The proliferation and illicit use of small arms in South Asia can never be understood in isolation. This is as much a theoretical position, as it is a practical one. In view of recent developments at the local and global levels, particularly with the arrival and reproduction of globalisation, small arms had a qualitative transformation with respect to its proliferation and use. Never did the world see such an easy availability and at the same time grandeur yet demonic use of weapons that have been conventionally categorised as 'small.' It seems that the humane call of Bhupen Hazarika that 'We are in the same boat, brother!' has come to haunt us - from Chicago to Chittagong, from Jaffna to Johannesburg, from Bosnia to Baghdad - indeed, more dramatically yet more painfully. But lest we make a mistake in understanding the dynamics informing, influencing and reproducing the proliferation and illicit use of small arms, it is important that we take a critical account of the meaning of globalisation and its practical implications locally, nationally, regionally, and of course, internationally. Let me begin by reflecting on what I call the multiversity of globalisation.

Globalisation, mainly because of its birth from a complex combination of multiple interactions, has given rise to a multiversity or multiple universes of knowledge and practices. Three precise modes could easily be identified. First is economic globalisation, second is reverse globalisation, and the third is subaltern globalisation. In each of these modes small arms play a precise and distinctive role. A closer exposition will make this clear.

Economic Globalisation
This has also been referred to as globalisation from the top or above (Brecher, 2000; Ahmed, 2001). Its meaning has been best captured by an OECD publication which, while crediting the term to Theodore Levitt who first used it in 1985 in his book, The Globalisation of Markets, sees globalisation as 'a seamless or borderless, global economy.' More concretely, it is informed by precise sets of economic activities with precise characteristics on a world scale.

There exists a subtle difference between the 'internationalisation of economy' and 'globalisation' according to this perspective. While the former primarily refers to the internationalisation of trade and later on, the internationalisation of finance and investment, each coming in the wake of precise historical moments of capitalism, globalisation refers to the complex combination of all these but more importantly one that is inclusive of a thoroughly transformed production structure. The latter can be best described as the organisation and development of a denationalised form of production.

That is, multi-national or rather transnational companies now collect resources in several countries, process them in another several countries and finally, export the finished products to the rest of the world. A fully finished product, therefore, no longer has one single birthmark; it has multiple birthmarks since several countries have gone to produce it. A Compaq computer, in that sense, is no longer entirely American, or a Toyota car fully Japanese. The final product of both these items will have components made in several countries of the world. Put differently, unlike the previous internationalisation of things, in the globalisation phase of capitalism the thing itself is the product of the international or global market.

In this newer configuration, the non-state enterprises are often more critical than the state-oriented or state enterprises in the reproduction of capitalism. The need for safeguarding the non-state enterprises, therefore, is as vital as protecting the state enterprises. The outcome has been greater policing and diffusion of licit weapons, which often for reasons of pilferage and structural leakage end up in the market as illicit commodities. I will have more to say about this issue later. But then, this is only one mode with precise layer of activities that has come to fashion globalisation.

Reverse Globalisation
The second meaning of globalisation is very much intrinsic to the developing country's craze for modernity, principally the organisation of the (post-colonial) nation state in the image of the modern 'Western' state. In some respect this has been well described by Nirad C. Chaudhuri as early as 1926 when Chaudhuri, while referring to 'a clash of civilisation' between the East and West, sarcastically noted that 'the real cultural role of the (colonised Indians) is to assimilate the ways of Europe' (1996:1,5). Put differently, if OECD's definition could be referred to as economic globalisation, the modernist aspirations of the developing or less developed countries could be referred to as reverse globalisation.

The global reach of Bollywood (India's film industry) and Indian restaurants are good examples of reverse globalisation, where the non-state forces of the East or that of the South are no less critical in channelising the development of the (culturally and intellectually colonised) less developed or developing countries. One critical outcome of reverse globalisation has been to develop militarily in the image of the modern West, bringing with it not only the military hardware, including small arms, developed in the West but also the impetus to produce such weapons at home. Often this has taken the form of joint collaboration between developed and developing countries with many of the small arms like AK-47, M16, G3, and even grenades produced and marketed as globalised items. Again, for reasons of pilferage and structural leakage many of these weapons end up in the market as illicit commodities.

Subaltern Globalisation
There is yet another type of interaction informing and reproducing globalisation. This is a complex mode and therefore requires greater care in its exposition. Critics have already referred to the mushrooming of global networks resisting economic globalisation as 'globalisation from below' (Brecher, 2000:10). The latter includes a diverse group of people environmentalists, NGOs, religious groups, small farmers, labour unions (incidentally of both the developed and developing countries), women's movement, consumerists, African debt relief campaigners, anti-sweatshop activists, and the like, all one way or another either critical of or directly suffering from and struggling against the impact of economic globalisation. Here the forces of the seemingly disempowered non-state have creatively joined hands to overcome the exploitation of the empowered non-state, i.e. the forces of economic globalisation. The subaltern nature of the resistance movements, particularly the networking, can hardly be minimised.

But then, there is a further subaltern variant to the whole notion of globalisation from below. This refers to the deepening of relationship between and amongst the 'dubious groups' and 'shadowy activities' ranging from smuggling of goods and people, illicit production and trading of small arms, money laundering, narco-production and trading, terrorism, and the like, and that again, across and beyond national, ethnic, racial, and even religious affiliations. The subalterns, particularly the poverty-ridden and marginalised population, become easy target of such groups and activities, but more importantly the state of being itself becomes a factor for certain groups of (relatively well off) people to rally support and even clandestinely work for their cause.

A protracted nature of poverty and marginality and a lack of substantive global concern also push them to seek informal or even criminal means to reproduce their lives or redress the situation. The complex networking at this level and in combination with the resistance movements against economic globalisation could be best referred to as subaltern globalisation. Here the subalterns, including their ardent supporters and sympathisers, are no less creative and empowered when it comes to organising and reproducing their activities at the global level, and that too often by challenging the overly empowered forces of economic globalisation.

Two things are worth pointing out here. First is the subtle connivance of the state machineries with the dubious forces in reproducing subaltern globalisation. In fact, the state machineries go on to empower the subaltern networks almost to their own peril, which brings us to the second point. Indeed, if economic globalisation is in the business of weakening the power of the state, the practices of subaltern globalisation are no less menacing and destructive to the state. According to Mittelman (2000: 214):

'(Criminal) groups are alternative social organisations that, in some respects, challenge the power and authority of the state to impose its standards, codified as law. These groups constitute an alternative system by offering commerce and banking in black and gray markets that operate outside the regulatory framework of the state; buying, selling, and distributing controlled or prohibited commodities, such as narcotics; providing swift and usually discreet dispute resolution and debt collection without resorting to the courts; creating and maintaining cartels when state laws proscribe them; and arranging security for the so-called protection of businesses, as well as sheltering them from competitors, the state and rival criminals.

There is no reason to doubt the destructive potential of subaltern globalisation. Even those resisting economic globalisation and joining ranks with the subalterns may find themselves at risk if and when the destructive potential of subaltern globalisation is played out with full ferocity and demonic intent. The use of small arms can hardly be underestimated here. A quick look at some of the practices of subaltern globalisation would provide credence to our contention.

Subaltern Globalisation and the Arming of the Non-state
The element of subalternity in the resistance movements against economic globalisation (and the case could also be stretched to reverse globalisation) cannot be denied. The anti-globalisation protests in Seattle, Rome, Prague or Washington all tend to indicate that the subalterns or marginalised forces have been put into a dire situation because of economic globalisation. The protests are otherwise meant to highlight the grievances of the subalterns worldwide.

The resistance movements however in and by themselves do not reproduce the life and living of the subalterns. Mittelman has already indicated that 'where poverty is severe, criminal gangs flourish' (2000: 209). The link between poverty and criminality is less linear than what is seemingly suggested here. A state of subalternity in fact creates conditions that make people disinterested in the business of reproducing the power of the state. Mis-governance otherwise becomes the (dis)order of the day. People, particularly the subalterns, increasingly start depending on informal, often criminal, means for reproducing their livelihood. Even when requiring business or personal security they fall back on the power of the 'godfathers,' hired goons, mastans, and the like, than on the otherwise inept, often corrupt, governmental machineries.

A shadowy network of things and transactions gets reproduced and in the process destabilises not only the power of the state but also the power of the subalterns, indeed, making them more vulnerable and disempowered. This further creates grounds for fresh recruits and creative but demonic ventures for organising and reproducing subaltern globalisation. The complex structure is somewhat demonically intriguing. I will limit myself to three areas, with particular reference to small arms.

Narco-terrorism
Narco-production and trading is a lucrative business in this region. In 2001 Myanmar surpassed Afghanistan as the largest producer of illicit opium and heroin in the world. To provide some knowledge of the amount, 865 metric tons of opium was produced in Myanmar in 2001, almost all of which were processed into heroin and sold to the illicit market both within and outside the region (BCB, 2002:1). This is more than double the amount of illicit opium that is available in other heroin-producing countries, such as India, Columbia, Mexico, or Laos (ICB, 2002:2). It may be mentioned that there exists a vibrant but complex relationship between opium growers and heroin producers, drug dealers and consumers, security and custom officials, high-risk investors and money launderers, and that again, not only nationally but also regionally and globally. As the following U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency report suggests (BCB, 2002:1):

'Opium poppy cultivation and heroin refining take place in remote, mountainous border regions. Armed ethnic groups such as, the United Wa State Army, the Kokang Chinese, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army control the cultivation areas, refine opium into heroin, and also produce methamphetamine. Associates of these organisations from other Asian nations have shipped tons of heroin from Burma to the United States within the past decade. The largest single heroin seizure in the United States consisted of 486 kilograms of Burma-produced heroin that the US Customs Service discovered in a containerised shipment of plastic bags from Southeast Asia, via Taiwan, en route to a warehouse in Hayward, California, in May 1991'.

But Myanmar, apart from being a member of the infamous 'Golden Triangle', is also close to yet another major narco-producing region, the 'Golden Crescent.' In smuggling heroin from Myanmar beyond the region and the continent both India and Bangladesh are used as transit points (BCB, 2002:4). This further exacerbates problems related to narco-terrorism in the region. In fact, one critical problem arising out of the confluence of two major narco-producing and trading regions is the cementing of a diabolic relationship between insurgent groups, arms dealers and narco-terrorism. Such a relationship is quite common in and around Thai-Myanmar, Indo-Myanmar and Bangladesh-Myanmar borders. Not that all the insurgent groups engage in narco-production or narco-trafficking but it has been found that almost all of them have regularly taxed and exhorted money from the traffickers while providing protection to the latter for conducting trafficking in drugs. There are several critical implications of this.

Firstly, the transnational narco-networks, now backed by armed insurgents, make anti-narco-production or anti-narco-trafficking drive immensely difficult. And given the terrain (both physical and topographical) in which the insurgents and the traffickers operate there is now all the more reason to believe that the nationally-organised military or coercive solutions may not be the correct way of overcoming the menace of narco-terrorism.

Secondly, weapons, particularly small arms, in the hands of both the insurgents and traffickers become more rampant, indeed, to the point of threatening the law and order situation in the vicinity. A large portion of the money received from taxing and extorting the narco-traffickers goes on to purchase small, at times sophisticated, arms for the insurgents. I will have more to say about this issue later.

Finally, subaltern aspirations get entwined between insurgency and narco-terrorism, almost to the point of blurring the distinction between the two. While this becomes handy for the state machineries in the strategy of depicting the insurgents as narco-traders and winning back the support of the members of the dissenting communities, it often leads them to quick-fix remedies with little or no results. As the World Bank-sponsored study on Indo-Bangladesh border smuggling once pointed out that 'Ordinary men, women and even children participate in smuggling as couriers, porters and rickshaw pullers' (Nandy, 1995), which only indicates that the subalternity of smuggling or even narco-terrorism is far more complex than what is readily understood. There is therefore no guarantee that the narco-menace would discourage the subalterns from joining the trade.

Money Laundering
Narco-terrorism would not make much headway without the practice of money laundering. It is the latter that provides the required funds for the production and later on, shipments of the narcotics across regions and continents. The weakness and corruption prevalent in the banking system of the region remain easily susceptible to money laundering. Often drug traffickers invest their drug profits in the country's infrastructure and legitimate businesses (BCB, 2002:11). The drug trafficker cum money launderer otherwise with the connivance of the bank and the state end up running legal businesses! When such a structure comes into being it becomes impossible to eradicate narco-trafficking and all the corroborating agencies, including money laundering and terrorism, unless and until the state itself goes through a sustained period of reforms and restructuring.

At times certain other structural factors are also responsible in reproducing money laundering, as is the case with the stateless but relatively well off Rohingyas living abroad. As stateless and few licit areas to invest, these Rohingyas have no option but to launder money to various Rohingya nationalist or insurgent groups, mainly to fulfil their subaltern aspirations in the northern Arakan region of Myanmar. That a part of this money would be used in purchasing arms and later on in insurgent or terrorist activities can never be ruled out.

Let me at this stage clarify one point. Once a subaltern struggle takes a military or violent turn, it cannot escape from being linked to the various networks of subaltern globalisation. This is because in order to sustain the subaltern movement through military means there is a dire need for both cash and arms, indeed, over and above the committed recruits of fighters. Often the funds as well as the arms come via the network of dubious groups and shadowy activities.

In recent times, more so in the post-cold war era, this has been the case practically with all the militant groups, including those directly involved in subaltern movements. Tamil Tigers is a good instance, which despite having being funded by the Tamil diaspora, did not hesitate to enter into the business of selling heroin and hashish for financing arms purchases (Shah, 1998:515). Again, take the case of Kachin Independence Organisation, a militant group fighting for the interests of the Kachin people within Myanmar, which with five thousand regular 'armed' soldiers remains 'heavily involved in the heroin trade' (FAS, 2003). This is not something unexpected in view of the protracted nature of these movements and the cost that is involved in sustaining them.

Even a modest costing will show that the need for cash is quite substantial. For instance, if we take that a militant group is made up of 3000 fighters or terrorists and that each is paid a monthly allowance of Rs. 5000, the need for cash just for paying the terrorists every month comes to Rs. 15,000,000 (or USD 319,148 at the current exchange rate), which is quite substantial in local standards (Swami, 2003:7). Often the militant groups for the sake of maintaining their freedom and this is more so in the aftermath of the cold war shy away from a particular source of funding. Instead, they now prefer diversifying fund-raising, which at times includes money from taxing the narco-traders or even joining in the business of selling drugs and arms. The following report is a good indicator of the militant groups' involvement in arms trafficking and making money from it (TDS, 2002:12):

Around 100 AK-47 rifles reached different gangs of criminals in the port city (of Chittagong) and its surrounding areas from the insurgents of Arakan state of Myanmar staying in deep forests across the Bangladesh border.... Arakan insurgents sold the rifles and some other sophisticated weapons to these gangs through a clandestine channel of local kingpins of arms dealers and smugglers on various occasions in the past few years.

This brings us to the third and final area, the issue of illicit small arms.

Illicit Small Arms
If anything that has empowered the terrorists and mastans lately, it has been the proliferation and use of illegal small arms. In April 1996 the Bangladesh military seized the following weapons from the vessels off Cox's Bazar (Nepram, 2002:99), a place incidentally not very far from the Bangladesh-Myanmar border:

List of Illegal Small Arms
AK-47 Rifles............................	500
Machine guns........................	80
Rocket launchers..................	50
Grenades.................................	2000

It is difficult to imagine that these weapons, including many in the pipeline, enter Bangladesh without some connivance of the state machineries, particularly police and customs departments. But even the knowledge of possible 'helpers' does not provide a clear picture as to who received the arms and more importantly who supplied them. The best we can do in this kind of circumstances is consult Jane's Infantry Weapons, a book of notable distinction, and find out the names of the countries manufacturing these weapons. According to Jane's 1996 edition, the following countries, both developed and developing, were listed as the main producers or suppliers of small arms: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Chile, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, USA, Venezuela and many more.

But this does not help much unless we identify the birthmark (i.e. the original manufacturer) of the small arms that are found and used in terrorist activities. But since the public had no access to the seized weapons mentioned above, there was no way to find out the birthmark of these weapons. But then a survey conducted at Dhaka University in 1995-1996, supplemented by various newspaper reports, helped to trace the type, birthmark and cost of small arms found in the hands of student political cadres and in-campus mastans. The following is the list:

Small Arms Used by Mastans in Dhaka University
Type	Birthmark/Manufacturer	Price (Taka in Thousand)
Saddam Pistol 9 mm bore pistol 22 bore pistol 7.65 mm bore pistol Chinese rifle 303 cut rifle .45 revolver German revolver .324 revolver Pipe gun Shutter gun	India Italy Spain, Italy, Brazil Italy China Britain USA Germany Pakistan Local India	40-50 50-60 30 60 80 25 60 n.a. 15-22 3-5 n.a.

The type and birthmark of the small arms indicate that the bulk of them were produced in developed countries but then it does not tell us how they made it to the University. It is unlikely that these weapons were directly shipped or airlifted from the manufacturing countries to their destination in Dhaka. What is more likely is that these weapons entered Bangladesh from various border points (Bangladesh-Myanmar as well as Indo-Bangladesh) via a vibrant subaltern network (both dubious and political) that possibly included at various stages of their shipments members of both developed and developing countries. On this issue, a national daily of Bangladesh reported (TDS, 2000:10):

'Sixteen northern districts of the country, especially the frontier ones are flooded with illegal arms and ammunition, posing a threat to law and order situation. These arms are mostly possessed by political activists, outlawed extremists, terrorists, extortionists and miscreants. The illegal arms include both foreign and local sten gun, SMG, sawed-off rifle, SLR, revolver and pipe gun. Most of the firearms are in the hands of activists of 'three political parties' who have separate hideouts in different places in this region including frontiers of Natore, Pabna, Sirajganj and Bogra districts'.

The subaltern nature of the network cannot be denied, although the flow of small arms has gone beyond those adhering to some form of subaltern aspirations. In fact, the flow has become so acute and extensive that even the former Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Deb Mukherjee, publicly noted that 'It is possible that firearms are among the items smuggled from India into Bangladesh' (TDS, 2000:12; Husain, 2002). Put differently, without an extensive subaltern network, it is impossible to imagine the flow of small arms, whether to Cox's Bazaar or Dhaka University. At times, however, not only the arms flow but also the network could prove deadly. Let me cite an example by quoting Singh (1995:59):

'A large number of terrorist groups are believed to be in possession of man-portable SAMs now.... The whereabouts of the unaccounted 560 Stinger missiles (out of the stock supplied to Afghan Mujahideen) are unknown, and all efforts to recover them have failed so far. A few had appeared in Iran, having been sold by the Mujahideen. Another 312 were reportedly sold in the open market at Landi Kotal (Pakistan) in January 1993. Earlier this year (1995) the LTTE shot down two Sri Lanka Air Force aircraft carrying passengers'.

What we have here is a subaltern network consisting of Afghans, Iranians, Pakistanis, and in so for as the missiles making it to the hands of the Tamil Tigers, Indians and Sri Lankans. But then, an American made weapon changing hands in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and finally reaching Sri Lanka can only make everyone culpable when the said weapon is finally used against the Sri Lankans. Similar is the case with the weapons that are used in Bombay, Karachi, Dhaka, Delhi, Colombo or any other place in South Asia. Indeed, if there is an element of subaltern bonding among the users of small arms, there is also a bonding, albeit more social, among those killed by these weapons. This is because most of the victims turn out to be disempowered, marginalised subalterns!

What is To be Done?
The activities arising out of subaltern globalisation, particularly of the shadowy and dubious variants, are not so easy to overcome, and this is more so when access to and returns from them are overwhelming and easy. Indeed, in the backdrop of poverty, polarised politics and poor policing, there is less urgency on the part of the common masses to help locate and seize illicit small arms. The return (physical, mental as well as financial) from doing so, and this is at the level of both the community and the individual, must be higher than those provided by the various networks of subaltern globalisation. In this respect, if there is a need for macro-intervention, reforming and even reformulating age-old institutions and laws and covenants, there is also the need for micro-intervention, with the locality and the individual actively participating in the process and benefiting from it. In the case of South Asia the macro-micro interventions may be initiated at three levels.

Reforming the police is the first. The group that is responsible for tracing, seizing and destroying illicit small arms is thoroughly inadequate. This is not so much for the lack of efficiency as for the deliberate disinterestedness in the task. Some policemen even do not have a chair to sit at their respective offices! If that is the case, and added with the poor pay and uncertain future, there is little hope that the police could challenge the shadowy and dubious networks of subaltern globalisation. As is the case, often the latter buys them up. In this respect, police reforms would be no less 'a revolution' for it would weaken a critical part of the network through which illicit small arms enter the market and reproduce subaltern globalisation. This reform must be substantial inclusive of the population as a whole.

Empowering civil society is the second. Creative micro interventions are required in this area. One could think of activities ranging from 'civil watch groups on small arms' to forming local, national, regional, even international 'associations of the victims of small arms.' Insofar as the latter is concerned, I am somewhat reminded of the role of the American mothers during the Vietnam War. As mothers of the victims they were at the forefront in anti-war demonstrations. In fact, their contributions were no less in bringing sense to the government and putting an end to the U.S. military role in Vietnam. Given the number of killing in South Asia from illegal small arms, it would be quite worthwhile for the mothers (or even fathers, sisters and brothers) of the victims, irrespective of their national, sub-national, religious, ethnic, ideological and communal affiliations, to come together and share their pain and bereavements. This could even lead to novel initiatives, including voicing in greater numbers a global disarmament of small arms.

Finally, insofar as the proliferation and use of illicit small arms is beyond national boundaries, a South Asian civil-police force ought to be creatively nurtured and established. In this region, policing has been an absolute prerogative of the government and the coercive forces, namely the police and the military. There has been virtually no role for the civic population or the civil society on matters related to security. But there is more civil content than military when it comes to narco-terrorism, money laundering and illicit small arms. Indeed, these are critical sectors in the nexus that is responsible for reproducing contemporary terrorism and the demonic use of small arms. Beefing up the power of the police or the military to contain and resolve these issues would take us nowhere. A combined civil-police force and that again South Asian in scale would have the effect of not only de-governmentalising but also de-policing security issues, indeed, to a point where civic population would be engaged in the task of creatively challenging and combating the shadowy and dubious networks within and beyond national borders.

Indeed, a safe and peaceful South Asia can come about only when we have dutifully created an environment for it!.

Note: Money laundering here is understood as changing the form and ownership of monies generated from illegal sources. In South Asia it is also called hawala or hundi. For a detailed exposition, see Shah (1998: 491-511).

(Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed is professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.)

References