Communal
Relations The principles that keep individuals
together in a given community may be equally operative
in keeping the communities together within a state.
Conflicts among communities may arise at times with
far-reaching consequences, unless these are duly resolved.
Historically,
religion may be taken as the most readily identifiable
criterion for distinguishing communities and their
mutual relations in this country. This assumption
rests on the fact that religion played a crucial role
in moulding the Bengal socio-cultural systems and
sub-systems, rites and rituals, literature and philosophy.
Religion had also been the major source of guidance
for state control and governance. The very early history
of Bengal of course reveals the categorization of
people according to their ethnic and territorial traits.
During the course of the Aryanization of Bengal, long
before the Christian era, ethnicity was the main criterion
for identification of peoples. In the eyes of the
ruling Aryans the non-Aryan natives were braytya
jati or people with Prakrit culture, ranked
far below that of the Aryans. Similarly, in the eyes
of the subjugated prakrit
peoples the Aryans were a jati or community
having a different culture, Sanskrit culture. Though
the Aryans and the non-Aryans kept a distance from
each other for sometime, there is evidence that the
absorptive power of Prakrit culture was able to accommodate
Sanskrit culture with great profit. Through a gradual
process of assimilation the larger part of Bengal
society was Aryanized while maintaining the cultural
dominance of Prakrit, which not only survived the
Aryan offensive, but also led to the rise of many
living vernaculars including Bangla.
The
Aryanization process finally dissolved the original
ethnic jatis (Aryans and non-Aryans) into a
hierarchy of castes. Jati, nonetheless,
survived even after the Aryanization process was
completed. Every major caste had developed several
sub-castes within it on the basis of the attributed
superiority or inferiority of jatis. Territoriality
was never considered an important factor while castes
and jatis were ascribed to people, though it
is a fact that a particular area of Bengal was predominantly
inhabited by a particular jati.
An
important element of the caste system of the social
organisation was that people belonging to a particular
caste did not rule out the legitimacy and importance
of other castes. Because caste mobility was becoming
extremely difficult, toleration of other castes and
religions turned out to be a practical necessity.
Buddhist Pala kings are seen to have employed, as
a mark of statesmanship, Brahmins as ministers and
local administrators on a large scale. The succeeding
Sena kings behaved the same way. Consequently, the
change of a political regime was seldom followed by
communal strife. Structurally, the community was more
pragmatic in rural areas. As caste isolation was not
practicable at village level where social production
took place, the people forged inter-community solidarity
by having a village god or goddess worshipped by all,
irrespective of caste and religion.
The
long interaction and mutual influence of all the cultures
flowing from the Prakrita, Aryans, Brahmanic, Buddhists
and Jainas under various regimes had established a
great tradition of inter-religious and inter-caste
syncretism under which peoples of all ethnic groups
or tribes of Bengal had been living together without
resorting to any serious conflicts, though kings were
engaged in frequent warfare. But such warfare aimed
at achieving territorial control, not to damage the
religio-cultural fabric. Even the Turko-Afghans came
as territorial conquerors rather than champions of
a faith. Scholars agree that Muslim proselytisation
in Bengal was the act of sufis and itinerant
preachers and not of rulers who, like their Pala and
Sena predecessors, took the local people in partnership
by accommodating them in administration and armies,
irrespective of religion or caste and who supported
the religious establishments of all communities by
land grants.
On
the eve of the establishment of Muslim rule, Bengal
was politically characterized by tiny kingdoms dotted
around the country. One of these kingdoms was called
Vangladesh. Two other states were called vanga
and vangala. Most scholars believe
that these were distinct states located in south and
southeast Bengal. There were other states in eastern
Bengal, such as, harikela (assumed to be in Sylhet),
samatata (Comilla area), Pattikera (Comilla-Noakhali),
and chandradvipa (Barisal area).
The kingdoms in western Bengal were Kajangal (southwest
Bengal), tamralipti (Midnapur), Suhmabhumi
(parts of Burdwan, Hugli and Howrah) and radha (West Bengal). Central Bengal was
the domain of the kings of karnasuvarna (Murshidabad area),
varendra (Rajshahi area), gauda (Murshidabad, Birbhum,
Maldah and Burdwan), and pundravardhana (Bogra, Dinajpur
and Rajshahi areas). It is assumed that quite a number
of these little kingdoms were ruled by the ethnic
peoples and ruled in a tribal style, while others
were ruled in a clannish manner, as kingship with
its expansionist attributes was yet to develop. Political
unification of Bengal was to come in phases under
the Turko-Afghan rulers in the 15th and 16th centuries,
specially under the Husain Shahi dynasty (1498-1538)
when almost all of Bengal came under a single independent
authority. Husain Shahi rulers also gave a political
name to the united kingdom, Shah-i-Bangalah, the
precursor of subsequent Suba-i-Bangalah and
still later Bengal.
It
is indeed remarkable that like many other politics
of the time, the political unification of Bengal was
not conjoined with a similar unification of religious
faith and cultures. The Turko-Afghan rulers were sagacious
enough not to impose their own faiths and rituals
on the conquered communities. Rather, the great tradition
of syncretism and assimilation of the previous regimes
was prudently maintained. The central government saw
to it that all the communities of the mulk/shahi
(state) lived harmoniously according to their own
beliefs and ways of life. The sultani administration
was established in partnership with the local communities
of all castes and creeds. All communities were allowed
to observe their own religions and practices without
any interference from others. Thus, as cultural systems,
Islam and Hinduism came in contact with each other
in an atmosphere of mutual toleration. Both the systems
are seen to have influenced each other, without any
noticeable conflict. Syncretism as a dynamic force,
operated to smooth away the critical differences between
the two religio-cultural systems and led, in consequence,
to a merger of beliefs and practices at folk level.
The Bhakti movement, and the Satyapir and Badr Pir
cults are the results of free interaction of the two
religions. Folk belief went to the extent of considering
the saints of Islam and Hinduism as the same figures
in different forms.
The
tradition of inter-communal syncretism and peaceful
co-existence continued, further strengthened, under
the Mughals. The Mughal polity absorbed the local
Hindu elite into its fold by sharing power and resources
with them. In keeping religious rites and rituals
and prejudices unaffected by political considerations,
the jobs and services of the suba (province)
were distributed more or less on communal lines. For
example, whereas the military and judiciary were mainly
kept in the hands of the Mughal military aristocracy,
the revenue administration, land control, civil service,
local administration and civil supply were mostly
reserved for Hindus.
The
country's trade and commerce were shared between the
local Hindu baniks, Moors, marwaris, Eurasians and the
maritime Europeans. That such an arrangement received
public consensus is attested by the fact that there
was seldom any serious communal antagonism under the
Mughals. However, there is evidence of occasional
Hindu-Muslim conflict, even of riots. The religious
processions passing mosques, temples and other sacred
sites on the occasions of durga puja and muharram, cow slaughtering,
loud music before mosques etc were the commonest causes
for triggering off communal tensions. But such tension
scarcely led to lingering communal discord and disturbances.
The state officials like Muhtasham, faujdar, kotwal, zamindar, amil, kanungo and qazi were under orders to maintain
social morale and discipline. The government made
the officials responsible for all crimes including
communal disturbances within their jurisdictions.
The
Bengal Muslims belonged predominantly to the sunni sect, but the ruling classes
belonged to the shi'ah sect. Shia-Sunni tensions have
also been noticed during the later Mughal period.
But such tension was the syndrome of the Muharram,
and invariably short-lived. There were also sectarian
differences among the Hindus. The rise of numerous
syncretist sects and sub-sects (vaisnavism alone had 28 sub-sects)
in Mughal times tended to undermine Brahmanical control.
In advocating and practicing sectarian viewpoints
the dissidents often encountered opposition from the
established sects. Again the state officials were
always very alert about the sectarian tensions and
saw to it that any sectarian difference did not escalate
into largescale communal unrest.
The
participation of the maritime Europeans and Eurasians
in the trade and commerce of Bengal from the mid 17th
century added a crucial new dimension to the communal
composition and relations. The establishment of European
trading settlements, and trading outposts in various
places of maritime Bengal by the Europeans and Eurasians
like the portuguese, French,
english, dutch, danes, greeks, armenians introduced new elements
in the Bengal society and economy. The European trading
towns like calcutta, chandannagar, Chuchura, serampore, hughli were growing on communal
lines.
Though
the Europeans and their native baniks and amlas
worked in perfect collaboration in hats, bazaars,
aurangs, dockyard and shipping offices, they preferred
to live away from each other. Every European town
in Bengal distinctly grew in two parts, white town
and black town. Physically and culturally the two
towns never met. From a communal point of view, such
segregation originally developed through consensus.
The socio-religious rites and rituals and caste rules
of the native elements of the town required them to
maintain a spatial distance from the 'Feringhees'
who were perceived by them as unclean. The Feringhees,
again, needed to keep a similar spatial distance for
reasons of their own styles of health and sanitation,
civic amenities, religious practices, food habits,
housing, transportation, entertainment etc. Language
too was, of course, an important consideration for
mutual segregation.
But
what was an acceptable arrangement of city settlement
in the 18th century became a racial affair in the
19th. Before, the Europeans used to take it as part
of their communal and personal obligation to participate
in the fairs and festivals organised by their collaborators
in the native part of the town. They were invited
to pujas and nautch (dance by baijees)
in which they participated enthusiastically. Within
the domestic front, almost all Europeans used to engage
native ayas and servants and many of them even
married native women. But social interaction between
whites and natives practically ceased in the 19th
century when the British, as a race, began to consider
themselves as superior in culture and civilization
to the Indians. Racial arrogance reached such a level
that the British began to think that it was their
sacred duty to 'civilize' the Indians. The Anglo-Indian
community grew in size significantly in the 19th century.
Besides the people in the state departments, (civil
service, police, judiciary, military, etc.) there
were Anglo-Indians in the railways, inland and overseas
navigation, plantation, industries, trade and commerce,
engineering works, education, missionaries, land control
and so on. Though internally there was social stratification
and hierarchy among the Anglo-Indian community, in
relation to the natives they formed a homogenous community
different from the natives as regards skin pigmentation,
income, lifestyle, general outlook, manners and habits.
Being always very conscious as rulers and being puffed
up with the idea of racial superiority, the Anglo-Indians
formed a distinct community with a segregationist
outlook.
The
all-white clubs, all-white railway and steamer saloons,
all-white shopping arcades, all-white associations
of sports and games, all-white theatre and the like
made the natives feel that communally the Anglo-Indians
were different from them in all respects. The natives
were pained to see that the Anglo-Indians made themselves
a separate category even in the eye of the law. Under
the Criminal Procedure Code, the native judges had
no jurisdiction over the members of the ruling race.
When the liberal Governor General lord ripon (1880-1884) tried
to eliminate this discrimination, the Anglo-Indian
community successfully put up a resistance. The Anglo-Indian
agitation against Ripon's reform proposal led to progressive
deterioration in the relationship between the rulers
and the ruled. The conflict took on the colour of
racialism.
The
wahabi Muslims and nationalist
Hindus united in opposition to the British. The resistance
to the ruling white race took many forms, peaceful
and violent. The reform movements in the Muslim and
Hindu communities in the 19th century were indirectly
a peaceful method of responding to the moves of the
Christian missionaries. The swadeshi movement, terrorist
movement, non-cooperation movement and
finally the quit india movement were more
assertive political responses to the arrogance of
the ruling white race.
British
rule based on racialism was not in agreement with
the tradition of assimilation and syncretism. But
ironically, the hatred generated against the racist
Europeans had over time contaminated the relations
between the Hindus and the Muslims. The age-old Hindu-Muslim
amity degenerated into communalism, conflicts and
clashes in the 20th century ultimately led to the
partition of bengal on communal
lines. The Bengal Muslims and Hindus looked at the
partition from two opposite poles. The introduction
of separate electorates under the India Act of 1909
was another major contributory factor behind the spread
of communalism.
The
most ineffaceable mark of Hindu-Muslim rift and confrontation
was a series of communal riots in different parts
of Bengal. Riots are explosions in socio-political
processes and are expressions of the unworkability
of the old relationship. Bengal history has known
momentary and short-lived riots in the past on the
occasions of Durga Puja, Muharram processions and
cow slaughtering, but organised and lingering widespread
communal riots with political slogans were a phenomena
of the twentieth century. From the early 1940s, communal
riots in Bengal increasingly assumed organised form.
This form found its fullest expression in the Calcutta
carnage of 1946. The great Calcutta killing made the
partition of Bengal in 1947 on communal lines inevitable.
It
led to a mass exodus of Hindus from East Bengal and
a similar exodus of Muslims from India. The Bangla
speaking muhajirs were quickly absorbed into
the social mainstream and identified themselves as
Bangalis. But the non-Bangali muhajirs, because
of their ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences,
appeared as a distinct social group. The distinctiveness
was made more glaring by the government policy of
having separate settlement zones for the non-Bangali
muhajirs as well as a priority quota, though
undeclared, for jobs and services for them. For their
own safety and welfare, the non-Bangali muhajirs
tried to organise themselves politically under the
banner of muhajirs. The non-Bangali muhajirs
were mostly skilled labourers and professionals and
naturally it was they who seemed to have seized the
opportunities created by the new state. Mills, factories
and shops were seen to be dominated by them. The host
community could not take the events generously. Soon
there was tension between the Bangalis and the non-Bangalis.
The social nucleus of the new community was formed
by the biharis who constituted the
majority among the muhajirs.
The
partition (1947) and the abolition of the zamindari
system in 1950 seemed to have had largely resolved
the Hindu-Muslim conflict. But isolated communal incidents
are still noticed in the 1950s particularly in areas
where there were muhajir concentrations. The
muhajirs who had lost or left their properties
in India felt it politically legitimate to grab the
Hindu properties here in East Bengal. But it is true
that organised rioting was there no more. By the 1960s
Hindu-Muslim and Bangali-muhajir relations
became normal, barring occasional tension which might
happen in any multi-communal state.
Communal
relations during the war of liberation and after,
acquired an explosive dimension. The Biharis as a
community openly sided with the Pakistani forces and
collaborated with Pakistani troops in their crimes
against humanity. Relations between the two communities
reached its lowest ebb. Apprehending reprisal at independence
in the hands of the oppressed people and the mukti bahini, most of the solvent
Biharis moved their families and wealth to Pakistan
and other places before the war ended. But most unfortunate
were those who could not move out before independence.
To save them from the fury of angry Bangalis, most
of the Biharis were huddled up in sheltered places
under the care of the International Red Cross. They
claimed themselves to be Pakistanis, but Pakistan
is yet to recognize them to be so. Hence, they are
still living in many camps located in various parts
of Bangladesh. It is true that many sneaked out of
these camps, and either integrated themselves with
the Bangalis or silently migrated to Pakistan or India
or elsewhere.
The
community question was not resolved by the War of
Liberation. Soon after Bangladesh came into being,
a new community problem emerged. Under the Pakistan
Constitutions of 1956 and 1962, the religious and
ethnic minorities were recognised as separate communities,
and they had been enjoying minority rights according
to International Laws and Conventions. But as the
Bangladesh War of Liberation was fought on the basis
of Bangali nationalism, and as secularism was adopted
as a state principle, the Bangladesh Constitution
of 1972 did not accord any separate status to any
religious or ethnic minorities.
The
constitutional provision making all people living
within the territory of Bangladesh constituting one
nation and styling all people irrespective of religion
and ethnicity 'Bangali' in nationality, was quickly
challenged by some ethnic minorities, particularly
the chakmas. They refused to be
identified as Bangalis. They asserted that the Chakmas
and other ethnic minorities within Bangladesh were
different communities, not Bangalis, though citizens
of Bangladesh. Their claim was based on their historic
relation with the central government in the past.
Historically, the Chakmas were enjoying autonomous
status ever since their region was conquered by the
Mughals. They alluded to the British Act of 1900 which
gave autonomy to the Chakmas and other tribes, and
to the Pakistan Constitution of 1962 which recognised
their minority status. The demands of the Chakma community
finally led to a protracted armed confrontation between
the government and the shanti bahini, the armed wing
of the parbatya chattagram jana-samhati samiti.
Many lives were lost on both sides ever since the
Shanit Bahini resorted to guerrilla operations. At
last a peace accord was signed under which the Shanti
Bahini laid down their arms and accepted peace under
terms and conditions acceptable to the hill people.
