One way to move India and Pakistan away from territorial security and arms build up against each other is to redefine the parameters of security. There is a need to emphasise that national security does not depend merely on military strength and readiness. This also involves social cohesion, internal political strength, socio-economic development and diplomatic support. Greater attention should be given to removal of poverty and under-development, promotion of socio-economic justice, and strengthening of the economy. Unless a state acquires domestic political and economic viability and the populace is given a hope for secure and prosperous life, it cannot effectively cope with internal and external security pressure. Similarly, mobilisation of international diplomatic support helps to overcome weaknesses in military security.

The expanded notion of security which covers military as well as societal security will shift the focus of these countries away from the notion of security through military strength and preparedness. Their bilateral cooperation can increase if they start devoting greater attention to improving the quality of life for the ordinary people. They can learn from each other's experience in dealing with socio-economic and other societal issues. Growing religious and cultural intolerance in India and Pakistan is a serious obstacle to improving their bilateral relations and promoting region based perspectives. Religious extremists are generally opposed to accommodation between India and Pakistan and advocate a hardline towards each other. If these political forces stay strong and assertive in both countries, their governments will find it difficult to work towards improving their bilateral relations. The imperative of peace and stability demand that cultural and religious extremism and intolerance should be firmly curbed.

Pakistan should pay attention to cultivating multifaceted relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. There are no political disputes or problems with these countries. Therefore, the expansion of ties should not be a problem. Somehow, Pakistan has not fully utilised the opportunities of cooperation with these states.

The bitterness between Pakistan and Bangladesh because of Pakistan's military action in the then East Pakistan in 1971 has eased. The Government of Pakistan released the Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report on the conduct of the Pakistan military authorities in the then East Pakistan in 1971, and President Pervez Musharraf expressed regrets on the killings of Bengalis in 1971 during his visit to Bangladesh in 2002. The question of division of asset and liabilities between Pakistan and Bangladesh and the future of non-Bengalis stranded in Bangladesh since 1971 are not yet settled. However, the two governments do not let these issues adversely affect their bilateral interaction. Bangladesh and Pakistan will benefit if they adopt more cooperative measures in socio-economic, scientific and technical fields.

Hopefully, new and positive dimensions will be added to Pakistan-Sri Lanka relations with the signing and implementation of the free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. Similarly, Pakistan should make earnest efforts to expand and deepen relations with Nepal and the Maldives. If Pakistan expands its interaction with the smaller states of South Asia, its South Asia policy will become a comprehensive and genuinely South Asia policy rather than being a highly India oriented policy.

The experience of regional cooperation in other parts of the world suggests that a sense of partnership and cooperation does not mature until the concerned states cultivate trade and economic relations. The states of the region must experience concrete gains of improved relations. At present, Pakistan economic and trade ties with the South Asian states are limited which need to be expanded so that their mutual relevance increases. The states of South Asia should start negotiations to identify ways and means to expand trade and cooperation, giving due considerations to the trade-related concerns of the smaller states of South Asia.

Non-official interaction between Pakistan and the rest of South Asia should be encouraged. The exchange visits of parliamentarians, academicians and intellectuals, the media people and students should be facilitated. Non-official interaction promotes mutual understanding and builds support at the societal level for peaceful relations. Such support can also be cultivated by exchanging each other's newspapers and magazines, provision of information about each other's society and the state, and cultural exchanges. Tourism may also be encouraged and special discounted air travel fares should be offered for visits to other countries in South Asia.

The print and electronic media and societal groups in the states of South Asia should advocate regional political, economic and cultural networking. They should mobilise support for a shared regional outlook and profile. Many people do not see the relevance of region-based networking for their societal and individual development. If public opinion support is built for a positive, smooth and multifaceted interaction in South Asia, regional cooperation will become popular in South Asia. A pro-South Asia consensus has to be built at the popular and intellectual levels within each state of South Asia. The print and electronic media are best suited to undertake this task.

There is a dearth of information in Pakistan about other states of South Asia. The same is the case with information about Pakistan in other South Asian states. The support for South Asia as a region cannot develop without keeping the people informed of what is happening in different countries of the region. Each country’s media gives little coverage to the developments in other states of South Asia. Newspapers, magazines, TV channels and region-wide NGOs should disseminate information on all aspects of politics, economy and society in all the states of South Asia. The people may also be informed of the advantages of developing region based interaction and cooperation. An informed and interested public opinion offers hope for cultivating a positive vision of South Asia in Pakistan and other South Asian states.

(Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi is an independent political and defence analyst. He has taught at Columbia University, New York, Heidelberg University, Germany, and University of the Punjab, Lahore).

References

1.	For a study of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity and its impact on the politics of individual state and their mutual interaction, see Subrate K. Mitra and R. Alison Lewis (eds), Subnational Movements in South Asia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), Raju G.C. Thomas, ‘Secessionist Movements in South Asia,’ Survival, Vol.36 No.2 (Summer 1994), pp.92-114.
2.	For a review of India-Pakistan problems, see Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 2001), pp.198-227; Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp.87-108,214-217; Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1988).
3.	S.M.Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy An Historic Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.3-61; see also G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (London: Pall Mall, See Bertram Bastiampillai (ed), India and Her South Asian Neighbours, Colombo: Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, 1992.
4.	Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geo-strategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy, London: Macmillan Press, 1993, pp.20-22.
5.	Ibid.
6.	Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
7.	For different perspectives on the induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia, see the articles published in Asian Survey, Vol.41 No.6 (November-December 2001); see also Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen (eds), South Asia After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), see chapters 3, 9 and 11.
8.	Pervez Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.176-177.
9.	See Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (eds), Internal Conflicts in South Asia London: SAGE, 1996.
10.	For a succinct narrative of historical evolution of South Asia, see Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India, 5th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
11.	Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 610-1947 (Karachi: Bureau of Compilation and Translation, University of Karachi, 1977, reprinted 1999; Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar, Ideology of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1999).
12.	Vernon M. Hewitt, The International Politics of South Asia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p.47-48; Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and Geostrategic Environment, p. 69.
13.	On April 18, 2003, India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared in Sri Nagar that his government would like to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan on the contentious issues. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, welcomed the statement and accepted Indian offer for dialogue. President General Pervez Musharraf also welcomed the offer. The two sides decided to restore normal interaction at the official and unofficial levels. Some non-official delegations visited each other. Pakistan's new High Commissioner (ambassador) reached Delhi on June 30 and presented his credentials to India's President on July 10. India's High Commissioner (ambassador) reached Islamabad on July 15. The Lahore-Delhi bus service restarted its operations on July 11. They also released fishermen and others in detention in each other's prisons. But, there were no indications in mid-July of initiation of an official dialogue.
14.	Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003), pp.10, 113-116.