Nepal's unfortunate location between India and China has led to the phrase: Nepal's 'strategy for survival'.¹ Referring to Nepal's delicate balancing act between India and China, this essay attempts to trace the process which has led to the coining of this phrase and explains what it actually means. The article tries to cover internal security linkages, sheds light on relevant aspects of Nepal's foreign relations and identifies its cost.

Historical Roots
Shortly after enthronement as King of Gorkha in 1743, Prithivi Narayan Shah undertook a series of measures to stem the threat he perceived from the British. He went to Benaras to obtain 'first hand information on the Indian subcontinent'.² There, 'after closely observing the political situation of India, the King visualised the danger from the rapidly growing power of the foreign imperialist and he felt the urgent need of a strong and unified Nepal, to meet the challenges of the imperial conquest'. ³

From Benaras he brought some Matlock rifles and also engaged the services of some skilled mechanics, who could make rifles at home. A small foundry was set up in Gorkha and small arms were manufactured there⁴. After being crowned King of Nepal on September 25, 1768, he continued to expand and fortify the kingdom. Assuming that Christian missionaries were 'secret agents of the British rulers, whose aim was to preach the Christian religion and break Nepal into pieces' ⁵, he ordered their expulsion.

He then sought to divert India's trade with Tibet through Nepal. His prescient conviction was, 'if foreign traders are allowed in, they are sure to impoverish the people'⁶ - a doctrine that had enormous significance in an age where the flag followed trade, and at times, the Bible.

Yam Between Two Stones
In his Divyaopadesh (Divine Counsel), an invaluable set of guidelines on statecraft that he issued for posterity, it is stated that: 'The Kingdom is a yam between two stones. Maintain friendly relations with the Emperor of China. Great friendship should also be maintained with the Emperor beyond the Southern Seas (i.e. the British), but he is clever. He has kept India suppressed, and is entrenching himself on the plains. One day the army will come. Do not engage in offensive acts. Fighting should be conducted on a defensive basis'. ⁷

For over a century and a half this sagacious advice served Nepal's rulers to find their way out of the conflicting demands of two big and powerful neighbours. Subsequently, Nepal continued to adopt a well calibrated 'policy of physical isolation and exclusion of foreigners, coupled with balance of power politics.'⁸ Notably, 'Nepal's physical distance from central China and the succession of weak governments there for centuries before 1949, inclined Nepal in the past to think that India's interference and intervention in Nepal's affairs was a greater probability than China's.' ⁹

Off and on, Nepal engaged in wars with both Tibet as well as British India. Inevitably, Gorkha expansion in the east, west and south, beginning from 1768, triggered the Anglo-Gurkha War of 1814-16 leading to the Treaty of Sagauli under whose terms Nepal had to cede territories it had earlier conquered. Even before it was concluded, agreement had been reached for recruitment of Gurkhas into the East India Company's forces. The first Gurkha Corps was raised on April 24, 1815. ¹⁰

Jang Bahadur Corollary
The rise of Jang Bahadur Rana as de facto ruler in 1846 paved the way for an increasingly pro-British foreign/security policy, particularly after his landmark visit to England in 1850 and meetings with Queen Victoria and other British notables. The Jang Bahadur 'corollary' to Prithivi Narayan's doctrine of balanced relations between the 'two stones' was a strategy to denude incentive for British intervention in Nepal's affairs. Even more important than recruitment of Gurkhas was Nepal's assistance to the British during the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Not only did Nepal come to the aid of the beleaguered British; Jang Bahadur and his brothers personally led troops, helped turn the tide and brought for the tottering British Raj a precious 90-year lease of life.

Jang Bahadur provided the finest rationale of his policy as evident from excerpts from a speech delivered in Kathmandu prior to his mission:

'I have three motives for acting as I am now acting. First, to show that the Gorkhas profess fidelity and will pour out their blood in defence of those who treat them with honour and repose confidence in them. Secondly, that I knew the power of the British Government and were I to take part against, although I might have temporary success for a time, my country would afterwards have been ruined and the Gorkha dynasty annihilated. Thirdly, that I knew that on the success of British arms and re-establishment of British power in India, his Government would be stronger than ever, and that I and my brothers and my country would all then benefit with our alliance with you as your remembrance of our past sacrifices will render our present friendship lasting and will prevent you from ever molesting us.'¹¹

One direct upshot of the Jang Bahadur-inspired foreign policy was that on December 21, 1923 Nepal initiated a formal treaty relationship with Great Britain that acknowledged Nepal's status as a fully sovereign nation. Without doubt, this helped Nepal escape the fate of 536 princely states that were absorbed by India after independence. They were integrated as a result of what J.N. Dixit terms, a 'foreign policy and national security exercise' by India's Sardar Vallabhai Patel.¹²
Nepal's quest for security linked with her geo-strategic location was somewhat altered following China's decline in power and prestige in the wake of the Opium War (1840-1842) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1856). Yet, Jang Bahadur himself 'turned strongly towards China whenever it (Nepal) had any difficulty or difference with the British government.'¹³ Even Chandra Shumshere, who, later as Prime Minister (1901-29), became the greatest ally and friend of the British, was reported to have said openly to the British envoy as late as 1890 that 'since Nepal was subordinate to China, it would in no way be subordinate to the British Government of India.'¹⁴

Post-1947 Nepal
No assessment of Nepal's security strategy can be complete without considering the departure of the British from India in August, 1947 and the creation of Pakistan on Nepal's doorsteps. 'Official Indian policy after independence came to assert India's interest in the integrity and territorial inviolability of India's smaller neighbours as a variant of the policy of integration with India.'¹⁵

More noteworthy is Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's statement in parliament on December 6, 1950: 'From time(s) immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent frontiers...We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security.'¹⁶

On March 17, 1950, Nehru had declared: 'It is not necessary for us to have a military alliance with Nepal...But the fact remains that we cannot tolerate any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any part of the subcontinent. A possible invasion of Nepal would inevitably involve the safety of India.'¹⁷ Singh claims that Nehru's activism vis-á-vis Nepal finds reflection in the Nepal-India Treaty of July 31, 1950 formalised with the signatures of the Indian ambassador and the Nepalese prime minister, against the backdrop of a growing movement against Rana rule by the Nepali Congress.

Clearly, the end of Rana rule was accelerated by China's re-establishment of control and authority in Tibet. Thereafter, Nepal's quest for security gained a new vitality, gaining momentum after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. This came after India granted asylum and encouragement to Nepali political dissidents angered at King Mahendra's takeover of December 1960.

Other significant measures were the signing of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in April 1960 and the opening of the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu in August the same year. Yet another was the 1961 agreement with China to construct a highway connecting Kodari, on the Nepal-Tibet border, to Kathmandu. It was clearly meant to increase Nepal's strategic options, especially since her capital was then linked by road solely with India. No Chinese tanks or divisions have rolled or marched down that highway, as was repeatedly predicted by Indian commentators after the highway's inauguration in 1967. The national consensus, however, is that national security was thereby significantly enhanced.

Beyond Her Neighbourhood
Having noted in passing the nexus between Nepal's inexorable search for security and her foreign policy goals and achievements, here now is an update and elaboration. On April 21, 1947, before the British withdrew from India, Nepal had secured recognition as an independent nation from the United States. This was followed on April 25, 1947 by an agreement of friendship and commerce providing for the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations. Then, in May 1949, Nepal established diplomatic relations with France at ambassadorial level.

Thus, even before Nehru made the ominous statements on Nepal, it had entered into diplomatic relations with the U.K., the U.S. and France, which made it impossible for India to contemplate action against Nepal, as was done against the Indian princely states. Even during the twilight years of the Rana regime, Nepal wisely chose to expand its ties to the outside world to enhance its standing and international visibility. A key milestone was Nepal's initial move to secure membership of the United Nations in 1947. Because of cold war politics this was delayed until December 15, 1955 when Nepal, along with 15 other nations, was admitted to the UN. 18 Contesting elections for non-permanent membership to the UN Security Council, twice successfully, can also be attributed to its dogged pursuit of the Holy Grail of national security. ¹⁹

In 1955, Nepal participated in the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, after having attended her first international conference in March 1947: the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. In 1961, King Mahendra led the Nepalese delegation to the first-ever summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade. Like many NAM members, Nepal possibly found solace, and security, in numbers. Till the end of the Cold War, NAM membership provided her a useful forum to maximise her foreign policy gains, including the preservation of political independence.

National security as a key priority is reflected in King Mahendra's pronouncement at the Belgrade Non-aligned Movement summit: 'Nepal has made clear in the United Nations and outside that she is opposed to all domination over any country by another.' ²⁰

Creation of Bangladesh, Annexation of Sikkim
That geo-strategic considerations constituted a vital ingredient in Nepal's foreign policy design is further substantiated by it establishing diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1960 and an embassy there in 1964. ²¹ In a joint communique issued after President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan's state visit to Nepal in September 1970, against the backdrop of the crisis in East Pakistan, it is stated that: 'they (the two heads of state) agreed that one of the greatest dangers to world peace was the direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of a country by outsiders and that in no circumstances, whatsoever, should any country interfere in the internal affairs of another.' ²²

Bangladesh's creation after the break-up of Pakistan, through India's active intervention and generous assistance from the Soviet Union, is too well documented to merit further discussion. What is to be noted is that the after-shocks were widely experienced far and wide, including in Nepal. Nepal was reluctant, unlike Bhutan, to rush in with Bangladesh's recognition and timed it only after Myanmar (Burma), which shares a border with the new nation.

Although King Mahendra passed away soon thereafter, the sense of national insecurity it engendered was strengthened after King Birendra's accession. It climaxed less than two years later when a carefully orchestrated anti-Chogyal (ruler) movement in 1973-1974 in Sikkim led to its annexation by India in 1975. Apart from 'the role played by the Government of India in manoeuvring the political parties of Sikkim and sustaining the anti-ruler movement' significantly, Sikkim's merger took place 'under the shield of a heavy Indian presence' that 'gave the impression, within and outside Sikkim, that India's was the hidden hand.' ²³

Besides officially protesting against 'outside interference' by Foreign Minister Gyanendra Bahadur Karki, the Nepalese media accused India of 'imperialistic' designs, while students staged huge anti-Indian demonstrations in Kathmandu. ²⁴ Though unable to change facts, Sikkim's annexation - on the heels of Bangladesh's emergence out of Pakistan - triggered a serious re-thinking of Nepal's national security options. It took the shape, ultimately, of a demarche by King Birendra in the form of a proposal to have Nepal internationally accepted as a Zone of Peace (ZOP).

Three months after anti-Chogyal protests began in Sikkim, King Birendra first gave expression to his deep sense of anxiety. In a passionate speech before the Nepal Council of World Affairs on July 26, 1973, he referred to 'the drama of world politics' and pronounced that it 'makes a dispassionate observer feel pity at the fate of some small states which (while) striving for liberation or freedom have only succumbed to subjugation and drudgery.' ²⁵ Meaningfully, it concluded, 'While we pledge friendship with all nations, we shall take special pains to cultivate friendship with our neighbours hoping earnestly that peace, cooperation and an understanding based on a sober appreciation of each other's problems and aspirations shall prevail. Notwithstanding these fervent pleas, notwithstanding this sincere expression of goodwill, notwithstanding these endeavours, should ill-fortune ever overtake us, I hope and pray that the people of Nepal will not lag behind to brace themselves with the last resource they have - courage: courage to prove to the world that force or contrivances are but feeble instruments to subdue the fierce spirit of a people whose lifeblood, through the ages, has been independence or nothing.' ²⁶

By April 1990, although 116 nations - including China, the U.S., the U.K. and France - had endorsed ZOP, India adamantly refused to coalesce in. Two American scholars, think India viewed ZOP as 'an attempt by Nepal to opt out from India's security perimeter and to abrogate the special relationship with India under the 1950 Treaty.' ²⁷ Dampening India's enthusiasm was the fact that Pakistan and China were among ZOP's first supporters. What must not have gone un-noted, too, was that a joint Sino-Pakistan communique issued in Beijing after Premier Z. A. Bhutto's official visit to China in May 1976, expressed the two governments' 'firm support' for ZOP. ²⁸ The 1950 Treaty signed by India with an autocratic regime on its last legs came with secret letters that were also exchanged and which, inter alia, committed Nepal to seek India's permission to import arms through its territory.

In 1989, when Nepal secretly acquired arms from China, India exerted its pressure by economic muscle. Facing renewal of the trade and transit treaties, India sought a renegotiated single treaty, and to pressurise a recalcitrant Nepal, it imposed a blockade of all but two transit routes between the two countries. ²⁹ Although 'the Treaty and the EOLs (Exchange of Letters) have never been published officially or made public, they have unofficially appeared in a number of texts in both India and Nepal.' ³⁰ After 1990, there has been a chorus of demands for its revision or replacement. Despite official bilateral talks in that context, the Treaty, which India regards as a sheet anchor of her relationship with Nepal, remains intact. By way of comparison, there has not been any similar demand vis-á-vis the 1960 Nepal-China Treaty.

Notably, after King Mahendra's takeover, sharply criticised by India, 'Nepali politicians organised a movement for the restoration of democracy from their base of exile in Nepal' ³¹ that led, even, to a bid on King Mahendra's life. India stopped such activities only after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian conflict in October 1962. Earlier, in Beijing on October 5, 1962, the Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi had declared, 'In case any foreign army makes a foolhardy attempt to attack Nepal...China will side with the Nepalese people.'³² Thus, rather than King Mahendra's use of the China card, it was India that first allowed the activities of the Nepali dissidents and then backed off when China stepped into the picture. The 'balancing act' factor is thus influenced by the 'two stones' as much as by the 'yam'.

Nepal has not, to date, banned the recruitment of her nationals into the Indian Army, an antiquated legacy of Nepal's ties with the erstwhile British Raj - despite the demand from many nationalistic groups and the deep embarrassment to her relations with China and Pakistan that have chosen not to make an issue out of it. In this important instance, Nepal has not followed the dictum of strategic balance between India and China.

Post-April 1990
Significantly, the drafters of the 1990 Constitution threw out the ZOP baby along with the panchayat bath water. While pleasing India, this rash move was undertaken without a national debate or any thought to the grave security implications for small states of momentous events that had already occurred, such as Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Vietnam's thrust into Cambodia. Subsequently, one notes a wilful neglect of all matters pertaining to national security - at least, until the Maoist problem became too serious to ignore and invited American, and then international, attention after 9/11.

The misunderstanding and mishandling of the Bhutanese refugee issue which is still going on after 13 years must also be included in this list. A glaring example is Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala's statement in New Delhi in December, 1991 that the forcible expulsion of southern Bhutanese by Thimphu was wholly within Bhutan's domestic jurisdiction. ³³ Nepal's handling of the refugee issue has been incompetent, unfocused and totally lacking in an understanding of its larger strategic politico-demographic underpinnings. The disturbing implications of India allowing (some would say assisting) Bhutanese refugees to traverse through at least 100 kms. of Indian territory before entering Nepal but preventing them from returning, seem to have been glossed over.

Another area reflecting the sad state of national security consciousness, post-1990, is manifested in the inability or unwillingness of governments in checking the unfettered flow of foreign nationals across the porous Nepal-India border.

Internal Security and External Implications
Even more glaring has been their incapacity to tackle the Maoist insurgency which first burst in the open in February 1996 in the form of a 'People's War' against the state by the underground Communist Party of Nepal, Maoist. Initially dismissed as a law and order problem, it escalated progressively until a cease-fire was instituted in 2001. Three rounds of peace talks were held from August to November, 2001 between the Maoists and the Sher Bahadur Deuba government. Matters came to a head when Maoists broke off talks and attacked Royal Nepal Army barracks in Dang district leading, subsequently, to the declaration of emergency by King Gyanendra, on Prime Minister Deuba's recommendation, as also to the Army's mobilisation against the rebels.

Following the King's October 4, 2002 intervention and appointment of Lokendra Bahadur Chand as prime minister, new initiatives produced another cease-fire and two rounds of official talks. Following Chand's resignation, Surya Bahadur Thapa was nominated as prime minister on June 5, 2003. Continuing on the groundwork laid earlier, a third round of parleys was held with the new governmental team. The talks broke down on August 27 after the Maoist leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai unilaterally called it off rejecting the government's concept paper. According to figures released by the Informal Sector Education Centre more than 8,000 lives have been lost in the past eight years, with over 1,200 deaths since the collapse of the latest cease-fire.

Infrastructure worth over US$ 300 million has been destroyed, including basic facilities such as those catering to providing drinking water and telephone services, bridges, school buildings and health posts. ³⁴

The cost of the Maoist insurgency, as per a report quoting expert sources, placed it in the range of Rs. 55-84 billion. (One US $ is equivalent to roughly Rs. 75 Nepali.). Therein, it is claimed: GDP loss during the last seven years may be in the range of Rs. 55-84 billion; some Rs. 18 billion worth of physical structure destroyed; tourism sector lost Rs. 6 billion in 2001 and 2002; and development budget in education, health, rural drinking water and local development registered a negative trend in 2001/2002. Combined police and military expenditure for 1997/1998 was Rs. 5.16 billion. It jumped 300 percent in 2002/2003 to Rs.15.09 billion. ³⁵

Nepal's grave internal security situation has impacted on her foreign relations, principally with India, the United States, the U.K. and China. American interest began to focus on Nepal and the Maoists only after September 11, 2001 (9/11), although the problem had been around since 1996. The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Nepal in January 2002, followed by a mission to Washington in May 2002 by Prime Minister Deuba when President Bush committed modest military assistance and increased development assistance to Nepal. Stung by Maoists' murder of two Nepali embassy security guards, the U.S. has placed CPN (M) in the State Department's 'Other Terrorist Groups' listing. ³⁶ Following the Maoists' vow to target America, the U.S. declared it a threat and ordered the freezing of all assets in the U.S. and banned most transactions and dealings with the organisation.³⁷

U.S. concern was thus graphically summed up by Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski, 'We don't want to see areas of Nepal become chaotic so as to create a vacuum for mischief makers to come in. You know, the nest of Al Qaeda was broken in Afghanistan, but the birds are still flying about. We don't want that bunch to land in Nepal, for the region's sake, for Nepal's sake and for our own.' ³⁸ A Kathmandu-based diplomat explained: The 'neo-cons' in Washington see 'the very real possibility in Nepal of a conjunction of their worst nightmares, communism and terrorism.' He, however, saw a 'silver lining' in America's current interest saying that a major positive change was registered in Nepal's Army gradually replacing 'Indian SLRs by American M-16s' adding, 'Indians don't like it, but they can't do anything about it.' ³⁹

While by and large, the British government shares the American concern on the internal security situation and has provided valuable military assistance, some analysts note tactical differences with Britain and the Europeans, who place greater hope on a negotiated settlement. One, in fact, claims that 'Maoists have not inflicted any physical harm on personnel, projects belonging to either India or Britain.' ⁴⁰ Beijing's policy has been clear and consistent. Declaring that the use of the term 'Maoist' is an insult to China's great leader Mao Zedong, China labels CPN (M) as an 'anti-government outfit.' There have not been any reports of contacts between Nepalese Maoists and Chinese officialdom. Neither has one ever heard of Maoists either being assisted in any way or being offered sanctuary or safe haven by China.

With the security situation extremely fluid, external forces' interest and activities opaque, or dubious, it is impossible to say what's next. The political gridlock gripping the nation since King Gyanendra's intervention of October 4, 2002 has further complicated matters. Some argue it has hindered the search for a peaceful solution to Nepal's serious political-cum-security problems; others are equally convinced it will help. Only the future will tell if Nepal will survive as an independent nation state.

(Mr Josse is Consultant Editor, The People's Review, Kathmandu, former editor-in-chief of The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu and Deputy Permanent Representative of Nepal to the United Nations, 1985-1990.)

References
1. Title of Leo E. Rose's much-quoted book, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970).
2. Promode Shumshere Rana, Rana Nepal - An Insider's View (Kathmandu: Sahayodi Press, 1978), pp. 1-2.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. I.R. Aryal and T.P. Dhungyal, A New History of Nepal (Kathmandu: Voice of Nepal publication, 1970), p. 123.
6. Ibid, Op. cit. p. 126.
7. Quoted by Rishikesh Shaha from Yogi Narahari Nath and Babu Ram Acharya (eds.), 'Rastrapita Shri Panch Bada Maharaj Prithivinarayan Shah ko Divyopadesh', in Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect (Oxford University Press, 1978) p. 104.
8. Op. cit, p. 104.
9. Op. cit, p. 102.
10. Harold James & Denis Sheil-Small, The Gurkhas, (London: Macdonald, 1965), p. 17.
11. Sushila Tyagi, Indo Nepalese Relations, (Delhi: D.K. Publishing House, 1974), pp. 80-1.
12. J.N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Pincus Books, 1998), p. 26.
13. Rishikesh Shaha, Op. cit. p. 107.
14. Ibid, Op. cit. p. 61.
15. Shelton Kodikara, Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia, (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1984), p. 17.
16. Leo E. Rose, Op. cit. p. 192.
17. Jaswant Singh, Defending India, (Chennai: Macmillian India Ltd, 1999), p. 54.
18. Sita Shrestha, Nepal and the United Nations, (New Delhi: Sindhu Publications Ltd., 1974), p. 19.
19. From personal knowledge, having served as Nepal's Alternative Representative to the UN Security Council, 1988-1989. Nepal has also served on UNSC in 1969-1970.
20. Proclamations, Speeches and Messages, vol. II (Department of Publicity, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, HMG/Nepal, 1967), pp. 38-9.
21. M.R. Josse, 'Nepal-Pakistan Relations: A Brief Review', Institute of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu in Policy Study Series 3, 2003.
22. Ibid, Op. cit. p.80.
23. Nari Rustomji, Sikkim: A Himalayan Tragedy (Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., India, 1987), pp.156-7.
24. M. D. Dharmadasani 'South Asia: Stability and Regional Cooperation, Nepal's Proposal for a Zone of Peace', Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, Chandigarh, India, 1983, p. 87.
25. His Majesty King Birendra Speaks on Foreign Policy, HMG, Ministry of Communications, Department of Information, 1980, pp. 3-4.
26. Ibid. Op. cit. p. 4.
27. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Kochanek, India: Government & Politics in a Developing Nation, fifth edition (Harcourt Brace College Publishers, U.S., 1993), p. 407.
28. M.R. Josse, Op. cit. p. 98.
29. Hardgrave Jr and Stanley A. Kochanek, Op. cit. 407.
30. Ram Kumar Dahal, 'Review of Nepal-India Relations: Issues and Challenges, 1950-1999', Institute of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu, Policy Study Series, November 2000.
31. Rishikesh Shaha, Op. cit. p.118.
32. Xinhua news agency, October 6, 1962.
33. M.R. Josse, Nepalese Foreign Policy: A Critical Review, Op. cit. p.15.
34. The Kathmandu Post, January 30, 2003.
35. The Kathmandu Post, October 30, 2003.
36. The Kathmandu Post, (May 2, 2003).
37. American Embassy statement, November 1, 2003.
38. The Rising Nepal, (May 7, 2003).
39. Personal interview, November 17, 2003, on condition of anonymity.
40. Dhruba Hari Adhikary, Asia Times, Bangkok, (November 15, 2003).