India-Bangladesh Border Conflict
The Ganges River
Dispute
India-Bangladesh
Conflicts |
Origions
India
and Bangladesh share a 4096 km-long border. Of this,
180 kms lies along the river line. The delimitation
of the Indo-Bangladesh border is not complete as a
6.5km stretch near Comilla on the Tripura border is
yet to be demarcated. A dispute exists between the
two countries along various sections of the border.
Consequently, unprovoked firing along the border continues,
and escalates occasionally to draw the attention of
higher administrative levels.
Issues in contention:
The
major bone of contention is the adverse location of
enclaves. There are 111 Indian enclaves (locally known
as Chits) in Bangladesh territory covering 17,258.24
acres. And there are 51 Bangladesh enclaves in Indian
territory, measuring 7,083.72 acres. Of these disputed
enclaves, 65 are along the West Bengal-Bangladesh
border (35 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh territory
and 31 in reverse).
The border between Bangladesh and India is defined
along fixed lines. In some cases, they pass through
the middle of common rivers. It is a misconception
that if the river shifts, then the line separating
the two countries will also move, conforming to the
centerline of the common river. Thus, if the river
erodes on the Indian side, people living on the Bangladesh
side think that they have the right to occupy and
use the newly accreted land contiguous to Bangladesh.
In fact, this land belongs to India. Consequently,
conflicts break out between border communities living
on both sides of these shifting common rivers. Examples
of this type of dispute are found when the Ganges
river shifts its course in a random manner leading
to disputes about the newly formed island (locally
called a Char).
Similarly, a river eroding on the Bangladesh side
leaves a part of Bangladeshi land contiguous to India
and leads to a dispute. The Kusiyara river (a branch
of the Barak river in India) erosion case is an example
of this type of problem. Disputes of this nature include
Ichamati, Gumti, Feni, Muhuri rivers etc.
Another problem is that some areas on the Indian side,
when studied demographically, are revealed as actually
belonging to Bangladesh. For example there are same
football grounds along the border where one goalpost
is on the Indian side and the other on the Bangladesh
side.
The residents of the disputed enclaves suffer from
a serious identity problem. Neither country acknowledges
these residents as nationals nor do they bestow upon
them voting and other rights. These people are therefore
stateless.
History
The
problem of enclaves is a legacy of the dissipated
life styles of the rulers of two former princely states
– Cooch Behar in North Bengal and Rongpur in
South Bengal (present day Bangladesh). The Rajas of
the two princely states routinely staked pieces of
their estates over a game of cards, and thus came
to acquire pockets of land in each other’s territory.
The lands were pledged on a piece of paper known as
‘chits’ and hence, these lands are still
called ‘chits’. The ownership of these
enclaves devolved upon India and East Pakistan after
partition in 1947. Sir Cyril Radcliffe drew the dividing
line as the parties involved failed to arrive at any
agreed border. He was concerned with not disturbing
the ‘railway communications and river systems’
rather than the issue of enclaves.
This issue was not resolved till 1971, when East Pakistan
became Bangladesh, and inherited the problem. The
residents of these enclaves were initially free to
move to their respective mainland. But an increase
in tensions between India and Pakistan led to this
movement being restricted, and problems arising in
trade and transit. There has been no administration
in these enclaves for the last 50 years. Hence, no
police, no revenue, no taxation, and no government
services are available. Over the years, the Bengali
Muslims in the enclaves in India have migrated to
other parts of the state (West Bengal), and the Hindus
in the Indian enclaves inside Bangladesh have migrated
to India.
| Indira
Mujib Treaty of 1974 |
| The
Indira Mujib Treaty was signed between Indira
Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1974, to
ensure a comprehensive settlement of outstanding
border issues like Bangladeshi citizens’
access to an enclave through a corridor called
Tinbigha, transfer of enclaves, demarcation
of six and a half kilometers of land boundary
(mainly at Muhirchar), and sea and maritime
boundaries and ‘adverse possession’.
It has been agreed by both sides that no construction
can be done within 30 yards of the no man's
land or 150 yards from the zero line of the
boundary. |
India's
Perception:
India
believes that the porous border with Bangladesh has
an adverse impact on internal security. It became
more visible since the 1980s with growing foreign
support to insurgencies in north-eastern India. Easy
passage across the border has facilitated guerilla
tactics of the armed outfits which have their camps
in foreign territory. Of equal concern to the security
of the nation is the problem of massive influx of
illegal migrants. Even a cursory look at official
statistics reveals that India is facing the brunt
of the demographic explosion taking place in the world’s
most densely populated country – Bangladesh.
The impact in the north-east has already assumed alarming
proportions. The threat to internal security from
the unabated immigration can hardly be exaggerated.
Various districts have undergone considerable changes
in terms of demographic composition. Such shifts in
the local demographic balance poses an increased risk
of violent conflicts between communities, and its
probability is even higher in the north eastern region
where resources are scarce.
Bangladesh’s
Perception:
Bangladesh has been demanding a number of measures
from India to mitigate the border problem. They are:
• Ensure free movement of enclave people;
• Permit exchange of enclave people;
• Undertake necessary measures for demarcation
of the border line;
• Refrain from pushing Bengali speaking Indian
nationals into Bangladesh territory;
• Adopt methods to check violation of the border
by Indian civilians and BSF members;
• Ban smuggling of Phensidyl (an intoxicating
chemical) and drugs;
• India should ratify the Indira-Mujib
Agreement (1974) to facilitate the demarcation
of the remaining part of the border.
CURRENT
STATUS:
Indian and Bangladeshi border troops, known as Border
Security Force (BSF) and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) respectively,
have exchanged fire a number of times in the past.
Those incidents centred on Muhurichar Island further
to the south. Conflicting claims to ownership of this
river island provoked gunfire in 1975, 1979 and 1985.
However, the clashes that broke out in the April of
2001 were by far the most serious in the history of
Indian-Bangladeshi relations.
According to the Bangladesh government, ever since
Indian military intervention during the 1971 war with
Pakistan, Indian forces have occupied a small sliver
of land along the border near the village of Pyrdiwah.
On April 18 2001, BDR troops occupied the disputed
village. In the fighting that followed, 15 members
of India's BSF were killed, along with several of
the attacking soldiers. Indian forces responded and
retook the village. Between 10,000 and 20,000 villagers
living in the area fled the fighting, with at least
17 suffering wounds. The combat remained limited to
the border troops of the respective nations, though
mortars were used in addition to automatic weapons
fire. Several villages were destroyed or heavily damaged
in the fighting.
The
demarcation of the unmarked 6.5kms of the border has
been pending because of the concerns of the Hindu
population living in the lands likely to go to Bangladesh
after demarcation. Land will have to be found to resettle
them before the final demarcation. Since West Bengal,
Assam and Tripura (the three states having a common
border with Bangladesh) have no surplus land, this
is difficult to resolve the dispute to the satisfaction
of the parties concerned.
The Bangladeshi officials maintain that the absence
of ratification of the 1974 treaty by India is the
root cause of the disputes along the 4096 km-long
border between India and Bangladesh. While Bangladesh
claims that it is prepared to complete the demarcation
work, India has kept this dispute alive under various
pretexts. India has not ratified the agreement on
the plea that the demarcation of the border had not
yet been completed.
Origion
The Ganges River originates in People's Republic
of China, passing through Nepal and India, forms a
boundary of 128 km between India and Bangladesh, then
flows 112 km in Bangladesh taking the name Badhma,
before joining the Jamuna-Brahmaputra. Afterwards
it joins the Meghna River before the combined flows
empty into the Bay of Bengal.
For nearly a quarter century, the sluices of the barrage
at Farakka, close to the India-Bangladesh border,
have been one of South Asia's trickiest diplomatic
disputes.
The river divides into two main streams at Farakka,
one flowing southwards to the eastern Indian port
of Calcutta and the other eastward to Bangladesh.
The barrage aims to ensure enough water in the south
flowing tributary to keep one of India's main foreign
trade ports navigable during the dry pre-monsoon months.
Despite an agreement on sharing the dry season flows
at Farakka, India and Bangladesh continue to squabble
over what many consider to be the region's richest
natural resource.
The surrounding countryside is covered with lush green
paddy farms and water bodies teeming with fish. The
Ganges and its Himalayan tributaries have blessed
the plains of north India and Bangladesh with farm
abundance, giving huge profits to landlords, agribusiness
corporations and major food exporters.
This is why years of diplomatic negotiations and various
accords on sharing the river water have failed to
fully satisfy Bangladesh where the Farakka barrage
fires political passions.
The dispute centres on differing views about the negative
effect of the barrage on farming, fisheries and industry
in Bangladesh and ways of boosting the lean season
flow of the Ganges at Farakka.
Farakka typifies the deepening water crisis in South
Asia which can worsen hunger and cause widespread
economic loss in the region unless riparian governments
show greater maturity in tackling differences over
water sharing, say experts.
History
| Timeline |
29
Oct 1951 |
Pakistan
first calls Indian attention to reports of
Indian plans to build a barrage at Farakka
to divert Ganges water to Calcutta Bay. India
responds that the project was only under preliminary
investigation. |
28
June 1960 |
Meetings
commence at level of "expert" between Pakistan
and India to exchange data on regional projects. |
1960-1968 |
Experts
level meetings continue; there are five in
all, most focusing on data issues. |
30
Jan 1961 |
India
informs Pakistan that construction had begun
on the Farakka Barrage. |
1968-1970 |
Five
meetings continue at the level of secretary.
Fundamental disagreements over approaches
to Ganges development and the data required
to make policy decisions. |
1970 |
India
completes construction of Farakka Barrage. |
1971 |
Bangladesh
comes into being, replacing eastern Pakistan. |
Mar
1972 |
India
and Bangladesh establish Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Rivers Commission, specifically excluding
issues of Ganges development. |
16
May 1974 |
Prime
ministers of India and Bangladesh sign a declaration
agreeing to find a mutually acceptable solution
to Ganges development, and to turn the question
of the best way of supplementing Ganges flow
over to the Joint Rivers Commission. |
16
Apr 1975 |
The
two sides agree to a limited trial operation
of the Farakka Barrage. India continues to
divert Ganges water after the trial run, without
renewing or negotiating a new agreement with
Bangladesh. |
June
1975-June 1976 |
Meetings
continue, with little result. |
Jan
1976 |
Bangladesh
lodges a formal protest against India with
the United Nations, which adopts a consensus
statement encouraging the parties to meet
urgently, at the level of minister, to arrive
at a settlement. |
5
Nov 1977 |
Ganges
Waters Agreement signed, covering allocation
of Ganges water between the two riparians
for a period of five years. No long-term solution
was found within that time frame. |
Oct
1982 |
Joint
communiqué issued, pledging to resolve Ganges
issues within 18 months, a task not accomplished. |
22
Nov 1985 |
Memorandum
of understanding issued, on the sharing of
Ganges dry season flow through 1988. When
accord lapses, no new agreement is signed. |
Attempts at Conflict Management:
When India announced in 1951 that it planned to build
the Farakka Dam, Pakistan protested its construction.
Pakistan, at the same time, offered that the planning
of the utilization of the "shared resources"
be made by a UN body and that the subject matter be
examined by the experts of both countries. These proposals
were not accepted by India and the construction of
the Farakka Dam started in 1961 and was completed
in 1970. The matter of the allocation of the transboundary
waters was negotiated between India and Pakistan until
Bangladesh gained its independence in 1971.
By March 1972, the governments of India and Bangladesh
had agreed to establish the Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Rivers Commission, "to develop the waters of
the rivers common to the two countries on a cooperative
basis." The question of the Ganges, however,
was specifically excluded, and was to be handled only
between the two prime ministers.
The prime ministers of India and Bangladesh met in
New Delhi on 12-16 May 1974 and, in a declaration
on 16 May 1974, they:
• observed that during the periods of minimum
flow in the Ganges, there may not be enough water
for both an Indian diversion and Bangladeshi needs;
• agreed that during low flow months, the Ganges
would have to be augmented to meet the requirements
of the two countries;
• agreed that determining the optimum method
of augmenting Ganges flow should be turned over to
the Joint Rivers Commission;
• expressed their determination that a mutually
acceptable allocation of the water available during
the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges would be
determined before the Farakka project is commissioned.
In
a series of five Commission meetings between June
1974 and January 1975, and one minister-level meeting
in April 1975, the positions of the two sides coalesced
into the following:
Bangladesh
Position:
• There is adequate storage potential of monsoon
flow in the Ganges Basin for Indian needs;
• There is additional storage along the headwaters
of the Ganges tributaries in Nepal, and that country
might be approached for participation;
• A feeder canal from the Brahmaputra to the
Ganges is both unnecessary and would have detrimental
effects within Bangladesh, not least of which would
be massive population resettlement;
• Indian needs would be better met through amending
the pattern of diversion of Ganges water into the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly, and constructing a navigation
link from Calcutta to the sea via Sunderban.
India Position:
• Additional storage possibilities in India
are limited, and not sufficient to meet Indian development
needs;
• The most viable option both to supplement
the low flow of the Ganges, and for regional development,
is a link canal and storage facilities on the Brahmaputra,
to be developed in stages for mutual benefit;
• Approaching Nepal or other third countries
is beyond the scope of the Commission, as is discussing
amending the pattern of diversion into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly;
• Constructing a separate navigation canal is
not connected to the question of optimum development
of water resources in the region.
In January 1976, Bangladesh lodged a formal protest
against India with the General Assembly of the United
Nations which, on 26 November 1976, adopted a consensus
statement encouraging the parties to meet urgently
at the ministerial level for negotiations, "with
a view to arriving at a fair and expeditious settlement."
Spurred by international consensus, negotiations re-commenced
on 16 December 1976. At a 18 April 1977 meeting, an
understanding was reached on fundamental issues, which
culminated in the signing of the Ganges Waters Agreement
on 5 November 1977.
The
Ganges Water Agreement 1977:
In
principle, the Ganges Water Agreement covers:
1. Sharing the waters of the Ganges
at Farakka, and,
2. Finding a long term solution for
augmentation of the dry season flows of the Ganges.
Specific provisions, described as not establishing
any general principles of law or precedent, include
(paraphrased):
Art. I. The quantum of waters agreed
to be released would be at Farakka.
Art. II. The dry season availability
of the historical flows was established from the recorded
flows of the Ganges from 1948 to 1973 on the basis
of 75% availabilities. The shares of India and Bangladesh
of the Ganges flows at 10-day periods are fixed, the
shares in the last 10-day period of April (the leanest)
being 20,500 and 34,500 cusec respectively out of
55,000 cusec availability at that period. In order
to ensure Bangladesh's share in the event of any lower
availability at Farakka, Bangladesh's share should
not fall below 80% of the stated share in a particular
period shown in a schedule annexed to the agreement.
Art. III. Only minimum water would
be withdrawn between Farakka and the Bangladesh border.
Art. IV-VI. Provision was made for
a Joint Committee to supervise the sharing of water,
provide data to the two governments, and submit an
annual report.
Art. VII. Provisions were made for
the process of conflict resolution: The Joint Committee
would be responsible for examining any difficulty
arising out of the implementation of the arrangements
of the Agreement. Any dispute not resolved by the
Committee would be referred to a panel of an equal
number of Indian and Bangladeshi experts nominated
by the two governments. If the dispute is still not
resolved, it would be referred to the two Governments
which would, "meet urgently at the appropriate
level to resolve it by mutual discussion and failing
that by such other arrangements as they may mutually
agree upon."
Outcome:
By the end of the five year life of the agreement,
no solution had been worked out.
In the years that followed, both sides and, more recently,
Nepal, have had years of greater and less success
at reaching towards agreement. Since the 1977 accord:
•
A joint communiqué was issued in October 1982,
in which both sides agreed not to extend the 1977
agreement, but would rather initiate fresh attempts
to achieve a solution within 18 months -- a task not
accomplished.
• An Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding
was signed on 22 November 1985, on the sharing of
the Ganges dry season flow through 1988, and establishing
a Joint Committee of Experts to help resolve development
issues. India's proposals focused on linking the Brahmaputra
with the Ganges, while Bangladesh's centered on a
series of dams along the Ganges headwaters in Nepal.
• Although both the Joint Committee of Experts
and the Joint Rivers Commission met regularly throughout
1986, and although Nepal was approached for possible
cooperation, the work ended inconclusively.
• The prime ministers of Bangladesh and India
discussed the issue of river water-sharing on the
Ganges and other rivers in May, 1992, in New Delhi.
Each directed their ministers to renew their efforts
to achieve a long-term agreement on the Ganges, with
particular attention to low flows during the dry season.
Subsequent to that meeting, there has been one minister-level
and one secretary-level meeting, at which little progress
was reportedly made.
The Ganges River Treaty 1996:
The Ganges River Treaty has as its principal objective
the determination of the amount of water to be released
by India to Bangladesh at the Farraka Barrage for
a period of 30 years. It fills the gap left when the
1977 agreement lapsed and is based generally on the
1985 accord.
The
1996 treaty establishes a new formula for sharing
the Ganges waters at Farraka in the dry season (1
January to 31 May), providing also that below Farakka
the waters are not to be reduced further except for
"reasonable use" in a limited amount. The
new arrangement is as follows:
if
the Ganges flow at Farraka is 70,000 cubic feet per
second (cusecs) or less, both countries are to receive
50%; with a flow of between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs
Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs and India receives
the rest; with a flow of more than 75,000 cusecs or
more India receives 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh receives
the balance.
Further
provision is made for the situation where the flow
falls below 50,000 cusecs. The sharing arrangements
are to be reviewed every five years and if no agreement
can be reached on adjustments, India is to release
at least 90% of Bangladesh's share.
The
Bangladesh-India Treaty makes reference to a number
of guiding principles. It aims to make "optimum
utilisation" of the waters of the region, bringing
a "fair and just" solution to the Farraka
waters problem but without establishing "any
general principles of law or precedent". It provides
for application of the principles of "equity,
fair play and no harm to either party" to emergency
situations, future adjustments of the Treaty, and
the conclusion of agreements for other rivers.
Current Status
Under
a mammoth river-linking scheme, India plans to connect
37 rivers, including the Ganges and Brahmaputra, by
digging canals to divert major common river waters
to its drought-prone states. Bangladesh's Water Resources
ministry says the scheme will severely hit Bangladesh,
which depends on the two major rivers for 85 per cent
of its surface water supplies during the dry season.
For
a long time, Bangladesh has expressed a desire to
be involved in every phase of the inter-linking project,
so that it is not lumped with the consequences –
consequences that it claims will severely hit its
water-flow, environment and agriculture.
Marking
a significant breakthrough in relations between the
two countries, the Joint River Commission (JRC) talks
between India and Bangladesh were held in September
2003, whereby India agreed to involve its neighbour
in future discussions on the US $200 billion controversial
river-linking project.
The
ministerial-level meeting, held after a gap of three
years, also focused on Dhaka’s demand for a
breakthroughs in talks over water-sharing arrangements
on seven trans-boundary rivers in the region, along
the lines of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty signed
by the two countries in 1996.
India
said such treaties require expert-level investigations,
but it agreed to inform Bangladesh in advance about
the diversion of water flow of common rivers from northeastern
India to water-deficient areas in the southwest.
