Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and the separatist war it gave rise to can be described as the country's most intractable and destructive problem. The war that steadily escalated between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is generally counted as having started in 1983. It caused around 65,000 deaths over the past two decades and major damage to personal and public property with the total loss from 1993-98 estimated at 1.27 times the GDP as at 1998.¹ A total of some one million people have been uprooted and displaced internally as a result at some time or the other with another half million leaving the country to claim refugee status abroad.

Ironically, Sri Lanka has had a relatively long tradition of modern democracy, stretching back to the British colonial period. The country was one of the first countries in the world to enjoy universal suffrage in 1931. But the inability of the political elite belonging to the different ethnic communities to share power equitably among themselves led to a series of broken agreements and to acute mistrust between the communities. The difficulty of protecting minority interests in a parliamentary system in which majority-minority relations are strained is exemplified by Sri Lanka's modern political history.

The difficulty of a negotiated peace has been compounded by the inability of the political elite representing the country's distinct ethnic communities to agree on a power-sharing formula over the past five decades. In Sri Lanka the democratic principle of one person-one vote has led to the domination of the numerically smaller Tamil population by the numerically much larger Sinhalese. But while the Sinhalese are a majority in the country taken as a whole, the Tamils are a majority in the northern and eastern parts of the country. If Sri Lanka had been provided with a federal constitution at the time of independence from the British, the Sinhalese and Tamil leaders might have been able to politically bargain with each other from their power bases at the centre and region, respectively. Instead, Sri Lanka was provided with a unitary form of government that vested all power at the centre and, therefore, in the hands of the Sinhalese.

In February 2002, following a general election that saw a change of government, the Sri Lankan government and LTTE signed a cease-fire agreement under Norwegian government auspices that appears to offer the real prospect of a final end to violence as a means of conflict resolution. The question is whether a lasting negotiated peace settlement is possible in Sri Lanka. On the one hand, the LTTE's highly military nature, a fragmented Sinhalese polity and economic vested interests put roadblocks on the path to political reforms and compromise. On the other hand, a general war-weariness among the general population, economic debilitation and the threat of the U.S.-led war against terrorism puts pressure on the conflicting parties to compromise and resolve their disputes through political negotiations.

Tracing Origins
Sri Lanka has a plural society of several different ethnic communities numbering 18 million. The Sinhalese form the main ethnic group with 74 percent of the population. The majority of the Sinhalese are Buddhists by religion and are mainly concentrated in the south, west and central parts of the country. The Sri Lanka Tamils with 12 percent of the population form the next major ethnic group. They are a majority in the north-east of the country. The Muslims form the third major group with eight percent of the population with concentration in the east. The Up-country Tamils, of recent Indian origins, form the fourth major community with about five percent of the population. They live in the central hills of the country and have not been involved in the separatist conflict. Most of the Tamils are Hindu by religion. While a minority of both Sinhalese and Tamils, comprising about seven percent, are Christian by religion, they are not considered to be a separate group.

The population census of 2001 carried out after an interval of 20 years was not conducted in much of the North-East province, which is a contested territory and claimed by Tamil nationalists as their 'traditional Tamil homeland.' However, estimates indicate that the Sri Lanka Tamil population has dropped to a little under 11 percent of the population in the intervening period.² Among the salient points brought out by the census is the intermingling of the Sri Lankan population with Colombo, the main city located in the south-west of the country registering a Sinhalese population of only 41 percent, with a majority of them from Tamil-speaking communities.

In tracing the history of the ethnic conflict there are two major considerations; first, that the ethnic conflict is essentially a 20th century phenomenon having its origins in rival elite competition. While the conflict cannot be fully understood in isolation from events that span over two millenia, the memory of these events is but a contributory factor and not the cause of the conflict. The fear of the Sinhalese of absorption by Tamil culture is one that has historical memory. As one of Sri Lanka's leading historians, K. M. de Silva observes, 'There is the Sinhalese sense of historical destiny, of a small and embattled people who have preserved Theravada Buddhism when it was obliterated in India under a Hindu revivalist tide, and whose language despite its roots in classical Indian languages, is uniquely Sri Lankan. Linked to this is their perception of the Tamils as a traditional 'national' enemy against whom they have fought at various times over two thousand years of a common history'.³

The challenge to Sri Lanka today is to find a suitable structure of governance in which two or more groups of people can co-exist, cooperate and be partners within a single state without the members of one group being able to unilaterally impose their wishes on the members of the other groups. Sri Lanka's experience with the Westminster system of government is that it has enabled an ethnic majority to monopolise power in a unitary framework and rule over the ethnic minorities. There is a compelling need for a decentralised and plural polity to replace the prevailing constitutional structure. Apart from addressing the grievances of the ethnic minorities, the rise of regional centres of power is likely to change the nature of elections. A genuine sharing of power away from the centre, distributed among the regional and ethnic communities, is the best recipe for a reduction in the level of political violence in society.

In 1963, having observed the experience of the independent country in its first 15 years, the architect of the country's first post-independence constitution, Lord Soulbury, wrote an introduction to B.H. Farmer's book prophetically titled 'Ceylon: A nation divided', in which he began, 'A Commission of which I had the honour to be the Chairman, was appointed by the British government in 1944, to examine and discuss proposals for the constitutional reform of Ceylon.' Lord Soulbury went on to say, 'Needless to say (,) the consequences have been a bitter disappointment to myself and my fellow Commissioners. While the Commission was in Ceylon, the speeches of certain Sinhalese politicians calling for the solidarity of the Sinhalese and threatening the suppression of the Tamils emphasised the need for constitutional safeguards on behalf of the minorities, despite the confidence felt by the Commissioners in Mr D.S. Senanayake and any government under his control.'⁴

In Sri Lanka, the centralised state bequeathed to the newly independent country in 1948 effectively transferred political power into the hands of the Sinhalese majority. This power was immediately used to restrict the membership of the polity by denying citizenship rights to the 'Indian Tamil' or Up-country Tamil population and by seeking to correct 'historical wrong' done to the majority. This followed a pattern in which the politicisation of ethnicity has occurred in contemporary plural societies and the claims to group entitlements in current mass politics provide the initial basis for collective identity, mobilisation and action.

The skewed distribution of political power in parliament also led to economic disparities emerging between the Sinhalese and Tamil-majority parts of the country. While social welfare benefits such as health and education were relatively equitably distributed throughout the country, the same did not hold true for large scale economic investments. With few exceptions, these prized projects which provided opportunities for political patronage and development, were located in the Sinhalese majority parts of the country. Ruling party politicians engaged in tussles to obtain these projects for their own electorates. As the Tamils from the north were rarely represented in the higher rungs of the government, their case went by default. The situation of deprivation of the Tamil majority areas has continued and escalated due to the war situation that has been prevailing over the past 18 years. A recent study has shown that the output of the north-east is a mere 60 percent of what it used to be in 1983, when the war commenced.⁵

Several serious efforts made by government leaders to work out a solution with the Tamil political leadership failed due to the inability of the government leadership to obtain the backing of their own party, let alone of the opposition. The most outstanding instance was the agreement reached in 1957 between the Prime Minister at that time, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the leader of the largest Tamil party. The Prime Minister unilaterally abrogated the agreement when it proved generally unpopular in the country. Buddhist monks even demonstrated in numbers against the agreement which gave autonomy to the Tamil areas. A similar agreement arrived at in 1965 by Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake suffered the same fate, but this time due to strong internal divisions within the ruling party itself. The salient feature of both these agreements was to provide a degree of autonomy to the northern and eastern provinces and to permit them to merge or work together if they so desired. The issue of self-rule, regional autonomy and merger of the two provinces remain the key issues dividing Sinhalese and Tamil sentiment to this day.

The Rise of LTTE
The frustrations and repeated political failure of the democratic and mainstream Tamil political parties to redress Tamil grievances led in the 1970s to demands for a separate Tamil state, articulated by the Tamil political parties themselves. This was followed by armed resistance and ultimately civil war. In 1972 the Tamil political parties joined to form the Tamil United Front and threatened to take 'non-violent direct action against the government... in order to win the rights of the Tamil nation on the basis of the right to self-determination' if the government failed to amend the constitution to take their aspirations into account. The first political assassination took place in 1975 with the assassination of the Mayor of Jaffna Alfred Duraiappah, a government supporter. The leaders of the Tamil political parties refrained from explicitly condemning the use of violence. As a result they permitted the steady erosion of the norms of democracy, and intolerance of any deviation from the nationalist line. The rise of militant Tamil nationalism can be traced back to this period.

In 1976, the Tamil United Front was renamed the 'Tamil United Liberation Front'. At its first national convention held in Vaddukoddai, it resolved 'that the restoration and reconstitution of the free and sovereign secular socialist state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent to every nation has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation in this country.'⁶ Thus, the uncompromising stand for an independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam has its democratic antecedents. The hard-line Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the main armed movement among the Tamils, gradually establishing its control over most of the Jaffna peninsula.

Rohan Gunaratne has summarised one view of the LTTE: 'Elements of the LTTE mindset are: its claim to the be the sole representative of the Tamils; intolerance of dissent within the Tamil community; liquidating the alternative Tamil leadership; massacring non-Tamil civilians; reneging on three peace agendas/undertakings; and the inability to compromise on [its leader] Prabakaran's avowed goal of Tamil Eelam.'⁷ A contrary view has been presented by S.J. Emmanuel: 'The government failed to recognise the political face of the LTTE and talked to them only as a militant if not terrorist group. This was a misapprehension. The government will do well, even concurrent to the understanding of a militant leadership, to clearly recognise not only the peace aspirations of the Tamil people, but also that of their de facto leadership.'⁸

Obstacles to Peace
Despite the progress in the peace process since the election of a new government in December 2001, there remain concerns about the sustainability of the peace process. Sections of the opposition are vigorously opposing the cease-fire agreement on various grounds as being unconstitutional, a 'sell-out' and as paving the ground for a renewed LTTE military campaign for separation. Spearheading the opposition to the cease-fire agreement is the JVP (People's Liberation Front), a Marxist-oriented political party that attempted to violently overthrow the government in 1971 and again in 1988-89. On both occasions, the JVP was militarily suppressed at the cost of tens of thousands of lives, estimated at around 15,000 and 30,000, respectively. The JVP's position draws upon a perception shared by many Sinhalese that the devolution of power is a means of dividing the country along ethnic lines. The fear of the division of the country in the minds of a sizeable proportion of the Sinhalese constitutes a major obstacle to a negotiated settlement with the LTTE. Clearly, the preferred option of this section of the population is a military solution that would eliminate the LTTE and, thereby, end the threat to the country's unity.

A second obstacle is the continued rivalry between the government and opposition parties in the Sri Lankan political mainstream, in which the ethnic conflict becomes yet another means of one side embarrassing the other for narrow political gain. Godfrey Goonatilleke has written: 'A clear lesson emerging from past failures is that no effort at resolving the conflict will succeed unless there is a broad-based consensus within each community, Sinhala and Tamil, around a solution that is perceived by both as equitable. The internal power struggles within both the communities - Sinhala and Tamil - have continuously thwarted such a process of consensus building. The negotiations took place in a changing configuration of political power with the constant prospect of changes of government, in which the ethnic issue was perceived as being a crucial factor. The history of negotiations up to 1990 shows that each of the two major Sinhala-dominated political parties, SLFP and UNP, have endeavoured to reach a political settlement when they have been in power and have opposed or thwarted a settlement when in opposition. The party in power then opts for an easy way out of the dilemma by withdrawing its proposal. It justifies its action on the ground that they cannot obtain the support of the people.'⁹

Gunatilleke continues, 'The other feature in the Sinhala-Tamil relations was the incapacity or unwillingness of the Sinhala leadership to resist the well organised, highly vocal pressure groups within their own constituency. This became a recurring characteristic of Sinhala-Tamil negotiations.'¹⁰ As for Bandaranaike himself, his 'convictions were not deep enough to oppose the Sinhala leaders who would not concede that the Tamils had genuine grievances or that their aspirations for a share of power were reasonable. Above all, the Tamil issue seemed to be at the periphery of the political agenda, and largely for demographic reasons the dissatisfaction of the Tamils seemed manageable. What pre-occupied Bandaranaike and other Sinhala leaders was the socio-economic socialist agenda and its impact upon the population as a whole.'¹¹

Since many years, community leaders and political analysts have been calling for a consensus between the two major political parties for a solution to the long drawn out ethnic conflict. But in doing so, they may have glossed over the political realities that have kept the two dominant parties apart on the issue. The hard fact is that the Sinhalese community, which by far forms the largest segment of the electorate, is still more or less evenly divided on the question of political reforms that could lead to a political settlement of the ethnic conflict.

While it has long been believed that at various levels the defence establishment has been a beneficiary of the ethnic conflict and the associated war, it is noticeable that these vested interests have not been able to pose any sort of open challenge to the present cease-fire agreement. The military appears to be cooperating with the government in the cease-fire at the present time, suggesting that the strength of the military's vested interest in the continuation of the war has been over-estimated. Certainly the conditions of war have permitted rent-seeking behaviour at all levels of the military, such as at checkpoints where an unofficial tax can be extracted from traders and civilians. Massive military procurements have led to allegations of 'commissions' determining the nature of such purposes. The manner in which the military has been cooperating with the new government in the cease-fire also suggests that the military is unable to resist a political leadership that is determined to engage in non-violent conflict resolution.

A further obstacle to a peace settlement would be the difficulty that the LTTE is likely to encounter in adjusting to a non-military lifestyle in conformity with democratic practices. Since its inception in the early 1970s, the LTTE has been a highly centralised and militarised organisation without an effective political wing. At present, due to the Norwegian-facilitated peace process, an LTTE political wing appears to be emerging, but unlike the Sinn Fein- IRA arrangement in Northern Ireland, the LTTE's political wing is completely under the domination of the military leadership and the LTTE's undisputed leader Velupillai Prabakaran. Further, the LTTE leader has an Indian arrest warrant against him due the Indian judiciary's finding that the LTTE was responsible for the assassination of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. These circumstances will make it more difficult for the LTTE to enter mainstream civil and political life.

International Mediation
A major breakthrough in the peace process occurred when President Chandrika Kumaratunga invited the government of Norway in February, 2000 to act as a third party intermediary with the LTTE. Prior to this invitation, few Sri Lankan politicians were prepared to publicly admit the need for foreign assistance in resolving the conflict. The Norwegian intervention in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict would count as the most significant event bearing upon a negotiated settlement over a decade. The last such external intervention was the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord which ended in 1990 with the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. However, much more than that ill-fated accord which the Sri Lankans saw as an Indian imposition, the Norwegian initiative appeared to be an expression of the government and LTTE's willingness to have the Norwegians play the role of intermediary.

However, another breakthrough that has taken place is the setting up of the parameters within which a negotiated political solution must take place. Ever since the TULF won its parliamentary mandate for a separate state at the general election of 1977, the question of an independent Tamil state has been a question mark over the negotiation process. At the Thimpu talks of 1985, the four principles enunciated by the Tamil parties were seen in the light of a separate state. At that time they were, and today they continue to be, rejected by the government and mainstream Sinhalese-dominated political parties in the country.

Soon after the Norwegian facilitators entered the picture they set the broad parameters within which a political settlement would have to be negotiated. The Norwegians stated that their facilitation was contingent on the two parties accepting a common framework of a united Sri Lanka in which Tamil aspirations would be substantially met. In their meeting with the LTTE, the Norwegian delegation took a decisive step in setting the parameters of a negotiated political solution. Aspirations are liable to be limitless, whether of individuals or communities of people. But the framework of a united Sri Lanka sets the limit on Tamil aspirations. The Norwegians have taken a risk in being so clear about their position. Of course, they have also made it clear that the position they have put forward is not theirs alone. It is the common position of the international community. Soon after the Norwegian foray into the Wanni jungles, and meeting with the LTTE leadership, the European Union issued a statement backing the Norwegian peace initiative.

The speech delivered by the U.S. Ambassador Ashley Wills in Jaffna in March, 2001 was an indication that the ethnic conflict was no longer the exclusive preserve of the Sri Lankans themselves, as it was in the first three decades after independence. Nor is India the only foreign country overtly interested, as was the case in the 1970s and 80s. The U.S. ambassador's speech was clearly meant to have maximal impact.¹²

Among the main points Mr Wills made were the following: 'We reject the idea of an independent Tamil state carved out of Sri Lankan territory; we regard the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and do not believe it is the sole representative of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka; we are also for Tamil rights; the Tamil people must be treated equally, respectfully and with dignity within a democratic Sri Lankan state whose exact political form should be determined by the people of this country; we do not believe Sri Lanka, or any part of it, is the special preserve of any one ethnic group; indeed, we regard Sri Lanka as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-cultural state.'

This U.S. statement of principles appears to narrow the parameters within which a solution to the ethnic conflict can be negotiated in a manner acceptable to the international community. It is significant that setting the framework for peace talks between the government and LTTE seems to be the job taken on by the international community and not by the Sri Lankan parties themselves.
Sinhalese nationalists have openly challenged the Norwegians, in particular, and western peace makers, in general. The Marxist-inspired JVP has been harshly critical of the Norwegian peace initiative. The extremist Sihala Urumaya has demonstrated in front of the Norwegian embassy and burnt effigies of their negotiators. The core concern of these protests is that the Norwegians are pro-LTTE and part of a Christian conspiracy. But it is not only the Sinhalese nationalists who have found the Norwegian peace initiative to be objectionable. Tamil nationalists too have been unhappy, though they have been less open in expressing themselves.

The events of September 11, 2001 have had serious implications for the LTTE's international operations. Shortly thereafter, the Canadian and Australian governments, which are host to large numbers of Tamil expatriate populations which contribute to LTTE coffers, categorised the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. They, thereby, lengthened the list of major international powers that had banned the LTTE. These international bans have been a source of grave concern to the LTTE as they imply a reduction in its international fund raising ability. Rohan Gunaratne has assessed that the Tamil diaspora as forming the economic backbone of the LTTE by providing as much as 60 percent of its procurement budget. The Tamil diaspora generates income for the LTTE through both legal and illegal economic activities including human smuggling, transfer of funds, shipping and shops. The various international bans imposed on the LTTE potentially threaten these income generating activities.¹³

The pressure caused by the unfavourable global climate would, undoubtedly, have a more severe impact on the LTTE than it would on the government. The LTTE, as a non-state actor that engages in political violence, is particularly likely to be seen as a terrorist organisation that has links with other such organisations. However, the declaration in September 13, 2001, by a spokesman of the U.S. embassy in Sri Lanka that the government should pursue a negotiated solution with the LTTE, makes the point that the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict needs to be resolved politically. Therefore, at this time the LTTE cannot afford to be seen as the intransigent party when it comes to peace talks.¹⁴

Way Forward
There has been a sea change in the attitude of people over the course of the twenty years of war, due to both war weariness and greater awareness of the issues underlying the ethnic conflict. The election of December, 2001 pitted the centre-left People's Alliance (PA) government and its Marxist ally, the People's Liberation Front (JVP) against the centre-right United National Front (UNF). Outwardly the general election in Sri Lanka was about the role of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in a future peace process that would end the 18-year ethnic war. The powerful government-controlled media made a secret deal between the main opposition party and the LTTE its centre-piece during the entirety of the election campaign period.

But underlying the rhetoric was the grim reality of an economy that had registered close to zero percent growth in 2001. In the same year, the economic growth was minus 1.3 percent. The economy was reeling from the impact of an LTTE suicide mission in July that year that had left half of Sri Lankan airlines in flames at the country's only international airport. The PA's alliance with the Marxist-oriented JVP did nothing to encourage investors. The clear mandate of the people at this election was for economic progress and peace with the LTTE which were the two foremost promises of the UNF in its election campaign. The electorate's rejection of the nationalist propaganda of the PA and the fear psychosis it was meant to create is a major encouragement for peace forces in the country.

During the run-up to the elections, the LTTE itself made its preference for the UNF clear. In his annual Heroes Day speech in late November, the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran indicated his willingness to come to a peaceful settlement. ¹⁵ He also called on the Sri Lankan voters to vote for the parties advocating peace and against those advocating war indirectly boosting the UNF's campaign. Some assessments of the LTTE leader's speech saw a willingness to drop the Tamil Eelam demand in exchange for a genuine peace process. The speech certainly had a large number of references to peace and a restarting of the peace process. However, there have been other assessments that remain sceptical of the LTTE leader's conditional words. The LTTE's peace thrust is indicative of its sensitivity to the intensified global clamp down on terrorism.

The new government's strategy is a complete shift from that of the previous government's, which was to simply confront the LTTE at every level. So far the government led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has been non-confrontational in its approach to its opponents, whether they be those in the former government or LTTE. The government's strategy appears to be based on an assessment of the former government's failure to succeed through confrontation. After the collapse of the peace talks with the LTTE at the very beginning of its term of office in April 1995, the former government declared a full scale war for peace. The two-pronged military and political strategy aimed to weaken and sideline the LTTE. However, both types of confrontation failed.

Initially, the retaking of Jaffna by the Sri Lanka Army through Operation Riviresa in November, 1995 seemed to indicate that the military strategy of full scale confrontation would succeed. But, thereafter, poorly executed military campaigns such as the two and a half year Operation Jayasikuru to retake the A9 main road to Jaffna, failed at a very high cost. Instead of being militarily weakened, the LTTE emerged militarily strengthened from these major confrontations. The former government's political prong against the LTTE in the form of the devolution package, which offered much hope in its initial manifestation of August 1995, could also not be sustained. The government fiercely confronted all political opponents of its devolution package, even incurring the curses of religious prelates upon it. But ultimately the governmentEs bid to transmute the devolution package into constitutional law proved unsuccessful. In a replay of partisan politics that have dogged all political efforts down the decades to end the ethnic conflict through negotiations, the opposition led by Ranil Wickremesinghe simply refused to cooperate.

It seems that the new government under Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has absorbed two important lessons from the former government's failure. The first is that head-on confrontation will not bring a solution to the ethnic conflict. Accordingly, political and structural reforms might have to be de facto rather than de jure, to be acquiesced to by the general population, with whom as little information as possible is shared. The alternative of explaining everything in detail to the people in order to get them to vote in favour of the settlement is likely to get into too much controversy. There is deep rooted resistance in the Sinhalese community to fundamental constitutional reform that would lead to power sharing across the ethnic and regional lines. Further, the LTTE thrives on confrontation by its astuteness in ensuring that the costs of any confrontational situation are piled onto the Tamil civilian population, creating in them alienation towards the government which is made to appear the source of the problem.

The second lesson evidently learnt by the new government is that all outstanding problems cannot be resolved in one go, but require a stage-by-stage approach. The two-pronged approach of the former government aimed at knock-out victories, such as the Jaffna victory and the devolution package. But even when the task was accomplished, as in the retaking and successful holding of Jaffna, the resilience of the LTTE ensured that the victory was incomplete. It is likely that even if the devolution package had been passed with the bipartisan support of the opposition, its implementation would have been impossible due to resistance by the LTTE. Having witnessed and contributed to the failure of the former government's confrontational strategy, the new government appears to have opted for a non-confrontational strategy, for the time being at least.

The building blocks of a negotiated solution would be the non-negotiables of the two sides. On the government side, it would be the unity and territorial integrity of the country. On the LTTE side it would be the Thimpu principles, which lay claim to the Tamils being a nation, with a homeland and the right of self-determination. The LTTE would also wish to keep their arms for the foreseeable future. The constitutional and political arrangements suggested by these determinants would be a variant of federalism and confederalism. Asymmetric federalism that provides the Tamil-dominated region more powers than other regions of the country was suggested by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe when he was leader of the opposition.

It is likely that the devolution of powers to the Tamil-dominated region would be more substantial in areas that have been contested ones, such as education, land, industry and security. Provision would also have to be made for the protection of the rights of the Tamil-speaking Muslim minority and Sinhalese in the north and east that will come under Tamil majority rule. Further, given the ethnic mix outside the north-east, and the large numbers of Tamils and Muslims outside the north and east, a mechanism to ensure power sharing at the centre and the rights of ethnic minorities countrywide would also need to be found.

Where questions of political power and constitutional reform are concerned, there is likely to be a high degree of contestation regarding the way forward to a mutually acceptable solution. There will undoubtedly be differences between the government, opposition and LTTE. These differences pertaining to issues of governance will be reflected among the people at large. A more democratic and consultative type of decision making will be required at this later stage than the new government appears to be contemplating. Civil society organisations need to be preparing the people for the restructuring of the polity in the longer term. The international community will have to play an important and effective role. The past experience with the LTTE has been one of disengagement once discussions reach substantive issues. This is on account of the wide gap between LTTE demands and what Sri Lankan governments have hitherto been prepared to offer. The success of the peace talks would depend largely on international pressure that would keep the government and LTTE at the negotiations table and compel them towards compromise.

Strengths
In the prevailing context of the cease-fire and peace talks between the government and LTTE, public support for the peace process has taken a sharp upward turn. Public opinion polls carried out in the period prior to the commencement of the Norwegian-facilitated peace process showed that no more than 40-45 percent of the population supported the idea of a negotiated political solution. But once the cease-fire came into effect, those supporting the peace process have begun to exceed 80 percent. The strong public support for the peace process and, in particular, the ongoing cease-fire is one of its greatest strengths.

Public support is also bolstered by the business community's stance on peace-related issues as it has the means of exerting considerable pressure on political parties. It is interesting that a year and a half after the signing of the cease-fire agreement even political parties that took up anti-ceasefire and pro-war positions such as the JVP, have begun to moderate their positions. This is due to the political pressures on them as they seek to achieve an alliance with the main opposition party, the People's Alliance. In addition, the PA, highly critical of the concessions made to the LTTE by the government on the grounds that the LTTE could not be trusted, has recently been reported to be making advances to the LTTE in secret talks.

These shifts in the respective stances of the major political parties to positions more favourable towards peace are reflective of the change in popular sentiment in that same direction. This pro-peace orientation is particularly strong within the ranks of the government. Governments in Sri Lanka, particularly coalition governments, have been vulnerable to internal chasms when initiating peace talks on the ethnic conflict. However, the present government shows no internal disagreement about the manner in which the peace process is being carried forward. The anti-peace forces have come to realise that their stances are not in consonance with the sentiments of the larger section of the population who are supportive of the peace process.

The positive attitude of the government to civic activism and international efforts in favour of the peace process is reflected in its willingness to coexist with parallel contributions from other actors. Many of the major international organisations, foreign governments, community based organisations and local NGOs have become part of the peace building exercise in Sri Lanka because of this open attitude of the government. Almost all governmental institutions involved in the peace process and surveyed, claimed that they work closely with non governmental organisations.

Of course a major strength of the peace process is the strong support being provided to it by the international community. This support is being manifested in a variety of ways. The international community has been issuing statements supporting the peace process at regular intervals and has got directly active in attempting to persuade the government and LTTE to recommence the peace talks that were suspended by the LTTE in April 2003. The envoys of several foreign governments even went to the Wanni to meet with the LTTE leadership an appeal for a more accommodating position on the resumption of peace talks.

In addition, foreign embassies and international organisations have increased their levels of funding and supply of resource persons for peace-related activities which has enabled NGOs in particular to expand their level of work. Impressive achievements have been made in research and policy level seminars that have been organised by local NGOs as a result. There has also been increased interaction between the international community and local NGOs involved in policy discussions and cutting edge research. As a result of these interactions, the international donor community has become more sensitive to the human rights dimensions of the peace process and willing to assert the need for human rights benchmarks which should guide their disbursement of economic aid.

But while international support for the peace process has been one of its greatest strengths, the strong support that the government has received from some international actors, most notably the United States and India, has generated a feeling in the LTTE that it is still at a disadvantage as far as the international community is concerned. The LTTE's suspicion that it is being cornered by the Sri Lankan government in concert with the international community is reflected in its assertion that there is a bid to pressurise it into agreeing to unacceptable terms and conditions. This concern has been reiterated several times by the LTTE and most recently, in the Heroes Day speech of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan in November, 2003.¹⁶

A suspicion by one side that it is losing its ground relative to the other party with which it is engaging in negotiations, can lead to destabilisation of the peace process. This has been the situation of the Sri Lankan peace process after the LTTE suspended peace talks for more than six months beginning in April, 2003. A prolonged situation in which there is no communication between two parties that have been in armed conflict with each other is fraught with danger. But on the positive side, there is little anxiety about an imminent breakdown of the cease- fire due to the repeated pledges made by LTTE leaders that their suspension of peace talks is in no way a withdrawal from the cease- fire agreement signed with the government in February, 2002.

On a more positive side is the dogged determination being shown by the Norwegian facilitators to break the deadlock in the peace process. With the international community watching keenly and playing an important role in Sri Lankan affairs, neither the government nor LTTE can pay the price in terms of international exposure in getting back to war or seek to impose their own conceptions of a just solution on the other. In other words, compromise is necessary. In signing the cease-fire agreement and coming into the peace process with foreign facilitation, both parties entered the complex world of politics which is about compromise and give and take.

Weaknesses
The measures adopted by the government at the outset of the cease-fire were taken with only a minimum of consultation with the other political parties, general population or with civil society. These included lifting the security barriers, ending the economic embargo of the north east and lifting the ban on the LTTE. The success of these measures, however, set a precedent where the government kept making decisions without either consulting or adequately informing the other stakeholders in society. In effect, therefore, they became passive bystanders in the peace process.

The absence of broad based consultations and the highly top down nature of the peace process was a primary reason for its rapid progress at the outset. However, this strategy had several negative results. One major weakness in the current peace process is the lack of a wide base of informed public discussion regarding the peace process. This has resulted in a limited output of creative ideas from the ranks of the country's intelligentsia and other socially active sectors. For instance, although the government and LTTE agreed to explore a federal solution, there has been little public discussion on this issue in either academic forums or the media. The limited representation of Muslim interests in most civil society discussions adds to the lacuna regarding appropriate representation and pluralism in the envisaged interim arrangements. A progressive and complex approach to peace building, more than the mere absence of war, has yet to make an impact on governmental bodies involved in the peace process.

The lack of adequate public participation in the peace process is further reflected in the slowing down of civil society activism in relation to the peace process. Although there is an increased amount of funding for peace work made available by the international donors, the capacity of civil society and NGO groups to absorb this has failed to increase at a proportionate pace. The involvement of the business community in actively supporting the peace process has also been declining over time.

A second weakness in the peace process is the exclusion of the opposition. This has led to politically motivated criticism of the peace process by the opposition, as it has no sense of ownership of the process. Apart from criticism, there is also no positive support from the opposition for the peace process. While this lack of opposition support did not prevent the government from taking bold decisions at the outset, now with more complex decisions that need to be made, the lack of opposition support in parliament has become a major problem.

The problem of lack of support from the parliamentary opposition is accentuated by the fact that the government does not have an integral element of governance under its control, namely the presidency. Since the president is from the main opposition party, attempts at working out a cohabitation agreement have failed. This makes it difficult for the government to take actions that require the president's consent as she is bound to refuse them. The possibility of the president dissolving parliament, or otherwise destabilising the government, adds to the difficulties of the peace process.

On November 3, 2003, the president took over three ministries of the government, including the defence ministry. This was done without consultation with the prime minister, in accordance with the constitutional power vested in her. The president's move plunged the country into a political crisis. But it was something that had been brewing and was expected by most political analysts. It is clearly important that a power sharing solution be arrived at between the president and prime minister.

A compromise between the government and president could be achieved on a three fold basis. First, it would be necessary for the government to find a face saving solution for the president. She would not wish to be seen as relinquishing the three ministries she took over. Therefore, it may be possible for her to keep the three ministries, but have three deputy ministers perform the day to day operations of the ministries. This was the case with the Ministry of Defence during the period of the last government. The deputy minister for defence was clearly in charge of defence. He stayed in that position, despite dismal results, without the president interfering.

The second basis for a negotiated settlement would be to accede to a request made by the president at the very commencement of the government's term of office that her nominee should be on the government's negotiating team. This is a fair request and would add to the representativeness of the government's negotiating team. If the Muslim community could demand that it have a representative at the peace talks, surely the main opposition party is entitled to have one too. It is a sign of the government's own unwillingness to recognise the basic principles of cohabitation that it disregarded this early request of the president in a most cavalier fashion.

The third basis for a negotiated settlement would be to find a direct role for the president as a democratically elected leader of the country who commenced the peace process with courageous leadership. It was during her period that it became uncontroversial to talk about an ethnic conflict rather than a terrorist problem. It was she who frontally confronted the critics of a federal type of political solution, proposed a semi-federal model and invited the Norwegians to be facilitators. The president deserves recognition both locally and internationally for the very positive role she once played. A new role for her, best suited to her strengths, but mindful of her weaknesses, needs to be found.

There is a need for urgency in the task of conflict resolution. Political stability must quickly be re-established for Sri Lanka to fulfil its economic promise and for the people to enjoy the peace dividend. The conflict between the president and government appears too much of an elite struggle for power at all costs. Instead of trying to defeat each other totally and escalating the conflict, Sri Lanka's political leaders need to negotiate with each other in the same way the government is negotiating with the LTTE. They also need to keep in mind that the mandate of the people at the last general election was for negotiated peace and not for a war for peace.

(Jehan Perera is the Media and Research Director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, a non-partisan civic organisation. He is also a political columnist for several Sri Lankan media publications.)

References
1. 'Cost of the War', National Peace Council, Colombo, 2001.
2. S. Kohobanwickrema, 'A lost referendum', Island (December 15, 2001).
3. K.M. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka, (Penguin, India 1998), p. 19.
4. B.H. Farmer, Ceylon: A nation divided, (Oxford University Press, 1963), p.ii.
5. National Peace Council, p. 28.
6. Gunatilleke, p. 21
7. Rohan Gunaratne, 'Impact of the Mobilised Tamil Diaspora on the Protracted Conflict in Sri Lanka', Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons, (London: International Alert, February, 1998), p. 303.
8. S.J. Emmanuel, 'Kumaratunga-Prabhakaran Talks: A Northern View' in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), p. 273.
9. Godfrey Gunatilleke, 'Negotiations for the Resolution of the Ethnic Conflict, Marga: Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation', No. 1, 2001, p. 51.
10. Gunatilleke, p. 11.
11. Gunatilleke, p.12.
12. Island, (March 8, 2001).
13. Rohan Gunaratne, p. 311.
14. Island, (September 14, 2001).
15. Daily Mirror, (November 28, 2001).
16. Daily Mirror, (November 28, 2003).